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EDITORIALS AROUND THE COUNTRY

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ATLANTA CONSTITUTION  
25 MARCH 1980

## CIA, Congress Work Together

There are two extreme schools of thought about the CIA in this country. One holds that we should not have a CIA, that a secret intelligence gathering organization is inconsistent with a free society. That notion is baloney. We could not survive as a free society without adequate intelligence about both our allies and our adversaries.

The other school is equally nonsensical. It holds that the CIA should go about its business unfettered in as much secrecy as it wishes to cloak itself. That is indeed anathema to a free society.

The role of the CIA lies somewhere between these two conservative and liberal poles. Fifth District Rep. Wyche Fowler, a member of the House Intelligence Committee, is insisting on an effective intelligence committee, but also that his committee be notified ahead of time about any covert operations. The CIA is resisting Fowler's proposal, claiming that prior notification of congressional committees could result in leaks which would destroy certain covert missions even before they were initiated.

There is such danger. We also believe that too many congressional committees now have oversight responsibility in regard to the CIA. (More than 220 members of the Congress now have such responsibility.) CIA

oversight responsibility should be reduced to the 24 members of the House and Senate intelligence committees.

But we agree with Fowler. These committees should be notified prior to conducting any major covert activities. The executive branch does not unilaterally set foreign policy. It does so in conjunction with the Congress. Nor should it unilaterally carry out intelligence operations. Congress has a major role in how intelligence operations are conducted. (Intelligence committee members also have a responsibility to keep silent on CIA activities that could destroy that agency's effectiveness.)

The recent history of the CIA has not been happy. First the agency went too far, too fast. It made up its own foreign policy as it went along. Then the pendulum swung back so far that the agency was stripped of much of its ability to conduct valuable intelligence-gathering operations. Now the CIA and Congress are trying to draw a proper charter for the organization.

We believe that the CIA can again become effective without violating the principles of a free society if an adequate system of checks and balances is maintained and selected members of Congress are allowed to have prior notification of any significant covert actions by the CIA.

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH  
24 MARCH 1980

## Restoring a Balance

In seeking to correct an abuse in society, lawmakers sometimes go too far and thereby create new problems. A prime example of this in recent years has concerned the nation's intelligence-gathering agencies.

Perceived excesses by the FBI in combatting subversive or disrupting groups and questionable covert actions by the CIA abroad led Congress and recent administrations to place new restrictions on these agencies. The restrictions, in some instances, have posed a threat to national security.

Now, fortunately, there is a growing realization that a balance must be found between intelligence agencies' excesses, on the one hand; and, on the other, the crippling of these agencies to the detriment of the nation.

The Iran hostage crisis and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan were major factors in sparking a reassessment of the need for effective intelligence operations. Another was the disturbing discovery that allied nations have become reluctant to share intelligence information with us because of the fear that so many people both in and out of our government would have access to the secrets that they would no longer be secret.

One indication of the gratifying return of reason to this subject was the House Foreign Affairs Committee's recent action in voting to amend the law governing CIA covert operations in order to provide for much more secrecy.

Under a 1974 statute, passed at the height of the anti-CIA furor, that agency cannot undertake covert activities in foreign countries unless the president "reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees" of Congress. Eight committees are entitled to receive the reports. Imagine how long word of a major covert operation would be kept secret if members of eight

congressional committees were told about it!

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has now voted to cut to two the number of committees that would receive the reports. These would be the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

Furthermore, in a highly significant action, the committee voted to allow the president to withhold prior notification of a covert operation when he deems it "essential" to do so.

At the other side of the Capitol, Republican Sen. Al Simpson of Wyoming has introduced a measure, with the support of several other senators, to make it a criminal offense to deliberately reveal the identity of any undercover agent or informant participating in a federal law enforcement operation.

"During the past five years," he declares, "we have observed — with an almost morbid fascination — the near destruction and dismantling of American intelligence and counter-espionage capabilities. This has come about, in part, because of the inability of the Justice Department to successfully prosecute those individuals who intentionally disclose the identities of undercover CIA agents." He adds that the Afghanistan invasion finally has convinced people that in this dangerous world, America needs "a functioning CIA — and not a toothless tiger CIA."

Any legislation such as that proposed by Sen. Simpson should be drafted with great care to be certain that it would not be in conflict with First Amendment rights. But his bill and comments are in keeping with the new atmosphere in Washington concerning the dire need for effective espionage and counter-espionage activities. If this were a world consisting totally of nice, friendly neighbors, the only place for spies would be James Bond novels. Sadly, it's not that kind of a world.

ATLANTA JOURNAL  
24 MARCH 1980

## Going Too Far

THERE IS room for debate over whether the CIA should be required to notify Congress of undercover operations which amount to an act of war and which could lead to an international crisis if discovered — such as an attempt to overthrow a government or assassinate a leader.

The relevant questions are how many congressional committees should be informed, whether notice should be given in advance, and whether proper secrecy and security can be maintained. But until now this has been debated only with reference to direct political actions, not mere gathering of information.

Surely there should be no requirement that would restrict gathering of information as distinct from operations like supporting a revolution, plotting an assassination and so on. Intelligence gathering is a normal activity of most countries.

Yet Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) plans to introduce legislation to require notification of Congress in advance with respect to covert activities which aim only at obtaining information. He claims that even the latter type of activities can lead to an international crisis if exposed, "for example, in the case of the U-2 spy plane flights over Russia."

Aspin's own worst-case example, however, shows the weakness of his argument. Although the United States was embarrassed when the U-2 flights became public knowledge on the eve of a summit conference in 1960, it did not provoke a serious, sustained crisis. We have continued such flights in later years, and the Russians know it. And what was the alternative? Not to conduct the U-2 flights? If so, how would we have known about the Soviet missiles placed in Cuba in 1962?

All major powers engage in intelligence gathering, and all powers know that other powers are doing it. Intelligence gathering, as distinct from direct political action, must go on. If Aspin's proposal gets anywhere in Congress, we might as well dismantle the CIA and be prepared to let the Russians get away with murder, not to mention spying.

TRENTON TIMES (N.J.)  
17 March 1980

## They don't want to know

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has perfected its famous-monkey imitation:

See no evil. It would eliminate the law requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to inform it and five other congressional committees of covert activities. Only two committees would be entitled to such information in the future.

Hear no evil. If the president decided such secrecy was "essential," the CIA could withhold information from the remaining two committees virtually as long as it wishes.

Speak no evil. The committee learned that the CIA, on the basis of a Justice Department legal opinion, has not been carrying out the letter of the law requiring it to inform Congress of such activities. The Foreign Affairs Committee chose not to challenge the interpretation.

The committee is seeking to revise the reporting requirements of the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Act. The administration and the CIA are enthusiastic about such revisions. There is no evidence that any of the congressional committees receiving reports since the act went into effect have been the sources of leaks.

The proposed reform, under the heading of "hear no evil," would leave a president free to order the CIA to break into a psychiatrist's office or start a war and declare either activity one that it is

"essential" to keep from Congress. The proposed reform, in other words, restores the conditions that needed reform badly.

The Foreign Affairs Committee is only one of many in Congress that will have something to say about CIA reform, but its vote shows the way the wind is blowing. The House Armed Services Committee already unilaterally waived its right to information.

What the members don't seem to realize is that we elect them to make sure the CIA isn't wasting money on hare-brained schemes and to, if necessary, declare war, a power specifically reserved to Congress in the Constitution. Saying they don't want to hear about such things is a cop-out.

CINCINNATI ENQUIRER  
10 March 1980

# INTELLIGENCE

## Tipoff proposal could be fatal to CIA's work

THE PROPOSED requirement for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to inform certain members of Congress in advance of its covert operations strikes us as the best way to put the CIA — if not the country — out of business.

Yet members of the Senate Intelligence Committee were surprised when CIA Director Stansfield Turner testified the other day that his agency had not followed such a practice to the letter since 1977. The CIA had indeed undertaken operations without providing advance tipoffs.

The CIA is not questioning the patri-

tism of any member of the committee, of course. But members of Congress have had loose tongues on occasion. And the CIA, long hamstrung by the campaign against it, has had trouble enough doing its job.

At issue is the pending CIA charter, introduced by Sens. Walter D. Huddleston, D-Ky., and Charles McC. Mathias, R-Md., on which hearings will be held until April 1. The advance-notice requirement is one of its most controversial elements. "Requiring full and prior congressional access to intelligence information will have an inhibiting effect upon the willingness of individuals and organizations to co-operate with our country," Admiral Turner said in a clear statement of the obvious.

The Carter administration's opposition to that aspect of the proposed charter is strong — and should remain so.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
29 March 1980

# Justice Dept. Opposes CIA On Information Act Relief

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department has voiced its opposition to the CIA's effort to win a broad-scale exemption from the Freedom of Information Act.

In a speech here Thursday, Associate Attorney General John H. Shenefield called the proposal "vastly overbroad and . . . in stark contrast to the spirit and philosophy of the act."

He said the Justice Department will propose "much narrower" relief for the CIA as part of a comprehensive effort to streamline the act and overcome the complaints of various government agencies since Congress put teeth into the law in 1974.

The CIA has asked for a virtually blanket exemption for its operational and technical files on the grounds that the freedom of information law has "perhaps unfairly" become "a focal point for the often-heard allegation that the CIA cannot keep a secret."

The debate so far has been largely confined to the Senate and House Intelligence committees. Both are considering the CIA proposal as part of overall charter legislation for the U.S. intelligence community. Yesterday, however, another and potentially less sympathetic House committee said it intends to make its jurisdiction over the FOIA issue with additional hearings of its own next month.

Rep. Richardson Preyer (D-N.C.), chairman of the House Government Information subcommittee, said he plans to call public witnesses and spokesmen from the Defense Department. An aide noted that the Pentagon receives more freedom of information requests than any other government agency and has one of the best records of compliance with the law.

Preyer's subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over the freedom of information law, has been receiving a mounting number of objections to the CIA proposal from historians, journalists and others, aides said.

In a letter to Preyer and other interested committee chairmen earlier this week, more than 150 organizations and individuals charged that the CIA bill would "represent a radical change in government policy and would severely limit the disclosure of information to the public."

The signers included Common Cause, the American Historical Association, the Association of American Publishers, the National Women's Political Caucus, the U. S. Catholic Mission Council and the Organization of American Historians. They said the CIA's files constitute "an invaluable resource for historians, political scientists and others" because of the major role the agency has played in U. S. foreign relations since the end of World War II.

In his talk, delivered to the Federal Bar Association's Government Information and Privacy Committee, Shenefield said the Justice Department proposals, which have been under study for more than a year, would be sent to the White House shortly.

Shenefield said he was convinced of the necessity to protect confidential intelligence information and confidential intelligence sources and methods from disclosure, but "we are not persuaded by arguments for sweeping file exemptions that would have virtually exempted intelligence agencies from the act."

Under the CIA bill, the agency's operational and technical files would be immune from disclosure, except to Americans seeking records about themselves. The CIA could reject other requests without even searching its files.

Shenefield did not spell out the "much narrower document exemption" the Justice Department is drafting, but he said it would correct the "perception" problem the CIA said it has encountered in dealing with foreign agents and other sources.

Testifying on the issue last month, CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci acknowledged that "under the current Freedom of Information Act, national security exemptions do exist to protect the most vital intelligence information. The key point, however, is that those sources upon whom we depend for that information have an entirely different perception." Preyer said he will introduce the CIA proposal Monday as a separate bill to get it squarely before his subcommittee.

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MINNEAPOLIS STAR  
24 MARCH 1980

# Legislation threatens to chain Freedom of Information Act

IT'S self-evident that a free flow of information is essential to democracy. Therefore, every American should be alarmed about concerted—but camouflaged—moves to mutilate the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Under pressure from various agencies and business—although those in business make more use of the information act than any other group—Congress is moving all too quickly to pass the first major truncations to this beneficial law since it was enacted 14 years ago.

As a recent publication of the American Society of Newspaper Editors observed, merely trying to track the various attacks is a "horrendous task." The reason: So many of them are slipped into appropriation bills or otherwise manipulated. The object: to slide them past an unaware public.

And, of course, the risk of information-act mutilation doesn't deprive only news organizations, scholars, students, free-lance researchers, businessmen and others who interests are directly affected by information access. Blocking access to what government does with our tax dollars is a matter for general consternation. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has warned, "For the first time entire federal agencies—in this case the Federal Trade Commission, the FBI and the CIA—will be virtually exempted, under pending legislation, from giving any infor-

mation to the public and the press under the Freedom of Information Act."

The bills' passage could be a fateful first step: Other federal departments and regulatory agencies are sure to try to void the information act as it applies to their files. Thus, under one bill, a wide range of consumer information in FTC files would be kept secret. The bill also would assist the CIA, which, with White House backing, has been pushing the claim that it's hampered by the act. But the information act, as it stands, gives the CIA plenty of power to keep secret information that would endanger national security. However, thanks to the information act, the CIA has been forced to disclose its blunders and illegal acts: domestic spying on a vast scale,

drug experiments on human guinea pigs, the surveillance of the Rev. Martin Luther King, to name a few. Under the bill, this kind of information would be kept secret.

Indeed, much information would no longer be available, even when its release could not possibly damage national security. The FBI also has a broad exemption under existing information act provisions. But pending legislation would expand the FBI's secret sanctuary and nearly exempt the agency from a right-to-know disclosure.

All in all, this ambushing of the Freedom of Information Act is bad business. It ought to stop.

—Austin C. Wehrwein  
for The Minneapolis Star

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THE HAMPSHIRE REVIEW (W. VA.)  
26 MARCH 1980

## News-Spook Flap Absurb

By Bill Davidson

One of the more irritating (and potentially dangerous) hypes around now is the effort by some journalists and certain politicians to outlaw use of journalists by U.S. intelligence agencies.

The implications are (a) that no decent newsperson would want to moonlight for the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation or other "spook" organization and (b) this is somehow immoral.

But a sizable number of writers and other journalists, this one among them, finds absolutely nothing unchaste with a journalist serving his country in any intelligence role whatsoever.

And it is arrant nonsense to suggest this somehow sullies the profession: Britain has for centuries used a few of its newspeople as spies, undercover agents and more, usually with remarkable success. Occasionally this boomerangs, as with English newsman Kim Philby, who proved to be an outstanding Soviet agent.

But in the main, the talents required for certain roles in espionage are similar to those practiced in journalism. The two roles sometimes interchange with success.

While serving short-term as a copy editor on a major Western daily, I became aware that one of the departmental editors was a little snidely resented as "that former CIA man." This was a decade before Senators like Frank Church virtually ruined the effectiveness of CIA and FBI with absurd strictures on disclosure and operations, but the feeling was strong even then among newspeople whose ideology I would have to accurately brand as liberal-left.

The resented editor had in fact served as a CIA spy during his long service as a wire-service bureau chief on three continents. How valuable he was I could not ascertain; he always seemed a little pompous to me, and pompous people are rarely effective. But I was amazed at how virulently a few of his colleagues felt about the man's sideline job undercover for CIA.

Walter Cronkite and other good, grey godling figures — celebrities and executives — in urban axis journalism spearheaded the fight to forbid CIA, etc. to employ newspeople. The fight is still in progress, and its outcome is uncertain. But the morality behind their case is obscure.

For example, few media or political people find it unwholesome that some younger person is a member of a service reserve unit in his or her spare time. Few people have called on Washington to prevent news people from serving in the National Guard.

Yet the possibility that some reporter or editor may serve the nation by clandestinely providing vital information outrages a certain segment of the news community.

It's ironic: The service reserves are primarily for young people who can serve the country only a decade or a bit more; a practicing journalist can often provide useful service to a national intelligence organization for several decades. Not many news people have to remain in physical shape to make an airborne mission into Yugoslavia (as Winston Churchill's journalist son Randolph did during World War Two; Randolph's "reviews" on Marshal Tito's partisans led London to back the Croat Communist leader even though the opposing anti-German guerrilla leader, General Draja Mihajlovich, was politically much more palatable).

But journalists are often in a position to render outstanding service in subtler ways. And the insistence that the United States should be deprived of this service is an outrage to the rights of journalists who are willing to help. If this disturbs other journalists who regard intelligence services as suspect or dangerous, they should remember that their own views and practices often disturb some of their colleagues.

It is to be devoutly hoped Congress and the executive offices in Washington will resist the pressure for banning newsmen as spies. Frankly they often make very good ones, and should no more ban their participation in an often-vital effort than we should ban teachers or physicians — or for that matter welders or brewmasters.



RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH  
12 March 1980

## Baptists Warn Carter

By Ed Briggs  
*Times-Dispatch*  
Religion Writer

The foreign missionary society for the nation's largest Protestant denomination sent a warning yesterday to President Carter not to allow a relaxation of government policies against the use of missionaries in intelligence gathering.

The Richmond-based Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board approved a letter demanding a continuation of a hands-off policy for missionaries in gleaning intelligence data.

\* \* \* \*

The letter to Carter was signed by Dr. R. Keith Parks, the board's executive director, and its president, Dr. John Patterson. It alluded to "recent indications" that the government was about to relax its ban on questioning missionaries. The ban went into effect several years ago as the nation was reviewing activities of such agencies as the CIA.

It was revealed then that the agencies gained some intelligence information from missionaries, either by questioning them or attending services where they preached and talked about the lands in which they served.

Dr. Parks, in recalling the revelations, said the foreign mission board had no connection with such incidents. In the letter to Carter, also a Southern Baptist, Dr. Parks and Dr. Patterson said the board has a "longstanding policy that our missionaries should not be so involved. ... Any such incident tends to cast suspicion on all religious workers."

The letter said, "Any implication, even indirectly or by rumor, that a missionary might be in some sense a government agent will 'make unclear' the proper image of the missionary and will 'greatly handicap' his missionary ministries."

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NEW MORNING  
PACE UNIVERSITY (N.Y.)  
24 MARCH 1980

# letters to the editors

## CIA protest

To the editors:

Several years ago, the American Association of University Professors passed at its national convention a resolution condemning covert intelligence activities on campuses by our government. Shortly after this, the Pace Pleasantville Faculty Council voted its endorsement of that resolution. These steps were taken in the wake of numerous disclosures of intrusion by the Central Intelligence Agency into university and scholarly life in the United States, including the presence of "operatives" at a sizeable number of colleges and universities. Presumably, these persons had the task of secretly recruiting those they deemed acceptable for intelligence jobs. But whether or not that was their only mission—and who could be sure in view of the long record of exposes of quasi-legal or illegal C.I.A. work—it was no less an institution than Harvard that passed strict guidelines designed to curb such operatives. They did so, it was explained, because they felt the whole clandestine nature of this network obviously tended to have a "chilling effect" on the free exchange of ideas so essential to the academic world.

Now, in the midst of the current pressure to "unleash" the Agency from congressional restrictions imposed after the scandals, we learn from the newspapers that they have already violated those controls! According to the *N.Y. Times*, (Sun., March 2), Admiral Stansfield Turner, C.I.A. Director, testified to a Senate committee that he had "in very limited

occasions" waived restrictions and authorized the use of journalists, teachers, and clergymen for covert missions in recent years. (Later, his Deputy issued a "clarification" to the effect that although authorized, the operations were never carried out.)

—We the undersigned faculty can only view with dismay these clear threats to our basic liberty in the name of protecting liberty.

—Further, we agree with the efforts of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to pass charter legislation that would, according to the *Times*, prohibit use of the three above-mentioned professions for "covers." Also, the charter would require some congressmen to be briefed in advance of significant secret operations. Unfortunately but not surprisingly, the C.I.A. has expressed its opposition to these and other regulative measures—measures which are designed, in the words of Senator Byrd of West Virginia, to make them legally and not just informally accountable.

—Thus, we must express our deep regret that Pace has at this time chosen to honor Admiral Turner as spring commencement speaker at Pleasantville. And we hope that the important issues we have raised will be debated by each member of the Pace community, so that we all consult and act according to our consciences as citizens of a democracy and as people involved in democratic education.

Blanche Abramov, Assoc. Prof.,  
Math/Computer Sc.

Daniel Farkas, Instructor,  
Computer Sc.

Martin Kotler, Ass't. Prof.,  
Math/Computer Sc.

Brian Pasby, Prof., Biology

Herbert Robb, Assoc. Prof.

of Education

Anthony Salotto, Prof.,  
Chemistry

Billie-Jane Schwartz, Ass't. Prof.,  
Nursing

Ernest Sherman, Ass't. Prof.,  
Social Science

Ellen Weiser, Ass't. Prof.,  
Chemistry

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LOS ANGELES TIMES  
27 MARCH 1980

FBI, CIA

# Intelligence Rules a Battle Over Rights

By ROBERT C. TOTH  
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—If an American citizen who happens to be a close associate of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has a meeting with the Iranian revolutionary leader, should U.S. intelligence agents be allowed to eavesdrop?

And what about the propriety of placing a Jewish American under surveillance if he lunches privately with the Israeli ambassador and later lobbies his congressman on behalf of Israel? Or should it be legal to keep tabs on an Irish American who meets with leaders of the Irish Republican Army in Dublin, then makes pro-IRA speeches in Boston?

In all three of these hypothetical cases, the American citizens are seemingly innocent of criminal wrongdoing. Legally, they could not be subjected to electronic surveillance or other intrusions on their privacy by U.S. law enforcement agencies conducting criminal investigations.

Yet where intelligence agencies are concerned, the situation may be far different. Under current rules and under a proposed new charter being considered by Congress, intelligence agents sometimes can encroach on the privacy of apparently innocent Americans in ways never permitted for law enforcement agents.

As a result, the proposed charter for intelligence agencies has become the center of a fierce controversy between those—including President Carter—who wish to give intelligence agencies greater freedom to combat threats to national security and those who fear that greater freedom for intelligence agents will mean erosion of civil liberties for Americans generally.

The nub of the controversy is whether Americans should be treated differently when it comes to gathering intelligence information than they are in the field of law enforcement. Put another way, the charter raises the question of whether the "criminal standard" that must be met to justify any breach of a citizen's privacy by police should be lowered for intelligence agents.

Lacking evidence of criminal activity, should agents be able to eavesdrop on the American who meets with Khomeini because he might have essential information about the U.S. hostages in Tehran? Should the Jewish American and the Irish American be spied on because of the chance that they might be engaged in "clandestine intelligence (or terrorist) activities" even though they might actually be doing nothing more than exercising their constitutional rights?

FBI Director William H. Webster, former CIA chief William Colby and even some liberals in Congress and the Carter Administration believe that the answer is yes, that there should be a lower threshold for investigation in intelligence cases than in criminal cases.

"Few intelligence cases ever go to trial," Webster told the Senate Intelligence Committee recently. "Targets" are usually followed to learn their contacts and intentions, and steps are then taken to neutralize or misinform them and their employers without going to court, he explained. "This distinguished them from a

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criminal investigation where prosecution is the aim," he said. He urged an "earlier threshold" at which surveillance can be started than in criminal cases, where authorities must show that they have "possible cause" to believe a suspect has committed or is likely to commit a crime before electronic surveillance can be used.

"Law enforcement isn't what it's all about," Colby said in an interview. "If an American visits a foreign capital whose soldiers are fighting our soldiers, it seems not too much to ask that an American surrender part of his rights against surveillance and intrusion to allow our government to learn more (about the enemy's plans) if other Americans are being asked to surrender their lives."

The American Civil Liberties Union, on the other hand, has attacked sections of the charter dealing with rights of Americans for "authorizing rather than prohibiting the many types of investigative activities that were labeled 'abusive' in the past."

ACLU lawyer Jerry Berman said "The standards for investigating Americans are too vague and overbroad, the controls too ineffective and the enforcement mechanisms too inadequate."

In trying to meet President Carter's demand that "unwarranted restraints" on the Central Intelligence Agency be removed, Berman said, Congress "may ignore or give short shrift" to intelligence activities directed at Americans that could violate their rights.

"Those of us proud of our liberal credentials will have a very hard time voting for a law in which innocent Americans can be treated as criminals by the intelligence community," Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee said.

But he maintained in an interview that the controls on intelligence investigations written into the charter are strong enough to justify permitting the lower standard for such surveillance that is being asked by the FBI.

In addition to lowering the threshold for spying on Americans, the charter, hammered out between Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.) of the intelligence committee and the Administration, promises the CIA relief from three much publicized grievances:

- Reporting covert actions to eight congressional committees;
- The inability to punish ex-agents who leak the names of current agents;
- Being compelled to provide information under the Freedom of Information Act that is damaging to the United States.

Congress appears likely to pass such relief in the wake of the Iran and Afghanistan crisis. Virtually no one argues against this relief, though some are fearful of efforts to curtail restraints in the proposed charter on activities against individual Americans.

Basically two kinds of activities against Americans are involved: collection of information, or "positive intelligence," such as on the condition of the hostages; and counterintelligence or counterterrorism information, such as learning the plans of a foreign power or terrorist group.

To wiretap, bug or commit burglary against a "target" under the charter, the FBI would first have to obtain a warrant from a special intelligence surveillance court composed of seven federal judges. It would have to show "probable cause" that the target was a foreign agent or terrorist, or that the President had decided that the information he possessed was "essential" to the national security.

For less intrusive techniques, less justification would be required.

To collect "positive intelligence" by interviewing a target's friends, associates, or himself on some pretext, by monitoring his mail without opening it, and the like, the FBI would only need to report its activities to the attorney general.

To begin such surveillance for counterintelligence and counterterrorism purposes, the FBI would not need to tell the attorney general unless its activities collected "significant" information about the political and religious activity of the target.

The Administration maintains that the attorney general would issue guidelines to the FBI under which the bureau's actions would be far more limited than the charter requires. For example, friendly countries would be distinguished from hostile ones for counterintelligence surveillance, and "agents of influence" such as the hypothetical Jewish and Irish Americans would be treated differently from "intelligence agents."

Moreover, the Senate and House intelligence committees would have oversight powers to keep tabs on the intelligence agencies.

But the ACLU's Berman said such controls are insufficient to prevent the kinds of abuses that were uncovered during the Watergate investigations.

"Personally I think the charter has enough safeguards and controls," Colby said. "But perhaps others think not. Let's argue it out and come to some compromise on these provisions, because we need a charter covering civil rights as well as the 'relief' of (intelligence agencies)."

"Unleashing" the CIA and other intelligence agencies will not materially improve their performance, Colby said. Intelligence officials will be looking over their shoulders, worrying whether an activity they authorize today will be considered an abuse tomorrow, he added, unless do's and don'ts are written into the law now.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES  
26 MARCH 1980

# Escaped Spy Leaves Clueless Investigators Out in the Cold

By ROGER SMITH

Times Staff Writer

Christopher Boyce, 27, the convicted spy who easily escaped from the maximum security prison at Lompoc two months ago, has apparently vanished without a trace.

Investigators have made hundreds of phone calls, checked out scores of tips and interviewed dozens of his acquaintances, friends and members of his family. Now, with all leads exhausted, they do not have a clue where he is.

It is the kind of baffling case that turns detectives gray and keeps mystery writers in business. Like the search for D.B. Cooper, the notorious airline hijacker who parachuted into history 9 years ago with \$200,000, investigators now have to wait for an unexpected event, a twist of fate, that might lead them to Boyce.

One U.S. deputy marshal is assigned to the case full-time, although other investigators are occasionally called in to help with interviews and law enforcement agencies around the world have been briefed and asked to be on the alert for Boyce.

Will he be spotted walking down a street in Rio? Will he call someone who will in turn call police? Will he make a mistake that will arouse suspicion or inadvertently call attention to himself?

Or has he masterminded himself into what might be called lawman's limbo, that netherworld of new identities and backwater existences that make detection almost impossible?

Boyce was convicted in 1977 of treason. He had spirited top secret documents about U.S. spy satellites out of the "black vault" communications room at TRW Inc. in Redondo Beach where he worked as a clerk.

He and his boyhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, sold the documents to Soviet agents in Mexico City for \$70,000. At the trial, prosecutors alleged that the information was so valuable that the damage done to the United States was almost beyond calculation.

Boyce, by most accounts an engaging, clever young man, was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Lee, who used the money to finance a small-time drug trade between Mexico and California, received a life sentence.

Both were sent to Lompoc federal prison last summer shortly after the prison was given a maximum security designation. In December, Boyce applied for a sentence reduction, pleading that the prison was brutalizing him. He was turned down. A month later he escaped with the help of a Seattle bank robber named Perry Gilbert, 23, who was left behind.

The ease of his escape and his background—he is the son of a former FBI agent and was reared in a strongly patriotic and religious house—fed a theory that the espionage was set up to mislead the Soviets, and that the Central Intelligence Agency had "sprung" Boyce.

But federal investigators quickly dismissed such speculation. "There is no evidence to indicate that," one said.

As it turned out, there has been very little evidence of any sort.

What is known is that Boyce, with the help of Gilbert, managed to take advantage of loopholes in security at Lompoc to escape. He hid in a drainage ditch near the fence, leaving a paper-mache dummy in his cell. On the night of Jan. 21, he scaled the fence at a blind spot in the field of view from a guard tower. He fled on foot into the surrounding wilderness.

The prison was ripe for such an escape. It was maximum security in name only. New guard towers had not yet been constructed. Prisoner check procedures were still at a medium security level, which allowed Boyce to be unobserved in the prison for hours at a time.

The FBI field office in Los Angeles initially took charge of the case. By midafternoon of the following day, 25 FBI agents and U.S. marshals were conducting a ground and air search near the prison.

A few days later, the FBI bowed to bureaucratic imperative. The Marshals Service had officially taken charge in October of investigating escapes from federal prisons. Although the marshals had fewer men to spare and less extensive investigative training, they took over the Boyce case.

When the ground search proved fruitless, they began interviewing former friends of Boyce. They probed the backgrounds of guards recently dismissed from the prison. They staked out homes, factories, and shops in Southern California on the skimpiest of tips.

They tracked down theories offered by other prisoners, "almost all of which are completely worthless," an investigator said.

They came up with a handful of air.

CONTINUED

Today, they believe that Boyce, probably acting alone but perhaps with the help of some new-found friends, is hiding in another country or somewhere in the United States.

"You know, he sold his country down the river, and in 10 minutes he could have you liking him," a marshal says.

He is the marshal's most wanted man. His poster is pinned to law enforcement bulletin boards around the world. "We'll get him," says marshals' spokesman Bill Dempsey. But the marshals can only wait. And hope.

Meanwhile, three guards at the Lompoc prison face disciplinary

proceedings for being lax in their duties the day Boyce escaped.

The Bureau of Prisons has since decided to replace the 8-foot fence around the prison with a 12-foot fence, build two additional guard towers, install an electronic perimeter detection system, and beef up internal security procedures.

Until the prison is truly a maximum security facility, Andrew Daulton Lee and several other prisoners have been moved to other federal prisons. Lee's attorneys have protested the move, and say they hope to get a new trial for Lee.

MIAMI NEWS  
6 March 1980

## New ad campaign chalks up recruits

# Your CIA wants YOU

ANA VECIANA  
Miami News Reporter

If you're intelligent, skilled and like a challenge, then it's time for the CIA and you to know more about each other. That's assuming the CIA doesn't already know all about you.

In a media advertising campaign that began last summer, the Central Intelligence Agency is trying to recruit "men and women who want a career with a challenge and rewards to match."

"We're looking for all minorities," said Robert Peterson, CIA personnel representative for the southeastern region. "Miami, with its high concentration of Hispanics, fits right into the picture." Many referrals have been the result.

Overall, CIA recruiters say, the ad campaign has brought about "tremendous" results.

"We've gotten very good response," said CIA spokeswoman Kathy Pherson. About finances, she would only say the agency has gotten its money's worth.

In the past few years, a tarnished image and other problems have given the CIA trouble in recruiting new agents. The agency tried small ads in professional journals for engineers or scientists and college newspapers, but job applications continued to drop.

"I think we lost out on a lot of

people when they cut out the draft. Before, we used to get a lot of people with military background. They had served in the armed forces, traveled around some and were looking for something else to do," Pherson said.

So the agency went to Madison Avenue. Gaynor & Ducas created the new ads, aimed at a special type of person — "Not everybody can work for the Central Intelligence Agency, but you may be one of them."

The ads have appeared in big-name newspapers such as the New York Times and Washington Post, and some magazines geared to minorities. NUESTRO, a national magazine for Latins distributed in Miami, New York, Chicago and the southwestern United States, ran a full-page CIA display ad with a profile of an eagle on a black background earlier this year.

This ad, like those in the newspapers, makes its pitch to the person who has "the ability to piece together information from many sources and build it into a picture of what's happening in the world."

The agency, which wants people with backgrounds in computer sciences, economics, engineering, foreign studies, languages, mathematics, photographic interpretation and physical sciences, has a new slogan: "It's time for us to know more about each other."



NEW BEDFORD STANDARD TIMES (MA.)  
1 March 1980

# CIA caused Zaire leader's death, daughter claims

By David H. Kogut

STANDARD-TIMES STAFF WRITER

The United States is propping up a corrupt despot in Zaire, and "the same thing will happen in Zaire as in Iran," Julianne Lumumba, daughter of slain Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba told an audience of 30 students at Southeastern Massachusetts University yesterday.

Her father was the first premier of Zaire, known as the Congo when it achieved independence from Belgium in 1960.

Patrice Lumumba was assassinated in 1961, she said, "because he was a threat to the west." She blames the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency for his death.

(In November 1975, the U.S. Senate's Intelligence Committee reported two CIA "officials were asked by superiors in the fall of 1960 to assassinate Lumumba; poisons were sent, and some preliminary steps were taken, but the evidence does not show that the U.S. was involved in his eventual killing," according to the Associated Press).

Turmoil followed her father's death, and in 1965 Col. Joseph Mobutu seized power. Known now as "Mobutu Sese Seko," he continues to run the country, now known as Zaire.

## CIA agent?

Mobutu, she charged, is a CIA agent who continues to be propped up by the intelligence agency. "The U.S. is now the staunchest backer of the Zairean regime."

(A former ranking CIA official acknowledged in 1975 that the agency provided money for Mobutu, the AP reported).

Miss Lumumba, a political science student at the University of Paris, spoke in French. Her comments were translated by SMU sociology professor Alex Dupuy.

She is on a 17-day tour of the United States, she said, to draw attention to conditions in her native country. Her tour is sponsored by the All Africa Peoples Revolutionary Party. The party is headed by former civil rights activist Stokely Carmichael. Carmichael has changed his name to Kwame Toure, she said.

Zaire today is a ravaged country, she said. Unemployment is at 47 percent, 60 percent of the country's infants die of malnutrition, and inflation roars at 120 percent, she said.

Mobutu remains in power with an iron hand, she charged. She alleged several massacres of student dissenters in Zaire. An attempted coup by the Zairean army's generals in 1975 was foiled by the CIA, she charged, and the 37 officers involved were executed.

Two "liberation movements" were responsible for the 1977 and 1978 battles in Zaire's mineral-rich "Shaba" region, she said.

## Two factions

They are the National Liberation Front for the Congo and the People's Revolutionary Party, she said. The two groups have popular support inside Zaire but need to cooperate. Her eldest brother, Emery Lumumba, 29, is trying to bring the two factions together, she said.

The aim of the groups, she said, is to fashion Zaire into an "anti-imperialist society." The "true masters" of her home country today, she alleged, are the major Japanese, European and American corporations.

Her father's "Congolese National Movement" is "very powerful" inside Zaire today, she said, kept alive by former followers.

"I want to go home," Miss Lumumba said, "but for strategic and tactical reasons I cannot go back."

Mobutu wants her and her family to return, she said. Her mother already lives there, under a kind of loose house arrest. With the entire family there, he could claim their endorsement, she said.

"We don't trust him; it's not very secure."

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*Soviet Union*

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LONDON OBSERVER  
23 MARCH 1980

# How CIA measures Russia's war threat

by IAN MATHER, our Defence Correspondent

A NEW arms race is under way, with all the attendant dangers of war.

Western leaders justify increased spending on defence with the argument that the Soviet Union is building a bigger and more powerful war machine. How real is the Soviet threat?

This analysis is concerned with Soviet capabilities and the facts about Soviet strength, particularly in relation to NATO.

There is a crude balance between the super-powers in strategic nuclear weapons, the Russians having more missiles, while the Americans have more warheads.

The only available details of the Soviet defence budget are contained in an annual statement seven lines long.

This says that in 1978 the Soviet Union spent the equivalent of only \$25 billion at the official exchange rate, less than a quarter of United States defence spending, and clearly not enough to explain Soviet armed strength.

So, Soviet spending has to be estimated. In a study earlier this year, 'Soviet Defence Activities 1970-79. A Dollar Cost Comparison,' the US Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the Soviet Union spent \$146,000 million on defence last year, 45 per cent more than the US.

This figure is commonly used in American armed forces journals, and is quoted frequently by American politicians.

Yet the CIA method of calculating Soviet defence spending is highly misleading. The technique is to build up a profile of Soviet troops and their equipment from satellite photographs and other intelligence sources.



The CIA then calculates what it would cost in US dollars to run these forces and to manufacture and maintain this equipment. The resulting total is published as the CIA's estimate of Soviet spending expenditure.

Whenever one country's output is valued at another country's prices, the value becomes exaggerated. Nations adjust their production according to local factors using what is cheap and avoiding what is expensive.

A country where labour is cheap will produce labour-intensive products. Russia's enormous conscript army is paid very little.

Thus the Russians can be profligate with the numbers of people they use. Large numbers of Soviet troops work on construction projects, on the railways, or on military farms. All these are jobs done by civilians in the West and so do not appear in any Western military budget.

There is a second common misuse of statistics. Up to 1976 the US intelligence agencies calculated Soviet military expenditure at between 6.8 per cent of the Gross National Product.

Then, under political pressure, they decided that Soviet defence procurement procedures were a lot less efficient and more costly than had been previously presumed. Overnight the proportion of defence spending to GNP

went up to 11.12 per cent.

Although all that had happened was a change in accounting procedures, commentators have used these figures to claim a sudden increase in Soviet spending.

It is frequently pointed out that this 11.12 per cent compares with less than 5 per cent of GNP which the US spends on defence. This is true but meaningless without including another necessary fact, that the American GNP is double that of the Soviet Union, so the Russians would have to spend twice the proportion of their GNP merely to maintain parity.

There is nothing unique about bureaucracies using

every form of argument to persuade their governments to give them more resources, and Western defence departments are no exception. The military are in a peculiarly powerful position in that they have virtually exclusive access to the information which can justify their demands, because so much of the basic material is secret.

The Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, whose work is taken seriously by all sides, calculates on the basis of unclassified information that the Soviet Union spent around \$70 billion last year compared with \$105 billion by the US, and that there is a slight downward trend in Soviet spending.

Even the best Western estimates can be little more than guesswork. The Soviet Union has only itself to blame if the West has an exaggerated view of its military budget.

Further reports will consider the strengths of Soviet land, sea and air forces.

## ASSOCIATED PRESS

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## SOVIET-EMBASSY LEAD

MOSCOW (AP) -- THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA ON SATURDAY ACCUSED THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW OF LARGE-SCALE ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE AND PUBLISHED PICTURES OF WHAT IT SAID WERE THREE SECRET EMBASSY DOCUMENTS PROVING THE CLAIM.

A U.S. EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID IT WAS EMBASSY POLICY NOT TO COMMENT ON ANY ALLEGATION OF U.S. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

THE NEWSPAPER SAID THE ALLEGED ESPIONAGE WAS DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE MOSCOW AREA AND DEMONSTRATED U.S. "AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS" AGAINST THE KREMLIN.

IT WARNED "SOVIET COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE HAS THE RESOURCES" TO "REBUFF" U.S. SPY ACTIVITIES.

IZVESTIA SAID THE ALLEGED EAVESDROPPING OPERATION, CODE-NAMED "COBRA ACE," IS DIRECTED BY THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND CHARGED THAT THE SECURITY AGENCY, USING ANTENNAS ON THE EMBASSY ROOF, "REGULARLY HOLDS INTERCEPT SESSIONS BEAMED AT CERTAIN AREAS OF MOSCOW AND THE MOSCOW REGION."

IT SAID SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD COMPLAINED TO THE EMBASSY ABOUT THE USE OF THE "FOREST" OF ANTENNAS BUT DID NOT THREATEN ANY ACTION. THERE HAS LONG BEEN A COLLECTION OF ANTENNAS ATOP THE EMBASSY ROOF.

IZVESTIA SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS BRINGING IN "UP-TO-DATE" RECONNAISSANCE APPARATUS IN SHIPMENTS TO ITS EMBASSY HERE AND THAT SPECIALISTS INCLUDING A "SERGEANT COOL" OPERATED IT. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE INDICATION WHO "SERGEANT COOL" WAS.

THE IZVESTIA ARTICLE INCLUDED A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE EMBASSY ROOF IN ADDITION TO THE PHOTOS OF THE PURPORTED DOCUMENTS. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT MEMORY THAT THE SOVIET PRESS HAS PUBLISHED COPIES OF ALLEGED U.S. DOCUMENTS ON ANTI-SOVIET ESPIONAGE.

THE ARTICLE INCLUDED PICTURES OF PARTS OF THREE DOCUMENTS, STAMPED "SECRET," WHICH WERE ONLY PARTLY LEGIBLE AS PUBLISHED BUT APPEARED TO DEAL WITH ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSE

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# ASSOCIATED PRESS

INSTALLATIONS.

IT INCLUDED ONE PURPORTED CODED MESSAGE TO THE EMBASSY, PRESUMABLY FROM WASHINGTON, ASKING STAFFERS TO MONITOR SPECIFIC SOVIET TRANSMISSIONS FROM 3 A.M. TO 6 A.M. MOSCOW TIME. THE PURPORTED MESSAGE APOLOGIZED FOR THE "UNGOODLY" HOUR WHEN THE MONITORING WAS TO BE PERFORMED.

ANOTHER PURPORTED DOCUMENT LISTED THESE GENERAL TASKS FOR THE EMBASSY'S EAVESDROPPING:

"--DAILY MONITORING OF THE STATUS AND OPERATION OF AIR DEFENSE FACILITIES IN THE MOSCOW REGION;

"--CAREFUL INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ON RADIOELECTRONIC SYSTEMS OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, PARTICULARLY SUCH ELEMENTS AS TARGET ACQUISITION AND TARGET FOLLOWING RADAR AND SYSTEMS OF CONTROL OF SURFACE-TO-AIR ROCKETS;

"--STUDY OF THE OPERATION OF NAVIGATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS OF AIRCRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES, BOTH THOSE CURRENTLY IN SERVICE AND NEW MODELS UNDERGOING TESTS IN THE MOSCOW REGION."

IZVESTIA SAID SOME U.S. DOCUMENTS THAT HAD FALLEN INTO SOVIET HANDS WERE SO SECRET THAT THEIR DISTRIBUTION TO BRITISH AND CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WAS BARRED.

THE IZVESTIA ARTICLE WAS ONE OF A SERIES OF RECENT SOVIET PRESS CLAIMS OF AMERICAN ESPIONAGE IN MOSCOW.

ON THURSDAY, THE GOVERNMENT PAPER ACCUSED TWO FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE EMBASSY OF PLANTING A FAKE TREE STUMP OUTSIDE MOSCOW THAT WAS CAPABLE OF RELAYING SOVIET MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EMBASSY AND OTHER POINTS.

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*Afghanistan*

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 6

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
29 MARCH 1980

# Say Afghan prisoners being liquidated

By Lars-Erik Nelson

Washington (News Bureau)—The United States charged yesterday that the Soviet Union or its Afghan helpers were detaining 15,000 political prisoners in Afghanistan and executing them at the rate of 50 a night.

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the Russians, who invaded Afghanistan last December, had suffered between 6,000 and 7,000 casualties, of whom one fifth to one sixth were killed. That would produce a death toll of between 1,000 and 1,400—unusually high for an invasion force estimated at 85,000 men.

Christopher, speaking at a luncheon meeting with reporters, gave the most

specific figures yet offered by the United States on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He said he was trying to keep attention focused on the "brutal, life-and-death reality" within the country.

## Sifting through rumors

The United States maintains only a skeleton embassy in Kabul, and intelligence officials have conceded that they have a hard time sifting through rumors about the extent of the Soviet fighting and the number of casualties. Christopher, for example, said that the United States still tended to be deeply skeptical of reports that the Russians were using lethal gas against Afghans but said the charges could not be ignored.

He said that the 15,000 political prison-

ers were being detained in "unusually unattractive" conditions and that most of the executions had taken place in Kabul, the capital.

Soviet troops, he said, were becoming increasingly frustrated by the resistance from Afghan "nationalist forces"—the name now used for guerrilla fighters—and were firing at mosques or rolling into villages and mowing down everything in sight.

A senior U.S. official said that economic sanctions—limits on grain sales, fishing rights and technology transfers—would be maintained until the Soviet Union withdraws its forces. He conceded that U.S. allies had still not fallen into line on the issue of technology transfers.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 3

BOSTON GLOBE  
28 MARCH 1980

# Anti-Soviet Afghans get Soviet missiles

By William Beecher  
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON — The Russian weapons system most feared by Moslem insurgents in Afghanistan, the MI24 helicopter gunship, is about to meet its match.

And, in the process, the cost of the war to the Soviet Union, and the tactics it follows, are bound to be seriously affected.

Diplomatic sources say the Soviet-made, shoulder-fired SA7, a heat-seeking missile, has been spirited into Afghanistan for use by insurgent forces. Ironically, the weapons are said to come at American urging from Egyptian stocks supplied years ago by the Soviets when Moscow and Cairo were on good terms.

Called the Strella by Western intelligence, the SA7 is aimed in the general direction of a plane or helicopter. When the missile's guidance system senses the heat of the engine it emits a buzz, signaling the soldier to fire. The missile then homes in on the hottest part of the engine and explodes.

Soviet tactics in Afghanistan have been to use helicopter gunships to fly along mountain roads and ridge lines looking for insurgent bands. These are then brought under fire both by jet fighter-bombers and helicopters.

In the steep mountains, the fast-moving jet more often than not misses its prey, darting among boulders. But the helicopter, which is slow and armed with both rockets and machine guns, can be devastatingly accurate.

The MI24 and a newer version, the MI28, are very much feared by the insurgents, analysts say. They have played a large role both in escorting convoys of troops and ammunition, as well as in attacking Moslem strongholds in eastern Afghanistan, along the Pakistan border. In addition, the Russians often use MI8 transport helicopters, each of which carries 35 fully armed troops, to leapfrog behind insurgent units in an effort to encircle them.

So far, the insurgents have had only rifles and light machine guns to counter the helicopters. But since these are heavily armor-plated underneath, it's only

when snipers on mountain peaks could get a shot from above that they could knock down the copters.

During the Vietnam war, when the Russians supplied SA7s to Viet Cong units in the northern region of the country, the United States modified both its equipment and its tactics to compensate.

Steel plates were welded onto helicopter engine exhausts to deflect upward the escaping gases and thus defuse the hot-spot on which the missile could home. Also, in an operation in an area suspected of having SA7s, helicopters often dropped flares to confuse missile homing systems. Finally, both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters flew a lot higher than they normally would, even though they become less accurate in hitting enemy positions, in order to decrease the chances of being shot down.

"When the first MI8 gets shot down, with the loss of 35 soldiers, the Russians are bound to go into a frenzy," one source said. "They'll have to assume that anywhere they fly they may suddenly encounter the SA7."

"Perhaps the generals will simply decide to accept higher losses, of both planes and men, to pursue the war. But you can be sure the pilots will fly higher and fire off their weapons as fast as they can before peeling off."

The Carter Administration will not, of course, admit it is behind the supply of this weapons system to the insurgents. To do so would raise embarrassing questions about how the missiles are smuggled into Afghanistan, through whose territory.

Egypt has admitted it is training Afghan nationalists, although it hasn't said what weapons are featured in the training. It is understood, however, that these include the SA7 and antitank rockets, called RPGs. Presumably the latter have found or will soon find their way into the war too.

For the Soviet Union, which has been relying increasingly on tanks, planes and helicopters to fight the lightly armed insurgents, the supply of sophisticated weapons to them will make the campaign bloodier and costlier.



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SVERDLOVSK

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 24THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
31 March 1980

## Suspicion in Sverdlovsk

Are the Russians violating the 1972 treaty outlawing the development, production, or stockpiling of biological warfare weapons? The Soviet Union says no. The United States is not sure. In the current climate of strained relations, it may be difficult to get at the truth. But, now that the question is raised, it will require a satisfactory answer if Americans are not to be left with more doubts about Soviet willingness to comply with international agreements.

The issue arises over an incident in the Urals city of Sverdlovsk in April, 1979. The US says it has amassed evidence of an anthrax epidemic there caused, perhaps, by an accident at a germ warfare plant. Hundreds reportedly died. Queried about the incident (just as the 1975 treaty was being reviewed in Geneva), the Soviet Union admitted to the outbreak of the disease but said it was due to tainted meat caused by improper handling of meat products, not to contamination by biological-warfare agents. Yet US officials continue to be skeptical that "natural causes" would have resulted in so many deaths. There are indications the Carter administration intends to press the Soviets further.

Given the seriousness of the issue, it can do no less. If the Russians are storing more quantities of the anthrax agent than permitted under the treaty (only small research quantities are allowed), this would be a grave matter. But it also bears pointing out that Moscow is provoked over Washington's handling of the matter, first acting through

private diplomatic channels and then publicizing the inquiry in the press and on Voice of America (along with unconfirmed reports that the Russians were using poison gas in Afghanistan) before the Russians could give their reply. Indeed it would appear that normal diplomatic rules were breached in what may have been political eagerness to put the Russians in a bad light at this particular time.

Of added concern is a Boston Globe report that the US did not bring up the issue when it first obtained evidence, as far back as 1975, that the Russians were not only not dismantling but were even expanding their germ warfare facilities. A desire not to spoil the climate of détente is said to have figured in the decision not to raise the issue. If this is so, it points to a flawed approach to détente, a policy that was meant to provide a framework for cooperation where this is possible — but certainly not a smokescreen for Soviet violation of agreements. Only by vigorously calling the Russians on every suspicion of unlawful behavior could détente be made credible — and failure to do this is perhaps why détente is in trouble today.

Taking gratuitous swipes at the Russians for political purposes, or treating them too kindly for political purposes — both extremes are unacceptable. US diplomacy ought to rest on an honest, principled, consistent basis. And this is the approach which should govern further consideration of the Soviet anthrax affair. May the public not jump to a judgment until it is assured of the facts.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1

BOSTON GLOBE  
29 MARCH 1980

# US rejects Soviet anthrax claim

By William Beecher  
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON — The Carter Administration has decided to reject categorically the Soviet Union's claim that an anthrax epidemic in Sverdlovsk a year ago was caused by tainted meat, not, as Washington suspects, by an accident at a germ warfare plant.

Well-placed officials say that next week diplomats in the American embassy in Moscow probably will press for meetings with senior Soviet biologists to discuss some of the intelligence information that convinces the United States the Russians may be cheating on the 1972 treaty banning the development, production or storage of biological warfare weapons.

"The Russians claim the deaths occurred because of the sale of infected meat," one official said. "That could have caused several deaths, perhaps even a score. But not hundreds. Our evidence is that hundreds died from

airborne pulmonary anthrax in the vicinity of a plant in Sverdlovsk suspected for several years to be making biological weapons."

If the Russians reject the demand for detailed technical discussions, officials say, the United States might bring the matter before the United Nations Security Council. Under the treaty, suspected violations can be brought to the United Nations, which has authority to call for an investigation that all signatories, of which the Soviet Union is one, are pledged to cooperate with.

If the Russians veto such a probe, the United States might then move the matter to the UN General Assembly for a debate and a call for either censure or sanctions.

Sources say that US intelligence in 1975 came up with information suggesting the Russians, rather than dismantling germ warfare plants and destroying stocks, were expanding production facilities in Sverdlovsk, Zagorsk and Omutninsk.

But the evidence was mostly from spy satellite photos and was not regarded as conclusive. Partly to avoid leveling charges that might damage detente, a decision was made not to raise the issue with the Russians at the time.

Since then, the intelligence community has ruled out Omutninsk but concluded that there is a likelihood that a banned substance is being produced at Zagorsk, an open city to which tourists may go, and Sverdlovsk, a closed city.

American intelligence learned about the incident at Sverdlovsk shortly after it occurred in April of last year. But it was not until emigres appeared in the West with confirmatory details within the last month or so that policymakers concluded the case for a germ warfare violation was strong.

So the issue was raised both bilaterally, in Moscow, and at an already scheduled Geneva conference, which was routinely looking into compliance with the treaty.

Officials were pleased that the Russians didn't just stonewall, but rather decided to answer with a formal letter claiming a natural epidemic. But assertions that the disease was transmitted through ingestion of infected meat contradicts specific information the United States has, that it was caused by spores in the air. Even the burning of bad meat, which the Russians did not claim happened, would have destroyed the spores, analysts say.

If the Soviets should fail to come up with a more convincing argument, the United States is considering asking for admission of scientists from neutral countries for an impartial inspection of the suspected facilities.

But some officials are worried that, if the Russians are making biological weapons and toxins at the plant, they might be able to clear out the evidence before inspectors arrive. The United States would then appear silly for having lodged the accusations.

The Central Intelligence Agency is making a study now to determine whether the Sverdlovsk plant could be sanitized quickly, without outside knowledge. If so, no request for an on-site inspection would be made.

"We shouldn't jump ahead of ourselves," one official declared. "Our next step is to request technical discussions to see what more the Russians will offer. Only after seeing their reaction will we be in a position to decide on our next step."

Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers captured by the Israelis from the Egyptians during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war showed they had been designed to protect their crews against biological, chemical or radiological weapons effects.

The biggest concern of many planners is that the Soviet Union is secretly building up arsenals of both chemical and germ warfare weapons, giving itself the option of using them in the event of a major war in Europe.

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U.S. PACT WITH TURKEY

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ON PAGE A-16

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
2 APRIL 1980

## A pact with Turkey

The conclusion of a five-year defense agreement with Turkey, on aid to that country and American use of intelligence and defense bases there, serves the interests of both countries and the West in general. It should be followed by broader commitments of multilateral assistance, to be taken up this month by Turkey's allies and trading partners in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Turkey has been plagued in recent years by the threat of economic collapse, political instability and terrorism. Internal troubles and the international uproar over Cyprus have hurt Turkey's ability to play its full role on the eastern flank of NATO.

Relations with the United States have been strained over much of the last six years as an indirect result of Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus in a confrontation with Greece and the island's Greek-Cypriot majority. A congressionally imposed arms embargo against Turkey was lifted in 1978.

Efforts to promote a settlement on Cyprus and also restore Greece's participation in NATO have, in the meantime, lagged. Turkey's democratic system has limped along under a succession of shaky coalitions headed alternately by Suleyman Demirel and the more leftist Bulent Ecevit, who recently was flirting with non-align-

ment and anti-Westernism, and making friendly gestures to the Russians. Mr. Demirel, upon returning to power last fall, re-emphasized Turkey's identification with the West and his hope for help from that quarter.

The U.S.-Turkish agreement will assure the continuance of American operations at a dozen joint military bases and intelligence stations in Turkey. Some of the latter are particularly important for the monitoring of Soviet military activities across the Turkish border since the closure of surveillance facilities in Iran. The arrangement also will help to keep Turkey functioning effectively as the NATO partner closest to the Middle East — a Moslem nation on the edge of the Islamic world, and at the same time a prospective member of the European Economic Community.

With the improvement of the link with the United States and an infusion of Western aid, the Turkish government should be in a better position to heed the pleas of friends for a Cypriot political settlement and troop withdrawal — and to negotiate other differences with Greece over Aegean resources. The restoration of a working partnership with Greece under the NATO umbrella would be another gain for the Western camp, and would ease the U.S. problem of maintaining equally good relations with these mutually suspicious neighbors.

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ON PAGE A1-8

THE WASHINGTON STAR  
30 March 1980

# U.S., Turkey Sign Pact To Bolster Defenses

By Allison Muscatine  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The United States and Turkey yesterday signed a long-awaited defense agreement aimed at bolstering Western military strength in the Middle East.

Under terms worked out during 14 months of negotiations, the United States will be allowed to continue operations for five years at 12 joint defense installations and additional intelligence bases in Turkey, including two scanning stations that monitor Soviet military activities. In return, the United States has pledged unspecified amounts of economic and military aid to Turkey.

The pact will be renewable on a yearly basis after 1985.

For nearly five years Turkey, which is part of NATO's southern flank as well as a key link to defense of the Middle East, had been at odds with the United States over conflicts involving Greece and Cyprus.

The U.S. government imposed an arms embargo against Turkey in 1975 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus the year before. In retaliation, the Turkish government closed American military facilities. The 26 bases were re-opened after Congress repealed the embargo in the summer of 1978, but continued military operations were contingent upon signing of the defense cooperation agreement.

Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as continued political volatility in Turkey, accelerated the final negotiations leading to yesterday's formal signing. The State Department issued a statement calling the new partnership "a mutual obligation to assist each other in fulfillment" of NATO responsibilities.

Most important to American defense strategy are guarantees of continued U.S. intelligence operations at Sinop on the Black Sea, at Pirinlik in southern Turkey, and at the huge NATO air base at Incirlik, which houses fighter bombers equipped with nuclear weapons capable of striking Soviet targets. The scanning stations became crucially important after Iran shut down American electronic surveillance facilities last year.

Officials in Turkey emphasized that the agreement precludes any independent U.S. military activities not sanctioned by NATO, such as a move into Iran or the Middle East. A Turkish Foreign Ministry official stated that use of the bases would be limited to "within the sphere of the NATO region and NATO obligations."

The pact with Turkey comes at a time of heightened U.S. concern over relations between Greece and Turkey, and the seeming fragility of the Turkish government.

A recent report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asserts that Turkey is on the verge of internal collapse and is prone to military dictatorship or anarchy. The report, written by committee staffer Hans Binnendijk and National Security Council spokesman Alfred Friendly, also states that Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus are "intractable."

The report, which does not necessarily reflect the view of the committee members, suggests that the United States should consider taking dramatic steps to solve disputes between the two countries. But it also outlines the potential risks of any

U.S. efforts to bring about a reconciliation.

The report warned of escalating anti-American sentiment in Greece and cautioned that diplomatically the United States is caught in a cross-fire between the neighboring countries. "The United States may not be welcome as an arbitrator in the larger Aegean dispute," the report stated.

The tenuous relationship between Greece and Turkey has undermined the military strength of the United States and NATO in the region, according to the report, and there is now a greater need to reintegrate Greece into the alliance.

U.S. Gen. Bernard Rogers, NATO commander, has negotiated with the government in Athens in an attempt to recommit Greece to NATO, but so far he has met with little success.

Though the 1974 invasion of Cyprus brought tensions between Turkey and Greece to a boiling point, the two nations have also been at odds over other islands in the Aegean, notably those with oil reserves.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will use the staff report when it considers sending economic and military aid to both countries.

Funds earmarked for Turkey include \$300 in economic aid and credits and \$252 million in military training. Some \$181.5 million has been pledged to Greece for military training and credits.

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES  
30 MARCH 1980

## U.S. and Turkey Sign Pact on Aid and Bases

Special to The New York Times

ANKARA, Turkey, March 29 — The United States and Turkey signed an agreement today that will enable the United States to continue to use an air base, four intelligence-gathering installations and seven communications stations in return for military and economic assistance to Turkey.

Although the sum was not disclosed today, Turkish officials have said that Turkey will receive about \$450 million in American economic and military aid this year.

The agreement was signed by the United States Ambassador, James W. Spain, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hayrettin Erkmén. The Foreign Minister, in a news conference after the signing, said: "The United States is promising to give us economic as well as military aid and there is no fixed figure. The important thing is the equipment and arms that they would provide."

President Carter, in a letter to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, said that he believed in the necessity of continuous aid to Turkey in all possible forms and that he was giving it high priority.

Mr. Demirel, head of the Justice Party's minority Government, is struggling with an annual inflation rate of more than 100 percent and was obviously pleased with the President's approach. A high Government source said: "It is a commitment of Mr. Carter. It is the most important part of today's announcement. It shows that U.S. aid will continue and that the President attributes a great importance to the signing of this agreement."

Turkey abrogated a military treaty with the United States in July 1975 in retaliation for an American arms embargo after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus the year before. After the embargo was lifted in August 1978, Turkey gave the United States temporary authorization to use the bases pending a new agreement.

American diplomats in Ankara say that developments in Iran and Afghanistan might have encouraged the Western allies to make a major effort to help Turkey resolve its urgent problems. A committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development will meet April 15 in Paris to discuss joint economic aid to Turkey.

A Foreign Ministry statement said that

according to the agreement, Turkish military installations would be used by the United States "only within the NATO framework."

"The agreement will be subject to parliamentary approval," it said. "All installations and communications centers will be under Turkish command."

Turkish military sources indicated that the visit of two Turkish military committees to Washington clarified some points and hastened the agreement. One committee prepared the first list of Turkish requirements. "This has been very useful," one of the sources said.

The Turkish armed forces had expressed doubts about American intentions for substantial military assistance, and preparation of the lists of material for Turkish forces had been a matter of friction during the negotiations.

A supplementary agreement on military-industrial cooperation was also announced: "An immediate \$29 million worth of equipment will be given," the Foreign Ministry statement said.

Although the Foreign Minister refused to disclose the projects the United States would support, they were said to include building a frigate, an ammunition plant and a factory to make antiaircraft artillery.

Talks on the agreement have been under way for more than a year. At first, 25 installations were discussed, but the United States decided that 13 of them

were not needed. The most important installations are the large air base at Incirlik on the Mediterranean, two intelligence-gathering radar installations on the Black Sea.

The two intelligence-gathering radar stations are considered vital in monitoring Soviet nuclear explosions and troop movements.

A naval station in the Sea of Marmara will be turned over to Turkey, according to the statement.

Turkish officials involved in the talks said the Turkish military had wanted a five-year agreement and a long-term commitment from the United States. Under the accord, joint committees will prepare each year's program, they said.


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MISCELLANEOUS

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ON PAGE 76-77TIME  
7 April 1980


High above Hanoi, a U.S. Air Force RF-4C Phantom catches fire as it is hit by hot fragments from an exploding SAM-2 missile

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

## Science

### Spying from on High

*Newly released photographs show just how much the U.S. knew*




One of the pictures, taken in 1967 over Hanoi by a U.S. reconnaissance plane, freezes a terrifying moment in the Viet Nam War: an exploding SAM missile scoring a kill on a U.S. Phantom reconnaissance jet that has burst into flames. Another shot resembles a sort of hacksaw that turns out, on closer inspection, to be an assortment of bombers at a top-secret airfield in the Soviet Union. There are also high-altitude views of submarines nestling alongside their mother ships on the coast of the Barents Sea; a lunar-like landscape that is a Soviet hydrogen-bomb test site; a graceful triangular pattern deep in central Asia that marks the Tyuratam launch site for Soviet space shots and missiles.

Except for the Phantom being downed, these remarkable pictures (all

but one never before published) were shot by U-2 aircraft flying high over the Soviet Union as long as 24 years ago. The glider-like plane was conceived in December 1953 by the brilliant Lockheed Aircraft Corp. designer Clarence L. ("Kelly") Johnson, now 70, for one purpose: to gather hard data on Soviet military capabilities. Its mission was to soar beyond the range of any jet interceptor or antiaircraft missile and provide the photographic and electronic intelligence necessary for accurate military assessments.

"Kelly's Angel," as the odd-looking plane was called by its pilots, was up to the task. Flying from bases in Turkey and Pakistan, U-2s crisscrossed the Soviet Union with impunity from 1956 to 1960. Though the Kremlin was aware of the spy flights, it issued no public protests; to do so would have amounted to an embarrassing admission that the Soviets could not protect their own airspace.

As a result, the U-2 was free to make discoveries that strongly influenced U.S. strategic policy for several years. The 1956





picture of M-4 Bison jet bombers lined up at one airfield showed virtually the entire Soviet production of the craft; only a few were found at the other fields, ferreted out by the U-2s. That convinced the Pentagon that the feared bomber gap was fictional. Three years later, the overhead view of the Tyuratam site (where all Soviet missiles were then tested) gave the U.S. some needed reassurance. Determining that the rocket booster aperture at the base of the launch pad was 15 meters (50 ft.) in diameter, photo interpreters concluded that the Soviets were still using missiles boosted by auxiliary rockets strapped around the circumference of the main rocket. Because they were so cumbersome that they could not be practically deployed, U.S. strategic planners concluded that the missile gap did not exist either. The photograph of the Soviet's North Sea submarine fleet showed that it was largely a defensive force; the moored submarines shown here turned out to be Whisky- and Foxtrot-class submarines, designed to attack surface ships rather than to launch nuclear missiles.

**T**hough the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union ceased after Francis Gary Powers was shot down in May 1960 by a newly developed SAM-2 rocket, U-2s played a major role in U.S. intelligence of Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis. They shot pictures that the CIA's top photograph interpreter, Dino Brugioni, analyzed to prove that Russian missile sites were being built on Cuban soil. Brugioni is now an ardent advocate of preserving declassified aerial photography. Says he: "I say these are historic films. The record of our times is here."

Today much of the aerial spying role has been taken over by giant satellites like the 12-ton Big Bird and by the top-secret SR-71 Blackbird high-altitude reconnaissance plane (also designed by Kelly Johnson), which flies near but not over Soviet territory, peering far into the heartland with its sophisticated electronic and optical sensors. The SR-71 may have set a record. So far, it has successfully eluded some 900 attempts by the Soviets and their allies to shoot it down. ■

Counterclockwise from left: Soviet missile and cosmonaut launch pad in Kazakhstan, Bison and Bear bombers lined up at an airfield, Whisky- and Foxtrot-class submarines, a Soviet nuclear test site



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ON PAGE A9

THE WASHINGTON STAR  
30 March 1980

## The Nation

### ■ U.S. Oil Use Fell in '79, Industry Group Says

The United States was the only major industrial nation to cut use of oil in the first 11 months of 1979, the American Petroleum Institute said yesterday.

The institute made the evaluation based on data from the Energy Department and the CIA.

It said consumption in the United States dropped 2 percent during the 11-month period, compared to the same time in 1978, while Japan and Great Britain had increases of 1.9 percent. West Germany and France increased use by 3.2 percent, Italy by 4.5 percent and Canada by 4.7 percent, the institute said.

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AFGHANISTAN

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ON PAGE 15-16

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
7 April 1980

## Washington Whispers

Latest size-up from U.S. intelligence on Soviet penetration of Afghanistan: Russians control Kabul, other chief cities and main roads—but not the nation's hills and mountains. The Afghan Army—once 90,000 strong—is now down to 25,000 as deserters either return home or join the rebels.

★ ★ ★

*From intelligence sources comes word that Libya's strong man Muammar Qadhafi, long a financier of worldwide terrorism, is suddenly cooling off on the idea. Reason: Qadhafi has learned that he himself is the No. 1 target of terrorists who have been offered huge sums to kill him by some of Qadhafi's intended targets in the Arab world.*

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THE BALTIMORE SUN  
3 April 1980

# Man earlier denounced as CIA agent assails 'U.S. imperialism' on Soviet TV

*From Wire Services*

Moscow—A man who was arrested in Afghanistan in February and denounced in Moscow and Kabul as an American working for the Central Intelligence Agency, appeared on Soviet television last night and condemned "U.S. imperialism."

Speaking in a slurred drawl, Robert Lee said: "I think most importantly that the Muslim people of Afghanistan realize they are being tricked and deceived by U.S. imperialism."

The interview appeared to end abruptly.

The man, who appeared to be in his early 30s and was wearing steel-rimmed tinted glasses, a heavy turtleneck sweater and a raincoat, bore no apparent signs of ill treatment.

State Department spokesman David

Nail said in Washington that a man identified as Robert Lee had appeared on Afghan television several days before and made similar comments.

"We don't know who he is," Mr. Nail said. "We haven't had a chance to talk to him, although we have asked the appropriate Afghan authorities about him."

The Soviet television broadcaster introduced him as an "American citizen" arrested during disturbances in Kabul, the Afghan capital, February 22 that she said were provoked by "internal and external counterrevolutionaries."

She said Mr. Lee had agreed of his own free will to be interviewed by a Soviet television special correspondent, Leonid Zoltorevski.

The television broadcaster made no

mention of repeated charges by the Soviet and Afghan official media that Mr. Lee was an agent the CIA had sent to Afghanistan to stir up antigovernment feeling.

The broadcaster also did not mention an announcement by pro-Soviet authorities in Kabul in February that Mr. Lee had been arrested with 16 Pakistani "agents" and that he and one Pakistani would stand trial on sabotage charges.

In reply to questions by a Tass correspondent, Mr. Lee said he was a chemistry student from Berkeley, Calif., and had left the United States "in recent times," when he had gone to Afghanistan.

He described events in Afghanistan as "another example of what we saw 20 years ago in the struggle for freedom in Cuba and just as we saw in Vietnam."

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PRE-PUBLICATION REVIEW

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ON PAGE A-21

THE WASHINGTON POST  
9 April 1980

*Griffin B. Bell*

## Secrecy After the Snepp Case

The legal principle underlying the case of the *United States v. Frank Snepp* is a simple one; but it may well be the glue that preserves our intelligence agencies from the ravages of a purported absolutism, described under the euphemism of "the public's right to know."

Continued disclosures by ex-agent Philip Agee, books by Snepp and others, had alarmed intelligence officials in the United States and abroad, American and allied. The CIA and related American intelligence agencies, were more and more viewed as existing in an unstable environment.

Now that the Supreme Court has sustained the principle that the CIA may contractually require its employees to clear any publication concerning the agency, careful consideration should be focused on how the government is to operate with this right.

Clearly, the government's successful action against Frank Snepp, the ex-CIA agent who had signed at least two agreements with the CIA to submit matters proposed for publication concerning the agency for clearance—and who had represented personally to Adm. Stansfield Turner that he would—is one of the more significant recent steps to buttress our nation's intelligence capacity. The rush to disclose by ex-employees and officials had reverberated throughout the international intelligence community. Our longtime allies seriously questioned our ability to maintain their confidence and trust, and sources questioned our ability to protect them. Our own operatives in the field were endangered by the disclosures of their ex-colleagues.

We are beyond the day of Le Carré-like cloak and daggers in furnishing adequate and timely intelligence to the president and his advisers for responding to the social, political and economic complexities of today's world. Protecting our intelligence secrets, and the sources and methods by which we derive them, is the cornerstone of an effective CIA.

But in embracing the principle of the Snepp case, there is no lessening of our nation's resolve or ability to channel the activities of our intelligence agencies in a proper and lawful manner, to live within those safeguards and established bounds that prevent proscribed activities both at home and abroad.

In a significant article on the First Amendment and a responsible press, which caused much comment on these pages (September 5, 1977), the late Alan Barth, a discerning First Amendment advocate, wrote:

"There are many matters, it must be recognized, that governments—including the governments of democracies—ought and must keep secret. . . . But the responsibility for guarding them is a government responsibility. It is not a responsibility of the press. Nor should the press be considered in any sense a partner or agent of the government in discharging this responsibility."

The eminent British jurist and scholar Lord Scarman put it well when he observed that while freedom of the press, including the right of the public to be informed, is a transcendent right, it is a right subject in some instances and to some extent to the security of the nation, the security of the individual, property rights, the right of privacy and the right of the individual to reputation.

In foreign intelligence and counterintelligence there is no danger of covering up wrongdoing if one wishes to report it. Specifically, there are internal agency and executive branch mechanisms for disclosures, including taking the matter to the intelligence oversight board or to the president himself. In addition, our shared system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches provides—through the congressional oversight function of the Senate and House intelligence committees—additional means for the "whistle blowers" redress—all without public disclosure necessarily of those matters that should be protected.

Beyond a possible criminal sanction in a clearly definable area, such as publishing the names of CIA agents abroad, no statutory scheme, given the limitations in definition, can be as effective, fair or limited as the simple contractual preclearance requirement. Nor is the argument persuasive that the contract should distinguish between classified and nonclassified data. The relevance of whether the matter is classified, nonclassified or classifiable is better left to the agency review process. Moreover, this across-the-board formula facilitates application of the clearance requirement to all levels of the agency, as it should, whether the proposed author is a former head of the agency or the lowest-level agent.

Now that the contract principle is firmly in place, the government's own responsibility is to see that such contracts are carefully and narrowly drafted to ensure the reasonableness of the basic contract in relation to the job and trust imposed, as well as to ensure the reasonableness of the agency's response. This importantly includes the speed of the review process and the basic fairness of the review to exclude only from publication those matters that are and should be truly secrets. For the most part, the greatest burden is on the reviewing agency to ensure this. But because of the understandable reluctance of the courts to undertake a review of the fairness of the agency review process, not to mention the outright difficulty, consideration should be given to the creation of a special review panel inside the executive branch, but apart from the agency itself, to review any appeals of the employee from the agency's own review. This addresses the important concern of keeping secret those things that should be, and not necessarily that which is merely embarrassing or disconcerting. Resort to the courts as is presently the case could then be had.

CONTINUED



The contractual principle of the Snepp case should be limited to those engaged in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. That many governmental agencies employ persons who hold positions of trust and confidentiality does not sufficiently distinguish the very special character and national needs of our foreign intelligence operations.

The issues in the Snepp case were not those of the First Amendment, but rather whether the government might exercise its responsibilities in foreign intelligence by conditioning the employment of those who seek to enter into its employ on a publication-preclearance process. The courts, on every level, found such a condition to be valid and reasonable. The required forfeiture of profits was no more than an application of the ancient maxim that one should not profit from his own wrongdoing. The legal principles involved and the lack of disputed facts rendered the case so simple as to warrant summary disposition in the Supreme Court. The nation is the better for the decision.

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*The writer, former attorney general in the Carter administration, is in private practice in Atlanta.*

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A4THE WASHINGTON POST  
8 April 1980

# Aspin Decries Federal Power Of Censorship

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The chairman of the House Intelligence oversight subcommittee yesterday urged congressional action to prevent government censorship powers from being used to ward off criticism and embarrassment.

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) expressed alarm at the scope of a recent Supreme Court decision upholding the CIA's secrecy agreements and said he feared that other government agencies could use the ruling to clamp down on current and former employees.

"This is an area that cries out for legislation," Aspin declared in a statement following up on a briefing last month on the CIA's prepublication review system. He said a brief check of other U.S. intelligence agencies showed wide disparities in their practices.

Aspin, who intends to hold a hearing on the issue, pointed out that the top secret—National Security Agency, "whose employees are privy to some of the most highly classified national security information," has no rule requiring the submission of writings for review.

Meanwhile, the FBI, "whose primary mission is one of law enforcement and whose employees may never see classified information," Aspin said, requires all present and former employees to submit manuscripts containing any information learned in the course of their work for the bureau.

The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency require the submission of manuscripts containing any intelligence information, whether it is classified or not, obtained in the course of employment.

Aspin said he had no quarrel with the notion that U.S. intelligence agencies ought to be able to protect their legitimate secrets, but he said the Supreme Court ruling, in effect, "sharpens the government's blue pencil and invites the intelligence agencies to edit manuscripts for far more than classified material."

The Supreme Court held in the case of former CIA officer Frank Snepp that explicit secrecy agreements were not necessarily required, and it suggested that all government employees who deal in confidential matters could be required to submit to prepublication review.

Calling for legislation to narrow the court's Feb. 19 ruling, Aspin said that "many agencies deal with classified information. The Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Interior and the Department of Agriculture are but a few examples."

He said the legislation should spell out which agencies may impose secrecy agreements and should set up an outside review board to consider appeals of what is censored. Appeals of CIA deletions, Aspin noted, are handled by the CIA.

Aspin said he felt Congress should also try to spell out what can be censored, should limit legal liability to the individuals who pledged to keep secrets, and should consider more appropriate punishments for violators.

The penalty in Snepp's case was confiscation of the earnings from Snepp's book, but Aspin said that might not deter someone "who might wish to harm the CIA."

"It is essential that we protect key operations of the intelligence community from compromise," Aspin said. "But we should not set up a process to protect key officials of the intelligence community from embarrassment."

UP-105.

R H

(REVIEW)

RELEASE AT 6:30 P.M.

UPI

WASHINGTON (UPI) - REP. LES ASPIN, D-MIS., TODAY CALLED FOR CREATION OF A REVIEW BOARD OUTSIDE THE CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO CLEAR MATERIAL WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION BY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.

"NOW, THE ONLY CLEARANCE IS DONE BY THE AGENCY THE EMPLOYEE WORKED FOR, WHICH ALL TOO OFTEN FEELS IT 'OWNS' THE INFORMATION," ASPIN SAID IN A STATEMENT.

HE SAID CIA OFFICIALS APPEARED BEFORE THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, OF WHICH HE IS A MEMBER, IN A CLOSED SESSION MARCH 6 TO DISCUSS THE CIA'S PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING MANUSCRIPTS BY CURRENT AND FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN THE LIGHT OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION FEB. 19.

THE COURT ORDERED THE CONFISCATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MORE THAN \$100,000 IN ROYALTIES EARNED BY FORMER CIA AGENT FRANK SHEPP FROM THE PUBLICATION OF "DECENT INTERVAL," A BOOK HE WROTE ABOUT HIS CIA ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM.

IN VIOLATION OF A SECRECY OATH HE TOOK IN JOINING AND LEAVING THE CIA, SHEPP DID NOT SUBMIT HIS BOOK TO THE CIA FOR REVIEW AND THE DELETION OF POSSIBLY CLASSIFIED MATTER.

A SANITIZED TRANSCRIPT OF THE MARCH HEARING SHOWED THAT ONE CIA OFFICIAL DEFENDED HIS AUTHORITY TO REVIEW MANUSCRIPTS BY SAYING, "THE PEOPLE WHO OWN THE INFORMATION ARE IN THE BEST POSITION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION WHETHER OR NOT ANYTHING IS CLASSIFIED."

ASPIN SAID: "THIS WAS A PARTICULARLY POOR CHOICE OF WORDS. NO GOVERNMENT AGENCY 'OWNS' INFORMATION OF HAS AN OWNER'S RIGHT TO DENY AN OUTSIDER ACCESS WITHOUT CAUSE. THIS IS AN AREA THAT CRIES OUT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION."

"THE SECRECY AGREEMENTS THAT ALL MEN AND WOMEN MUST SIGN ON BEING HIRED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DON'T NECESSARILY PROTECT NATIONAL SECRETS FROM COMPROMISE BUT MAY ENABLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO WARD OFF CRITICISM AND EMBARRASSMENT - QUITE THE REVERSE OF WHAT SHOULD BE OUR INTENT," HE SAID.

"THE PENALTY IMPOSED ON SHEPP WAS THE SEIZURE OF ALL HIS PROFITS FROM THE SALE OF THE BOOK. BUT THIS IS NO DETERRENT AT ALL FOR SOMEONE WHO MIGHT WISH TO HARM THE CIA OR FOR SOMEONE WHO FEELS A PRESSING NEED TO GET INFORMATION OUT BEFORE THE PUBLIC.

"THE HEARINGS ALSO SHOWED THAT WHEN AN AUTHOR REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE RULING OF THE CIA, HE CAN APPEAL THAT DECISION. BUT THE APPEAL THEN GOES TO THE CIA'S INSPECTOR GENERAL WHO REPRESENTS BOTH SIDES IN THE DISPUTE!"

UPI

CIA

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"THAT'S AN ARRANGEMENT THAT MIGHT BE SUITABLE IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORSHIPS," HE SAID, "BUT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, IT SHOULDN'T BE ACCEPTED IN THIS COUNTRY."

WHILE ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT APPEALS BOARD, ASPIN SAID, CONGRESS SHOULD ALSO ENACT LEGISLATION "WITH TEETH SHARP ENOUGH TO DISCOURAGE THE RANDOM FLAUNTING OF THE SECRECY OATH."

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ON PAGE A-19

NEW YORK TIMES  
7 APRIL 1980

## ABROAD AT HOME

# The Mind Of the Censor

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, April 6 — The "chief purpose" of the First Amendment's free speech and press guarantees, the Supreme Court has said, was to prevent prior restraints on expression: Americans did not want the old English system of censorship, when nothing could be published without an official license. So it is a constitutional truism that prior restraints are bad.

But one book in American history has been subjected to prior restraint — to censorship — by court order. That is "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Eight years ago this month the Government won an injunction allowing the C.I.A. to censor the manuscript. It was published with 168 blank spaces where the censors had cut.

Now the C.I.A., after lengthy consideration, has agreed to let 25 of the missing passages be printed in whole or in part. The words that we are allowed to see for the first time make fascinating reading. That is not because they disclose highly charged matters of national security: to the contrary.

Pages 292-3 of the book as published, for example, described a meeting of the National Security Council under President Nixon in December 1969. After the first sentence the censors cut out a passage. Now restored, it reads:

"The purpose of this session was to decide what American policy should be toward the governments of southern Africa."

A few lines down, the censors cut in mid-sentence: "There was sharp disagreement within the government on how hard a line the United States should take with the..." The remaining words, now restored, are: "...white-minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies in Africa."

Two words were cut from this sentence: "Henry Kissinger talked about the kind of general posture the United States could maintain toward the ——— and outlined the specific policy options open to the President." The missing words turn out to be "white regimes."

Finally, on those two pages, there was a reference to the fact that "Henry Kissinger had sent a National Security Study Memorandum (N.S.S.M. 39)" to departments interested in southern Africa. Kissinger was then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and N.S.S.M. 39 must have been one of the least secret things he did. The memo, the text of which was widely published years ago, took the view that black movements for majority rule were unlikely to succeed soon.

When C.I.A. officials talk about the need for censorship of books about the agency, they always point to the danger of disclosing agents' names or secret foreign sources or intelligence methods. What is striking about these passages is that they contain no such material.

The restored lines are innocuous. To the extent that they point anywhere, it is toward a discussion of policy: American policy on southern Africa. Is there a serious argument, of constitutional law or common sense, that the American public should not be allowed to reflect years afterward on the wisdom of such a policy and the way it was made?

The Kissinger-Nixon policy was founded on the belief that the Portuguese would hold on to their African colonies indefinitely. Within a few years that premise was shattered, and the whole policy had to be reappraised. If there is anything the First Amendment protects, it must be the right — indeed the responsibility — of a democratic public to scrutinize such official mistakes and changes in policy.

The courts held that the C.I.A. could censor the Marchetti-Marks book because Victor Marchetti had been an agency official and had signed a secrecy agreement. On an even farther-

reaching theory the Supreme Court has just deprived Frank Snepp of all his modest profits from a book on the last days in Vietnam. And the C.I.A. is now going after John Stockwell for his two-year-old book on the American role in Angola. Again, these other two books are largely concerned with policy. And both, incidentally, are highly critical of Henry Kissinger.

Of course the C.I.A. says that it does not censor policy criticism or merely embarrassing material. And Government lawyers offer the reassurance that any mistakes on the part of the censors will be corrected by reviewing courts.

But the history of "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," is compelling evidence to the contrary. The agency cut many passages of no security relevance whatever; the ones mentioned here are just the latest example. Reviewing courts did not restore the cuts; judges were shy of tangling with the C.I.A. It took years of administrative appeals under the Freedom of Information Act to get these 25 passages cleared. And now the C.I.A. is asking Congress largely to exempt it from the Act!

There are some real secrets to protect. But censors, however thoughtful, tend to be overzealous; it is the nature of censorship to go too far. That is why the framers of the First Amendment sought to prevent prior restraints. And that is why wholesale, self-interested C.I.A. censorship should be replaced by a careful, detached system to safeguard only genuine intelligence secrets.

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ON PAGE A10

THE WASHINGTON POST  
6 April 1980

# CIA Defends Its Selective Censorship of Ex-Agents' Writings

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA acknowledged at a secret House briefing last month that it has allowed the writings and speeches of a number of former CIA officials to go uncensored while pressing court action against others more critical of the agency.

CIA officials admitted that they are worried about the "impression" of unfairness arising from their review system, but maintained that some ex-officials can be trusted more readily than others.

The CIA's censorship practices have come under scrutiny as the result of a sweeping Supreme Court decision upholding the secrecy agreements that the CIA requires of its employees and also imposes on them after they leave the agency.

The briefing for the House Intelligence Committee was held in executive session March 6 at the CIA's request, but a "sanitized" transcript was finally prepared for public release at the urging of Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.).

Aspin said in an interview that the CIA "softened" one exchange in the testimony slightly, but that the transcript still shows that the agency appears to have "a very arbitrary and capricious system."

"It also gives the impression, if not the fact, of their going after the CIA's critics and leaving the 'old boy network' alone," Aspin said. "We have, in essence, an operation here that raises more questions than it answers."

The CIA's censorship rules are so broad that they could be construed to cover even casual remarks, according to a copy submitted to the House committee. They require employees and former employees to submit "all writings and scripts or outlines of oral presentations intended for non-official publication, including works of fiction," to the CIA's Publications Review Board if they make "any mention of intelligence data or activities."

"Publication," in turn, is defined as

"communicating information to one or more persons." As a civil-liberties lawyer put it, that could cover "even letters to your mother."

The chairman of the CIA's Publications Review Board, Herbert E. Hetu, acknowledged at the briefing that it is impossible to check on everything CIA alumni write or say.

"There are a lot of things that take place, you know, that we just can't keep track of," he told the committee. "People go on talk shows, make extemporaneous speeches, and all sorts of things."

But he maintained that the board, which was established in mid-1976, makes every effort to be evenhanded and even "to assist the author" in getting his work into print while making sure that no classified information is disclosed.

He said the review board has gone over 198 manuscripts in the past three years, most of them magazine articles, and disapproved only three—two by current CIA employees and one by a

former employee. Four other manuscripts were withdrawn.

CIA regulations specify that approval for publication "will not be denied solely because the subject matter may be embarrassing to or critical of the agency." Hetu has said that the CIA tries to be scrupulous about that and "lots" of the manuscripts approved have been quite critical.

He and the other CIA officials at the briefing acknowledged, however, that they do not review the newspaper columns written by Cord Meyer and Tom Braden, the novels of E. Howard Hunt, or the university-course lectures on CIA by E. Lyman Kirkpatrick, all former officials of the agency.

Thus far, the CIA has pressed court action against three CIA veterans accused of not submitting their work for pre-publication review. The government won the first case, involving a book called "Decent Interval" by Frank Snepp, with the Supreme Court ruling of Feb. 19. Snepp has been or-

dered to turn over the \$120,000 he earned from the book to the government, and he cannot publish two other manuscripts he has been working on without CIA clearance.

The other two cases, still in preliminary stages, involve breach-of-contract suits against John R. Stockwell, author of an expose of the CIA's operations in Angola in 1975-76; and Philip Agee, who helped write two books exposing the names of CIA agents in Europe and Africa.

CIA officials at the House briefing acknowledged a certain discomfiture over the fact that legal actions have been taken only against the CIA's critics.

"This is something that does indeed concern us," CIA lawyer Ernest Mayerfeld testified. "... What worries us most in this area is the impression we create by going after Snepp and not going after Cord Meyer."

He suggested, however, that the CIA ought to have "greater concern about people like Snepp who, after having repeatedly promised the director to submit his book for pre-publication review, went ahead and surreptitiously published. We have less concern that Mr. Meyer would deliberately reveal a secret or would deliberately do harm."

The government did not allege in the Snepp case that he had disclosed any classified information in his book. The Supreme Court held this was not necessary to holding him liable for not submitting his manuscript.

CIA officials insisted at the hearing, however, that there was some classified information in Snepp's book although they did not press that point in the courts. They maintained that "Decent Interval" could have been published with little revision if Snepp had submitted it for review.

"The criticisms would have remained intact," Hetu declared. "We would not have hurt the sense of the book at all."

CHATTANOOGA TIMES (TE)  
14 March 1980

## Green Light for Secrecy

Armed with a favorable opinion from the Supreme Court in the Frank Snepp case, the CIA has turned its attention to John Stockwell, suing to collect royalties on his book, "In Search of Enemies." That book, written in 1978, accused the CIA of lying to Congress and the public about its covert operations in Angola.

In the Snepp ruling, the court affirmed the CIA's authority to censor books or articles by employees, including those no longer working for the agency, and to collect any royalties on works published without its approval. The court supported its open-ended ruling by holding that the agreement each new employee signs represents a contract to preserve agency secrets. Breaching that contract, as the court ruled that Mr. Snepp had done, entitles the government to damages, even if no classified information is published.

The problem with such "contracts," of course, is that they often are applied selectively. An official

high in the agency hierarchy is less likely to be taken to court than, say, a low-ranking employee — especially if the latter's version of certain events differs markedly from the former's. Thus we see former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger publishing his memoirs with no worry of being censored, despite the charge in the Stockwell book that Mr. Kissinger was one official who falsified events in Angola during the mid-1970s.

It will be surprising if the government fails in its case against Mr. Stockwell. This means that unless the Supreme Court clarifies or at least limits the scope of its Snepp ruling, we are likely to see future administration officials publish their own version of events and rely on the courts to prevent subordinates from airing versions that present embarrassing conflicts.

Sounds like an efficient way to control the historical record.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

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## EDITORIAL

# BURIED HISTORY

At a time when some on the left speak of Cold War II, we should remind ourselves that the full history of Cold War I has yet to emerge. Lacking an understanding of the past, we are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the first cold war. (*Vide* Alan Wolfe's discussion of Pentagon nostalgia for 1950s nuclear superiority across the page.)

Fittingly, this issue of *The Nation* appears on the eve of the annual gathering of the Organization of American Historians in San Francisco. We commend to them the cold-war scholarship of Prof. Sigmund Diamond on page 423. Diamond's excavations into F.B.I. files through the Freedom of Information Act (which also unearthed the hilarious J. Edgar Hoover letter on page 421) limns the Bureau's intrusive presence on the Yale campus in the late 1940s, and provides, *en passant*, an amusing glimpse of the efforts of a Yale undergraduate named William F. Buckley Jr. to curry favor with the Director.

Professor Diamond's account, based as it is on censored F.B.I. documents, cannot pretend to give the full story, yet it does strongly suggest Bureau meddling with academic freedom. More central to the current foreign policy imbroglio between the United States and Iran would be the information buried in C.I.A. files on its 1953 intervention that restored the Shah to his throne, the subject of Kermit Roosevelt's *Countercoup*, reviewed by Thomas Powers on page 437. Even Roosevelt's upbeat, Rover Boy view of the coup was withdrawn by its publishers, a conglomerate, under pressure from a British oil conglomerate. Given the crucial role of the C.I.A. in American policy, it becomes vital that current efforts to exempt it from the F.O.I.A. be defeated. As Kirkpatrick Sale, vice president of P.E.N., recently testified: "To remove [from the F.O.I.A.] this particular agency . . . would be tantamount to denying our people their own history."

UPI

CIA

WASHINGTON (UPI) - ATTORNEY GENERAL BENJAMIN CIVILETTI SAID TODAY HE HAS ENDORSED A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PERMITTING THE CIA AND FBI TO "CERTIFY" CERTAIN MATERIAL AS SECRET AND BAR ITS REVIEW BY FEDERAL COURTS.

UNDER THE PROPOSAL, CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER AND FBI DIRECTOR WILLIAM WEBSTER WOULD BE PERMITTED TO EXEMPT RAW INTELLIGENCE DATA FROM RELEASE UNDER THE ACT, CIVILETTI TOLD A LUNCHEON OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS.

UNDER THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT, CIVILETTI SAID, WHERE THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES MAKE SUCH A CERTIFICATION, "THAT CERTIFICATION IS BINDING ON THE COURT."

ALL OTHER INTELLIGENCE FILES "MUST BE PRODUCED FOR THE COURT FOR REVIEW" TO DETERMINE WHICH MATERIAL IS EXEMPT, HE SAID.

THE PROPOSAL APPARENTLY WOULD ALLOW THE CIA AND FBI TO FORECLOSE RELEASE OF MATERIALS NOT PREVIOUSLY CATEGORIZED AS CLASSIFIED, AND LEAVE PERSONS CHALLENGING DECISIONS UNDER THE ACT WITH NO LEGAL RECOURSE.

CIVILETTI SAID SOME FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUESTS FOR DATA FROM THE CIA HAVE FORCED THE AGENCY TO RESEARCH "HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PAGES" OF RAW DATA BEFORE DETERMINING WHICH MATERIAL CAN BE RELEASED.

"IT IS AN ENORMOUS WASTE OF TIME," CIVILETTI SAID.

HE SAID INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ALSO ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE REQUESTS FOR THEIR FILES HAVE CAUSED FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO BECOME MORE HESITANT TO COOPERATE FOR FEAR THEIR INTELLIGENCE WILL BE MADE PUBLIC.

BARRING FEDERAL JUDGES FROM OVERTURNING CIA AND FBI DECISIONS IN CERTAIN CASES WOULD EASE THOSE FEARS, HE INDICATED.

UPI 04-09 05:42 PES

UPI

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- A STUDY SPONSORED BY THE FUND FOR PEACE AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CONCLUDED SUNDAY THAT THE CIA SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM REQUIREMENTS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

THE STUDY FOCUSED ON PROPOSALS PENDING IN CONGRESS THAT WOULD FREE THE CIA FROM ANSWERING REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION UNDER THE FOI ACT.

THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES -- SPONSORED BY THE ACLU FOUNDATION AND THE FUND FOR PEACE -- DID THE REPORT.

BROADENING FOI EXEMPTIONS FOR THE CIA WOULD DRASTICALLY CUT PUBLIC ACCESS TO IMPORTANT INFORMATION, THE REPORT SAID.

"THROUGH THE FOIA, THE PUBLIC HAS LEARNED MORE ABOUT THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION, MIND-DRUG EXPERIMENTS, CIA SPYING ON AMERICANS," THE REPORT SAID.

"MUCH OF THE INFORMATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND SOME OF IT MAKES CLEAR THAT CIA OPERATIONS WERE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS HAD INDICATED."

A MAJOR CIA OBJECTION TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT IS THAT THE AGENCY'S SOURCES AND AGENTS ABROAD FEAR THEIR IDENTITIES MAY BE REVEALED, THE REPORT SAID.

BUT IT SAID THAT PERCEPTION ALSO IS BASED ON FEAR OF LEAKS, CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF OPERATIONS, PUBLICATION OF CIA MEMOIRS, CIVIL LAWSUITS, "CIA ABANDONMENT OF AGENTS AND ALLIES IN VIETNAM AND ELSEWHERE AND OTHER FACTORS HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH FOIA."

THE CIA ALSO HAS COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF COMPLYING WITH FOIA REQUESTS. HOWEVER, THE REPORT SAID, IN 1977 THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, TREASURY AND HEW SPENT FIVE TIMES MORE THAN THE CIA PROCESSING FOIA REQUESTS.

THE REPORT SAID THE CIA HAS ADMITTED THE PROPOSED EXEMPTIONS WOULD CUT ITS FOIA AND RELATED COSTS ONLY 15 PERCENT TO 20 PERCENT.

LEGISLATION PROPOSED BY THE CIA TO SUBSTANTIALLY EXEMPT IT AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES FROM DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED IN BOTH THE SENATE AND HOUSE. AN EXEMPTION FOR THE CIA ALONE IS INCLUDED IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT, WHICH IS PENDING IN THE SENATE.

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UPI 04-06 04:54 PES

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ON PAGE 3

THE WASHINGTON POST  
5 April 1980

# Justice Endorses FBI, CIA Information Act Exemption

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department has endorsed an unprecedented exemption from the Freedom of Information Act that would empower both the CIA and the FBI to block court review of "certified" secrets.

The new proposal, which the CIA has agreed to support, would cover three broad categories of intelligence information that would be immune from disclosure.

Under present law, the federal courts have the authority to examine any government documents denied under the Freedom of Information Act to determine if they have been properly withheld.

Officials at Justice, however, said the new bill would set up a certification procedure that would not permit any "second-guessing" by the judiciary.

Several sources said that, under the plan, it appears that even previously unclassified information could be held back. They said it could also be construed to block the disclosure of activities such as those undertaken years ago in the FBI's controversial COINTELPRO program to disrupt and discredit antiwar groups and other domestic targets.

The proposal, sources said, covers:

- Intelligence information obtained from sources other than employees of the U.S. government.
- Information identifying or "tending to identify" a source or potential source of information or assistance to an intelligence agency.

- Information about scientific or technical systems for the collection of intelligence so long as these systems do not involve a risk to human life or health. Officials said this was designed to prevent the CIA, for example, from maintaining the secrecy of any drug-experimentation programs such as MK-ULTRA and others it has conducted in the past.

Justice Department sources described the plan as a much more limited inroad on the Freedom of Information Act than the sweeping exemption the CIA proposed earlier this year to put its operational and technical files virtually beyond the reach of the law. Information in the three cate-

gories set down in the new proposal could still be sought in the courts by Americans requesting records about themselves.

"The whole intent is to preserve the principle of public oversight," one government lawyer said. The CIA, the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies would still have to inspect their files in response to freedom of information requests before certifying any documents or portions of documents as covered by the new exemption.

Once that is done, however, the certifications would be "conclusive and not subject to judicial review."

"The big change [from current law] is that the decisions [to withhold] will be made by the executive branch," another official said. "I don't think it will cause any additional information to be withheld."

Congressional experts and defenders of the current Freedom of Information Act were skeptical.

"In some respects, it may be broader than the CIA's original proposal," said one congressional source. "It doesn't appear to be limited to classified information. They [the CIA] should be very happy if they get this."

Another freedom of information expert pointed out that the CIA has in the past attempted to withhold even newspaper articles, on the grounds that their disclosure would reveal a CIA source. In any case, he predicted that the proposed certification procedure would stir up strong opposition.

Government officials said no consideration was given to prohibiting certification for information about illegal or improper activities. "That would be insulting [to the intelligence agencies]," one said. "The whole process assumes good faith in complying with the law. There are no guarantees against abuses of any law."

The new proposal is expected to be submitted to the House government information subcommittee and the Senate subcommittee on administrative practice and procedure, the two panels with jurisdiction over the Freedom of Information Act. It may also be assigned to the potentially more sympathetic House and Senate intelligence committees, which are considering charter legislation for the U.S. intelligence community.

THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
31 March 1980

# CIA's Exemption from Scrutiny by the Public Would Impede Scholarship, Congress Is Told

By Anne C. Roark

WASHINGTON

If the Central Intelligence Agency succeeds in freeing itself from public scrutiny, it would impede scholarly research and keep the public in the dark about its activities, members of academic organizations and a writers' group told Congress last week.

Their testimony was perhaps the most vigorous attack thus far on the C.I.A.'s campaign to win exemption from the Freedom of Information Act, which gives the public access to government documents.

## Others Might Seek Exemption

"If the C.I.A. is successful in this effort," said Richard S. Kirkendall, professor of history at Indiana University, "it is entirely likely that other government agencies—such as the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the State Department—will also attempt to gain similar exemption from the [Freedom of Information Act], thereby further denying scholars public records indispensable to their scholarly research."

Athan G. Theoharis, professor of history at Marquette University, argued that the measures being considered by Congress failed to insure that the intelligence agency would conduct itself properly.

What's more, Mr. Theoharis said, there is no evidence that national security has been harmed by any revelations based on C.I.A. documents released so far.

## 'Scholarly Works of Lasting Value'

"We do have evidence, however, that the act has already been used by historians to produce scholarly works of lasting value," said Mr. Kirkendall, who was testifying on behalf of the Organization of American Historians, the American Historical Association, and the American Association of University Professors.

Kirkpatrick Sale, an author representing an American writers' group known as the PEN American Center, argued that, without the Freedom of Information Act, the public would never have known about the C.I.A.'s involvement in attempts to invade Cuba and assassinate Fidel Castro, in events surrounding the assassination of John F. Kennedy, in drug trafficking in Southeast Asia, and in a host of domestic spying and mind-altering projects.

"This, we argue, is nothing minimal; this is the stuff that an informed citizenry absolutely must know if it is in any real sense to be a citizenry, to protect its very integrity and to participate intelligently in affairs of the state," Mr. Sale concluded.

Testifying last week before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, scholars cited more than 50 books and articles based on C.I.A. documents obtained through the information act.

In another development, 150 leaders of academic, religious, and civil-liberties groups sent a letter to Congress last week opposing the proposed exemption.

The Freedom of Information Act, the letter argued, serves as an important "independent check on the C.I.A.'s activities."

## More than 30 Scholars

"It is imperative," the letter continued, "that the Freedom of Information Act not be sacrificed as part of a hasty or ill-considered reaction to current international tensions."

Signers of the letter included more than 30 university scholars, as well as spokesmen for organizations ranging from the American Baptist Churches, USA to the Association of American Publishers. Academic groups signing the letter included the Association of Arab American University Graduates, the Federation of American Scientists, the Historians for Freedom of Information, the Middle East Research and Information Project, the United States Student Association, and the Freedom of Information Center at the University of Missouri School of Journalism.

The public-disclosure exemption was not the only thing about the proposed C.I.A. charter that disturbed academic groups.

The American Association of University Professors warned that it did not go far enough to protect scholars from covert and possibly illegal activities on campuses.

Testifying for the A.A.U.P., Douglas Rendleman, professor of law at the College of William and Mary, said:

"We recognize the legitimate role which the intelligence agencies play in promoting our country's national interests. In carrying out their proper functions, the intelligence agencies should benefit from the intellectual resources found in the nation's colleges and universities.

"Congress should make it clear, however, that access by the intelligence agencies to the academic community must not compromise the independence of our educational institutions and the free search for truth which is the hallmark of academic inquiry in a free society."

Mr. Rendleman said the legislation should:

- Ban the use of academic institutions as a cover and the use of university employees for covert activities and recruitment.

- Require that any contacts between the C.I.A. and academic institutions or individual scholars be fully disclosed.

- Prohibit intelligence agencies from subsidizing the publication or distribution of scholarly books or articles that attempt to influence public opinion in the U. S. or abroad.

- State that intelligence agencies are not authorized to violate the Buckley Amendment, the federal law that restricts public access to student files.

Alfred D. Sumberg, the A.A.U.P.'s director of government relations, said last week he had been assured by Senate staff aides that academic groups would be consulted in redrafting provisions in the C.I.A. charter that would affect universities.

The provisions that are causing scholars so much concern are part of a bill, S 2284, introduced in February by Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky; Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Republican of Maryland; and other members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

A similar bill, HR 6820, was introduced in March in the House of Representatives by Rep. Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin.

HUNTINGTON HERALD DISPATCH (WV)  
22 March 1980

## Pending bills would emasculate the Freedom of Information Act

CONGRESS, under pressure from both the business community and various arms of the federal government, is moving to legislate a major mutilation of the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Under pending legislation, three entire federal agencies — the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency — would be virtually exempt from giving any information to the public and the press under the FOI Act.

For example, as matters now stand, the FTC can be required to disclose a whole range of significant consumer information submitted by private businesses. But, under legislation already approved by the Senate, all a business would have to do to keep such information from the public would be to mark it "confidential" when submitting it to the FTC.

For its part, the FBI already has a broad exemption under the act to keep secret any information that would "interfere with a pending investigation" would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy" or would "disclose the identity of a confidential source." But legislation has been introduced that would

give the FBI a blanket exclusion from the FOI Act.

Similarly, under current law, the CIA is permitted to withhold from the public any information the release of which, in the view of the spy agency, would cause "identifiable damage to the national security." But, as is the case with the FBI, pending legislation would totally exempt the agency from the FOI Act.

While there have been various minor amendments to the FOI Act since its enactment in 1966, these attempts represent the most sweeping — and devastating — changes in it yet proposed.

And make no mistake about it. If efforts to exempt these three agencies meet with success, it will prove only the first step. Other cabinet departments and independent regulatory agencies will lose no time seeking the same sort of exemption.

At that point, the FOI Act — one of the most important steps ever taken in the campaign to bring government into the "sunshine" — will be as good as dead.

That must not be allowed to happen.

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ARTICLES/OPINIONS/EDITORIALS - PRO AND CON

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ON PAGE 24

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
8 April 1980

## Intelligence: Misguided Quest for Moral Purity

By JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

*The following is excerpted from a statement last week by Mr. Schlesinger, who served as Director of Central Intelligence in 1973, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.*

The question before this committee and the Congress is not whether American intelligence should have a charter of enabling legislation. Such legislation has existed in skeletal form since the National Security Act of 1947. The question before you is whether to repeal the existing legislation and to replace it with a lengthy and detailed charter specifying countless do's and don'ts, establishing (until such legislation is again changed) the criteria, limits, and obligations not only for the intelligence community and the American people but for the entire international audience as well.

I submit that the proper path to follow to have an effective intelligence community for the United States is to retain the skeletal form and then amend it as necessary. Repealing the legislation will, by itself, create confusion by wiping out over 30 years of court decisions. Substituting a detailed charter will restrict future flexibility, severely handicap liaison relationships and agent recruitment, and grossly curtail special operations capabilities.

When virtually all democratic states maintain intelligence establishments, it is significant that other democracies have not seriously considered this type of legislation. The comprehensive legislative charter is an idea that was germinated in the investigations and exposures, much of it ill-advised, that started in 1975. The comprehensive charter is an idea whose time has passed—I believe beneficially passed. Much has been said in recent months about the desirability of easing the restrictions that have been placed upon the CIA in recent years. It is sometimes suggested that the charter would assist in that process.

Regrettably, it would not. A charter would intensify restriction. And more restriction, by any other name, is still more restriction.

In the last five years, incalculable damage has been done to the U.S. intelligence establishment. While we have been engaged in a quest for purity and in extended discussion of the meaning of righteousness

(or of self-righteousness), the intelligence instrument itself has been deteriorating. Morale has declined. Recruitment, internal and external, has suffered. The capacity of intelligence gathering has suffered concomitantly; both special operations and counterintelligence have been severely damaged. Our actions have been viewed with amazement by foreign intelligence agencies, and foreign governments—with regret and apprehension by our friends and sheer *schadenfreude* by our enemies. Thus, the immediate goal for this nation—and for this committee—should be the rebuilding and revitalization of the intelligence establishment.

In the post-war period, despite a searing recollection of Pearl Harbor, this society examined with some trepidation the matter of secret intelligence. There was concern that an intelligence agency might become too powerful. That, in the intellectual ambience of those years, it might result in a Gestapo-type organization. Thus, there was recognition of a tension between secret intelligence and open democratic institutions. That tension has never disappeared. Nor has the need disappeared for a balanced judgment acknowledging the requirements of secret intelligence and the protection of democratic institutions. The dilemma is still there. It must be squarely faced. In 1947, it was wisely decided that the preservation of democratic societies required the acceptance of compromises regarding secret intelligence. That judgment not only remains valid today, it has become increasingly valid.

A detailed and lengthy charter is, in effect, a written constitution for the intelligence community. The consequence of such a written constitution will be the appearance of "strict constructionists" and "loose constructionists" regarding whether or not specific activities are permissible. In all probability, certain actions would be challenged in the courts on the basis that the CIA has exceeded its prescribed authorities. (This is a nation extraordinarily given to litigation.)

Indeed, it would have further effects. It would reinforce the already existing tendency for prospective operations to be extensively debated or deferred awaiting the judgment of the new specialists in intelligence law. (The General Counsel's office has, in recent years, been one of the few growth industries within intelligence.) It would further reinforce the debilitating tendency for intelligence to become inward-looking, dealing with domestic constraints and debates rather than devoted to external actions.

The detailed charter represents something akin to moral elephantiasis, based explicitly on the unstated premise that U.S. law is superior law placed above that of other nations. The charter, in effect, publicly and explicitly states the general conditions in which agents of the United States are authorized to violate the laws of other nations. Indeed, it has even been suggested that the domestic law on wiretapping be extended to provide federal judges with the authority to authorize electronic surveillance overseas even when it is prohibited by the laws of other nations.

In part, it is this obvious element of moral megalomania that, in the past, led other nations to be less than explicit regarding the conditions under which their intelligence establishments were permitted to operate. There are reasons for this veil of decency. I trust that the United States will not be the first nation to tear down this veil. Contrary to the current fashion, reticence is not invariably a vice.

Similarly, there remain advantages in deniability. Intelligence officers are institutionally expendable; not so judges. Members of Congress, or Presidents. It is still advantageous that specific intelligence operations cannot be tied directly to judges any more than to elected officials.

Reflecting these broader considerations, I conclude that the quest for tablets of stone by which to guide the intelligence community is both misguided and self-defeating. In itself it suggests a misunderstanding of the intelligence function—and a distrust of intelligence personnel that would weaken both the sense of mission and morale in a period in which they must be strengthened.



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 24THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
8 April 1980

# Intelligence: The Wrong Debate?

By KENNETH L. ADELMAN

The intelligence debate now raging in Congress harks to the past rather than looks to the future. For it centers around past excesses, first by the CIA in terms of civil liberties and then by the Congress in terms of restrictive legislation. During his sensational 1975-76 sessions on CIA abuses, Senator Frank Church said, "We are not a wicked people and cannot have a wicked institution." Congress proceeded to hold the CIA down in its alleged wickedness rather than to beef the CIA up in its real capabilities.

Now Congress swings towards unfettering the CIA. Contemplating a new intelligence charter, the Congress heatedly debates: prior notification of all CIA covert activities; exemption from the Freedom of Information Act; criminal sanctions for divulging agents' identities; and adequate cover for covert operators.

All such issues arouse considerably more passion than they carry importance. For most bear upon the CIA's covert activities, which have generally been marginal to U.S. national security interests, rather than upon the CIA's estimates and analyses, which have always been central to U.S. national security policies.

## Accuracy of Intelligence

Even though the CIA's task here is more critical and its record more dismal, its performance here has been less scrutinized. During its relentless raking over the agency, the Church Committee never once touched upon intelligence analyses and estimates. Nor has its successor, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, held a single hearing on the accuracy of intelligence reports during its three years in existence.

Rumblings are heard only in times of crisis. Why didn't the CIA foresee and foretell that the Shah would fall? Why didn't it predict that the Soviets would march into Afghanistan? These failures were failures of imagination, a common human frailty displayed by the Russians before Hitler's invasion, the Americans before Pearl Harbor and the Israelis before the 1973 War.

More regrettable yet less understandable than these surprises have been intelligence failures on long-range developments abroad. Here is where the CIA's record is bleakest. The agency has long underestimated the overall Soviet military effort. In 1976 it revised its estimate of the percentage of GNP the Soviets spend on defense from a range of 5% to 7%, or just a tad higher than ours, to 11%-13% or up to nearly three times our level. Today experts with better track records still contend that the agency is low, with the correct figure around 18%.

Beginning in the 1960s, the CIA embarked on an era of consistently underestimating the Soviet ICBM buildup, missing the mark by what we now know were wide margins. The agency also underestimated the scale and effectiveness of Soviet MIRV programs and considered present-day Soviet warhead accuracies, which are equal to ours, to be unattainable by Moscow until the mid-1980s. Lastly, the CIA long underestimated regional adversaries such as the

Warsaw Pact and especially North Korea, whose forces were underestimated by a whopping 25% to 40%.

None of these situations changed swiftly. So surprise was not a factor in explaining these CIA errors. Regardless of cause, however, the consequences have been enormous. Such wayward estimates fostered wayward national security policies such as holding down the U.S. defense budget and abjuring new U.S. strategic initiatives for 15 years and planning U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea.

Should Congress move beyond the sensational to the more significant, it could

help the intelligence community sidestep such errors in the future. Congress should promote independent, rival centers of intelligence collection and analysis. This would increase the quality of reports by increasing the competition. It would also remove institutional biases from final assessments.

Yet the legislation now before the Senate moves in the opposite direction. It would centralize the U.S. intelligence community even beyond President Carter's 1973 Executive order and Congress's 1947 legislation. This is harmful. Lumping together an array of responsibilities—for paramilitary operations, technological collection, military "order of battle" estimates, and political and economic analysis—opens the entire intelligence community to the same political and cultural pressures. Decentralization precludes the tendency for the intelligence agencies to sway together with the mood of the moment. For precisely this reason, West Germany established three main organizations responsible for foreign intelligence: France four and Britain at least five.

Congress could begin by mandating that the nation's top intelligence officer—the Director of Central Intelligence or DCI—be separated from the Chief of the CIA. The two have been combined since 1947. Were they wrenched apart, the caliber of reporting would be elevated, particularly if the new DCI were to coordinate only intelligence programs and not intelligence estimates. His task should be one of gathering for the President the conflicting evidence and opposing views that would well up from a newly dispersed intelligence community (which includes the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and groups in the State, Defense, Treasury and Energy Departments).

Divorcing the DCI from CIA chief would

understandably relishes its supremacy in the community. It contends that the move would deprive the new DCI of a large power base essential for effective maneuvering in Washington's bureaucratic jungle. But this argument doesn't wash. If it did, Henry Kissinger could not have been a major power during his White House years when he had but a tiny band of underlings in the National Security Council staff. A DCI needs as an effective power base only the President's confidence.

Congress should also do in the CIA what Pope John XXIII did in the Vatican and open the windows a crack. This can be done without abandoning secrecy. In 1976, the now-famous Team B had access to raw data as it reached conclusions on the Soviet threat which have fared far better than those of Team (CIA)s. In 1977, a gallant effort was mounted for the CIA to reach out and tap the best minds in academia, business and research outfits. No security problems arose, even though the move was eventually subverted by CIA insiders.

## Overshadowed and Undermined

Such efforts should be revived and should accompany a revival of the CIA's analysis unit. For too long the analysis crowd has been overshadowed and undermined by the clandestine clan. And for too long the CIA has placed excessive emphasis on current intelligence, not on longer range trends, and has rested content with unimpressive country and regional reports. In the early 1970s, for instance, a CIA analysis of that perennial topic "Yugoslavia after Tito" was found to be more superficial than those in some European newspapers. The authors had averaged less than two years' experience with that country and had not tapped outside expertise.

An augmented analysis side could offer the President superb net assessments, i.e. comparisons in each theater (Europe, Asia, strategic, etc.) of the resources available to an adversary and those available to the U.S. and participating allies. The CIA has, with justification, considered assessment of U.S. capabilities outside its previous jurisdiction. Yet the Secretary of Defense has used this technique to good effect and the President should now do likewise.

There are a host of excellent proposals offered by ex-Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Ellsworth and others to: centralize electronic intelligence collection and analysis; fund additional back-up satellite systems; boost a warning and crisis management system; and augment tactical intelligence.

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More evident than these necessary measures would be changing the very name of the CIA, as has been recommended by ex-Deputy Director of the CIA Ray Cline. Such a step would, as he says, deprive "the K.G.B. and every tinhorn dictator or ayatollah" of an "international whipping boy," or at least one with a familiar ring to its name.

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NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE  
6 APRIL 1980

## By Tad Szulc

Room S-407 on the Senate side of the Capitol has more than its share of protective electronic devices inside and armed guards outside. It is designed to keep its secrets.

On Wednesday, Jan. 9, during the Congressional Christmas recess, a small group of Senators was summoned back to Washington to meet in S-407, the most "secure" room in all of Congress, with high officials of the Central Intelligence Agency. The agenda: a presentation by the C.I.A. of its plans for covert, paramilitary operations in Afghanistan.

The Senators included Birch Bayh of Indiana, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence; Barry Goldwater of Arizona, vice chairman, and Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware — plus the committee staff director, William G. Miller, and the minority staff director, Earl D. Eisenhower. The C.I.A. was represented by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Frank C. Carlucci, accompanied by John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations, the top man in clandestine operations.

What Mr. Carlucci spelled out at the session was a new covert aid program for the anti-Soviet Moslem guerrillas of Afghanistan. Since last November, as the Senators knew, the C.I.A. had been secretly providing the rebels with limited assistance — field hospitals and communications equipment. But after the Soviet invasion of Dec. 27, the Carter Administration had decided to escalate that aid program dramatically. The C.I.A. proposed to provide the Afghan rebels with Soviet-made AK-47 assault rifles from American stocks, TOW antitank weapons and SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles and launchers. (The SAM's were for use against an anticipated spring offensive when the weather would permit the Russians greater use of planes and helicopters; the offensive has since begun.)

The Senators listened. They offered no major objections. The next day, Mr. Carlucci advised the White House of the results of the session, and President Carter signed a Presidential Decision (known as a P.D.) setting the program in motion.

# PUTTING BACK THE BITE IN THE C.I.A.

For all the secrecy and the high-stakes international gamble involved, that progression from Room S-407 to the signing of the P.D. was fairly routine. It was a standard example of Congressional oversight of American intelligence work as it has developed in the last five years — a balancing of the C.I.A.'s national-security requirements and the Congress's desire to keep a hand in foreign-policy decisions and safeguard Americans' individual rights. According to sources in both camps, the agency has been informing the appropriate Congressional committees of its plans, and the committees have, apparently with few exceptions, gone along.

Today, however, that relationship is undergoing dramatic change. The C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies are openly and successfully seeking greater independence of Congressional oversight and of a variety of other restraints, as well. According to its critics, the "unleashing" of the C.I.A. is well under way.

■ A bill that would deprive the Congressional intelligence committees of the right to review all C.I.A. covert operations has been approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is likely that some such legislation will be passed by Congress this year.

■ A measure, once encouraged by the Carter Administration, which would for the first time have defined the powers of the intelligence agencies, is given little chance in Congress this year.

■ A bill to amend the Freedom of Information Act to protect the agency's secrets is expected to pass the Senate. Further protection has been granted by a Supreme Court ruling.

■ The C.I.A.'s own internal ban on the use of American journalists, clergymen and academics for covert operations is no longer in force.

These developments signal a startling change in the attitude of both the White House and much of the Congress toward the intelligence community. They also reflect an altered perception of the world and America's place in it. From Afghanistan to Iran to South West Africa to the Caribbean, the interests of the United States are perceived by the public and by many of its leaders to be at risk. And the C.I.A. is perceived by many to be a key to America's future security.

Over bean soup in the Senate Dining

Room recently, a veteran legislator commented: "Even old-line liberals are becoming very careful. Many of them continue to hold extremely strong views that Congressional committees ought to be kept fully informed of sig-

nificant covert operations, but they are being shouted down."

Five years ago, it was the liberals doing the shouting. In the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress took a long, hard look at the freewheeling ways of the C.I.A. The first concrete result was the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization Act of 1974. According to this measure, no funds could be spent on a covert intelligence operation unless it was reported in a "timely fashion" to the appropriate committees in Congress. Public reports of secret, widespread and illegal C.I.A. moves against political dissenters in the United States (code-named Operation CHAOS) led to the hasty creation of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, with Senator Frank Church of Idaho as chairman.

Along the way, the committee learned in detail of C.I.A. plans to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Congo's Patrice Lumumba, and of the agency's crucial role in establishing a climate in which Chile's President Salvador Allende Gossens, a democratically elected Marxist, could in 1973 be overthrown by the Chilean military. The committee also discovered that the agency had been conducting mind-control experiments, feeding LSD and other drugs to unwitting subjects; covertly passing money to foreign political parties to affect the outcome of elections, and recruiting American journalists, clergymen and academics for secret intelligence work.

Congress demanded a curtailment of the C.I.A.'s ability, in effect, to make

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foreign policy and an end to its infringements upon the individual liberties of Americans. Eight committees, four in each house, were given oversight responsibilities. The agency lost major political and popular support, and its embarrassment was deepened by a series of intelligence-gathering failures in Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

President Carter seemed to be in tune with the hard line. In January 1978 he issued an executive order that forbade illegal operations against American citizens and assassinations of foreign leaders. He also ordered his aides to cooperate with the Senate's new Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the drafting of legislation that would, for the first time, clearly spell out the powers as well as the limitations of the

intelligence community. (The measure surfaced this year in the form of the proposed National Intelligence Act of 1980, known generally as "the charters.")

In the same executive order, the President called for a reorganization of the intelligence community in the interests of greater efficiency. He gave unprecedented control over the budgets of the various member agencies of the community to the Director of Central Intelligence. The President's choice for that post, Adm. Stansfield Turner, responded to criticism of the C.I.A., in part, with large-scale staff reductions, further eroding agency morale.

According to those familiar with intelligence operations, there has been no change in the efficiency of agency work that could help explain the new C.I.A. popularity in Washington. Morale at headquarters in Langley, Va., remains low. Admiral Turner has been forced to rehire on contract some of the people he fired. (For example, the lack of staff on the clandestine side with expertise on El Salvador, which is on the verge of civil war, led to one such return — on the expert's own terms.) The quality of intelligence analysis, in the view of many Government officials, is still considered to be weak, in spite of top-level personnel changes, and agency knowledge of internal situations in such cru-

cial spots as Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and Afghanistan is still thought to be inadequate.

Nor is the new mood a significant issue in the Presidential elections. Both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, almost in identical phrases, have publicly demanded that the agency be liberated from legislative constraints.

Indeed, students of the issue are close to unanimous as to the basic reason for the move to "unleash" the C.I.A. It is a sense of vulnerability new to Americans, a fear that grows out of an excessive dependence upon foreign sources of energy and a concern over an ever-stronger Soviet military power seemingly on the move.

"In the present situation," says a White House policy planner, "you just can't tie the President's hands and force him to share every sensitive secret with the Congressional oversight committees before an operation has been launched. The President wants the backing of the Congress and he wants to work with the committees on intelligence matters, but he has to be able to exercise his discretion when required. If you're not careful, you will wind up over-legislating the intelligence community to death. We cannot afford it."



The pivotal issue in the current debate over the C.I.A. is to what degree, in what depth and, most significantly, when Congressional oversight committees are to be informed of major covert operations, those clandestine actions that may range from military support for the rebels in Afghanistan to operations in the restless Caribbean. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment is the only legislation ever written requiring that the C.I.A. report on its covert operations. The specific language of the law gave the agency leeway as to the "when" question, there being room for honest differences of opinion as to what represents "timely fashion." However, the requirement for a report on the fact of a given covert operation was unmistakable.

There seems to be a consensus among Congressmen on the main intelligence committees that the C.I.A. has given them accurate briefings on covert operations, and that "timely fashion" has usually turned out to mean in advance of the event. They have no way of knowing, of course, just how full the reporting has been.

One instance in which the agency chose not to inform Congress of its covert activities concerned the American diplomats who fled to the Canadian Embassy before the United States Embassy was seized by Iranian militants. (The agency manufactured the false passports and exit visas that enabled the diplomats to leave Iran as Canadians.) However, this was not viewed in Washington as an example of noncompliance with Hughes-Ryan. Many Congressmen have since indicated that they accepted the agency's decision since they had no real need to be informed in advance of the event. Administration officials say that a similar situation involving American lives could arise again, and that it is just such situations that lead to agency opposition to a law requiring review of all its operations.

Most often, the oversight committees listen to C.I.A. reports and nod their approval, but there have been occasions when a Senate or House committee has taken a vote as to whether it should register its disagreement with the proposed action. In such cases, disagreement is conveyed to the President by letter, and there have been reports that some covert operations have been halted in this fashion. Chairman Bayh will only say, "Our voice is heard at the White House."

On March 12, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House voted in favor of a bill that would be a substitute for the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. One part of the new measure would limit briefings to the members of the two select intelligence committees. (Critics of the original law have long claimed that it meant briefing more than 200 mem-

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bers of all eight Congressional committees involved in intelligence oversight. In practice, as a recent study shows, fewer than 50 Congressmen were briefed. And the number of committees has dropped to seven.)

The most significant aspect of the proposed new law, however, would enable the President to bypass Congressional review. That would be permitted under "extraordinary" circumstances affecting the national interest or in order to protect the safety of the agency's people and methods. The effect would be to make Congressional oversight a matter of Presidential judgment, a prime goal of the Administration. For it is the contention of the C.I.A. and the White House that the current requirement to discuss covert operations with members of Congress keeps the agency from important undertakings. Indeed, Admiral Turner told a Congressional hearing in February that he has chosen to cancel what he felt to be highly sensitive clandestine operations to avoid the necessity of reporting them under the provisions of Hughes-Ryan.

The fear of press leaks from Congress runs through the entire debate about oversight. Many Congressmen find it galling, to say the least, that they are routinely accused of being unable to keep a national-defense secret. Admiral Turner has admitted, in a heated public exchange with Birch Bayh, that he knows of no examples of such leaks from Capitol Hill sources. Journalists covering national-security affairs tend to agree that the Congressional committees keep their secrets well and that it is more likely that a leak will originate in the executive branch. Speaking to that point in testimony before Congress on March 19, Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman, director of the supersecret National Security Agency, said straight

out: "My experience with these two committees [the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence] has been better than my experience with the executive branch." □

The approval of the Hughes-Ryan substitute bill by the House Foreign Affairs Committee represents an important preliminary victory for the C.I.A. and its supporters in the oversight controversy — and not only because it makes a change in the original measure more likely. The new bill is the first stage in what Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, calls a "piecemeal" attack on the National Intelligence Act, the proposed charters for the intelligence agencies. (The second stage, of which more later, is the introduction of a separate bill that would protect C.I.A. secrets from the public eye.)

Two years in the preparation, taking up 87 columns of type in The Congressional Record, the charters are designed to clarify the duties and responsibilities as well as the constitutional constraints on American intelligence agencies. The charters also spell out the domestic limitations on the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. And the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has the domestic counterintelligence mandate, is covered as well.

President Carter was initially a strong advocate of such a law, and in his State of the Union Message on Jan. 23 he made a pass at supporting "quick passage of a new charter." But then he went on to say, "We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information, and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence."

The Congress applauded, and Admiral Turner smiled broadly, the image being duly recorded by television cameras. Not quite a month later, followed by a phalanx of tight-lipped aides, Admiral Turner marched into a hearing room in the New Senate Office Building to offer some words of his own on the subject.

The Director of Central Intelligence listed eight points of the charters as being objectionable in the eyes of the Administration. But the phrases that really bother him are those calling for the Senate and House Intelligence Committees to be "fully and currently informed of all the intelligence activities . . . including any significant anticipated intelligence activities."

The charters go far beyond the Hughes-Ryan demand that Congress be told of covert operations. They also speak to the "when" question as to the timing of Congressional oversight. The operative word is "anticipated." The National Intelligence Act would require that the committees be told in advance.

Admiral Turner informed the Senate committee that covert operations are the responsibility of the executive branch, and "it is not proper to share that responsibility with the Congress." Long-term operations should "generally" be shared with the Congress at their inception, he said, but putting such requirements as prior notification into law "would amount to excessive intrusion by the Congress into the President's exercise of his powers under the Constitution."

There are a number of influential Senate figures, including Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the majority leader, who support the prior-notification provision. They hold that in intelligence, as in other aspects of foreign policy, the executive branch must take the Congress into its confidence, if such catastrophes as the Bay of Pigs are to be avoided. Representative Aspin says that those who planned the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba must have been con-

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vinced of the wisdom of their actions, but they lacked the outside critical counsel that might have swayed them from their course. In a tense and unpredictable world, he adds, it could happen again. His Subcommittee on Oversight seeks a species of outside counsel by inviting Assistant Secretaries of State responsible for the geographical areas where major covert operations are planned to express opinions as to the congruity of the projects.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in general an advocate of a strong C.I.A., is another supporter of prior notification, and he takes a dim view of the President's opposition. At a recent hearing on the charters, he wondered aloud about "whatever happened to those fine brave ideals" on sharing intelligence secrets with the Congress that the Carter Administration brought into office three years ago. He has also favored the committee with some sarcastic commentary about the role of Vice President Mondale as a determined opponent of the charters. Mr. Mondale, as a senior member of the original Senate Intelligence Committee investigating the C.I.A.'s past misdoings, used to be an ardent advocate of Congressional oversight — as was his key aide at the time, David Aaron, now President Carter's deputy national-security adviser.

In mid-March, Admiral Turner carried the Administration campaign against the charters to a hearing of the House Intelligence Committee. The proposed act, he said, would have a "chilling effect" on intelligence sources abroad. And he went on to say that if the charters were passed, he would cut his budget for human intelligence collection (as opposed to spy-in-the-sky and similar technological approaches) in half. "Every individual with access to prior notification," he said, "would have the power to veto the activity through a threat to disclose it."

In a curious manner, the intelligence battleground has shifted in recent years from the dominant concern over individual rights to the traditional struggle for power between Congress and the executive branch. In part, the shift reflects important advances in the protections provided individuals by laws already on the books or in the works.

A law passed last year, for example, calls for a special court of seven Federal judges to issue a warrant before the C.I.A. or any other intelligence agency may place electronic surveillance on Americans in the United States suspected of ties with foreign intelligence. In other words, the President must make a convincing case to the court.

(A notable exception to such limits on the agency has been Admiral Turner's insistence that the charters be drawn so as to permit him, on his own authority, to wiretap or otherwise keep track of foreign officials, in the United States and abroad, who have dual citizenship — a retained American citizenship and that of another nation. Two such personages were former Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, an early follower of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the late Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. The C.I.A. is believed to have spied on them at one time, raising the issue of their right to privacy as Americans. Admiral Turner considered this issue important enough to list it among the provisions of the charters he found objectionable in his testimony before the Senate.)

Another civil-liberties issue has been the C.I.A.'s right to control the publication of information about its activities. Senator Moynihan has introduced a so-called "short bill" that speaks to the issue in two ways.

First, the measure would amend the Freedom of Information Act, as requested by the White House, to limit the degree to which the C.I.A.

must abide by the law. According to the act, individuals and organizations may request specific information from any agency of the Government, the exception being files that compromise the current security of the nation. It was such a request, for example, that led to public knowledge of Project MK-Ultra, the C.I.A.'s experiments with mind-control drugs in the 1950's and 1960's. Under the provisions of the short bill, the agency would be required only to provide personal files it may be keeping on the individual making a request and so-called "finished intelligence," broad analytical estimates of situations in foreign countries. The agency would not be forced to disclose its operational procedures or any of its classified projects, no matter how old they might be.

The public controversy over this proposal appears to be growing. Last month, for example, 150 organizations and individuals joined in sending a letter to Congressional committees protesting the changes as threatening to "damage serious historical and journalistic research and the conduct of informed public debate." It is vital, the letter went on, that the Freedom of Information Act "not be sacrificed as part of a hasty or ill-considered reaction to current international tensions." Among the signers of the letter: the American Historical Association, the Association of American Publishers and the Federation of American Scientists.

Second, the Moynihan bill would establish criminal penalties for Government employees, past and present, who disclosed the names of American intelligence officers and agents. The C.I.A. has been seeking such a law since Philip Agee, a former officer, began in 1974 to publish lists of agency personnel working undercover abroad. While Admiral Turner also wants criminal penalties for those outside the Government who publish C.I.A. names, Senator Moynihan has dropped that provision from his bill on the grounds that it would violate the First Amendment.

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More evidence that the C.I.A. is on the offensive against its critics is the agency's decision to sue a former officer, John R. Stockwell, to recover the profits from his book on the agency's efforts to mount major covert operations in Angola in 1975 and 1976. The way for the suit was opened by a February Supreme Court ruling. It held that Frank Snepp, another former agency officer, must give the Government the profits from his book on the final days of the United States presence in Vietnam because he had not submitted it for prior approval. Although Mr. Snepp used no classified materials, the Court found that he had violated the secrecy pledge he took when he joined the C.I.A.

One area of continuing controversy between the agency and the public has been the C.I.A.'s use of American journalists, clergymen and academics for covert purposes abroad. According to agency officials, these people are not generally asked to ferret out intelligence information. Their value lies in their ability to initiate contact with persons overseas whom the agency would like to recruit — in situations where the agency itself lacks direct access. A journalist, so the argument goes, is able to approach openly a prospect who would be out of bounds for a C.I.A. person. Leaders of these professions, however, protest the use of academics and the like as damaging to their credentials, destructive of their appropriate functions and immoral insofar as it leads them into acts of duplicity.

In response, the agency in 1977 placed an internal ban on the practice, and the charters as drawn up also rule it out. However, the C.I.A. director opposes any such measure in the charters, insisting that he wants the leeway to use these amateurs under special circumstances. In fact, Admiral Turner recently mentioned at a hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee that he has granted waivers on that internal ban; later, he corrected the record to say that these waivers had not actually been acted upon.

The best judgment in Washington is that the charters will not pass Congress in 1980. The Senate calendar is overloaded, the members of Congress are caught up in an election year — and the sentiment on the subject is running strongly toward less control over the C.I.A. rather than more. In fact, the most likely scenario is that described by Representative Aspin as the "piece-meal" attack. There now appear to be enough votes on Capitol Hill to amend or kill the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, thus removing some or all of the reporting obligations on the C.I.A. And the short bill proposed by Senator Moynihan is given a good chance of passage by year's end. As a senior Senator, who asked that his name not be used, said the other day, "The reality is that we've been had, if not betrayed, by the Administration, and we seem to be back to Square One when it comes to any meaningful oversight by the Congress of secret C.I.A. operations."

Such comments, and the general talk of "unleashing" the C.I.A., suggest that Congressional oversight is about to vanish. In fact, that is not going to happen. What does seem quite certain, however, is that the degree of Congressional participation in the decision as to some of the most sensitive and, by definition, most important covert missions will be severely limited. And for many in Congress, who have lived through agency adventures of the past, the reduction of oversight makes for a threatening future. ■

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*Tad Szulc is a Washington writer who specializes in international affairs.*



*Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, warns that increased Congressional "oversight" could have a "chilling effect" on C.I.A. intelligence sources.*



*Top intelligence officers attend the Senate hearings on "unleashing" the C.I.A. From left, Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Review; Lieut. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman, Director, National Security Agency; Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director, C.I.A.; F.B.I. Director William H. Webster.*



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WASHINGTON STAR  
6 APRIL 1980

## Hugh Sidey Rallying 'round the CIA

Each morning at that ghastly hour of 5:30 when Jimmy Carter stirs himself and once again takes the bridge of the ship of state, his first priority after certifying to his security detail that he is functional is to determine what has happened to the world while he slept.

It is often the most critical few minutes of his day. In physical terms it is unspectacular. For the moment all of his aircraft carriers and the contents of Fort Knox are meaningless. Carter is alone with a few sheets of paper, his mind and, a little bit later, the interpretive energies of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser.

Everything in this process rides on information — words, sentences, images, ideas. Carter strains to understand what lies in the hardened and weary mind of Leonid Brezhnev and in those of his cronies. The delicate understandings between Iran's President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini must be assessed. The moods, emotions, health and political durability of 40 or 50 other men and women will fill out the day's global drama, and Carter must probe the reports on them to guide his responses until nightfall.

At the heart of this process is the CIA, an organization now hobbled by misapplied rectitude and, by all reports, undergoing grave internal stress. One must assume that this has been evident in the morning reading of the president, and that is in part why he has complained he is not as well served as he thinks he should be. The other part of the complaint comes from the fact that the agency cannot carry out covert responses once trouble has been detected without labyrinthine clearance procedures with Congress that run the high-risk of being blabbed, which, of course, kills them in embryo. Thus, at a time when our margins of power and maneuver are slimmer than ever, we need more and better intelligence activities and find ourselves with less that is often not as good as it used to be.

For three years now the Congress has been debating a new CIA charter designed to codify rules of behavior and control, an outgrowth of some past agency mistakes that took on exaggerated dimensions in the post-Watergate period of catharsis. The laws hastily passed in that punitive era were recognized as imperfect even then. The new charter was to supplant them. The first go was a harsh document of dos and don'ts. One would have thought it was for the Department of Agriculture, not the business of spying. By now the charter draft is down to 171 pages, having had a lot of the bureaucratic fat scared out of it by America's obvious decline in the world and the need to know and do things in secret. Still it is a formidable document, and its very contemplation led New York's Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan to suggest if that charter was ever implemented, the CIA would turn into a legislative reference service.

What is happening is that as the real world presses in we are being led back to the original concept of skeletal legislation that leaves the CIA up to the president and his overseers and a minimal number of congressional authorities. It is recognition again that intelligence activity is an art form, a people business of high risk that probably cannot be put into a civil service manual.

Voices like that of Richard Helms, former CIA director, and Washington's Sen. Henry B. Jackson have been crying common sense in the legislative wilderness for a long time. Now they are gaining.

Last week James R. Schlesinger, most recently secretary of energy but before that a lot of things including CIA director, went before the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence and added his protest. "I believe," he said, "a detailed charter is an inherently bad idea." Big Jim may not have been the city's best administrator but he has a way with plain words. He went on to describe intelligence activities as events requiring deep secrecy, discipline, high morale, creativity, risk and even the chance to fail without bitter and debilitating recrimination. He worried that a 171-page charter would infect the CIA with the classic bureaucratic disease in which ultimately most of its energy would be devoted to internal debate about constraints, blame-dodging and exercises of self-preservation.

Schlesinger got some hearty pats on the back from Rhode Island's Sen. John H. Chafee, who allowed that overzealous chartering might produce an agency that would be free of mistakes, but it would do absolutely nothing. It gets down to people, insisted Sen. Jackson, meaning good people in intelligence (and in the White House) did not need a catalog of laws, and bad people would not be deterred by all the rules that could be written.

These men fight the Washington hobgoblin which has grown so pervasive and insistent that it now threatens to engulf those delicate devices of national survival. The legislative arm has become thoroughly enamored with legions of aides and lawyers whose reason for being is to define, codify and draft legislation. Their faith is not in people but law books. Their basic interest is in process, not results.

As the world darkens, their arguments fortunately seem to grow fainter. Heard louder and clearer around town last week was the cry of Sam Halpern, a former CIA operative who knows a lot about global alley-fighting: "Somewhere, somehow, somebody has to be trusted."

NEWSDAY (NY)  
24 March 1980

# A Weak CIA Charter Is Worse Than None at All

(As Received)

Both President Carter and the CIA oppose laws requiring Congress or even the president to be informed of the agency's covert operations. Behind that opposition lies the concept of "deniability."

This was first spelled out in 1948, when the National Security Council authorized the CIA to perform operations "so planned and conducted that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and, if uncovered, the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

That effectively put the CIA beyond anyone's control.

Nearly 30 years later, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that both presidential supervision and congressional oversight of the CIA were nonexistent.

The committee found that "no one in the executive—least of all the president—was required to formally sign off on a decision to implement a covert action program." The point was to insulate the president should any embarrassing project come to light.

In response, Congress passed the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment, which provides that certain members of eight House and Senate committees are supposed to be notified of covert CIA operations. A bill now before Congress would reduce that to the two intelligence committees.

That might be acceptable—provided those committees were given adequate information.

But the House Foreign Affairs Committee has recently approved a loophole big enough to stage a coup through: If the president decides that withholding information is essential to the vital interests of the United States or the safeguarding of CIA personnel and methods, the agency

wouldn't have to report a covert operation to anyone in Congress.

You don't need much imagination to see how easy it would be to apply that provision to almost any covert CIA activity.

And last week, CIA director Stansfield Turner asked the House Intelligence Committee to delete provisions from a proposed CIA charter that would require advance congressional notification. Further, he said, Carter has ordered that he not be told certain details of spy operations.

We have long urged that formal charters be adopted to govern the intelligence agencies. But the administration and Congress seem headed in the wrong direction—toward less rather than more control. Unless that motion can be reversed, it would be better for the country to muddle along without an intelligence charter than to adopt one that could let the CIA get away with murder.

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IRAN - HOSTAGES ARE SPIES

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-16NEW YORK TIMES  
10 APRIL 1980

## Embassies Seen as Bases for Spying

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 9 — The United States and foreign governments have long publicly denied that their embassies are used for espionage purposes, but it is taken for granted in diplomatic circles that embassy personnel and facilities are engaged in intelligence-gathering activities, according to American Government officials.

While officials denied today that the United States Embassy in Teheran had been used for espionage, they acknowledged that it would have been feasible to equip the embassy with the kind of electronic equipment used elsewhere in Iran to monitor communications and missile and atomic tests within the Soviet Union.

Until the fall of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, officials said, the United States maintained extensive intelligence-gathering facilities in Iran to monitor the Soviet Union.

Iranian television broadcast a report

today purporting to show sophisticated espionage equipment in the United States Embassy in Teheran. One of the American hostages was quoted in the Persian language as saying that the equipment had been used to monitor communications and computers in Iran.

American officials called the report "completely false." They said the equipment shown was probably standard radio and telephone communications facilities. Experts in computer technology said that it was currently "technically unfeasible" to tap into computers.

Allegations that embassies are used as centers for electronic intelligence-gathering are not uncommon, according to officials. The Soviet press, they said, recently published several stories charging that the United States Embassy in Moscow was being used as a base for spying on sensitive Soviet communications.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A22

THE WASHINGTON POST  
10 April 1980

# U.S. Reacts Caustically to Reports of 2 Hostages' Spy Charge

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. officials reacted caustically last night to reports that two American hostages had appeared on Iranian television charging that the U.S. Embassy in Tehran had been a place of "espionage."

Noting that the State Department had heard only secondhand reports of statements attributed to the two Americans, spokesman George Sherman said the reported charges were "hardly credible" coming from persons illegally held captive and "subjected to the mental anguish of prisoners" for more than five months.

Sherman noted that the statements attributed to the two Americans tended to support the longstanding claims of the captors that the embassy was a "spy nest."

It was unclear here last night

whether the midnight television appearance of the two hostages discussing "espionage" activities was a step toward the spy trials that were threatened in the first weeks after the embassy takeover last November. Those threats in Tehran prompted the first White House statements Nov. 20 suggesting that the United States might take military action in the crisis.

Administration officials have expressed belief that the strong private and public warnings to Iran at that time dissuaded Tehran from moving toward espionage tribunals.

According to senior State Department officials, no other indications have been received in recent days that Iran may be returning to a serious discussion of spy trials. For this reason, the officials were reluctant to draw any conclusion at this

stage about the significance of the televised statements.

The Nov. 20 White House warnings elicited a declaration from the captors the following day that "all the hostages will be killed at once" if the United States took military action against Iran. The threat to kill the hostages was repeated yesterday, following new U.S. hints about possible use of force if the hostages remain captive. The new threats by the militants preceded the television appearance of the two Americans by several hours.

While acknowledging that the television appearance was an attempt to "embarrass" the United States, officials here declined to comment directly on the reported allegations of spy activities. It is government policy not to comment on charges of intelligence activities except under extraordinary circumstances.

The charges aired on the Iranian broadcast appeared unsurprising to persons familiar with intelligence-gathering techniques.

Aerial photography from transport aircraft is known to be practiced by several countries as a method of obtaining pictures of areas not open to visits from foreigners. Last April, South Africa expelled two high-ranking U.S. embassy defense attaches for allegedly photographing "sensitive military installations" from an embassy-owned plane.

The United States, following its standard practice, refused to confirm or deny the allegations that its military attaches had gathered information in this way.

The other reported charge from an American hostage aired in the Tehran broadcast was about radio-monit-

toring activity involving computers at the U.S. Embassy compound.

Monitoring of local radio broadcasts is part of an extensive worldwide U.S. intelligence-gathering operation, often using highly sophisticated equipment. Other nations also gather information this way as a routine part of their diplomatic activity.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-18THE WASHINGTON POST  
10 April 1980

# Hostages, on Iranian TV, Tell of 'Espionage'

By William Branigin

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, April 10—Iran's government-controlled television showed two American hostages early Thursday who said the U.S. Embassy here and some of its personnel were involved in "espionage."

The two hostages described secret communications monitoring activities and spoke of aerial photography by a specially equipped U.S. plane. The alleged flights would have taken place during the shah's reign.

The name of the first hostage was not clearly identifiable in the midnight broadcast. The second hostage shown reportedly identified himself

as "Staff Sgt. Subic." Army Staff Sgt. Joseph Subic Jr., 23, of Bowling Green, Ohio, was assigned to the embassy defense attache's staff last June and has been identified as one of the hostages.

It was not immediately known when the pretaped television footage was filmed, but the timing of the broadcast, following the severance of diplomatic and remaining trade relations with Iran by the United States, raised the prospect that the militant Moslem captors and their supporters now would press for long-demanded hostage trials.

Efforts to obtain a tape of the broadcast from Iranian television offi-

cials and positively identify the Americans were unsuccessful.

The broadcast followed a warning Wednesday by the militants that they would "destroy" all their hostages if the United States followed up its political and economic sanctions with "the slightest military intervention."

The broadcast and that statement—the harshest threat against the hostages by the captors since a U.S. naval task force steamed into the Persian Gulf area late last year—seemed to undermine a pledge by Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh to allow more visits to the hostages by outsiders, including their families.

The militant students later ruled

out visits by members of their captives' families and said they would only admit persons they had invited themselves.

Amid the threat to the hostages and the broadcast airing the alleged spy activities, the situation on the Iranian-Iraqi border continued to deteriorate, with new clashes reported. Meanwhile, Ghotbzadeh warned that Iran would help overthrow the Baghdad government "if Iraqi intervention continues."

In the midnight hostage broadcast, the first American shown was seated behind a desk in a room identified as the defense attache's office in the embassy chancery. Responding to ques-

tions asked by one of the militants, he denounced the deposed shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and criticized President Carter for allegedly putting the shah's welfare above that of the hostages.

According to a Persian-language narration that often made the hostages' statements in English inaudible, the American said, "I've seen people tortured by SAVAK, and with holes in their heads. I've seen pictures of some members of Congress in the nude with the shah's sister and in shameful activities."

The narration quoted him as calling for the shah to be put on trial as an international criminal.

Other statements of the hostages that were audible corresponded fairly accurately to the translation in the Persian-language narration.

The blond hostage, who appeared to be about 30 years old and was wearing a V-neck sweater, said, according to the narration, that U.S. personnel in Iran operated an aircraft identified as a C12 with "cameras fixed under the seats of the pilot and copilot for taking pictures for espionage purposes."

The second American shown appeared to be in his early twenties and was wearing camouflage fatigues, a red T-shirt and round, wire-rimmed

glasses. He had short brown hair and wore a sparse mustache.

The first hostage was on too briefly to evaluate his well-being, but the second hostage, who appeared much longer, seemed lucid and in good condition.

"I'm standing in the warehouse of the embassy," he said to the camera. He took up a section of carpet and, in audible English, said, "This is a computer carpet."

Under it, he removed sections of a metal grid floor that concealed six bundles of wire underneath it.

"These computers used to work during the time of the shah," the narration quoted him as saying. In English he was heard to say, "We would monitor radio wavelengths to find out what was going on." There was also an unclear reference to monitoring "computer traffic."

Intelligence sources have said in the past that monitoring of communications was a common embassy function also performed by other countries. The sources said that Soviet embassies in Tehran and Washington were known to carry out similar monitoring. Before Iran's February 1979 revolution, one intelligence source here said that the Soviets maintained about 40 full-time intelligence officers in Tehran.

According to the narration, the second American explained that after the revolution, the embassy was wary of using its monitoring facilities because they used up so much electricity that it was feared that the Iranian government would become suspicious.

To resolve the problem, the hostage was quoted as saying the embassy ordered extra electric generators that were to have been delivered two weeks after the embassy takeover Nov. 4.

"If this had been revealed, it would have been a major blow to the U.S."

CONTINUED

because very important espionage information was being obtained through these means," the Persian narration quoted the hostage as saying.

After removing ceiling panels that revealed more wires, the hostage pointed to a junction box and said in audible English, "This went to the National Security Agency." Pointing to another, he was heard to say, "CIA."

The hostage said it had been surprising that the generators cleared Iranian customs as quickly as they did.

"It brings in the question of who's in customs, whether it's a CIA man or not," the hostage said.

Referring to the ostensible use of the buildings that housed the monitoring equipment as a warehouse, the young American said, "They built this building here and put these supplies on top of it to conceal its real identity."

He added that embassy personnel sold liquor from the embassy stock, apparently before the revolution.

"We had enough to last for seven years for all the people in the embassy—that's about 120 people," the hostage said. "There was \$2 million dollars' worth. I'm talking about whisky, the hard stuff—not the beer or wine."

At the beginning of the broadcast, an Iranian speaker had introduced the program by saying, "These are two spies and they are going to reveal some shocking things."

Subic was one of four hostages who read statements on Iranian television during the Christmas holidays. He has written numerous letters to U.S. newspapers urging the shah's return to Iran to stand trial.

In response to the announcement of U.S. sanctions against Iran, the militants issued a statement Wednesday saying, "We warn the criminal U.S. government explicitly that if that government carries out the slightest mili-

tary intervention against Iran we will destroy all the spy hostages together. . . ."

At a news conference, however, Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh adopted a much more moderate tone, saying that there would be no retaliation for the sanctions because they "don't mean anything."

Meanwhile, Iran's tensions with neighboring Iraq escalated with Iranian news broadcasts reporting that an Iranian jet fighter and three military helicopters fought an air battle with Iraqi helicopters Wednesday above the Iranian border town of Baveissi. No planes were shot down, but 15 Iranian Revolutionary Guards were wounded in artillery barrages and rocket attacks, the broadcasts said.

There was no independent confirmation of the clashes and Iraq restricted its comment to accusing the revolutionary government in Tehran of trying to subvert the Baghdad government.



# Hostage Says U.S. Embassy Was Engaged in Espionage

## Spy Equipment Disguised As Furniture, GI Says on TV

By Raji Samghabadi  
Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran — An American hostage said in an interview televised in Iran last night that the U.S. Embassy was engaged in espionage and illegal activities before it was seized by militants on Nov. 4.

Staff Sgt. Joseph Subic Jr. of the Defense Attache's Office said the U.S. government was about to complete the installation of electronic espionage equipment in the embassy when it was seized.

"The entire range of equipment was flown in from the United States," Subic said in the telecast. "As you might notice, the equipment, this amount of it, is too much to air-freight. But that's what they did."

The staff sergeant, who said he has had a change of heart about the shah and the U.S. role in Iran, said most of the equipment is now in the U.S. Embassy courtyard, disguised as furniture, gathering dust.

"They could monitor all electronic communications in Iran under the shah. They wanted to set up the same facilities all over again," Subic told his interviewer, one of the militants holding the embassy. The militant talked to Subic through an interpreter.

(In Washington, a State Department spokesman, when asked to comment on Subic's comments, said, "What possible meaning can the so-called confession have under the circumstances?" The spokesman declined further comment. American sources said that Subic, 24, enlisted in the Army shortly after dropping out of Bowling Green (Ohio) High School in his junior year.)

Subic said that when he came to Iran last June he supported the shah and believed that the ex-monarch was a good, well-meaning modernizer.

"I came here and saw things for myself. I arrived after the shah had left. But still there was enough evidence of his crimes, torture and wrong policies."

Subic added: "I have written several articles for the American press, trying to tell the Americans the truth about Iran. Every time, after receiving a clipping of the article I have done, I realized that the words have been turned around to show the students as absolutely bad."

My articles are also censored. They don't mean what I intended them to mean." There was no elaboration on this.

Subic said he respected President Carter but said Carter is making "a big mistake" regarding Iran. "His aides have convinced him to behave like this."

Subic accused Carter of putting his own re-election efforts ahead of the safety and freedom of the hostages. "Carter is not concerned about us. He is concerned about his electoral problems." The soldier said the hostages were still in Tehran because they are not from the wealthy, influential segments of American society.

"If we had money, or we were Jews, we would have been back in the United States by now," he said.

He said the shah should be put on trial before "an international jury — similar to the one that tried Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg."

The staff sergeant appeared to have considerable knowledge of electronic espionage equipment and practices. He said the Americans used a C-12 spy aircraft to take intelligence pictures of Iran and Pakistan.

"The airplane was in Mehrabad airport (to the west of Tehran). The Iranians did not know what it was. The embassy finally got it out."

He said that about a month before the embassy was taken over he sent to the United States the spy plane's camera, which he described as a "top-secret classified device."

Subic said the embassy intended to bring the plane back to Iran for further espionage. "If the embassy had not been occupied, the airplane would have been here now."

Subic claimed his boss, whom he said was a Col. Schaffer, had had talks with a few Iranian military officers and CIA agents "from the second floor" to arrange for a coup

against the Islamic regime. "I heard them talking about it," he said.

He also claimed that Schaffer used the embassy's access to diplomatic mailing facilities to transfer money to an ex-attache at the Iranian embassy in Washington.

"He knew and I knew it was illegal to send money abroad. But he did it."

The staff sergeant said he has seen documents proving that the shah "did everything the Americans told him to do."

He also claimed he has seen pictures and documents concerning corruption in the imperial family. "What kills me is that the U.S. government leaders are also involved."

For instance, he said: "I saw pictures of the shah's sister and U.S. congressmen posing in the nude, doing illegal or indecent things together. Sex objects, sex magazines, everything lying around. Politicians, government leaders, are not supposed to do these things."

A spokesman for the militants said Subic had seen "the immoral pictures at a place outside the embassy." The spokesman said: "We neither deal with such lewd subjects nor take any interest in them."

Subic said the militants gave the captives new, clean clothes, fresh, good food, playing cards, magazines and "everything we want." "They even wash for us. . . . I think they are our servants rather than our captors."

He said the hostages and the militants "have some differences but we get along all right."

"Mail is a big problem," Subic said. "I think someone in the U.S. government is holding it up."

Reportedly, Subic has confided to a couple of his captors that he has a fiance awaiting him in England and does not plan to return to the United States.



## U.S. Officials Say Iraq Is Harboring Iranians Seeking to Oust Khomeini

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 9 — United States intelligence has detected armed Iranian exile groups inside Iraq. Government officials said today.

The officials said that the Iraqis had permitted the exiles to form military groups committed to the overthrow of the Iranian revolutionary government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Some officials said the anti-Khomeini Iranians might have been involved in recent skirmishes along the border. Defense Department aides were unable to confirm reports of an Iraqi-Iranian helicopter battle, but they said forces along the border had traded artillery fire near the Iranian town of Qasr-i-Shirin.

Little is known here about the size and the makeup of the anti-Khomeini groups, other than their affiliation with supporters of Shahpur Bakhtiar, the last Iranian Prime Minister designated by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. Mr. Bakhtiar left Iran at the time of the revolution in early 1979 and now lives in Paris.

### U.S. Seeks Closer Iraqi Relations

Officials said the pro-Bakhtiar groups were receiving no American support and were not in contact with Washington.

But the United States is said to be keeping a close watch on the Iraqi-Iranian dispute. The officials said that, in the wake of the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the United States is interested in exploring a new diplomatic opening with Iraq.

Although Iraq has been hostile to Washington and closely aligned with Moscow, officials said Iraq's dispute with Iran and a widening schism between Iraq and the Soviet Union had led senior aides to seek ways of improving American-Iraqi ties.

Officials said the effort was sidetracked this week when the Administration, under Congressional pressure, was forced to defer a decision on supplying Iraq with naval gas-turbine engines.

The officials said Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance had decided to approve the export of the engines, to be fitted on four Italian-built frigates. The \$11.2 million engine deal attracted attention in January, when the Commerce Department announced that the engines, built by General Electric, could be sold to Iraq.

The deal was attacked by Representatives Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of New York, and Millicent Fenwick, Republican of New Jersey, on the ground that Iraq had supported Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel.

Officials said that Mr. Vance, with the backing of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, decided to allow the sale to go through as part of an effort to signal interest in building a new relationship with Iraq.

Mr. Vance's action coincided with an attack by Iraqi-backed Palestinians against an Israeli kibbutz in which three people were killed. Following the attack, Mrs. Fenwick is known to have told the State Department that the engine deal would violate a legislative prohibition against selling military equipment to countries that assist terrorists.

A White House spokesman said today that the deal was again under review.

The engine deal has also generated controversy within the Administration. At the Pentagon, some aides are said to be concerned about strengthening the Iraqi Navy in the Persian Gulf. Iraq now has small, Soviet-supplied patrol boats that are confined to coastal waters.

Officials said the 3,200-ton Italian frigates would enable Iraq to operate in the Strait of Hormuz, which is used by oil-tanker traffic between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

"I'm not sure we want the Iraqis to be able to sink oil tankers," a defense aide commented.

State Department officials are said to be divided. Some believe that the United States should capitalize on Iraqi-Iranian tensions to build closer ties with Iraq; others fear that such a show of support could further alienate Iran.

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES  
10 APRIL 1980

# Militants in Iran Say Captives Die If U.S. Attacks

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, April 9 — The militants occupying the American Embassy threatened today to "destroy all the hostages immediately" if the United States began even "the smallest military action against Iran."

The threat, a renewal of one made shortly after the Americans were seized on Nov. 4, came after President Carter's announcement of political and economic sanctions against Iran.

While his announcement, made Monday, did not mention military action, neither did it rule it out, and the militants declared in a statement distributed this afternoon that the "criminal ruling circles of the United States" would be responsible for any harm done to the hostages.

## Hostages Seen in Telecast

The statement was followed tonight by telecast showing what the announcer described as two American hostages making "shocking revelations" of how the embassy had operated. A film, broadcast by the Iranian state television shortly before it signed off at midnight, purported to show two young military men assigned to the defense attaché's office, one of whom said he was being well treated.

[In Washington, Carter Administration officials, noting that the Government was keeping a close watch on the increasing dispute between Iran and neighboring Iraq, said intelligence had detected armed Iranian exile groups inside Iraq committed to the overthrow of the Teheran regime. Page A16.]

This morning Foreign Minister Sadeq Ghotbzadeh indicated at a news conference that Iran had no immediate plans for measures to counter the breaking of diplomatic relations and other sanctions ordered by Mr. Carter. The President's actions came after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini put an end to attempts to transfer the hostages to Government custody by ordering that they remain in the hands of the militants.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh said that while breaking relations was a "nervous action" by Washington, "we are keeping our cools." But he added that Iran might take such measures as cutting off oil to countries that supported the United States boycott, trade embargo or other measures.

In tonight's telecast of purported ac-

tivities at the embassy, the names used in the film clip were obscured by a loud Persian-language narration and translation of what the hostages said.

One hostage, a dark-haired young man wearing glasses, camouflage trousers and a red shirt, was shown in what appeared to be a computer center inside a warehouse or supply depot on the embassy compound. He pulled up squares of carpeting and removed metal plates in the floor to reveal wires and electrical connections.

## Generators Brought In

According to the narration, he said that the equipment was used to monitor computers and to listen to radios. He added that the embassy had brought in large generators to run the equipment because it used so much electricity that it might arouse suspicions.

"They came and we were surprised they were cleared through customs so rapidly," the Persian translation quoted him as saying. "I don't know whether there is a C.I.A. man in the customs."

He said, according to the film clip, that if the computers had been revealed it would have been a major blow to the United States because they were being used to obtain very important espionage information.

Opening a large locked structure resembling a vault, the young man was quoted as saying that embassy staff members were selling liquor from the embassy stores that he said contained some \$2 million worth of liquor. This was enough, he said, to last the 120-member staff for seven years.

## The Hard Stuff

"I'm talking about whisky — the hard stuff — not beer and wine," the hostage could be heard saying in English during a momentary pause in the Persian narration. The building appeared to be a warehouse, and, according to the narration, he said that the computer building had been constructed with the supply depot on top so that its purpose would be disguised.

The other hostage had blond hair parted on one side and he wore a V-neck sweater. He sat at a desk, questioned by two militants, in an office with a sign on the door saying "Defense Attaché."

According to the narration, he said that the captors allowed the 50 Americans to engage in sports, fed them good food and washed their clothes.

He said he had a high opinion of the Shah when he first arrived in Iran in July but that it had dimmed after he traveled about the country and saw that there were no roads and schools except in major towns.

The hostage showed a picture of an aircraft that he said had cameras mounted under the pilot and copilot in order to take surveillance films for espionage purposes.

The Persian translation overriding the spoken English quoted the hostage as

saying that the captives had not been freed because "we do not have any money, we are not important people and we are not Jewish."

"The American ruling body has left 50 Americans in here in order to put the Shah in the United States."

Mr. Ghotbzadeh raised the possibility at his news conference that families of the hostages might be able to pay visits to the embassy. This afternoon he discussed the matter with the militants at the embassy.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh said he was in favor of such a plan, but noted that it needed the approval of the Revolutionary Council and Ayatollah Khomeini.

Asked which countries were supporting Iran, Mr. Ghotbzadeh said:

"There are a number of them. Algeria for one, and Syria is the other one."

# Inside the news—briefly

## Hostages set up for spy trial?

Tehran, Iran

Two of the American Embassy hostages were shown on Iranian television late April 9 in an apparent revival of an attempt by their captors to prove charges of espionage.

The hostages were shown separately, one in the defense attache's office in the embassy and the other in what appeared to be a communications monitoring room, Monitor correspondent Ned Temko reports from Iran.

Both hostages were giving explanations of various aspects of embassy operations. Due to a sometimes inconclusive Persian language narration, it was not immediately possible to determine the full extent of the areas covered.

The identity of the hostages was also not immediately known.

One of those shown, apparently a young marine, pointed to wires in what seemed to be a communications room and said the equipment could "monitor computer traffic in Iran."

He then pointed to several junction boxes. "This one goes to the National Security Agency," he said. He was then briefly overridden by Persian language narration.

Pointing to another box, he said, "this is CIA."

It was not immediately clear whether the hostages' narrative had indicated specific instances of espionage or had implicated the interviewed pair or others of the 50 captives.

It was also not clear when the film had been taken or why it was being shown. But Western diplomats expressed concern that it could be a prelude to intensified efforts by student militants to prove wrongdoing and perhaps even go through with past vows to stage trials.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A1-STHE BALTIMORE SUN  
10 April 1980

# Use of military would cost hostages' lives, captors say

By DOUGLAS WATSON  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Tehran—The Iranian militants holding 50 Americans hostage here threatened yesterday that the captives all will be killed if there is "the slightest military intervention" by the United States.

The deadly warning overshadowed comments by Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh that he believed the militants favored improving living conditions for the hostages, perhaps through permitting members of their immediate families to visit them.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh said he personally favors allowing more visits to the hostages, now expected to remain captives in the occupied U.S. Embassy at least until the still-to-be-elected Iranian Parliament is organized in June. However, Mr. Ghotbzadeh does not speak for the Muslims holding the Americans captive.

Like most political groups here, the captors issued a statement supporting Iran's revolutionary regime in the intensified confrontation with the United States resulting from the announced American trade boycott.

The embassy militants declared, "The Iranian people and all oppressed people of the world celebrate this severance of relations. . . . It makes this brave people more determined in paving the straight line of Islam, which is confrontation with the criminal United States."

Yesterday, an article in the *Islamic Republic* newspaper, the organ of Iran's leading political party, called for expulsion of about 20 American journalists who have been permitted to report from Tehran. However, Iranian officials said they were going "to keep their cool," and there was no plan for kicking out what is—other

than Americans married to Iranians—the last remaining group of U.S. citizens in the country.

The *Islamic Republic* article declared: "Now that the political relations of Iran and the United States are cut, there is no reason anymore for the American spy correspondents to walk freely in the streets of Tehran and do spying for the CIA."

But Mr. Ghotbzadeh, who has become almost a nightly feature on American television, showed no inclination during a press conference here yesterday to say goodbye to the American television networks, who are constantly interviewing him.

And an official of Iran's ministry of national guidance protested what he described as a false, unsubstantiated report by Agence France-Presse, the semi-official French news agency, that the remaining Americans here would be arrested.

Iranians, meanwhile, were assured by their government yesterday that the break in diplomatic relations should not mean any severing of telephone or postal communications between the two countries.

An official of Iran's central bank said it was expected that a new arrangement could be made through a third party to enable Iranian parents to continue sending money to young Iranians still studying at colleges in the United States.

The Iranian media yesterday echoed this country's revolutionary leaders in declaring their contempt for the U.S. retaliatory actions.

*Ettelaat*, one of the main newspapers, editorialized that the previous diplomatic relations "were based on plunder and oppression and had been practically severed

by the revolutionary Iranian masses since the first days of the revolution."

An Iranian radio station said the news of the breaking of diplomatic relations "swept through the people like a spring breeze, boosting morale. . . . We were tired of American wheat, rice, meat, eggs and worthless goods."

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AFGHANISTAN

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ON PAGE A16

THE WASHINGTON POST  
8 April 1980

## More Evidence Cited of Soviet Nerve Gas Use

Associated Press

There is mounting evidence that the Soviets are using incapacitating gas against anti-Marxist rebels in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said yesterday.

Brown also said there are some reports that the Soviets may be using lethal gas in efforts to subdue Afghan resistance. He did not indicate the nature of the evidence or the sources of the reports.

Such reports have been received by U.S. intelligence as far back as January, although officials have said there has been no conclusive evidence.

U.S. intelligence sources have said Afghan refugees, questioned separately, have described effects corresponding to what American specialists say are known effects of a nerve agent called Soman.

Brown spoke of the possible Soviet use of gas in a speech prepared for the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, where he listed what he called "some of the harsh facts of life about Afghanistan today."

Brown's prepared speech obviously was designed to buttress the Carter administration's position that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could foreshadow Soviet designs on the oil-producing Persian Gulf area.

He warned that if the Persian Gulf area fell under Soviet control, "our allies would be in the shadow of economic vassalage to the Soviets, and our own vital security interests correspondingly crippled."

A similar theme was struck in a separate speech prepared by Deputy Defense Secretary W. Graham Claytor Jr. for a conference of the Advertising Council here.

Claytor said that "the reality of Afghanistan, I believe, has gradually slipped from public attention."

Both Brown and Claytor voiced support for President Carter's demand that U.S. athletes boycott the Moscow Olympics.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C25

THE WASHINGTON POST  
7 April 1980

## **JACK ANDERSON**

**Animal Farm**—The Russian bear that rampaged through Afghanistan is being transformed by Soviet propagandists into Mischa, the cuddly, cute cub that is the symbol of the Summer Olympics. It fools those of childlike gullibility.

The Kremlin has more skillfully utilized another animal from childhood fable—the wolf in sheep's clothing—to manipulate a worldwide network of interlocking front groups that lend respectability to Soviet policy goals abroad, according to secret CIA files.

The front organizations include such high-sounding groups as the International Institute for Peace, World Peace Council, World Federation of Democratic Youth, and even, with particular irony, the Christian Peace Conference and the International Federation of Resistance Fighters.

"These organizations profess non-communist goals," one CIA report states, "and for that reason are, under certain circumstances, more operationally useful to the Soviet Union than groups of communist sympathizers."

The CIA estimates that the Kremlin funds 13 of these international organizations to the tune of \$63 million a year.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 5CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
6 April 1980

# Russians getting Afghan message—'Ivan, go home'

Since Afghanistan closed its borders to Western reporters, news from inside the country has been sparse. London Sunday Times reporter Barrie Penrose managed to get into the country and filed this first-hand report.

London Sunday Times

KABUL, Afghanistan—The Moslem insurgents are tasting blood.

The burned-out tanks, wrecked helicopters, and other destroyed Soviet equipment are proof that heavy weapons are reaching rebel hideouts in the mountains.

This is reflected in Soviet reactions: the apparently systematic torturing of Afghan political prisoners; the desperate need to have "self-confessed" CIA spies to show to the people; and the virtual closure of the country's borders to Western correspondents.

I entered Afghanistan as a tourist, by buying a ticket to Kabul from Afghan Tours in Piccadilly. In the Afghan capital, I bought a second ticket, enabling me to join some pilgrims traveling by bus to Mazari-Sharif in the north to celebrate Nawroz, the Islamic New Year.

AT LEAST 20 vast military camps dot the 300-kilometer run to Mazar. With their guns pointing uniformly at Kabul were close-packed assortments of Soviet weaponry: tanks, armored personnel carriers, field artillery, and rows of amphibious vehicles each capable of carrying 12 men.

Positioned between these camps, at intervals of never less than a kilometer, are smaller emplacements. A cluster of tanks guard a bridge, or a solitary soldier peers from behind a machine-gun nest built of stones.

Significantly for the military mind, and a comfort for pilgrims on our bus, Soviet firepower points mainly toward the hills and the caves which honeycomb the peaks beyond. The Russian soldier has learned that, despite what his commander told him last December, he is not welcome in Afghanistan and that, if retribution comes, it will certainly come from above.

THE WHOLE HIGHWAY from Kabul to Mazar, and the nearby Soviet border crossing-point at Tirmiz is clearly, well protected from attack. In between frequent stops for prayers, the bus picks its way through a string of convoys, often more than 100 vehicles strong.

One convoy, driving toward Kabul, contains thousands of shiny metal beds, one of the most popular Soviet export lines to Afghanistan and a sure sign that the Russians will soon change their tents for more permanent barracks.

Not far from Mazar are three large Soviet supply depots and two impressive contingents of tanks, each set well back on the side of the road. Some move about like black crabs, and their guns point in every direction.

Their presence in such strength outside a city, even during the festival of Nawroz, is plain enough for any pilgrim. Indeed, there had been talk on the bus of a Kabul-style insurrection on Nawroz [March 21]. It is explained that the religious festival provides a chance for a get-together of underground supporters of the Islamic opposition parties.

EVEN MORE menacing are the armed civilian supporters of Babrak Karmal, the Soviet-backed Afghan leader. They and units from the Afghan army guard the city gates. Some of them, students with earnest faces, search the pilgrims and their bundles with a certain relish, occasionally flicking the safety catch of their semi-automatic rifles.

For once, I too am searched and my passport and tourist visa are studied carefully. After stating my wish to see the Mazar shrine of Hazarate Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, I am allowed into the city.

Mazar itself, dominated by the magnificent blue mosque with its thousands of pilgrims, is tightly under the control of tanks, armored personnel carriers, large numbers of Afghan troops, and well-armed civilians.

FROM MAZAR TO Aq Chah and Shibarghan, the road runs parallel with the Soviet border. Here are more burned out Soviet trucks and gasoline tankers. Just beyond Shibarghan are the stone graves of two government functionaries killed, the driver says, in recent fighting between party members and insurgents. The red party flags above their graves were left, says the driver, out of respect for the dead, and he spits upon the stones.

Pushing on toward Mazar, our coach squeezes past several fast-moving lines of tanks which, with the spring thaw, can spread far afield in the search for rebels and their hideaways.

The oppressive reality of this Soviet muscle is lightened temporarily by the sight of no one, but two burned out helicopters and the charred remains of a gas truck. With their smiles, the pilgrims display their sympathies.

FROM AFGHANS in the north, I learn of fighting 48 hours before in several areas around Baghjan and Kunduz. At Jari, a mass grave contains the bodies of some 40 people killed either in very recent fighting or in reprisals by the Russians.

On the road to Kunduz, there are burned out houses, and schools, clearly destroyed from the air.

Close to Kunduz, there is a funeral procession with several hundred mourners. A village elder says the victims died fighting the Shorvees [Soviets]. He points at the hilltop which runs parallel with the road 500 meters away. There are four tanks and a personnel carrier, their guns pointing in our direction.

IN KUNDUZ-ITSELF, occupied in force by the Russians, people generally dismiss claims heard in Mazar that some 300 Russians had died in fighting 48 hours before.

A school teacher says skirmishes have taken place outside the town but no more than 30 Russians have died. He says that more than 1,000 prisoners have been freed from a jail near Kunduz. In return, the insurgents and innocent villagers have suffered reprisal raids by Soviet bombers, leaving many dead and wounded.

Although a steady trickle of deserters from the Afghan army are joining the resistance movement, says the teacher, they remain lamentably short of weapons capable of combating Soviet airpower.

RETURNING TO KABUL in our mixed convoy of buses, taxis, and lines of Soviet tanks and other armored vehicles, we hear distant automatic rifle fire at times quite heavy. It is noticed that we are not Afghans and a Soviet NCO is placed next to me in my taxi.

He speaks irritably about the Afghans. In Moscow, he and his compatriots were told that they were going to fight a conventional war with American and British troops, aided by the Chinese and Pakistanis, invading Afghanistan from the east. In reality they have found nothing but sullen, unwelcoming inhabitants who take pot-shots at them from the hills.



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 48NEWSWEEK  
14 April 1980

## A 'CIA Confession' in Kabul

With his blond hair, his trendy aviator glasses and his sweater, the young man looked as though he had just walked off an American college campus. But when Robert Lee appeared on Soviet and Afghan television last week, he made a startling—if wholly unconvincing—confession: he said he was a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency sent to aid Afghan guerrillas in their fight against the Soviet-installed government.

Since the Soviet invasion last December, Moscow's puppet regime in Afghanistan has been anxious to establish foreign complicity in the rebel cause—especially if the foreign devil was an American. Lee provided a convenient propaganda tool. A former chemistry student at the University of California, Lee happened to be in Afghanistan during the guerrilla uprising in February. He was arrested and imprisoned in a Kabul jail. There, according to former prisoners, Lee was subjected to physical and psychological mistreatment designed to extract his "confession."

"Lee is very confused," said David Wilkie, a 21-year-old Australian student who had been in an adjoining cell. "He has

bronchial pneumonia brought on by the intense damp cold and he also has jaundice. Without medical treatment, he could die." Wilkie said Lee was questioned incessantly by Afghan and Soviet officers and offered asylum and a new life in East Germany in exchange for his televised performance. As Wilkie recalled: "I remember hearing him say repeatedly, 'I want to make a new beginning for myself, I want to go to East Germany.' He was in such a bad state, he began saying anything to please his guards."

**'Crying Like Babies':** According to the released prisoners, Afghan jailers systematically tortured inmates to extract information about the resistance movement. Several mentioned electric-shock treatment; others recounted how an 8-year-old boy and a 90-year-old man were severely burned with lighted cigarettes. "At night we could all hear other prisoners, Afghans and Pakistanis mostly, screaming while they were being beaten and questioned," said Wilkie. "There was banging and thumping and some were crying like babies." Given the prospect of undergoing such torture, Wilkie said, "I wasn't surprised that Lee agreed to do what they wanted." But Lee's captors have not done what he wanted. Despite his "confession," the young American is still imprisoned in his damp Kabul cell.

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ON PAGE 59

BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE  
6 APRIL 1980

# Soviet, Afghan treaty OK'd

Associated Press

NEW DELHI — Afghanistan's ruling Revolutionary Council has approved a treaty permitting the Soviet Union to temporarily maintain "a limited contingent" of troops in the country, Radio Kabul reported.

The broadcast, monitored here late Friday, also quoted Afghanistan's President Babrak Karmal as saying his government would not take part in any talks to ease the Afghan crisis until external threats to the country ceased.

"Nothing will get off the ground unless and until all interferences, interventions, armed raids, training, supply of arms and other forms of subversive activities against the Afghan revolutionary government are completely stopped," he said.

The state radio did not give the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Western intelligence sources have estimated their current strength at 85,000.

"The terms of the (Soviet-Afghan) treaty have been approved by the presidium of the Revolutionary Council at its recent meeting," said the broadcast, monitored here by the United News of India.

A report from Moscow said the treaty, signed during a recent visit by Afghan leaders, was ratified by the Soviet Parliament Friday.

China's official Xinhua news agency denounced the signing of the Soviet-Afghan treaty, saying the pact "demonstrates that the Soviet occupation troops intend to hang on in Afghanistan."

Russian troops moved into Kabul shortly before Christmas last year, then staged a lightning coup which toppled Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and replaced him with Karmal, another Marxist. Amin was killed in the takeover. The troops stayed on to help fight Moslem guerrillas who have been battling three successive pro-Soviet governments since April 1978.

Both Karmal and the Kremlin have accused the United States, China and other countries of arming and training the Moslem guerrillas.

Meanwhile, guerrillas claimed yesterday to have struck on the outskirts of the Afghan capital of Kabul last week, attacking police barracks in a crowded bazaar inaccessible to the regime's Soviet-made tanks.

According to a report reaching here, six persons died in the fighting, among the first since Soviet and government troops crushed an anti-Russian uprising in Kabul six weeks ago. The report, provided by a source who has proved reliable in the past, said the dead included three policemen, two government soldiers and one guerrilla. No independent confirmation of the report was possible.

Also, yesterday Reuters reported a delegation of congressmen from the United States arrived in Somalia after President Mohammed Siad Barre said he had agreed in principle to offer the United States air and naval facilities.

US officials said the delegation, headed by House Armed Services Committee chairman Melvin Price, would discuss President Jimmy Carter's strategy in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and increased American access to regional facilities.

Western diplomats in Somalia said US military technicians have examined the former Soviet base at Berbera which is strategically situated on the Gulf of Aden.

Berbera was used as a submarine, maintenance and communications base by the Soviet Navy until Somalia broke its friendship treaty with Moscow in November 1977.

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ON PAGE 4

CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
5 April 1980

## World briefs

### *U.S. uses gas, say Russ*

MOSCOW—The Soviet radio said Friday that the United States is supplying Afghan rebels with chemical weapons that "affect eyesight and human behavior" and can cause death. Radio Moscow's English-language service said the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is providing grenades with a toxic agent to "bands of mercenaries." U.S. officials have charged the Soviet Union has used toxic agents against rebels in Afghanistan. The Soviets have denied the charges.

CINCINNATI ENQUIRER  
18 MARCH 1980

## Readers' Views

# Should Taxes Support Afghan Drug Peddlers?

TO THE EDITOR: *The Enquirer* editorial calling for military aid to Afghan "rebels" (Feb. 28) seriously distorts the issues at hand.

In the first place, the "rebels," far from desiring freedom for their countrymen, seek to overthrow popular, far-reaching reforms made in the last two years. *The Enquirer* reported (Feb. 14) that a major reason for anti-government terrorism has been the extension of women's rights, including the right to marry without parental consent, to adopt Western dress and to attend public meetings. Other stories have listed a major land reform, a widespread literacy campaign, the abolition of usury and the extension of voting rights as factors prompting the "revolt."

Secondly, the proposal is unnecessary since, as *The Enquirer* reported in January, the terrorists have been supporting themselves on the sale of opium which, as heroin, has reached U.S. and European drug markets. Furthermore, again according to *The Enquirer* (Feb. 16), the United States is already supplying weapons to the rebels. *Counterspy* magazine has shown the existence of a Pakistan-based Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) task force for over a year, far pre-dating Soviet military aid to the Afghan government.

The *New York Times* has reported that several of the rebel leaders are men so unconcerned about their country's future that they have been U.S. citizens for years. Another leader, Sayed Ahmad Gailani, who claims to be a saint, has for years been the manager of Kabul's Peugeot dealership. Their concern is not for freedom, but instead the restoration of a regime under which the per capita income was \$120 a year, the infant-mortality rate over 25%, 5% of the people owned 50% of the land, and 95% of the population was unable to read or write. They have financed their terrorism by selling narcotics, scarcely an activity of genuine religious leaders.

Given the well-documented history of CIA "destabilization" of governments which do not prove properly receptive to U.S. policies (Guatemala, Chile, Guyana, Jamaica, Ethiopia, Grenada, etc.), it is understandable, if unfortunate, that the Afghan government felt compelled to protect its sovereignty by invoking its mutual-aid treaty with the Soviet Union. If the United States truly wishes to see the end of Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan, the proper course is to end administration support of terrorism, not increase it.

*Enquirer* readers should think about whether they want their tax dollars spent

in the support of drug peddlers whose goal is to restore tyranny in Afghanistan.

JONATHAN WEISBERGER  
PO Box 2063

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SEC - PAGE AIRWAYS

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
9 April 1980

# Page Airways Agrees To Settle SEC Lawsuit

By John F. Berry

Washington Post Staff Writer

Page Airways Inc., an aircraft servicing and sales company, agreed yesterday to settle a 2-year-old suit brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission alleging questionable payments to foreign officials.

Page said it agreed to a consent decree entered in U.S. District Court in its headquarters city of Rochester, N.Y., because the agency claimed that to continue litigation might jeopardize national security.

The SEC suit, filed on April 12, 1978, accused Page executives of defrauding company shareholders by failing to disclose some \$2.5 million of corporate funds allegedly used to make secret payments to foreign officials.

Among those who allegedly got payments from Page was former Uganda dictator Idi Amin, who before he was overthrown got a Cadillac convertible from the company, the SEC said.

The payments were made between 1971 and 1978, when Page was the exclusive sales agent for Grumman Corp.'s executive jet Gulfstream II, the SEC suit said.

Besides Amin, others allegedly getting payments to facilitate plane sales

were the president of Gabon, a government minister in Malaysia, the Ivory Coast Republic's ambassador to the United States, and several agents in the Middle East.

In a news release yesterday, the SEC said that in reaching the settlement "the commission and Page considered concerns raised by another agency of the U.S. government regarding matters of national interest."

The Wall Street Journal claimed in yesterday's edition that the SEC dropped the charges at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The SEC suit named Page chief executive James P. Wilmont and five other executives. Charges against all six were dropped as part of the settlement.

The company was enjoined permanently under terms of the settlement from further violations of the federal securities laws. The company also agreed to conduct an internal investigation of the SEC charges and report the findings to Page's board of directors.

The company retained Judith T. Younger, of the Cornell University School of Law to oversee the internal investigation. The company agreed to disclose any new findings to the SEC and the shareholders.

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ON PAGE A 8

THE BALTIMORE SUN  
9 April 1980

## In The Nation

### SEC allegedly bows to CIA

Washington (AP)—The Securities and Exchange Commission, allegedly bowing to a request from the Central Intelligence Agency, yesterday settled two-year-old foreign bribery charges against Page Airways.

Sources indicated the CIA intervened in the case, which involved accusations that the Rochester (N.Y.) company made \$7.5 million in illegal payments between 1972 and 1977 to officials in several foreign countries, including Uganda, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

Page subcontracted part of its Uganda work to Southern Air Transport, a Miami airline with past ties to the CIA. The SEC, in announcing the unusual settlement, would say only: "The commission and Page considered concerns raised by another agency of the U.S. government regarding matters of national interest."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 8THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
8 April 1980

## SEC Seen Dropping Foreign Payoff Case Against Page Airways at CIA's Request

By JERRY LANDAUER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Securities and Exchange Commission is negotiating an unusual settlement of foreign bribery charges brought in 1978 against Page Airways Inc. In effect, the SEC is dropping the charges at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Announcement of the settlement is expected soon, in papers scheduled to be filed with a federal district judge in Rochester, N.Y., Page's headquarters. And unless a last-minute hitch develops, this will be the first time the SEC has officially acknowledged that it can't prosecute a foreign payoff case without disclosing national security secrets.

Page hinted at the probable settlement in an annual report filed with the SEC last week, but without mentioning the CIA's involvement. A final agreement hasn't been reached, the company said, emphasizing its intention to fight the charges in court unless a settlement is reached.

Neither Page nor its Washington lawyer, Judah Best, would discuss possible reasons for the CIA's interest in disposing of the case as quickly and quietly as possible. "The facts contained in the company's annual report are true and accurate," Mr. Best said. "Beyond that I have nothing to say." Burton Wland, an SEC branch chief, likewise wouldn't comment, nor would the CIA.

### Link to Foreign Officials

Still, it seems apparent that the CIA doesn't want to risk unraveling an overseas intelligence-gathering mission in which Page participated, whether wittingly or unwittingly, by paying hefty sales commissions to foreign officials deemed friendly to the U.S.

According to the SEC's two-year-old complaint, Page and six top executives violated securities laws by channeling more than \$7.5 million of "corrupt, illegal, improper or unaccountable" payments to promote business abroad from 1972 to 1977. The asserted recipients included the president of Gabon, a government minister in Malaysia, the Ivory Coast's ambassador to the U.S. and agents who helped the company win business in

Saudi Arabia and Morocco. The agents weren't identified.

Page and the six accused executives have denied any violation of law. The charges against the six will probably be dismissed.

Significantly, too, Page operated in Uganda during the tumultuous regime of former dictator Idi Amin, at a time when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were jousting for influence there. The SEC complaint says Page once gave Mr. Amin a Cadillac convertible, and, whether by coincidence or design, Page subcontracted part of its Uganda business to Southern Air Transport, a Miami, Fla.-based airline with past ties to the CIA.

### Clandestine Missions

In fact, the CIA owned Southern Air Transport from 1960 to 1973, along with a secret stable of other airline "proprietarys" that were kept on call for clandestine, paramilitary missions abroad. And as the Senate Intelligence Committee reported in 1976, the sale of a CIA "asset" doesn't necessarily mean dissolution of all ties to the U.S. government. "In a very real sense, it's nearly impossible to evaluate whether a link still exists between the agency and a former asset related to a proprietary," the Senate panel noted.

Two years after the CIA sold Southern Air Transport to private interests, Page Airways hired Southern Air to provide ground services and flight crews for government-owned Uganda Airlines. One Southern Air pilot, Vernon Phillips, says Soviet military advisers were training the fledgling Uganda air force at the same time, and at the same airport on Lake Victoria. But Mr. Phillips says he's sure Page's presence in Uganda was strictly commercial; "it wasn't a CIA operation," he says.

Yet Mr. Best, Page's lawyer, apparently has reason to believe that the U.S. government knew about the foreign activities that are the subject of the SEC's bribery charges. Last year, according to court records, he issued subpoenas to the CIA and to the State Department demanding access to all government documents indicating knowledge of Page's business payments in eight foreign countries. Instead of responding to the subpoenas, government officials initiated settlement talks.

This issue — government knowledge or even encouragement of allegedly improper corporate payments to foreign officials — has been raised before, in a criminal context. The Justice Department didn't prosecute top executives of Lockheed Corp. partly because defense lawyers claimed government "awareness" of the payments that were deemed illegal. Also, indictments of two executives of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. were dropped because the government feared disclosure of national security secrets.

But until the Page case, the SEC hasn't had to confront the national security issue in public. "I don't know of any instance in which the agency has stated that it was exercising prosecutorial discretion because of national security consideration," says Andrew Rothman, an SEC spokesman.



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MISCELLANEOUS

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# BOOKS & THE ARTS.

## Book Held Hostage

THOMAS POWERS

**COUNTERCOUP:** The Struggle for the Control of Iran. By Kermit Roosevelt. McGraw-Hill. Withdrawn from publication.

**H**is Imperial Majesty Mohammed Riza Shah Pahlavi, Aryamehr, Shahanshah of Iran, did not cut a figure as imposing as his titles in the coup which saved his throne—for a time—back in August 1953. The coup wasn't his idea. He felt himself a prisoner in his own palace, was afraid to speak his mind even outdoors, shrank in royal circumlocution from the frank urging of his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, that the time had come to act. The British had put the Shah in power in 1941, when he was just 21, but had since written him off as hopelessly irresolute. A British diplomat proposed a "pen-n theory" to explain the Shah's erasing and plunging. In one mood he felt as dazzling as the gorgeous medals on his royal chest; he even told a French interviewer, years later, that God, personally, told him what to do. But the Shah's sense of destiny was only wind; he might go to bed a king and wake up in self-doubt and despondency, certain all was lost. He was far from being the ideal sort of man to seize power from a popular demagogue, but there was no one else in 1953 when the British and the Americans decided that Mohammed Mossadegh was slipping into the Russian orbit, and had to go.

Of course this is not quite the way Kermit Roosevelt describes the Shah in *Counter coup*. Restoring the Shah to power is probably the happiest memory of Roosevelt's life, and he is the friendliest of historians. But there is no disguising the tremulous man at the heart of Roosevelt's short, interesting, but problematic account of the events which have been rankling the Iranian national pride ever since.

But 500 copies of Roosevelt's book reached reviewers and bookstores last September when his publisher,

Thomas Powers, is the author of *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (Alfred A. Knopf).

McGraw-Hill, threatened with a libel suit in England by British Petroleum, abruptly canceled the book's official publication and recalled the copies which had already gone out. The entire edition of 7,500—less the few hundred beyond McGraw-Hill's reach—was then pulped, for a loss of about \$1.50 a copy. Second thoughts are not often so dramatic. Roosevelt, it appeared, had run afoul of Britain's Official Secrets Act in his original manuscript when he ascribed a role in the coup to the Secret Intelligence Service. The S.I.S. protested to the Central Intelligence Agency, which then insisted that Roosevelt remove all references to British intelligence in the published version of his book. Since the British role had been a large one—even greater than Roosevelt had been ready to acknowledge—this left a considerable gap in the story. Roosevelt solved the problem by simply substituting A.I.O.C.—the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company—for S.I.S. As the successor to the A.I.O.C., British Petroleum protested. Hence the book's withdrawal, so McGraw-Hill could print a new version amending the record.

According to a source at McGraw-Hill, Roosevelt went back to the C.I.A., and the C.I.A. went back to the S.I.S., and it was agreed all around that the best way out of the mess was to publish the first version of the manuscript, which correctly ascribed a role to the British. This time, encouraged by a book club sale, McGraw-Hill printed 15,000 copies and scheduled publication for January. But after the U.S. Embassy was occupied by Iranian militants last November, Roosevelt asked McGraw-Hill to hold up distribution once again, until after the hostages were freed. The new copies of *Counter coup*—apparently identical to the first except for the naming of the S.I.S.—are now sitting in a McGraw-Hill warehouse, as much the hostages of recent history as the fifty Americans being held in Teheran.

The C.I.A.'s role in the 1953 coup has been an open secret since the late 1950s, one of the two public "successes," along with the Guatemalan coup of 1954, habitually cited by the partisans of covert political intervention as a tool in

the cold war. One heard that Roosevelt had pulled off the coup pretty much on his own, with a handful of C.I.A. officers and a suitcase full of money. This is still the way Roosevelt describes the operation in *Counter coup*, ignoring, for the most part, the long debate over Iran in the White House and State Department, and passing lightly over the confused political events in Teheran which precipitated the coup. The little he has to say on these matters comes down to sketching in the cast of characters. His associates are also scanted; he not only changes the names; and in some cases the physical descriptions, of other C.I.A. officers but also reduces them to little more than walk-ons. More surprisingly, Roosevelt completely omits the parts played by Frank Wisner, then Roosevelt's boss as deputy director for plans, and by Wisner's chief of operations, Richard Helms. The U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson, is described by Roosevelt as being prissily nervous, and the British are left shadowy in the background. They proposed the project (apparently to Roosevelt himself) in London in November 1952, and thereafter were content with a secondary role in charge of radio communications maintained through a base on Cyprus.

The story Roosevelt tells, stripped of just about all its institutional trappings, has a lighthearted air, as if two or three fellows, not long out of school, had adroitly pulled the whole thing off with a word here, a few dollars there, a little bucking up at the crucial moment. This version of events is not so much untrue as it is incomplete, offhand and unreflective, the sort of story an old man might set down for the pleasure of his grandchildren.

Roosevelt does not make a point of it, but the C.I.A.'s coup was very much the doing of President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, who dismissed Mossadegh's claims as an Iranian nationalist, and chose to conclude that secret Russian influence was the source of Iran's squabble over oil with Britain, which, in fact, had balked at negotiating a new and more equitable oil concession. Eventually Iran nationalized the A.I.O.C., the British were expelled, and Mossadegh went to Truman and Dean Acheson for support and understanding. In late 1952 State Department

COPY 1

analysts concluded that he deserved both.

All that changed with Administrations. Roosevelt had already begun to the coup in the last months of an's term, and he got an O.K. to go ahead from the Dulles brothers in June 1953. In July he slipped secretly into Iran by car from Iraq, set up headquarters in a private house in Teheran (other sources say the basement of the U.S. military mission), and proceeded to line up Iranian support for a switch from Mossadegh to Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who had been interned during the war by the British on suspicion of pro-Nazi sympathies. The charges appear to have been only a convenient pretext for the British, but all the same, Roosevelt and Zahedi conversed in German, since Roosevelt had "practically no Farsi." (On the evidence of his book, the only Farsi he did have was "Zindabad Shah"—"Long live the Shah.")

Roosevelt's plan for the coup was very far from later heavy-handed C.I.A. efforts involving paramilitary operations, military rebellions, émigré armies and the like. He proposed that the Shah simply dismiss Mossadegh, which he had a clear constitutional right to, but which was risky because Mossadegh was more popular than the monarchy. The Shah required a great deal of coaxing; the pendulum seems to have been at the self-doubting end of its arc. Roosevelt's description of their meetings richly suggests the flattery and appeals to self-esteem he must have resorted to at the time. The royal figure he describes is virtually carved in marble; it is only between the lines, and from other sources, that we can see the wavering man of flesh and blood. But finally the Shah was convinced that a loyal military unit, led by the chief of his

imperial bodyguard, Col. Nematollah Nassiry (later head of Savak), could successfully deliver the royal *firman* dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi in his place.

The attempt was made on Saturday, August 15, 1953, and it failed. Mossadegh had learned of the plan through a spy in the Shah's camp—apparently a double agent trusted by the C.I.A.—and Colonel Nassiry was confronted by a hostile military unit when he arrived at Mossadegh's official residence. The undaunted Colonel bluffed his way through the troops, delivered the *firman* to a house servant, and even demanded a receipt before surrendering to arrest by his opponents. The following morning, Sunday, August 16, Mossadegh announced on the radio that he was taking full control of the Government, in effect deposing the Shah.

At this point Zahedi was still in hiding, the Shah instantly fled the country. (Roosevelt disingenuously calls it a strategic retreat) and the C.I.A.'s coup appeared to have collapsed. But three days later, a mob of Iranians, hired with C.I.A. funds (Roosevelt says the figure was roughly \$75,000, but another source claims it was much higher), marched on Mossadegh's residence and was backed up at the critical moment by a military unit. General Zahedi emerged from hiding, having been helped into his uniform by a C.I.A. officer, Howard ("Rocky") Stone, who buttoned his tunic. Mossadegh fled over a wall at the end of his garden, and the Shah prepared to return from his two days of exile in Rome. The night of the coup, General Zahedi's son, Ardeshir (who later became something of a Washington celebrity as the Shah's ambassador), went up to Stone at a victory party and

said, "We're in. . . . We're in. . . . What do we do now?" The Shah himself, after his return, told Roosevelt, "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army—and to you!"

On his way home, Roosevelt stopped off in London and described these events to Winston Churchill, who was in bed recovering from a stroke; the P.M. dozed off periodically during the story, but complimented Roosevelt handsomely at the end. In Washington that September, Roosevelt repeated his story for Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers. "John Foster Dulles was leaning back in his chair. Despite his posture, he was anything but sleepy. His eyes were gleaming; he seemed to be purring like a giant cat." Later, Eisenhower secretly awarded Roosevelt the National Security Medal.

The story Roosevelt tells in *Counter-coup* seems to be pretty much the story he told the old adventurer Churchill, a matter of confusion, intrigue, near misses, nail-biting, sudden triumph—a salty political string puller's yarn, rich in circumstantial detail, but so thin in context as to reduce the coup to a kind of international high jinks. This can be explained partly by Roosevelt's temperament, which still retains much of the undergraduate's enthusiasm for the exotic, the thrilling and the faraway. He is at his most appealing describing an opium factory which he visited in 1944 as an officer in the O.S.S. At the center of a subterranean chamber was a huge millstone turned by a camel. Roosevelt could not imagine how the camel had been coaxed and squeezed down the narrow winding stone passage to the grinding room. A kind of golly-gee-whiz air attaches to this passage, appropriate to a traveler's tale; but jarring when it carries over into the later account of political intervention.

At first look the motives for the coup seem to have been transparent. Before the coup, British oil interests were expelled from Iran. After the coup, a consortium of British and American oil companies was invited back in, with the British getting 55 percent and the Americans dividing up the remaining 45 percent among them. It is hard for an outsider to imagine that oil could have been far from the minds of the coup's planners, but according to Richard Cottam, an academic authority on Iran at the University of Pittsburgh, oil had little to do with it. The early 1950s were

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years of glut in the petroleum market, and one of Mossadegh's greatest problems was to find a replacement for the expelled A.I.O.C. So long as they didn't really need the oil, the majors were inclined to remain aloof in solidarity with the British. For one thing, they did not want to encourage the other Middle Eastern oil states to make similar demands.

Unlike Roosevelt, Cottam speaks Farsi and has followed events in Iran closely since an interest in Third World nationalism first took him to Teheran as a graduate student thirty years ago. "The explanation is anti-Communism," he said in an interview. "Roosevelt and Loy Henderson both saw Communists everywhere, and found it impossible to believe there might be liberal nationalists in Iran just as there are in the West. I've read all the documents, and when they're eventually declassified you won't find any conspiracy to get Iran's oil. The basic motive was fear of Communism. It's the old story."

According to Cottam and other experts on Iran, the Tudeh Party was small, well-organized and controlled by Moscow, but it did not support Mossadegh or any other leader of the "national front," which was a loose coalition of mostly educated, middle-class Iranians in favor of modernization and hostile to the Shah's embryonic (in 1953) ambitions to restore Iran to its ancient imperial glory. Roosevelt often cites the role of the Tudeh Party as proof of Mossadegh's ties to Russia, but in fact the two were hostile and Mossadegh actually ordered the army to chase the Tudeh off the streets the day before he was overthrown. Cottam does not sentimentalize the Tudeh or attempt to minimize its conspiratorial nature and hostility to Western interests. A year after the coup, a secret ring of some 400 Iranian Army officers (many American-trained) was discovered to be under Tudeh control. But Tudeh and the national front were poles apart, and U.S. fears of a Soviet takeover in Iran through Mossadegh were purely chimerical.

Roosevelt presumably rejects this interpretation of events, but he offers only the most casual and factually unadorned charges of Soviet-Tudeh-Mossadegh collusion to support his own view. The odd thing here is that the United States, without significant interests in Iran before the coup, should have adopted the myopic, condescending and self-

serving British view of nationalists whose most radical claim was of a right to be treated as sovereign equals. Stranger still is the fact that the United States, the world's oldest Republic with a written constitution, should have thrown its support to a monarch with archaic aspirations to absolute power. This strange infatuation can only be explained by a kind of schoolboy's awe of imperial pomp and circumstance, and the air of bubbling confidence in Roosevelt's book suggests he has still not found the time, nor the occasion, to question seriously whether we supported the right side in Iran twenty-five years ago for the right reasons. Iran was backward, foreign and far away, and that, for Roosevelt, was reason enough to jettison that loyalty to democratic principles he would have insisted on (one hopes) as a matter of course for his own country. This carelessness made him in effect, though probably not in manner, both arrogant and cavalier.

But *Countercoup* is not a book about policy; why we did what we did does not detain Roosevelt for long. It is a book about clandestine technique, a kind of guide for covert political manipulation. Other C.I.A. people say Roosevelt has misrepresented events in a number of ways, slighting the role of key figures, misrepresenting the positions held by some C.I.A. employees and minimizing both the initial failure of August 15-16 and the importance of luck in the success of August 19. One C.I.A. officer involved in the coup has been privately circulating a seven-page critique of Roosevelt's version of events. The exact truth about what happened is of course difficult for an outsider to pin down, but even so it is clear that this was a political, not a military undertaking. It shares nothing with the crude military approach of the United States to the Bay of Pigs, or of Russia in Afghanistan. It can be argued that Roosevelt backed the wrong horse, in the long run, but at least it was an Iranian horse. The Americans served an important role as catalyst in the coup, but we did not carry it out ourselves, and we were never in a position thereafter to back up our allies with the sanction of arms, as Russia has done in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Whatever it was that Roosevelt really did, he did it with a light touch, which was for the most part unnoticed at the time.

Roosevelt has argued, in *Countercoup* and newspaper interviews, that his success in Iran fatally dazzled Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers. A second "success" in Guatemala the following year, from which that country has never recovered, led inevitably to later failures in Syria in 1957, Indonesia in 1958 and Cuba in 1961, because the Dulles brothers had grown fond of the quick and dirty approach without regard to the real strength of local allies. Covert political manipulation of the sort that worked in Iran offered policy makers the one thing they couldn't resist—their way. If foreign leaders balked at the American view of matters, the C.I.A. could simply brush them aside. When political measures failed to do the trick, a military approach was tried instead. By superficially logical steps the handful of men working for Roosevelt in Teheran grew into the exile army of Cubans that failed at the Bay of Pigs. Roosevelt probably exaggerates his opposition to the habit of intervention; he was still around for Operation WAKEFUL in Syria, by then Wisner's assistant deputy director of plans, with two legendary C.I.A. adventurers as associates, Miles Copeland and Tracy Barnes. But the ghastly failure of WAKEFUL, which ended with the arrest (and in many cases the execution) of the C.I.A.'s local allies, must have confirmed Roosevelt's feeling that the ingredients of a successful coup had to be at least 90 percent of native origin.

Someday an Iranian historian, writing in Farsi, will explain what happened in 1953, giving due weight to the conflict of Islamic conservatism with the forces of Westernization, which somehow opened a side door to the Shah, and allowed him to rule for twenty-five years. The revolution seems to have returned Iran to square one. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with his brooding, evasive eyes, and President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, in his European suits, suggest an Iranian national schizophrenia beside which the Shah was an aberration and an irrelevance. Roosevelt put his thumb on the scale the last time the balance teetered in equilibrium, and one imagines that the Washington hard-liners who want to "unleash" the C.I.A. would like to try again. But we ought to have learned there is no such thing as fixity in political arrangements.

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Memory, on the other hand, is long. No one likes to see his country prodded and pulled by outsiders who can barely speak the language. The extraordinary hatred many Iranians feel for the United States was certainly not intended or anticipated by Roosevelt and his associates, but it was their doing all the same. By its nature a coup makes a handful of friends, and a great many enemies. The Shah was an Iranian, and he ruled with an Iranian Army and an Iranian secret police. It was not the dithyrambs of Nixon and Carter that kept him in power. But the coup indelibly marked the Shah as a creature of the United States, and committed Washington to his success long after his real power had eroded.

C.I.A. people would argue that the case of Iran proves the importance of secrecy. The trouble with the argument is that it obscures the heart of the American failure in Iran, which was not gabbiness on the part of Roosevelt and Allen Dulles, proud of their "success," but a deeper misreading of Iran itself. Recent events suggest we have not figured it out yet. It is this blinkered vision that is the most disturbing quality of Roosevelt's book, something it shares with a number of other C.I.A. memoirs. As a C.I.A. officer, Roosevelt was given broad operational freedom, but he was not encouraged to brood on the wisdom of what he was asked to do. That was "policy," and it was jealously guarded by the White House. The result, at Roosevelt's level, was a progressive intellectual numbness, the good soldier's devotion to the task at hand. He was more adroit than some of his successors, but like them he has little appetite for the broader question of whether what we did was really a good idea. ☐

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EDITOR & PUBLISHER  
5 April 1980

## News Council upholds Exxon's complaint

Exxon Corporation's grievance complaint against a segment of NBC Nightly News (October 16, 1979) titled "Dirty Oil and Dirty Air" was found warranted by the National News Council.

The segment focused on an Exxon marketing decision which cut sulphur fuel shipments to Florida Power & Light and how the decision had affected air quality in Florida.

The complaint contended the segment was permeated by "factual error, the selective use of information, lack of perspective and the building of effect through innuendo." NBC, according to the final Council action statement, insisted in part that "at no time did the NBC News report suggest that Exxon's decisions were made in an irresponsible manner."

After viewing the segment, the Council said it had "received a different impression" and concluded:

"Perhaps that suggestion was unintentional. But news broadcasters (or for that matter news writers) who seek to compress complex stories are not relieved of the obligation to be reasonably fair just because time and space limitations make their task harder."

The Exxon-NBC vote was 7 concurring, 4 dissenting, 1 abstaining with dissent filed by Lawson with Huston concurring.

The News Council, in its Freedom of the Press discussions, stated it is "deeply disturbed by the official disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency has repudiated its commitment to prohibit use of journalists affiliated with American news organizations in any of its espionage or intelligence activities."

The statement cited a policy directive issued in November 30, 1977, by the current CIA director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, that the CIA would not enter into any relationship with journalists "for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities" and forbade the agency from using "the name or facilities of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover" for its agents or actions.

The Council further noted that in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Admiral Turner disclosed authorization since 1977 of a "very limited" number of waivers breaching the general ban that supposedly rules out employment of journalists among others. The Council added: "Admiral Turner has declined to specify publicly how many, if any, of these waivers have directly affected the press and the CIA has asserted in a subsequent 'clarification' of his testimony that none of the waivers was actually used. But the Carter Administration has joined the CIA in resisting inclusion in a new Congressional charter for the intelligence agency of a statutory ban embodying the prohibition now theoretically in effect by administrative order."

The News Council concluded it has always recognized the country's need for an effective Central Intelligence Agency. "But that need must not be met through practices that make inescapable a destruction of public confidence in the integrity of the press as an independent instrument of public information free from government manipulation."

"A revival of the possibility that the CIA is using journalists as gatherers of intelligence or purveyors of propaganda would not only expose all reporters in many parts of the world to personal peril but also would undermine the credibility of news in ways subversive of democracy. The CIA was right to recognize that danger in its policy directive, but it has shown itself a slack guardian in a field where no slightest deviation from strict separation of journalism and intelligence functions is thinkable. The Council urges Congress to write an unequivocal prohibition into the law establishing a projected charter for the CIA."

The vote on the formal CIA statement was: Concurring—Ghiglione, Huston, Lawson, McKay, Otwell and Pulitzer. Dissenting—Brady, Miller, Rusher. Abstaining—Cooney, Isaacs, and Roberts.

Miller, in filing a dissent, stated: "I do not want to encourage the CIA to recruit reporters or encourage reporters to be recruited by the CIA. But I am opposed to extending any invitation to any legislative body to encourage any legislation affecting the press."

The National News Council fiscal year has a shortfall of about \$40,000 in its \$320,000 budget, and executive director William B. Arthur said efforts are continuing to overcome the situation.

The problem, in part, is due to the end of the Twentieth Century Fund's final 3-year grant of \$100,000 annually. Overall since the founding of the Council the Twentieth Century Fund has granted \$600,000 to its establishment and operation. The Council was created by a Twentieth Century Fund Task Force. Another major funder is the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation.

Arthur said the Council projects that eventually 40 percent of its funding will come from the media. Presently more than 30 media organizations contribute.

Following the March sessions, Ned Schnurman, an associate director for the Council since its founding in 1973, announced his resignation to pursue interests in various aspects of public broadcasting and television. He will serve as creative director for a public television program on the press and the public. No replacement has been named as yet.



SAN MATEO TIMES (CA)  
3 April 1980

# Review asked of CIA activities in Guyana

By KAREN PETTERSON  
Times Staff Writer

The staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has requested a review by the Select Committee on Intelligence of alleged CIA activities in Guyana, specifically those surrounding the visit of the late Leo Ryan.

In a letter sent Wednesday to Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki, committee staffers who had investigated the 1978

slaying of Ryan in Guyana and the murder-suicides of 900 Peoples Temple followers recommended a review of the findings and allegations of recent hearings before the subcommittee on international operations.

George R. Berdes, Thomas R. Sweeton and Ivo Spaiatin, who conducted the staff investigation of the Jonestown tragedy and issued a report in May of last year, said in their letter that, while the recent hearings produced "no substantive information not already considered in the committee investigation report," they requested the further scrutiny of CIA activities "in view of the persistence of the allegations."

While recognizing the "speculative and unsubstantiated" nature of the charges against the U.S. intelligence agency, the letter continues, the Select Committee should investigate those charges.

Specifically, the letter recommends

review of the following contentions:

- That the CIA conducted varied range of "activities" in Guyana.

- That a CIA agent witnessed Ryan's assassination.

- That the CIA may have violated the Hughes-Ryan Act by failing to report covert operations.

- That the CIA made a conscious decision to allow the tragic events of Nov. 18, 1978, to occur in order to avoid disclosure of CIA covert activities in Guyana.

- That this alleged reporting failure was conscious and calculated because Ryan was the co-author of the Hughes-Ryan Act.

- That the CIA was used to promote and protect American commercial interests in Guyana.

Charges of alleged CIA activities in the South American country have been made since the tragedy occurred and were reinforced by testimony at the subcommittee hearings in February. The hearings were designed specifically to determine whether or not recommendations made by the staff investigators regarding changes within the State Department and other government agencies had been carried out.

The committee staff's letter said that the hearings "reinforced the importance of the implementing the recommendations" included in the report and the letter noted that "little had actually been accomplished" to that end.

Copies of the letter were sent to Dante Fascell, chairman of the subcommittee, and to Rep. Bill Royer, R-Redwood City, who originally called for the investigative hearings.

Royer said yesterday he supported

the recommended investigation by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, but he said the Foreign Affairs staff "doesn't go far enough with examining State Department activities before, during and after Ryan's visit to Guyana."

Royer is still pushing for further investigation into the activities of four State Department officials surrounding Ryan's ill-fated trip.

He has requested testimony from U.S. Ambassador John Burke, U.S. Consular officials Douglas C. Ellice Jr. and Richard McCoy, and Richard Dwyer, deputy chief of the mission at the U.S. embassy in Guyana.

During the hearings, only Matthew Nimetz, deputy secretary of state for security assistance, and Barbara Watson, who heads the consular affairs division, testified as to State Department performance.

In addition to requesting further review of CIA activities, the committee staff's letter states that transcripts of interviews made immediately following the tragedy had been classified for security reasons. The letter recommends that the classifications be removed Jan. 1, 1985, with the agreement of the witnesses.

As for allegations that Peoples Temple member Sharon Amos had been ordered to kill Ryan on the plane flight to the temple outpost at Jonestown, the letter contends that such allegations would properly fall under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department's investigation into any conspiracy plot to kill Ryan.

Royer has also called for hearings by the House Judiciary Committee to explain the nature of that investigation and to reveal its findings. No such hearings have yet been set.



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ON PAGE A-7NEW YORK TIMES  
30 MARCH 1980

# SOVIET SAID TO GAIN ON ITS AFGHAN FOES

## Russian Troops Reported to Quell Rebel Activities in Northeast

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, March 29 — Soviet troops and equipment have virtually wiped out rebel activity in Afghanistan's Kunar Valley and in the northeastern Province of Badakshan, according to travelers.

The travelers said that after the tattered and demoralized Afghan Army failed in repeated attempts to clear these areas of active guerrilla bands, Soviet commanders in Kabul ordered full-scale assaults using Soviet armor and rocket-firing MI-24 helicopters.

"These offensives last month proved that the Russians can go anywhere in the country if they go in full force," a traveler remarked. Another commented that overt resistance to the Soviet occupation died away in the capital after mass arrests last month in retaliation for a protest closing of shops.

The distribution of clandestine anti-Soviet leaflets, called night letters, has stopped. The last one turned up two weeks ago.

Despite the quiet in Kabul, there were ample signs that the Government of Babrak Karmal and its Soviet protectors were still facing serious challenges on many fronts.

### Small Raids Throughout Nation

One traveler said that "mosquito-like raids" were being carried on daily in many parts of the country. Bridges are being expertly demolished, he said. Government convoys are being attacked. And 5-afghani coins, somewhat larger than an American quarter and worth about 2 cents, have disappeared. One explanation is that the coins are just the right size to fit into sections of pipe, sealing them to make grenades.

The travelers agreed that from what they had heard about the situation in military and civilian hospitals, various esti-

mates that about 1,500 Soviets soldiers have been killed since December seemed conservative.

A curfew is in effect in Kabul from 10:30 P.M. to 4:30 A.M. During the nights, checkpoints are manned by Soviet troops and tanks, though lately it is reported that well-dressed young men, presumed to be Afghan party functionaries, are in the streets with weapons.

In addition, neighborhood vigilante groups called Committees for Protection of the Revolution were established and armed three weeks ago, but they seem to have been disbanded. An Indian resident was shot and killed by such vigilantes some days ago.

### Lack of Skilled Employees

The travelers, both Western and Asian, say that the thorniest problem facing the Afghan regime and the Soviet residents is a lack of skilled and loyal people to take over administration of Government services and the war.

One traveler said that of the 90,000 soldiers the Afghans reported were in the army, only 35,000 were still in the ranks. Of these he added, fewer than half could be considered loyal. Desertions and defections have taken a heavy toll and the officer corps has been further pared by successive purges. Young men from universities are reportedly being sent to the Soviet Union for hurried military training. But it is unlikely, the source said, that there will be enough trained Afghans to take over vital roles at any near date. He said that President Karmal had a Soviet driver, a Soviet bodyguard and a Soviet cook.

Soviet citizens in civilian dress, virtually all described as having a Slavic appearance, are reported to be working openly in most ministries. Russians are said to be running both The Kabul Times, an English-language paper, and the television station. Most other foreigners, those who worked for international agencies or for the former Afghan Government, have left.

### American Speaks of C.I.A.

One American, Robert E. Lee, was shown on television Wednesday night. He was arrested Feb. 22 and, according to the Afghan press, was charged with "military espionage." On television he denounced the Central Intelligence Agency in a voice that was described as "strained." Mr. Lee has been described by people in Kabul as a wanderer who was trying to find employment as an English teacher. Another American, Charles Brockenier, a carpet dealer, was freed yesterday after more than a month in confinement.

In this period, the Kabul authorities have reported releasing 1,500 of the people seized in round-ups Feb. 21-22 in response to the shop closings. Many of those arrested were Hazaras, an ethnic and religious minority. They have Oriental features and are Shiite Muslims.

Along with a buildup of Soviet personnel, according to travelers' reports, there has also been a flow of arms and equipment. One man said he had seen all sorts of surface-to-air missiles, ranging from 3 feet in length to about 34 feet, mounted in tubes on trucks. An average of 20 Soviet transport planes arrive daily at the Kabul airport and at Bagram, 140 miles away. Heavy construction equipment, apparently brought by road from the Soviet Union, is being used to build what appears to some travelers to be a Soviet command post at the historic Bala Hissar Fort.

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BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE  
30 March 1980

## American reportedly praises Afghan regime

Associated Press

NEW DELHI — Robert Lee, an American arrested during anti-Soviet riots in Kabul last month, has turned up on Afghanistan government television praising the pro-Soviet regime and denouncing "capitalist bandits" of the West, a traveler from Afghanistan reported yesterday.

Afghan media earlier had charged that Lee, of Monterey Park, Calif., was arrested as a CIA agent.

The account of his television appearance last Wednesday said no mention was made of any CIA connection. Instead, he was quoted as saying he had entered Afghanistan in order to witness first hand the

"glorious revolution" being carried out by the pro-Soviet government of President Babrak Karmal.

The informant from Kabul, who asked not to be identified, said Lee told his viewers that the people of Afghanistan were united and that they should "rise up against the filthy imperialist (Western) bandits, just as their grandfathers did against the British nearly a century ago."

He quoted Lee as praising "class struggle" and as blaming anti-Soviet activity in Afghanistan on mercenaries and bandits armed and working for China, the United States and other Western countries.

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
31 MARCH 1980

# Karmal calls Amin mass killer, CIA spy

By United Press International

Afghan President Babrak Karmal charged in an interview published yesterday that his predecessor, Hafizullah Amin, was a CIA agent who killed up to 1.5 million people under a brutal regime "a hundred times more merciless than that of Pol Pot in Cambodia."

Karmal, who came to power when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan last Christmas and Amin was killed, denied Western intelligence reports that the Soviets have 80,000 troops in his country. "There are not more than 15,000," he told the West German news magazine Der Spiegel in an interview conducted in Kabul.

He said the Soviets moved into Afghanistan to defend the country against American-inspired plots.

Echoing the Moscow and Kabul line, Karmal charged Amin was a CIA agent who worked with China and reactionary Arab states to undermine the April 1978 revolution that brought the Kremlin-backed regime of Nur Mohammed Taraki to power. U.S. officials have denied the charges repeatedly.

Karmal said that 15 days after Amin ousted Taraki in a coup last year, he returned to Afghanistan from Eastern Europe to work against Amin. During the brief months of Amin's rule, Karmal said, "more than 1 million, 1.5 million, people were mercilessly destroyed through mass murder."

Karmal said more and more Afghans are supporting his rule. "In moral and military terms, we get stronger every day," Karmal said.

He dismissed the February anti-Soviet riots in Kabul as organized by the Israeli secret service, Mossad, which Karmal claimed assembled and armed a few thousand protesters to create an impression of internal resistance to the Soviet presence.

He also denied reports that the Soviets had used nerve gas in their fight to contain the Afghan rebels.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
31 March 1980

# Kremlin gloats that US can't budge it from Afghanistan

## Moscow shrugs at grain embargo, Olympic boycott, demands US recognize its equality

By David K. Willis

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

In a rare disclosure of senior Soviet attitudes toward Afghanistan and US countermeasures, including the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, Soviet sources here acknowledge that Moscow made one error of tactics in Afghanistan. But they insist the Kremlin is determined to exercise control there.

The Kremlin also sees a historic shift in the world's strategic balance, the sources say, and demands that the US acknowledge it, painful as that will be for American public opinion.

Meanwhile, two public attacks on alleged US spying in the Soviet Union in three days, plus some harassment of US military attachés traveling in Central Asia recently, indicate a worsening of the atmosphere here in the next few months.

Some Western sources worry that the next step could be physical actions against Americans living here or, at the least, condemnation of specific individuals.

The error in Afghanistan was the assassination of former Afghan President Hafizullah Amin, the Soviet sources acknowledged. "Better if he had stayed alive," this correspondent was told. "Those Afghans kill each other anyway [a reference to frequent political assassinations in recent years], so better to let events take their course."

Reports have circulated for weeks in Moscow and Washington that the Soviet official held responsible for the killing (thought to

have occurred Dec. 27 last year during a Soviet assault on the Darulaman Palace during the coup that installed Babrak Karmal in power) was Lt.-Gen. Viktor Paputin, the No. 2 man in the Soviet Interior Ministry (MVD).

Rumors said General Paputin was summarily recalled to Moscow but committed suicide on the plane rather than face censure here. But the Soviet sources told me General Paputin committed suicide in his own Moscow apartment, while his wife was in another room, thinking he was planning a visit to their dacha.

Pravda Jan. 3 published a very small death notice on its back page giving the general's date of death as Dec. 28. As a nonvoting member of the Communist Party Central Committee, General Paputin rated a much larger notice signed by more prominent officials than those in the party and the MVD (the internal political police and security organization) who actually did sign.

Sources agreed General Paputin was in

disgrace over the Amin episode. He has since been replaced by Leonid Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yuri Churbanov, a fast-rising man of 44 who is also a lieutenant general. He is married to Mr. Brezhnev's daughter Galina.

On the shift in the world strategic balance, sources said in effect:

"At the end of World War II Truman ordered the Soviets out of Persia in 48 hours and we went. After all, you had the atom bomb. In the 1950s you were stronger than us militarily. In 1962 you made us back down in Cuba. But we told ourselves it would never happen again.

"Today we are equal to you in military strength. We have reestablished the situation under the tsars: We rank as an equal, independent power, and no one can threaten us. No one can order us around, tell us what to do. "We don't really want Afghan territory. It's hard to administer and expensive for us to have troops there. But we don't want you to have it either. That's the important point."

The sources said Soviet intelligence had reported that former President Amin was looking around for American aid in Afghanistan because he disliked the Kremlin so much. The sources said the final meeting between Nur Muhammad Taraki and Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow in September last year had been unhappy: Mr. Taraki begged Mr. Brezhnev to send in troops against Mr. Amin, but Mr. Brezhnev refused.

When Mr. Taraki (who had ousted President Daoud in a coup in April 1978) returned to Kabul, Mr. Amin had him shot, explaining later he had acted in self-defense. Mr. Amin and the Soviets were at daggers drawn.

Soviet sources said that Soviet intelligence also indicated Mr. Amin was planning a massive strike against his enemies Dec. 29 — a point previously made by the Soviet press.

"We have told the Americans that Afghan governments, including Taraki, asked us 12 or 14 times to send in troops. No government can survive there without troops" — a revealing statement, meaning no communist-leaning government can survive without troops.

As for US measures including the embargo of 17 million tons of grain and a threatened boycott of the Moscow Olympics, the sources said:

"You are simply forcing us to be more self-sufficient. Russia is usually in a mess internally, and we need an outside enemy to stimu-

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late us, someone we can blame for all our ills.

"Now we can blame the Americans for any meat shortages next year, and grain shortages this year. We are much more serious about our agriculture now. We spend much more money on it and improvements are on the way.

"The Olympics? They're not so important. So you won't come and play games with us? You won't shake our hands and compete with us? Then to hell with you. You are doing small things, nasty things. If you go on, you'll push our people into slashing your tires in Moscow and so on, and things will get worse."

The two public attacks on alleged US Embassy spying came in Izvestia. The first talked of a radio intercept device planted in a plastic treestump several years ago, and named two former embassy officers. The second repeated two-year-old information about antennae and boxes on the roof of the embassy, alleging they tried to intercept Soviet conversations from official cars and phones.

The timing of the articles suggested the worsening of détente is leading to a harsher tone on both sides.

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SOVIET UNION

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THE NATION  
5 April 1980

## SOVIET INTENTIONS The C.I.A.'s Great Debate

DALE VAN ATTA

**T**he concept of a monolithic American intelligence community which moves with one voice and makes irrefutable conclusions based on vast technological and human resources has been eroding ever since the Iranian revolution caught them by surprise in the winter of 1978-79. The mixed reviews they have received over their predictions and advice regarding the Afghanistan invasion has further challenged any notions of infallibility.

Ignored in most of the commentary on "intelligence failures," however, is a basic issue that has caused a deep schism among key analysts for more than a decade—the intentions of the Soviet Union. Only the analysts, reviewing covert information from ingenious listening devices and spies, are expected to give their final estimation to the President. But it turns out that they don't know any more than the rest of us—or at least have the same disagreements over such issues as the usefulness of the SALT II treaty and Russia's next step after taking Afghanistan.

No document has shown this schism more clearly than an internal Central Intelligence Agency paper coded "Top Secret Umbra" and entitled: "Understanding Soviet Strategic Policy, Objectives." The relatively dry but erudite account of splits in the community over this issue was authored by a C.I.A. analyst, Fritz Ermarth, and disseminated to about 100 top policy makers on December 8, 1975, in the *National Intelligence Daily*, a supersecret newspaper. The unprecedented decision to publish such an analysis immediately after the appearance of the "National Intelligence Estimate," which represented the community's consensus on the subject that year, was explained by the editors as an attempt to air "the spectrum of arguments that specialists in the intelligence community had to deal with in reaching the estimate's key judgments."

Ermarth's analysis still holds up and reflects even more accurately the "groupings" of analysts over the Afghanistan situation today than it did for those on the SALT II debate at the time. Ermarth, who is now a high-level strategic adviser on the National Security Council, began:

The subject of Soviet strategic policy and objectives is very elusive. Pertinent evidence is voluminous; but it almost never speaks for itself. Interpretation of the evidence always involves our preconceptions about the Soviet Union as a nation, international politics, the meaning of military power and the condition of our own country.

Because of their sometimes limited access to secret Russian documents, Ermarth observes, U.S. analysts "do not have complete and explicit intelligence" on Soviet military doctrine. "Although we differ on important details, analysts inside and outside the U.S. intelligence community tend to agree on the broad outlines. . . . Soviet doctrine clearly postulates that war-waging forces are desirable for both deterrence and conflict, emphasizes counter-force capabilities and targeting, and stresses the value of preemption as well as the need to have a survivable retaliatory capability."

Where the analysts divide, however, is on the questions of the sway of the military in the Politburo and the importance Soviet leaders attach to military doctrine. Continues Ermarth:

Where we differ most is on how important doctrine actually is for Soviet policy or how well it reflects the actual thinking of Soviet leaders.

Some of us believe that it is quite literally prescriptive for and descriptive of Soviet behavior. They point out that the Soviets have serious deployment or R&D [research and development] programs in all areas required by their war-fighting strategic doctrine. Whatever the obstacles, the Soviets keep plugging away at the requirements of doctrine, perhaps only falling back temporarily when technological problems are severe, as in the ABM [anti-ballistic missile] area.

Others tend to regard Soviet doctrine as much less prescriptive for actual military policy. They see in it a good deal of pretense and exhortation really intended to support troop

morale, ideological prejudices, and parochial service interests. They point to the quasi-religious themes of "victory" and "superiority" in the literature as examples.

They believe that Soviet political and military leaders are free to ignore doctrine when they make practical decisions, as these leaders have habitually ignored or manipulated the ideas of Marx or Lenin. In this view, Soviet decision-makers admit to themselves that attaining the requirements of doctrine is vastly more difficult than pontificating on them.

As for assessing the role strategic power may play in any Soviet foreign policy move, that too is difficult, according to Ermarth, because "again we have to start with ambiguous evidence and divergent interpretations." But he is able to narrow down the divisions into two rough groupings:

Some of us believe that the Soviet acquisition of overall strategic equality has given the USSR a new platform from which to exploit opportunities and to press its global interests, even to the point of accepting strategic confrontation with the U.S. They believe that the political role of strategic power impels the USSR to increase that power which will, in turn, give the USSR even greater sway in the world.

Others take the view that at present levels the two sides' strategic forces tend to cancel each other out and that, always cautious, Soviet behavior in potential confrontation areas will be governed primarily by local risks and opportunities. Those of this opinion believe it to be not only objectively true, but also to be shared by the leaders of the USSR.

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Citing present levels of strategic power, Ermarth asserts that the Russians are rushing toward nuclear superiority and the potential for a knockout first strike against the United States, to be achieved by the early 1980s. In fact, the ultrasecret 1975 National Intelligence Estimate on Russia concluded: "Our best estimate of Soviet offensive force development over the next ten years, [even] assuming a SALT II agreement, is that deployment of new systems will continue at about the pace now demonstrated, that ICBM accuracy will continue to improve, and that force survivability and flexibility also will improve. Soviet ICBM forces will probably pose a major threat to U.S. Minuteman silos in the early 1980s, assuming that the Soviets can perfect techniques for precisely timed two-RV [re-entry vehicle] attacks on a single target. This is somewhat earlier than forecast last year."

Ermarth writes that "the Soviets can set practical strategic policy objectives for themselves only in terms of their expectations about U.S. behavior." Intelligence estimates on this subject reflect "judgments [which] are ambivalent because, as some of us believe, the Soviet view is itself highly ambivalent." Indeed, Ermarth writes, on the matter of Soviet perceptions of the United States, analysts again separate into different schools of thought:

As we attempt to assess the net Soviet appreciation of the U.S. as a strategic competitor, some tend to emphasize the actual or latent strength of U.S. capabilities, others the presumed weakness of U.S. resolve to be a vigorous competitor. All agree that there is a large measure of explicit uncertainty in the Soviet view, at least about the near and middle term, whatever may be their ideological confidence about the long run.

This uncertainty must be accounted for in Soviet foreign and arms policy, especially as regards détente and the strategic arms limitations talks. Here again differences in emphasis and interpretation arise among us.

At the end of the spectrum are those who tend to see Soviet arms limitations and détente policy as intended mainly to anesthetize the resolve of the U.S. to compete with the USSR during a critical period of shift in the global power balance.

At the other end are those of us who recognize the politically competitive nature of Soviet policy, including détente and strategic arms limitations but who see these policies as a more genuine, lasting, and—effectively if not intentionally—benign effort to dampen the more dangerous and costly forms of East-West engagement, namely international confrontation and arms competition, and to channel competition in other directions.

Although differences exist between these perspectives, they are of degree—not kind. Both acknowledge that Soviet policy is a combination of competitiveness and restraint.

Ermarth concludes with a rundown of what different analysts perceive are the Russians' strategic or overall military objectives. The gravity of such dissonance within the intelligence community on this bedrock issue is dramatized in the computer war games each agency "plays" throughout the year. Once a year, all of them group for a gigantic exercise called the "Arsenal Exchange," a war between the "Blue Team" and the "Red Team." Bureaucratic decisions are made at the outset—who goes first, which set of intelligence statistics will be used and which assumptions can be made about how the teams will act. The games have shown that the

final outcome is determined not by the number of weapons and troop movements but by miscalculations in basic assumptions of Soviet Union (Red Team) or U.S. (Blue Team) intentions. For this reason, I quote Ermarth's conclusion:

On the question of [Soviet] strategic policy objectives, *per se*, there are in principle three distinguishable perspectives current in the intelligence community.

*The first* holds that, without any particular deadline in mind, the Soviets seek clear superiority over the U.S. with confidence and determination and may see some serious prospect of achieving it in the next decade. They rest their hopes on a combination of radical new technology and the subsidence of U.S. competitiveness.

The Soviets look to more familiar strategic technology not so much to overturn the balance in their favor as to provide politically useful margins of advantage while more fundamental long-term technological and political transformations are in the making.

*The second* view holds that the Soviets entertain no realistic hope of acquiring clear strategic superiority over the U.S. and even see the chance for advantage as dubious. Their main aim is quite simply to prevent the great technical and industrial might of the U.S. from placing them once again in an inferior position. Their arms and arms control policies are chosen to this end.

*The third* perspective is at once a compromise between the first two and slightly off on another axis. The key concepts in this view of Soviet policy are *uncertainty* and *hedging*.

The Soviets do not know what future U.S. behavior will be or what their own capabilities relative to the U.S. will be. Nor do they know what dramatic new technology will actually appear on either side. Therefore, they do not set practical policy objectives in terms of a single desired future strategic balance.

Rather, their objective is to choose policies that best hedge against uncertainty: they frame their policies to offer some chance of attaining a decisive preponderance over the U.S., a greater chance of something less dramatic but still advantageous, and a virtual guarantee of establishing and retaining at least overall equality.

Hedging means that they cannot place all their eggs in the one basket of arms programs or in the other of diplomacy. It is this hedging that creates the appearance of either tension or duplicity in Soviet behavior. But in essence it is only rational behavior on the part of a very suspicious and very competitive actor in an uncertain world.

In this view, the Soviets are driven in arming themselves and in negotiating by their considerable fears and their considerable ambitions. Since they are Soviets, it is very hard to divest them of either.

Ermarth's tale of fractionalization within the U.S. intelligence community suggests that Capitol Hill leaders, scholars and other informed Americans might come up with their own correct readings of Soviet intentions without access to any top-secret information. Your guess is as good as theirs. □

*Dale Van Atta, a reporter specializing in the intelligence community, works with Jack Anderson.*



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 44

BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE  
30 March 1980

## US/WORLD IN BRIEF

### Soviet: US embassy spy center

MOSCOW — The Soviet government newspaper Izvestia charged yesterday that the US embassy in Moscow is packed with electronic equipment designed to spy on Russian defense installations. Izvestia said Soviet counterspies have penetrated the top-secret areas of the embassy compound and seized logbooks "indicative of tracking air-defense installations, satellites, aircraft and antiaircraft rocket complexes."

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ON PAGE 12-1

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
30 MARCH 1980

# Russia Is Caught in Oil Pinch

Nation Hard-Pressed to  
Up Petroleum Exports,  
Fill Own Energy Needs

By DAN FISHER  
Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—After more than a quarter of a century of growth as an oil exporter, the Soviet Union has apparently reached at least a temporary limit on its ability to meet its own growing energy needs while continuing to increase oil shipments abroad.

No official figures are available, but a survey of the Kremlin's major East Bloc and Western European customers indicates that Soviet oil exports in 1979 grew little, if at all, from the 3.2 million barrels a day exported in 1978.

Moreover, Soviet commitments to those customers for 1980, along with comments by Soviet officials, suggest strongly that Moscow has put a ceiling on oil exports. Such a ceiling would stand in sharp contrast to the large annual increases that have characterized this country's energy policy since it became a net oil exporter in 1953.

The picture appears to confirm at least in part a controversial CIA estimate three years ago. That study predicted that the Soviet Union would face severe energy constraints in the 1980s that would prevent it from maintaining its oil exports and could even turn it into a net oil importer by mid-decade.

Even if the rest of the CIA prediction proves to be overdrawn, the ceiling on Soviet oil exports clearly presents the Kremlin with some tough choices—with important political ramifications—in its relations with both Eastern and Western Europe, and with the oil-producing countries of the Middle East.

Oil exports have served Soviet foreign policy in the past by increasing Western Europe's stake in a relaxation of East-West tensions while simultaneously generating foreign exchange that can be used to buy Western technology to stimulate the Soviet economy.

Among the East Bloc nations, Soviet oil has acted as an insurance policy, reinforcing the satellite countries' dependence on the Kremlin.

Coming at a time when Moscow has sent troops into Afghanistan and otherwise increased its military presence in the Persian Gulf area, the apparent change in Soviet oil export policy also underlines Western concerns that the Kremlin, despite its consistent denials, has designs on Mideast oil.

One still-secret Western intelligence assessment says that the Soviet Union's primary objective in Iran is the establishment of a pro-Moscow government that would commit substantial oil production to the Kremlin and its East European allies in return for arms and other assistance.

While it calls a unilateral Soviet military move into Iran's rich oil fields "unlikely . . . in the near term," it does not rule out such a move, particularly if some future Iranian government should invite Soviet intervention.

Officially, the Kremlin insists that its oil output will continue to increase. Gennady Pisarevsky, a political analyst for the Novosti news agency, said in a recent article that the country has 50 additional oil deposits "prepared for operation." He did not say how big the deposits are.

"The U.S.S.R. has enough oil both for its own economic needs and sales on the world market," Pisarevsky said. "The aggressive aspirations with regard to the oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf the West seeks to ascribe to the U.S.S.R. are beyond criticism from the economic, political, and any other point of view."

On the other hand, a recent article in an obscure Soviet foreign policy journal dealt extensively with the prospects for greater trade between the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the members of Comecon, the East Bloc economic alliance.

The article proposed "mixed ownership" of energy and other raw material development projects, in which the OPEC partner would guarantee fuel supplies in return for Comecon technology and labor resources. One Western source here characterized the article as a Kremlin "wish list."

Whether the wish list will turn into an urgent necessity for Moscow and its socialist allies is a matter of debate among Western analysts. But virtually all the signs indicate that while the Kremlin does not face an imminent energy crisis in the American sense, it is very concerned about the near-term energy outlook.

Two years ago the Soviet leadership took the unusual step of departing from its 1976-1980 5-year plan and going into a crash program to boost primary energy production. Such moves are supposed to be unnecessary under the tightly controlled, centrally planned Soviet economy.

Late last year, President Leonid Brezhnev designated the conservation of energy and other natural resources as "the most important national goal" and announced formation of a high-level group to work out energy strategy for the 1980s.

The statistics of Soviet energy production being what they are, some might wonder at all the speculation. The Soviet Union is the world's largest oil producer. It surpassed the United States in the early 1970s and last year produced an average of 11.7 million barrels a day—about 25% more than Saudi Arabia.

It also is the largest coal producer, has enormous resources of natural gas, an ambitious program of nuclear power development and major undeveloped hydroelectric potential.

Beneath the surface, however, are a series of problems, all of which seem to be coming rapidly to a head.

The Soviet Union appears to be at, or very near, the limit of its ability to continue to produce more oil. In 1979 it had the smallest increase in production of any year since 1956, and promptly lowered its 1980 production goal.

Figures for the first two months of this year show that oil production dropped below the peak reached last December. Part of the drop is probably seasonal, but Western experts here say it is doubtful that Moscow will be able to achieve even its lowered production goal for 1980. Thus it could be that the December figure, reflecting an annual rate of 12.1 million barrels a day, marked the peak.

Moscow has shifted enormous resources from older oil-producing areas into its important Western Siberian fields since late 1977, but it has apparently failed to find any major new fields since 1973.

The Kremlin's answer has been to drill more wells in known fields—an approach that may boost production in the short term but will reduce the amount of oil that can be recovered over the life of those fields and divert resources that should go into looking for new fields.

That point was underscored in the pessimistic CIA report of 1977, and last month a prominent Soviet expert, writing in a regional scientific journal,

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made the same point. If present methods continue, the expert, Alexander Krylov, wrote, "oil production in our country will peak in a relatively short time and then start to fall off."

The Soviet Union is believed to have large, untapped oil reserves in Eastern Siberia and offshore, but it will take years, enormous investment and probably imported Western technology to bring those fields into production.

The strained Soviet economy has trouble developing new fields quickly even in established producing regions. Of 10 new Western Siberian fields developed since January, 1976, none had roads and only two had electrical power connections by mid-1978.

The CIA estimates that the Soviet Union now has proved petroleum reserves of 30 billion to 35 billion barrels, slightly more than U.S. reserves of 28 billion barrels. Soviet reserves, the CIA reported last August, "are being rapidly depleted in all producing regions, while the discovery of new reserves is lagging."

Exploratory drilling, beset by equipment deficiencies, is reported to have expanded only sluggishly. And to make matters worse, most new fields found in recent years contain low-grade "heavy" oil, a viscous petroleum that in some Soviet fields is more like tar than oil.

Oil has been a key factor in fueling Soviet economic growth for a generation. Crude oil output has quadrupled since 1960 and increased by more than 65% since 1970. It is by far this country's largest single energy source, accounting for about 43% of Soviet energy supplies.

If the economy is to continue to grow in the face of leveling or declining oil production, there must be changes.

As in the United States, the government has had a lot to say lately about the need to conserve energy. A year ago, Moscow authorities sponsored a much-publicized exercise in which residents were asked to turn out unnecessary lights and otherwise reduce electricity consumption for one evening. The resulting energy savings were trumpeted in the official press a few days later.

More recently, the minister of power and electrification, Pyotr Neporozhni, argued in an article for the government newspaper *Izvestia* for a Soviet version of daylight saving time. Instead of changing clocks, however, Neporozhni would change work schedules, bringing workers in as much as two hours earlier than normal during the summer months. That way, he said, even the evening shift would complete its workday before nightfall and the country would save electricity.

Despite those and other suggestions, however, there is no sign that the Soviets have put real teeth into their conservation program. Factories are still believed to be paying a fraction of the price for electricity that homeowners and apartment dwellers pay, in effect encouraging waste by the largest consumers.

Meanwhile, substitution of other fuels for oil is proving to be more difficult than the economic planners had thought.

Ultimately, Soviet officials told a delegation of British energy experts last fall, Moscow plans to stop burning oil in power and central heating plants by shifting those facilities to coal and nuclear fuel. An estimated 2 million barrels of oil a day are burned to generate electricity.

However, the Soviet coal industry is one of the least healthy in the entire economy. It has consistently failed to meet its production targets over the last several years, and production last year was actually lower than in 1977 and 1978.

The old Soviet coal fields are being worked out, and the new fields are far from the big energy-consuming regions—in Siberia and northern Central Asia. The Kremlin talks about building power plants at these new mines and transmitting the electricity to the European part of the country, but the technology for such a scheme has yet to be proved.

Another idea, which would involve moving coal through slurry pipelines to generating plants in the industrial regions, is still in the trial stage. There is a shortage of railroad cars, so that is not a near-term answer, either. In short, a Western expert said, "coal isn't going to make it" as an oil substitute for the 1980s.

Despite the Kremlin's ambitious plans, the nuclear program is far behind schedule. Nuclear power accounts for only about 1% of Soviet energy production, and even if the Soviets succeed with plans to quintuple their nuclear capacity during the 1980s, it would not take much pressure off oil.

And the sources of the Soviet Union's untapped wealth of hydroelectric power lie in eastern Siberia—too far from the industrial and population centers of the country to increase the amount of available energy there. The technology of electricity transmission does not permit the power to be sent such long distances.

The brightest spot in the Soviet energy picture is provided by natural gas. Production rose 9% last year over the year before. The Soviet Union now produces about 75% as much natural gas as the United States and it is closing the gap, thanks to fields in northern Russia that some think are the world's largest.

Still, even though gas production has been better than expected, it has not made up for shortfalls in oil and coal. The three fuels together account for about 93% of total Soviet energy, and Western experts now project that combined output of the three this year will leave the Soviets short of their 1980 fuels target, as set in the 5-year plan drawn up in 1976, by the equivalent of 1 million barrels of oil a day.

Circumstances thus force Moscow to a painful reassessment of its energy export policies. For the short term, at least, the Kremlin's answer appears to be a gradual cutback of oil exports to Western Europe, while limiting the East Bloc allies to small annual increases.

"We are pushing them (for more oil in 1980) but they haven't agreed yet," a Western European diplomat said the other day. "They told us they had reduced some deliveries to Western countries because they are very tight due to technical problems."

Another diplomat, whose government has long been a customer for Soviet oil, said: "They're not very keen on selling more oil now."

That opinion was heard repeatedly in a survey of seven Soviet oil clients in the West. Based on unofficial figures from those sources, it appears that Soviet oil exports to West Europe may have dropped as much as 100,000 barrels a day last year, and a further drop seems to be in store for 1980.

Exports to East Europe, meanwhile, are believed to have increased only slightly. A slightly larger increase has reportedly been promised for 1980, but it is still not expected to satisfy the East Bloc's growing oil appetite.

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Soviet oil exports to East Europe nearly doubled in the 1970s, to about 1.5 million barrels a day. But the bloc's oil appetite grew even faster, and as a result Soviet oil today accounts for about 63% total East European oil consumption, compared with 66 in 1970.

A British energy expert who visited Moscow last summer said that the Soviet Union apparently planned to freeze its total oil exports at about 3.2 million barrels a day for the next several years.

Then, last August, the Kremlin pledged to increase deliveries of all types of fuel to East Europe by 20% in the 1981-1985 period compared to the years 1976-1980. Western sources here have been puzzling over that commitment, but they are convinced that even if Moscow lives up to it, little, if any of the increase will be in oil.

If the CIA is right and Soviet oil production begins to fall, Moscow will be unable to maintain oil exports even at current levels, it is believed. Soviet officials still deny that any falloff in oil production is coming. They say that at worst there may be some leveling in output.

Income from increasing natural gas

exports, plus rising oil prices, make it easier for Moscow to face the foreign exchange consequences of reducing oil exports to West Europe.

The Soviets send oil to their Comecon partners in exchange for consumer and manufactured goods. The oil pricing formula is not made public, but Western specialists estimate it to be 20% to 30% below world prices. Still, the price continues to rise and, as a result, Eastern Europe is being stripped of its production to pay for Soviet oil.

At the same time, restrictions on Soviet oil exports mean that the East Bloc has to buy more oil on the world market for scarce hard currency. It is putting East Bloc economies in a vicious squeeze that promises lower living standards in those countries and, possibly, increased political discontent.

"Given the possibilities of alarmingly low GNP (gross national product, an overall indicator of a nation's economic health) growth in the U.S.S.R. and conceivable economic and political disorder in Eastern Europe, the Soviets may consider pursuit of an aggressive policy in the Middle East," the Western intelligence report said.

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CHARTER LEGISLATION

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
3 April 1980

## Charter for CIA Is Criticized By Schlesinger

By Allan Frank  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger yesterday urged the Senate to abandon its effort to write a charter governing the intelligence community and instead embrace a system of "rewards" for espionage officials who take risks in the "back alleys of the world."

Schlesinger told a subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the problem with American intelligence agencies is that the operatives no longer feel confident about promoting high-risk espionage that could reap great returns.

He urged the Congress to pass a joint resolution praising the intelligence agencies, noting and absolving their mistakes and spurring intelligence officers to greater heights.

Schlesinger, who also has served as secretary of defense, claimed that bureaucratic controls protecting military officers from possible congressional inquiries into cost overruns had probably doubled the cost of military equipment.

Using that analogy, he continued: "In the case of the intelligence establishment, we do not give those who are prepared to run risks sufficient protection. That's why intelligence analysis all too often comes out as mushy. 'On the one hand; on the other hand . . . It is possible that all things will occur.'

"Or, in the case of (covert) operations, the tendency in recent years increasingly has been to cut off the high risk operations even if they may be highly rewarding," Schlesinger said.

Prompted by Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., who claimed that the

proposed bill amounts to a "tax code" that would induce bureaucratic paralysis to the intelligence agencies, Schlesinger harped on the effect the proposed charter would have on incoming intelligence officers.

"We'll have a whole new generation of recruits at the CIA who will practice themselves in this code," Schlesinger said. "They will devote endless discussions to how to skirt the code and where to avoid risk and less and less on what they should be doing or might be doing in the back alleys of the world."

Although he was director of the CIA for only six months in 1973, Schlesinger's experience in the intelligence community is broader than almost anyone's as a result of his service at defense, as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and as secretary of energy.

Arguing that the United States is engaging in "self-abuse" that only benefits its enemies, Schlesinger said the revelations of CIA activities during the last five years have "done incalculable damage . . . special operations and counterintelligence have been severely damaged. Our actions have been viewed with amazement by foreign intelligence agencies."

He also charged that: "The United States could not have done what the Canadians did in removing Americans from Iran. It is precluded. I do not want to go into the details in unclassified session."

Schlesinger said such an operation to help another country would be prohibited under the proposed law and a 1978 executive order from President Carter, which sometimes is regarded as a precursor of a comprehensive intelligence charter.

His broadside on the inadequacies of the proposed charter to guide the country's intelligence agencies ran afoul of Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, D-Ky., the Charters and Guidelines Subcommittee chairman conducting the hearings and a co-sponsor of the 172-page bill.

Huddleston said "I happen to know it is not so" of Schlesinger's assertion that the United States would be unable to undertake an Iran-rescue-type operation.

Outside the committee room, George Carver, a former CIA official and now a colleague of Schlesinger's at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, elaborated by claiming that the United States would be prohibited from issuing false passports to foreigners using aliases.

Committee staff members immediately pointed out to reporters provisions of the proposed charter that would permit such operations.

One provision allows the president to use the Immigration and Naturalization Service (which issues passports) for intelligence operations and another authorizes the president to carry out and conceal operations "notwithstanding any other provision of law."

Schlesinger's testimony was the latest skirmish in a long-running battle before the Senate and House intelligence committees about whether the charter is needed and whether it would unduly restrict intelligence agency activities.

Only one of the other four witnesses yesterday, E. Drexel Godfrey Jr., a Rutgers University professor who once was a CIA official, argued strongly for the proposed charter.

Godfrey said the charter to strengthen and reorganize the intelligence community was necessary because "past operational scandals and misadventures not only put in question the ethical fitness of some elements of the intelligence community, but in so doing, undercut the credibility of the analytic and warning functions."

He said that "the wistfully romantic notion" that the Iranian and Afghan crises could have been prevented "had CIA operatives been fully deployed" is "nonsense."

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ON PAGE A6

THE WASHINGTON POST  
3 April 1980

## Schlesinger Is Critical Of Intelligence Charter

Associated Press

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director James Schlesinger criticized a proposed national intelligence charter yesterday, saying it would bar U.S. operations such as the Canadians used to sneak Americans out of Tehran earlier this year.

His contention was quickly contradicted by Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, D-R.I., co-author of the proposal and chairman of a Senate Intelligence subcommittee conducting hearings on it.

"I happen to know that is not so," Huddleston said, but the two agreed not to argue the matter further in public because of the sensitivity of the subject.

Schlesinger, who was CIA director for six months under President Nixon, said the charter would "enshrine in law" provisions that would keep the United States from doing for the Canadians what their Tehran embassy did for six Americans who managed to avoid capture by Iranian militants.

He said such action—by the CIA or others—also would have been precluded by President Carter's 1978 executive order on national intelligence.

Schlesinger would not elaborate, but an associate at yesterday's hearing, George Carver, indicated to reporters later that he apparently was referring to the executive order's various warnings against actions violating other laws—including those against passport falsification.

The Americans were evacuated using phony Canadian passports, and Carver said, "We could not issue an American passport to people we know are using aliases and are not Americans."

Huddleston would not comment further after the hearing except to say he felt sure the United States could have conducted such an operation if it had needed to do so.

And Intelligence Committee staff members quickly showed reporters



James Schlesinger, on crutches because of broken leg, appears at hearing.

charter provisions which say secret operations may be authorized by the president and carried out "notwithstanding any other provision of law."



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ON PAGE A-11

NEW YORK TIMES  
3 APRIL 1980

## SCHLESINGER ASSAILS A CHARTER FOR C.I.A.

Says Specifying Its Powers Would  
'Grossly Curtail' Intelligence  
Operations and Hurt U.S.

By CHARLES MOHR  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 2 — The debate over whether to change or even to specify the rules under which the nation's intelligence services operate became more spirited today as a former Director of Central Intelligence and a Senator clashed over how good the good old days of the agency had been.

James R. Schlesinger, who was chief of the C.I.A. for six months in 1973, said in his testimony that "incalculable damage" had already been done by disclosures of illegalities and improprieties by the intelligence agencies. He added:

"Substituting a detailed charter will restrict future flexibility, severely handicap liaison relationships and agent recruitment and grossly curtail special operations capabilities. I believe a detailed charter is an inherently bad idea that would permanently damage the intelligence capability of the United States."

Mr. Schlesinger also asserted that the proposed law and an existing Presidential executive order would have prevented the United States from undertaking operations like the one in which Canada assisted six Americans in escaping from Iran earlier this year.

### Huddleston Disputes Schlesinger

Senator Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, chief sponsor of a so-called legislative charter for the intelligence agencies, disputed Mr. Schlesinger's assertion about the Iran rescue, saying, "I happen to know it is not so."

Senator Huddleston, presiding over a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said that he would also like to dispel the idea that the C.I.A. had been a perfect organization before Congressional committees brought to light a series of scandals in the mid-1970's.

Saying that "people tend to forget history," Senator Huddleston asserted that the agency had sometimes miscalculated, had engaged in ill-advised and ill-fated special operations such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, and had tried, without success, to use organized crime to achieve the assassination of Cuba's leader, Fidel Castro.

The question whether present or proposed restrictions would have prevented the United States from helping foreign nationals in the same way Canadian diplomats assisted the six Americans in Iran was raised by Mr. Schlesinger.

### Question of False Passports

Outside the hearing room, he and a colleague, George Carver, who once headed the Vietnam task force at the Central Intelligence Agency, said that they believed President Carter's 1973 executive order governing the operations of intelligence agencies would have prevented American officials from issuing United States passports to foreigners who were using aliases. Canada apparently issued passports to the six Americans.

A section of the order says intelligence activities must be in accordance with applicable law, and there is a law prohibiting issuing of false, forged or mutilated passports. But legal and intelligence experts have said that the President would have been free to amend or waive his order and to tell the public about it only after the operation was completed. Senator Huddleston today cited several sections of his bill that he said would have covered such a problem, including authorization to conceal agency activities.

Most of the hearing today was devoted to whether it was appropriate or feasible for the United States to write detailed legislation governing the mission and behavior of its intelligence agencies. Mr. Schlesinger's answer was a strong no.

Another witness, E. Drexel Godfrey, a former C.I.A. director of current intelligence, firmly challenged this view and said that he hoped that the committee would place limits on the agency.

### 'Wistfully Romantic Notion'

Mr. Godfrey, now director of the masters of public administration program at Rutgers University, said in a statement:

"There are unmistakable signs that the Iranian and Afghanistan crises have encouraged a counter pressure against the safeguards of the new version. For two reasons, I find this counter pressure distressing. First, it is, I think, based on the wistfully romantic notion that had C.I.A. operatives been fully deployed when these crises situations erupted, somehow the agency might have successfully resolved them. This, of course, is nonsense.

"Secondly, the pressure to soften safeguards tends to obscure the original reasons for undertaking the delicate business of putting together a charter in the first place."

Past scandals, he added, "not only put in question the ethical fitness of some elements of the Intelligence community" but also tended to discredit the "analytic and warning functions" of intelligence.

### Moynihan Fears Bureaucracy

New York's Democratic Senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, on the other hand, derisively calling the Huddleston bill a "tax code" that would contribute to bureaucratic caution in the C.I.A. The avoidance of risk, Senator Moynihan said, "is what we don't want in the intelligence services."

Mr. Schlesinger said that such legislation would create "a whole new generation of sea lawyers" who would concentrate more on legalities and less on "what they might and should be doing in the back alleys of the world." He said that a written charter remained "a Procrustean bed by which all future intelligence actions would be measured, stretched and foreshortened."

He also opposed suggestions that the C.I.A. be forbidden from employing journalists, clergymen or professors or from using their institutions as cover, saying, "No American should be denied the right to serve the United States in this sphere simply because of membership in a particular group."



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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
2 APRIL 1980

## National

Experts urge more accurate and independent intelligence gathering.

Witnesses told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the proposed CIA charter must protect individual rights to privacy. But they doubted the legislation's ability to guarantee, for example, that the United States would have accurate information on Soviet military strength. Georgetown University Prof. Roy Godson said, "In the Middle East in recent years, the U.S. has suffered a number of major surprises which never should have been surprises." He said costly clandestine services for more than 30 years did not tell the United States enough about the Iranian revolution, the Afghan coup of 1978 or Soviet intentions in Afghanistan last year.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
2 APRIL 1980

## EXPERTS TO REDRAFT C.I.A. 'CHARTER' BILL

Senate Intelligence Panel Seeking  
a Shorter and Simpler Version

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 1 — The sponsors of a legislative "charter" for the nation's intelligence services have ordered staff experts to rewrite, shorten and simplify the proposed bill before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence begins to consider it later this month.

One aim, a Senate source said, was to cut the proposed National Intelligence Act of 1980 from its present length of 171 pages to perhaps 40 pages.

This might help deal with what another source described as "a perception problem" among some members of Congress that the proposed charter was too complex and cumbersome to be passed in a legislative year shortened by national political conventions and a Presidential election.

The argument that the bill in its present form is nearly incomprehensible is open to debate, but that argument has been used by those who prefer to pass a shorter bill that would "unleash" the Central Intelligence Agency from some of its current restrictions.

### Similar to Moynihan Bill

The proposed charter bill was introduced earlier this year by Senators Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, and Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Republican of Maryland.

The bill contains most of the measures proposed in a shorter bill by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, including a substantial exemption from the Freedom of Information Act for the C.I.A. and criminal sanctions for revealing the identity of intelligence agents.

However, the Huddleston bill also contains a legal requirement that the President give the two intelligence committees of Congress prior notice of covert intelligence operations and attempts to set forth legal standards for investigating or surreptitiously gathering information from Americans and aliens.

Spokesmen for the American Civil Liberties Union and other liberal groups have complained that the standards and procedures regulating such intrusive acts by Federal agencies are excessively broad and vague.

### Protections for Civil Liberties

Staff experts now engaged in redrafting the legislation may attempt to write into the new version of the bill greater protections for civil liberties. One source said the new version would attempt to deal with "some of the complaints" made by advocates of tighter restrictions on the Government's ability to investigate and to surreptitiously seek information.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is expected to begin to formally consider various competing intelligence legislation proposals about the middle of this month, after Congress comes back from its Easter recess. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which has also been holding hearings, is expected to act later.

In a hearing of the Senate committee today, spokesmen for two news organizations protested against a proposal in both the Huddleston and Moynihan bills to exempt the C.I.A. from the Freedom of Information Act, except for personal data sought by individuals.

Joseph Sterne, editorial page editor of The Baltimore Sun who is a member of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, told the committee that the group favored a provision in the Huddleston bill that would prohibit C.I.A. agents from using news jobs or institutions as a "cover."

Robert Lewis, a reporter for the Newhouse Newspapers who is chairman of the Freedom of Information Committee of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, added, "It is imperative for the survival of an independent press to maintain an arm's-length relationship between government and the press."

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FOIA RELIEF

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BALTIMORE SUN  
2 APRIL 1980

## CIA exemption on data opposed

Washington (AP)—Freeing the Central Intelligence Agency from most demands of the Freedom of Information Act would create "a curtain of secrecy that is simply unnecessary," a spokesman for American newspaper editors told Congress yesterday.

The Freedom of Information Act section in a proposed national intelligence charter, "by creating a new and sweeping exemption [for the CIA], would prohibit legitimate historical and journalistic research," Joseph R. L. Sterne, *The Sun's* editorial page editor, told a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on a charter to establish rules for American foreign intelligence operations.

The Baltimore editor also said the proposed exemption is not needed because the CIA already has authority to withhold any information its officials feel would harm the national interest if released.

Mr. Sterne was speaking on behalf of Charles W. Bailey, editor of *The Minneapolis Tribune* and chairman of the American Society of Newspaper Editors' Freedom of Information Committee.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
2 April 1980

# Journalists Urge Senate Unit to Curtail CIA Censorship of Former Employees

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Intelligence Committee was urged yesterday to fashion legislation that would curtail the CIA's censorship powers over its former employees.

The request came from the freedom of information committee of the Society of Professional Journalists (Sigma Delta Chi), which expressed alarm over the scope of the secrecy agreements that all Central Intelligence Agency personnel are required to sign.

The Supreme Court held in February that the government has broad powers to enforce such agreements against former employees and can censor their writings even when they do not involve the disclosure of classified information.

Testifying at a hearing on proposed charter legislation for the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, Robert Lewis, chairman of the society's freedom of information committee, said the CIA has a legitimate interest "in preventing former employees from disclosing, intentionally or otherwise, sensitive information that could damage this country's national security."

He added, however, that "we are disturbed by the reach of the contract" that the CIA uses, requiring pre-publication review of any information involving the agency that the government has not made public before.

In effect, Lewis protested, CIA "employees are forced to sign away their First Amendment rights of free speech and free press for the rest of their lives."

Voicing fears that this could block any effective criticism of the agency by CIA veterans, Lewis suggested that the Senate Committee consider a ban only on writings "that irreparably harm the national security." Another

approach, he suggested, would be to set a time limit—perhaps five years after leaving the CIA—during which former personnel would have to submit their manuscripts for clearance.

Other witnesses at the hearing—which drew only one committee member, Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.)—assailed provisions of the proposed charter that would give the CIA a sweeping exemption from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and that would allow extensive surveillance of Americans both here and abroad.

Katherine A. Meyer, director of the Freedom of Information Clearinghouse, said the CIA "cannot point to a single instance where release of information under the FOIA has endangered our national security."

Speaking for the American Society of Newspaper Editors' freedom of information committee, Joseph R. L. Sterne, editor of the Baltimore Sun, said the CIA proposal would "pull down a curtain of secrecy that is simply unnecessary."

Sterne also urged the committee to add to the proposed charter a provision that would prohibit the CIA "from recruiting, or seeking to recruit, journalists employed by American news organizations."

The bill, introduced by Huddleston, would prevent CIA agents from posing as journalists, but would not prevent the agency from paying journalists to work for the CIA.

Reed Irvine, chairman of Accuracy in Media Inc., which describes itself as "the citizens' media watchdog organization," said that curbing the use of journalists by U.S. intelligence agencies would be unwise, especially since there is nothing to prohibit their enlistment by the Soviet KGB or other foreign intelligence services.

"It is safe to say that any of the world's great intelligence agencies have made and continue to make good use of journalistic sources and journalists in their operations," Irvine said.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES  
1 APRIL 1980

## Act in Wisdom, Not Frustration

As legislation advances in Congress to bring the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation under statutory control, it has become evident that various proposals would seriously undermine the Freedom of Information Act.

The act requires the CIA to release information unless it is classified material and unless its release would cause "identifiable damage" to national security. Under that law, the CIA has been required to reveal domestic spying, drug experiments on human beings and the monitoring of domestic political groups. The proposed CIA charter (S 2284) would allow the CIA to keep secret all such information by exempting the CIA from disclosing "any information concerning the organization or function of the agency."

The present law also requires the FBI to release a broad range of information unless disclosure would "interfere" with a pending investigation, disclose a confidential source or constitute an "unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy. Under the information act, the bureau has had to reveal its surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, information about the

Rosenberg spy case and the bureau's counter-intelligence activities against domestic political organizations.

One bill now under study would let the FBI keep secret its records for 10 years after the end of an investigation or prosecution. Another would permit the FBI to destroy all criminal investigation records 10 years after the end of an investigation or prosecution. These two bills combined would virtually exempt the FBI from disclosure under the information act.

No one doubts that the two intelligence agencies must have sufficient power to accomplish their assigned functions, and that power must include the authority to maintain essential secrecy. But the CIA and the FBI now have broad exemptions from disclosure. Some modification of present law may be necessary, but there is no evidence to show that these agencies should be given virtual exemption from the Freedom of Information Act.

Congress should proceed cautiously, and not permit the frustrations over the crises in Iran and Afghanistan to outweigh a judicious judgment of current legislation. □

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
3 April 1980

# U.S. Wins Round in Its Bid To Seize Agee's Earnings

By Laura A. Kiernan

Washington Post Staff Writer

A U.S. District Court judge yesterday cleared the way for the federal government to try to seize all profits earned by former CIA agent Philip Agee from publication of two books which the government says violated Agee's secrecy agreement with the agency.

Judge Gerhard Gesell upheld the Justice Department's move to get at Agee through a Freedom of Information lawsuit that Agee himself filed in federal court here last October. The government had contended that by filing that suit, Agee had put himself within reach of U.S. courts for the first time since he left this country 11 years ago.

Agee's lawyers tried unsuccessfully to convince Gesell to allow them to abandon that suit and thus leave the government without a way to go after Agee for the profits from the books, "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe" and "Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa."

Agee's efforts to avoid the government's action came at about the same time the Supreme Court ruled that the government could collect the same kind of profits from former CIA officer Frank Snepp, who had signed a secrecy agreement similar to Agee's. The government alleged that Snepp published his book, "Decent Interval" without first submitting the manuscript to the CIA for pre-publication screening, as required under the agreement.

Gesell said yesterday that Agee's "change of heart resulting from the Snepp decision came too late." Gesell said that Agee could withdraw his lawsuit, but the government could still go ahead with its claim for his profits from the two books.

Agee's lawyer, Melvin L. Wulf, said in a telephone interview yesterday that there were "no profits" from the two books. Agee was the editor of the

first book and a contributor to the second, Wulf said.

"They're [the government] not going to get rich off this case," Wulf said. He added that Agee would now not withdraw his Freedom of Information Act request. In that request, Agee is seeking all government records about him held by the CIA, the FBI, the State Department and other government agencies. Wulf said earlier that Agee wants the documents to prepare his autobiography.

Agee's lawyers had argued that it was against the public interest to allow the government to use a Freedom of Information Act request as a vehicle to press other claims against the person who filed the request.

Gesell noted however, that the government had argued that Agee wanted the court's help with his document request against the government agencies "so that he can further flout his continuing legal responsibility under the secrecy agreement." The government's move to stop Agee from further disclosures without CIA approval serves the public interest, Gesell said.

Agee's efforts to block the government's move became caught up in a procedural error when his lawyer failed to file appropriate notice with Gesell that they wanted to oppose the government's move to intervene in the Freedom of Information Act case. As a result, Gesell went ahead, on Feb. 21, to grant the government's request, and Agee followed with his action to abandon the lawsuit. Agee had also asked Gesell to vacate the Feb. 21 order, but Gesell refused the request yesterday.

Gesell said yesterday that it would be unfair to allow Agee to abandon his Freedom of Information Act request and thus "frustrate" the government's right to intervene in the case, which has been under way either in the agencies or at the judicial level for more than 26 months.



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A8THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
3 April 1980

## U.S. Wins Round in Battle to Bar Agee From Publishing CIA Data

By Kenneth R. Walker  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The government yesterday won a significant battle in its fight to prevent former CIA agent Philip Agee from further publication of agency secrets and to recover any profits earned by earlier books.

The victory came in U.S. District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell's ruling that the government has a right to file a counterclaim against Agee in connection with the former spy's Freedom of Information Act suit — even if Agee withdraws his suit.

The United States had previously been thwarted in its attempts to press its case because Agee now lives in West Germany and because the CIA may not initiate lawsuits in its own name.

However, just before a Feb. 19 Supreme Court ruling upholding the government's right to confiscate proceeds of a book by another former agent-turned-author, Frank W. Snepp III, the government filed a motion to intervene in the Agee freedom of information suit to achieve the same end.

The government counterclaim says Agee violated the so-called "secrecy agreement" all CIA employees must sign. The agreement provides for prior CIA review of any publication of agency-related material.

The government has asked the court to bar Agee from any future publications without first gaining CIA agreement.

The government had also sought in the motion to stop distribution of an Agee book on CIA activities in Africa. After the publication of that book last month, the government amended that claim to request confiscation of all proceeds.



PHILIP AGEE  
Setback in court

Gesell first granted the government's right to intervene on Feb. 21, following a clerical mistake that prevented the filing of briefs by Agee's New York lawyer, Melvin Wulf.

The judge wrote yesterday that Wulf's opposing briefs were not included in the case file by court personnel because of a federal rule requiring that papers be signed by local counsel.

Last month, Wulf filed a motion for reconsideration of the intervention motion, and, alternatively, to allow Agee to withdraw his freedom of information suit seeking all records about him held by the State and Justice departments, the CIA and the National Security Agency.

It was Wulf's reconsideration motion that Gesell rejected yesterday. However, the judge ruled that Agee did have the right to withdraw the freedom of information suit, "... but the case will proceed in all other respects."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 32VILLAGE VOICE  
31 MARCH 1980

# MAKING BOOK

## Chilling Effects II

By Eliot Fremont-Smith

The story so far: On February 19, without consideration of full briefs or allowing oral arguments, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in *United States v. Snapp*. The unsigned six-to-three decision wrote new law; the dissent, signed by Justice Stevens with Brennan and Marshall joining, termed the decision, "unprecedented," "uninhibited" (in its disregard of the First Amendment and the principle of no prior restraint), and "drastic," and "draconian" in its remedy. Writers, publishers, and legal experts across the country have agreed.

In narrow terms, the decision holds that former CIA agent Frank W. Snapp III, in publishing without prior clearance his account of the end of the Vietnam War, *Decent Interval* (Random House, 1977), violated his employment contract with the CIA, which calls for such clearance even if (as the government conceded) no classified information is involved. Further, the decision holds that Snapp had and has (in regard to all future work) a fiduciary responsibility, that he was "unjustly enriched" by the proceeds of *Decent Interval*, and that therefore he must forfeit to the government all earnings from that book. Thus the court majority treated *United States v. Snapp* as a simple breach-of-contract case, though it wrote new law for remedy (in contract law, assessment of penalty has traditionally required a separate hearing).

In broader terms, but no less plain, the decision radically expands on previous findings (particularly on lower court findings in the two Marchetti cases), holding that privileged information need not be "classified," but may extend to any information that may be "harmful" to "national security" including that which could be harmful to "the appearance of confidentiality." Moreover, an actual contract may not be required to establish a trust relationship on government employees with access to such information: Any government employee, past or present (high officials of course excepted), may be under the same injunction that now applies to Frank Snapp, and subject to similar penalties.

All of this was detailed in last week's Making Book, including the CIA tactic (in the second Marchetti case) of deleting more material than was strictly necessary from Marchetti and Marks's *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (Knopf, 1974) "with the view that at a later date, possibly at trial, CIA could withdraw on the softer items"—this from a hitherto unpublished CIA internal journal.

Perhaps too ironically (caroming off shock), I wrote as well of the "chilling effects" of the Snapp decision and my belief that the Supreme Court majority knows exactly what it's doing—and that it's not petty vengeance for *The Brethren* or momentary ardor for re-unleashing the CIA, but a determined effort to strike at the political heart of the First Amendment, the freedom of informed analysis and criticism of important government practice and policy. But that's not all; the ramifications of this and other court decisions and legal actions ripple out in all directions. We are in a time of enormous threat and (alas, it follows) debilitating, unseemly, and even mischievous confusion.

For Frank Snapp, the immediate consequences of the court's decision is financial impoverishment. Barring an unlikely rehearing—the ACLU is considering such petition, but glumly—Snapp must turn over to the government his entire earnings from *Decent Interval*, about \$120,000 so far, plus whatever he may yet make on the book. (This represents him some five years' income plying his trade as a writer.) Meantime, two completed manuscripts—a novel and an account of his book battle with the CIA, must remain unseen by his agent, Lynn Nesbit (whose firm also represents Henry Kissinger—the ironies run deep), and publisher, Random House, until the manuscripts have been cleared by the CIA.

Nor is the agency under great compunction to minimize this prior restraint. The CIA is supposed to accomplish its screening within 30 days of submission, but if legal wrangling is involved (as it was with the Marchetti/Marks book), the limit becomes mean-

ingless. As a practical matter, the CIA can hold up Snapp's manuscripts for a very long time indeed, censoring whatever it chooses to consider possibly harmful to its activities, intelligence in general, national security, and "the appearance of confidentiality." One cannot know about the novel, but surely Snapp's own version of his free speech travail more than dabbles in these murky waters. Once cleared, of course, the manuscripts cannot be substantively altered—i.e., edited—without further clearances.

Robert Bernstein, the civil libertarian head of Random House, has suggested that for the sake of expedition a CIA screener might sit in on all editorial conferences, rendering instant decisions as to what change is okay with the national interest and what is not. Bernstein's suggestion shows frustration and despair: The fact is, most publishers, probably including Random, would countenance no such sitting-in. They would instead say to hell with books by the likes of Snapp: too much tying up of money, talent, and time, too much trouble, too costly a prospect of possible litigation—these are the "chilling effects." And they can kill.

And that's without even addressing the possibility that Random House itself could be held liable for its profit on *Decent Interval*. Given the basic Supreme Court decision, it should not be beyond the government's talents to show that Random entered into a conspiracy with Snapp in the publication of an unlawful book.

At the moment, Snapp is into Random for \$12,000 on a personal loan for living expenses, which he hoped to pay back out of earnings from the manuscripts Random cannot see. Maybe it will work out this way. Or maybe CIA snippers will render the manuscripts unpublishable. In the latter case, Bernstein can perhaps be expected to write off the loan, though with lingering frowns from the finance department of past and future owners (RCA is in the process of selling the Random complex to Newhouse Publications). But that wouldn't leave Snapp with much to show for his post-government profession, which is writing. And it wouldn't leave the editors of Random or any other publisher with the sense of tremendous company eagerness to land substantial and knowledgeable critiques of government policy.

The Snapp decision went far beyond the relief even the government requested (such is the radicalism of the Supreme Court majority), but the Justice Department recognizes a good thing when it sees it. The ink was hardly dry on *United*

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*States v. Snepp* when, on March 3, the Justice Department announced it was filing suit against another former CIA agent who had published an uncleared book critical of CIA practices and policies—John Stockwell's *In Search of Enemies* (Norton, 1978). Stockwell, who lives in Texas, was understandably exercised about the Snepp decision on the phone: "It is an atrocious, un-American decision—truly, truly tragic." Of his own book, he would not say (as Snepp insisted) that it contained no classified information. *In Search of Enemies* is a harsh criticism of CIA blunders and "depraved" and self-defeating policies in Africa. But it shares with *Decent Interval* an appreciation of U.S. security goals, a wish that U.S. intelligence were more effective in achieving goals that are worthy and realistic, and a disinclination to jeopardize secrets truly important to national security or that would endanger present agents. Both books were written only after the CIA rebuffed the authors' internal criticisms, and in the patriotic, even establishment, "whistle-blowing," tradition. In other words, the government isn't out after kooks or foreign spies, it's out to punish and silence citizens whose loyalty and experience might make them credible.

Anyway, John Stockwell can most likely expect to be ordered to forfeit his earnings from the Norton book—which, before taxes and expenses, total for three years' work about \$50,000. "I'm a big boy," he says gruffly. "I can live with a CIA overview—but that's because I've already had my say. If I write more, it will be fiction, and not about the CIA." Besides, he adds, *In Search* has already peaked out: "Every penny I made from it has long since been spent." Unlike Snepp's earnings, Stockwell's have not been tied up in escrow, so collecting could be a problem—as it may become anent Doubleday's current \$125,000 action against author Gwen Davis Mitchell, instituted in the wake of the Supreme Court's refusal last December to review *Bindrim v. Mitchell and Doubleday*, which appears to deprive works of fiction of hitherto assumed First Amendment guarantees. I shall return to the chilling effects of *Bindrim*—but first, Henry Kissinger.

Having in *Snepp* apparently placed all manner of government employees, with or without secrecy contracts, under possible fiduciary restraint, the court wished to make clear that certain personages were, of course, excepted. This could have gone without saying: High government officials, who make, implement, and elucidate policy, define the national interest, and decide what's best kept confidential, must be free to express themselves and even give certain things away as the national interest and good anecdotes dictate. It was nice of Kissinger—but hardly required by law or custom—to clear sensitive moments in his memoirs with a successor high official;

"Treatment of classified materials in this book," Kissinger notes in the foreword to *White House Years*, "have been worked out with the office of the national security adviser, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, to whom I express my appreciation." (If Richard Nixon has done likewise with his forthcoming and still top-secret meditation, *The Real War*, that's nice, too. "We must face up to the stark reality," I have learned he will reveal: "World War III has begun, and we are losing it.")

Still, the breathtaking breadth of the February 19 *Snepp* decision could sow confusion among high memoirists; a clarifying message was needed. This the court was pleased to supply, in roundabout fashion but with unmistakable gusto, on March 3—even as the long arm of Justice was reaching out to Texas and the "unjustly enriched" John Stockwell.

Back in the waning days of his secretary of statehood (so the story goes), Kissinger sought the advice of an employee who knew a bit about the law. The secretary had this problem: Unclassified materials left behind at a federal agency like State might conceivably be scrutinized by other people, even critics, under the Freedom of Information Act. Could, therefore, the secretary legally ship transcripts of his secretly recorded on-the-job telephone conversations, along with other "personal" papers useful to a book, to a vault on the estate of his good friend, Nelson Rockefeller, near Tarrytown, N.Y.? But of course, sir, the employee advised—and the deed was done (presumably at public expense, though Snepp's royalties should cover it).

But these days a private vault offers only temporary comfort; for real security, nothing less than the Library of Congress—which is exempt from Freedom of Information prying—will do. And so it was that in time the Kissinger papers and transcripts found their way back to Washington, where they were eagerly received by historian-turned-Librarian of Congress, Daniel Boorstin, with the stipulation that there be no public access to the materials for at least 25 years, like until 2002. Kissinger may consult them (literature will be served), but without his say-so, no one else.

Faull cried a group of reporters, scholars, and potential critics—and sued. In *Reporters Committee v. Kissinger*, the lower court held that the transcripts from Kissinger's time as White House National Security Adviser were in any case privileged, but that the State Department transcripts were not—and that these had been wrongfully removed—and should be returned forthwith to State to be made accessible under FOIA regulations. Kissinger appealed and lost. He appealed again (with the ever-busy Justice Department joining), and the brethren did their bit.

In a five-to-two decision (Stevens and Brennan again dissenting), and this time

not incognito (Justice Rehnquist did the signing), the court ruled that since State no longer had the papers, it could not be charged with "withholding" same under FOIA. "The agency has neither the custody or [sic] control necessary to enable it to withhold," Rehnquist penned; "even if a document requested under the F.O.I.A. is wrongfully in the possession of a party not an 'agency,' the agency which received the request does not 'improperly withhold' these materials by its refusal to institute a retrieval action." (Take that, Lewis Carroll!)

Moreover, the court noted, a suit to determine whether papers had been improperly removed would have to be filed under the authority of the Federal Records Act, which can be invoked only by Federal agency heads and not by mere citizens, loyal or not. The *Times* of March 4 reported that the prospect of this "did not appear likely today, however. The Justice Department's Supreme Court brief in the case noted that 'the Library of Congress desires to keep the notes; the State Department, so far as this record discloses, does not want them back.'" (For his part, Justice Rehnquist went on to new highs two weeks later, diddling the Eighth Amendment. No, he wrote for the majority, a mandatory life sentence for three larcenies totaling \$229.11 did not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment." Where would he draw the line? Well, life for overtime parking might be Constitutionally troubling.)

No decision is perfect, however, and in *Reporters Committee v. Kissinger* the court may have inadvertently aided the cause of future historians by confirming how high government officials may safely preserve all their papers, even the embarrassing ones: Get them out of any FOIA-covered agency and into the hands of "a party not an 'agency'" pronto, with whatever proviso for exclusive access seems within the realm of dignity. Critics may rage, but they can no longer "institute retrieval action," much less force disclosure; and historians will come around to a longer view: What's "instant history" anyway? Better delayed papers for the "ultimate record" than no papers at all.

The CIA would, of course, agree: If only Marchetti, Snepp, and Stockwell had been patient—had waited until the year 2000 to publish their accounts of CIA mistakes—there might have been no need to establish the government's right of prior restraint. I say *might*; no one, not even the nation's top Librarian, can foretell the exact time-frame an "appearance of confidentiality" may require of down-the-line employees and their brazen, would-be publishers.

Next week: Why, in the wake of *Bindrim*, Kissinger *et alia* would be best advised to stay away from fiction; revenge and fear at Doubleday; what's chilling as well as heartwarming about *Hellman v. McCarthy*; the First Amendment peril of *The Nation's* purloined papers; and a startling conclusion.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 28VILLAGE VOICE  
31 MARCH 1980

# Supreme Court-CIA Hit Team 'Destabilizes' First Amendment

By Nat Hentoff

When I first emigrated to New York in the early 1950s, an ancient journalistic mariner gave me valuable advice: "If you go to cover a story and see a bunch of reporters there, find another story." And so it has been in this column from the beginning. Most of the time, what you read here, like it or not, you are not likely to have come across elsewhere. Occasionally, I break the rule, moving into more crowded terrain, when there are such clear and imminent dangers as the end of the world or the further grasp for public office of such natural disasters as Daniel Patrick Moynihan or Ed Koch, the whitest of all mayors in New York City history.

This is another exception. The Supreme Court's decision in *The United States v. Frank W. Snepp III* has been widely reported and abundantly interpreted, but I do not think the full extent of this ruling's garroting of the First Amendment has yet been recognized. In drastic essence, the High Court has usurped the law-making powers of Congress and has gone a long way toward enacting an American version of the British Official Secrets Act. (This statute so greatly constricts the British press from disclosing what the Government does not want it to disclose that had there been a British Watergate, most of that story could not have been reported in the press there because so much "confidential information" from Government sources would have been involved.)

The immediately visible victim here is ex-CIA whistleblower Frank Snepp—now subject to lifelong censorship by the CIA for anything he writes, fact or fiction, that may relate to what he learned while working for the Agency. He's also broke, the Supreme Court having required him "to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness" (all the bread from his book, *Decent Interval*). But having talked to Snepp during his long travail, I expect that losing a sizable chunk of his freedom of speech weighs on him much more heavily than his present penury—no matter what the Supreme Court maliciously says to the contrary about his motivations.

Snepp was harshly punished even though the Court concedes, as has the CIA, that his book contained no classified information. Snepp's transgression was that he broke his employment contract by which he had pledged to submit all writings concerning the CIA for pre-publication review by that very Agency. This, in itself, is a grave First Amendment question: Can you contract away your First Amendment rights? The Court had never dealt directly with it before, and in *Snepp*, the majority brushed that First Amendment issue aside in a single footnote. (Yes, you can sign away those rights.)

Then, however, the Supreme Court went far beyond the facts of this case, far beyond the sanctity of the CIA's employment contract, far beyond any law now on the books, and far beyond Snepp himself to fashion a doctrine which can extend to hordes of Government employees, as well as to newspaper, magazine, and book publishers. A secrecy contract, said the Court, can indeed be used to censor those who work or have worked for the Government; but even in the absence of such an agreement, any employees with "access to confidential sources and materials" can be placed under the same kinds of restrictions as Frank Snepp. This confidential stuff need have nothing to do with national-security secrets. So long as the Government worker, high or low, is in a relationship of trust with his agency or department, his First Amendment rights are now substantially diminished.

The *Snepp* decision, therefore, stiflingly envelops not only the 12 or so Government agencies that currently make their employees sign agreements similar to the one Snepp signed with the CIA, and the more than 30 agencies that already have the authority to classify documents for "national-security" purposes. This Supreme Court clamp on the First Amendment also extends throughout the Government to any department or agency that expects its workers to keep confidences. Both present and former employees.

As Henry Kaufman, the Association of American Publishers' resident Constitutional expert, says: "The Court's opinion provides the theoretical underpinnings for a significant expansion of Government secrecy at all levels."

And if the Supreme Court says that it's okay—actually, necessary and desirable—to place all these Federal employees under prior restraint, what is to prevent the *Snepp* doctrine from being applied to state and local Government agencies?

But how is the press affected? Well, under the lower-court injunction imposed on Snepp—now emphatically affirmed by the Supreme Court—not only Snepp has to abide by the court order making the CIA his supreme editor. Anyone acting "in active concert or participation with him" is also so bound. Accordingly, if a book, newspaper, or magazine publisher went ahead and published a Snepp manuscript that had not been first examined by the CIA, the publisher could be hit with a contempt ruling and conceivably could go to jail, no matter how loudly he brayed about his First Amendment rights.

Indeed, because Snepp's *Decent Interval* was published without clearance, the Department of Justice was also seriously considering a suit against his publisher, Random House, at the time. Now, with this implicit encouragement from the Supreme Court, the Government is much more likely to move against any kind of publisher, or broadcaster, who retains the quaint notion that muckraking cannot depend on the prior approval of the targets of that muckraking.

By this point, I hope I have communicated how startling a landmark decision this is. As Robert Bernstein, president of Random House has pointed out, the Court has now empowered all branches of Government to muzzle with a "fiduciary duty" (a trust relationship) "those employees and former employees who are in the best position to know of bungling and wrongdoing." From the State and Defense to the Commerce and Agriculture Departments, potential whistleblowers can now be bound by this free-floating concept of censorship.

CONTINUED

So, too, can the clerks of Supreme Court Justices. Not a few Court-watchers believe that the *Snepp* decision—the raging sweep of that majority opinion—was not unrelated to the Justices' steaming resentment against Woodward and Armstrong's *The Brethren*. It is now quite likely that no sequel will be published for a very long time to come.

Meanwhile, Frank Snepp has submitted a novel to Random House. An official of the firm tells me, "I have not read it. I cannot read it until the CIA has looked at it first, because, from what I'm told, it has something to do with the Agency."

Say Snepp: "This must be the first novel in American history that is enjoinable in advance."

On the other hand, whoever wrote the unsigned majority Supreme Court decision emphasizes, in a footnote, that none of this is censorship at all. What is required is "no more than a clearance procedure subject to judicial review." The CIA has to make its cuts within 30 days, and if the author and publisher disagree with the Government's editors, they can bring the Agency to court. Of course, the aggrieved parties have to get up a lot of money for lawyers while we, the taxpayers (including the author and publishers) are funding the Government's legal costs.

Then, there is that stubborn question of where the First Amendment fits into this "clearance procedure." As Mr. Justice Stevens said in dissent: "The Court seems unaware of the fact that a new remedy has been fashioned to enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to criticize his Government. Inherent in this prior restraint is the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy."

Stevens was not fooled by the 30-day-clearance ploy of the majority. The mere fact, he said, that a writer has to submit a manuscript for Government review before publication "is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing." He might also have added that the delay involved in this profoundly un-American procedure can be much more than 30 days.

"The Agency makes cuts," a lawyer for a publishing firm told me, "and then we argue back and forth. This haggling can take months, sometimes years. And if we can't come to an agreement, we go to court, and that will surely take years. So, if it's a very timely book, as practically all muckraking works are, it'll be out of date by the time we win—if we win. And that precisely is what an agency, any Government agency, wants. I can't tell you how awful a decision this is, and because it was a 6-to-3 ruling, the effect can last the lifetimes of many of us. The Supreme Court has spoken."

And, as Anthony Lewis has noted, "The effect is not limited to books . . . . An official who talks to the press could be taken to court and enjoined from further leaks."

In speaking for censorship, the Supreme Court, moreover, has done something few Constitutionalists thought would ever happen. It has broken the precedent against prior restraint of publications that goes back to the start of the American Revolution. In the colonies, libertarians argued about whether the press should ever be punished for libel or whatever after publication. But everyone agreed with the 18th-century English jurist, Sir William Blackstone: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications."

The Framers of the Constitution also strongly believed that Government had no business stopping or delaying publication. And, during this century, the Supreme Court, in a series of key decisions, has steadily held that only in extreme circumstances can even the idea of prior restraint be considered. For instance, printing news "of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops in time of war." (*Neur v. Minnesota*, 1931) Or, when publication "will surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people." (The Pentagon Papers case, *New York Times v. United States*, 1971)

It is true that in two subsequent cases—both concerning CIA pre-publication censorship of ex-agent Victor Marchetti, with only classified materials involved—the High Court declined to review lower-court decisions permitting this particular form of prior restraint. The foundations of the First Amendment had begun to crack. But now, in *Snepp*, the High Court directly, vehemently, even viciously, sets up a powerful precedent for prior restraint that, by freezing the First Amendment rights of Government employees with access to "confidential" information, also deeply violates the public's right to know what's going on.

No matter what happens with Jimmy Carter's attempts to eviscerate the Freedom of Information Act, along with his other moves to keep the Government hidden from its citizens—as explored in the past three columns—the Supreme Court, in *Snepp* and in its upholding of Henry Kissinger's right to sneak his telephone transcripts out of the State Department with impunity, has already helped greatly to erect a wall of separation between the citizenry and the State. Indeed, in the *Snepp* decision, the Court has accomplished vastly more in this pursuit than Jimmy Carter could ever have hoped for from Congress.

Since I am still doing penance for not voting for Hubert Humphrey, war criminal though he was, in 1968, I must note that all four Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court were in the majority in *Snepp*.

At the close of this series on the national-secrecy state, I have debts to acknowledge. For information—earlier and much more complete than the rest of the press—on all these matters, and more, I recommend *First Principles*, a publication of the Center for National Security Studies (sponsored by the ACLU Foundation and the Fund for Peace), 122 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. A tax-deductible contribution of \$20 to the Center brings you *First Principles* and access to many precisely illuminating reports and documents.

*First Principles* covers Congress, the courts, and all manner of civil liberties developments—and reverses.

Also essential to those hooked on freedom is *Organizing Notes*, put out by the Campaign for Political Rights, 201 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. For a \$10 donation, you'll get a year's subscription. In addition to analyses of attempts in Washington to amputate the Bill of Rights, there's a lot of news from around the country. For example, continuing reporting on the key civil liberties issue of the 1980s—the growth of a malignant nuclear-power apparatus, in and out of the Government, that insists the Bill of Rights cannot coexist with the "security" needs of nuclear reactors and weapons.

Finally, a note of gratitude to *The Washington Post*, which covers the maneuvers and plain lies of the national-secrecy state much more comprehensively and astutely than *The New York Times*. For this and its coverage of the Middle East, as well as a sharper Op-Ed page than the *Times*, the *Post* is essential reading. Not that I forgive its owner for union-busting.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
1 APRIL 1980

## National



Stansfield Turner

**A congressman wants clarification  
on the use of spy covers.**

Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said that Central Intelligence Agency director Stansfield Turner had not come clean about whether religious and academic professions are used as "covers" for overseas spying. Turner acknowledged that the agency had waived its rule against using employees of the American news media three times during the Carter administration, Aspin said. He does not want the CIA to use clergymen, teachers, journalists, Peace Corps members or congressional staffers as spies.

# ASSOCIATED PRESS

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## WASHINGTON BRIEFS

WASHINGTON (AP) -- A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE  
SAYS HE HAS ASKED CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER TO SAY CLEARLY  
WHETHER THE AGENCY HAS USED THE RELIGIOUS OR ACADEMIC PROFESSIONS AS  
'COVERS' FOR OVERSEAS SPYING.

TURNER TOLD THE COMMITTEE IN A RECENT LETTER THAT THE AGENCY HAD  
WAIVED ITS OWN RULE AGAINST USING EMPLOYEES OF AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA  
THREE TIMES DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, REP. LES ASPIN SAID  
SUNDAY.

DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI HAD EARLIER TOLD THE SENATE  
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE THAT THOSE WAIVERS DID NOT LEAD TO ACTUAL  
OPERATIONS AND THAT "THERE WAS NO USE OF JOURNALISTS."

"BUT TURNER'S LETTER WAS SILENT ABOUT ANY DEALINGS WITH OTHER  
GROUPS SUCH AS CLERGYMEN AND TEACHERS," SAID ASPIN, D-WIS.

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DCI Energy Testimony

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
23 April 1980

# CIA Chief Foresees 'Vicious Struggle' As Oil Output Falls

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Staff Writer

Declining oil production worldwide in the 1980s is likely to produce "shortages, uncertainties and risks" and result in a "vicious struggle" among nations for scarce resources, CIA Director Stansfield Turner testified yesterday.

In somber testimony before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Turner forecast that "world oil production is probably at or near its peak and will decline throughout the 1980s."

As a result, he said, the world as a whole faces the prospect of declining petroleum consumption and slowing economic growth. "Politically, the cardinal issue is how vicious the struggle for energy supplies will become," he added.

The backdrop for Turner's long-planned testimony was rising congressional concern about the consequences of unilateral U.S. military action to blockade or mine the harbors of Iran. Such action, especially if it causes spreading turmoil in the Persian Gulf, could bring about a major oil supply interruption with global repercussions.

Turner did not comment on possible U.S. military action against Iran, which has been repeatedly mentioned by President Carter in recent days as a potential next step in the crisis over the U.S. hostages in Tehran. The CIA director said his agency has produced

an estimate of the probable reactions of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and other Persian Gulf oil producing nations to such U.S. action, but he declined to discuss it in public session.

According to Chairman Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), an extensive Energy Committee inquiry into "the geopolitics of oil," including Turner's testimony, has found that "an oil supply interruption of a major magnitude is a virtual certainty at some time within the next decade." Describing the United States as "heavily dependent" on imported oil for at least 10 to 20 years, Jackson called on the executive branch to fill the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve despite opposition from Saudi Arabia.

The present U.S. reserve is the equivalent of only 11 days' oil supply, according to Jackson. Failure to expand the reserve—in the face of the grave dangers of a petroleum cutoff—is "a one-way road to suicide," he charged.

As in previous CIA estimates and testimony, Turner said one of the factors in the world's coming petroleum bind is an expected decline in Soviet oil production. The CIA director forecast that Soviet petroleum output will peak this year and begin falling next year. The communist countries as a group will go from net exporters of oil to net importers within the next several years, he said.

At the same time, oil output in the Persian Gulf countries "will at best

remain near current levels," while production by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in other areas will decline in the 1980s, Turner said.


Despite heavy drilling, U.S. production will continue to decline, Turner estimated, noting that "most U.S. companies in the past year have reduced their projections of output in the 1980s."

Turner's forecast of U.S. production brought sharp dissent from oil-state senators Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and Henry Bellmon (R-Okla.). They charged that that the CIA and other official estimates are too pessimistic and fail to take into account the impact of recent and potential discoveries.

Just about the only bright spot in the world oil supply picture, as outlined by Turner, was the possibility of a major increase by Mexico in the 1980s. He said Mexico is now increasing production rapidly to meet its revenue needs and might double its output from the present 2 million barrels per day.

In the tension-filled period of the 1980s, said Turner, "all the obstacles to securing a stable flow of oil from the [Persian] Gulf will be magnified."

He described as "tenuous" the physical security of the oil routes and the oilfields of the area. "Any major intra-regional conflicts—such as another Iran or another Arab-Israeli war—could well lead to some disruption of oil supplies," he said.



STANFIELD TURNER

cites "shortages and risks"

23 APRIL 1980

# Iranian Oil Output Said To Decline

## C.I.A. Sees No Threat to Buyers

By RICHARD D. LYONS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 22 — The Director of Central Intelligence told a Senate hearing today that Iranian oil exports were continuing to decline but that this did not appear to pose an immediate threat to the economies of either Japan or other major petroleum-importing nations.

Adm. Stansfield Turner testified that sabotage in the Iranian oilfields, the lack of proper maintenance of equipment, such as pumps and pipelines, plus a lag in exploration and drilling had combined to reduce Iranian exports to 1.5 million barrels a day.

"I think even this number is going to erode downward," Admiral Turner told the Senate Energy Committee.

Because of falling production, Admiral Turner said, "the Iranians don't have a great deal of leverage at this time, but coupled with what other oil exporters do, it could be serious."

### Iranian Impasse With Moscow

Admiral Turner appeared before the committee with two aides, Ronald L. Smith, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's International Materials division, and John E. Eckland, chief of the agency's Petroleum Supply Analysis Center.

The three faced a wide range of questions, which elicited a number of conclusions:

¶The Iranian Government and the Soviet Union are at an impasse on negotiations over prices paid by Moscow for natural gas imports.

¶The Japanese have stockpiled 93 days of oil supplies for their economy, while West Germany and other Western European nations have slightly less — about 90 days' supply.

¶The Soviet Union will switch from being a net exporter of oil next year to being a net importer and will start making purchases from Persian Gulf states.

¶Soviet and United States demand for energy "sets the stage for an East-West competition for Mideast oil."

The possibility of such a confrontation and the probability of a disruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were the reasons that the committee held the hearings, according to its chairman, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

## U.S., Soviet Competition in '80s For Mideast Oil Predicted by CIA

Associated Press

CIA Director Stansfield Turner, in rare public testimony before the Senate Energy Committee, yesterday painted a gloomy picture of world-wide oil supplies through the 1980s.

Turner said Soviet and U.S. demands for energy "sets the stage for East-West competition for Mideast oil."

Because the Soviet Union will go from being an oil-exporting to an oil-importing nation over the next few years, Soviet leaders face "extremely painful" economic, political and military choices, the Central Intelligence Agency chief said.

The Soviet Union is the world's biggest oil producer, pumping 11.7 million barrels daily in 1979, Turner said. Production will "probably peak this year at less than 12 million barrels daily and begin falling next year."

That means the Soviet Union and its dependent Eastern European nations will begin competing on world markets for oil, already in short supply.

The oil crunch, he said, will put pressure on Soviet leaders to use "forceful action, ranging from covert subversion to intimidation" and military action.

Turner predicted that the Soviets will try to trade for oil at reduced prices by offering to sell weapons or other commodities to oil-producing nations.

Turner was pressed hard by committee members to predict that the United States will face a major cutoff of oil imports.

"The possibility certainly does exist," Turner said. "It certainly can happen."

THE BALTIMORE SUN  
23 April 1980

# CIA head predicts 'vicious' oil rivalry

From Wire Services

Washington—CIA Director Stansfield Turner yesterday said that potentially "vicious" competition will develop in the next decade for a diminishing worldwide supply of oil.

In a rare public forecast of the international energy outlook, the Central Intelligence Agency chief said the Soviet Union will begin importing oil over the next few years, putting increased pressure on already tight Middle Eastern reserves.

For the United States and other western powers, Admiral Turner told the Senate Energy Committee, "the cardinal issue is how vicious the struggle for energy supplies will become."

Admiral Turner predicted that obstacles to securing a stable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the United States would be magnified during the 1980s.

"The physical security of the oil routes and any of the gulf oil fields is tenuous and any major intraregional conflicts—such as another Iran or another Arab-Israeli war—could well lead to some disruption of oil supplies," he said.

Admiral Turner, in response to questions by committee members, would not assess the chances of a Middle East oil cutoff during the decade. But committee chairman Henry Jackson (D. Wash.),

whose panel is investigating the strategic implications of a tightening supply of oil, said he regarded it as almost inevitable.

"Internal turmoil throughout the Middle East, fueled by Soviet intrigue, make a supply interruption in the next decade a virtual certainty," he said.

Admiral Turner told committee members, who unsuccessfully encouraged him to speak more frankly about the likelihood of international energy crises over the next 10 years, that "we believe that world oil production is probably at or near its peak and will decline through the 1980s."

The director of central intelligence said that before the end of 1980, Soviet oil production—11.7 million barrels daily last year—will peak.

As the Soviets begin looking for new sources of supply, Admiral Turner said Russian leaders will be forced to make "extremely painful" economic, political and military choices to keep the Soviet economy from sharp decline.

He said the Russians may use diplomatic pressures or barter arrangements for weapons with Middle Eastern producers.

But he added that tougher action, including "covert subversion," intimidation and military action, "cannot be ruled out."

Combined with diminishing production

from Middle Eastern producers, Admiral Turner said the smaller Soviet oil supply will add "another potentially destabilizing ingredient to an area [the Middle East] which already has experienced wrenching political events in the past year. . . ."

"It also is likely that the Soviets will be increasingly active in the diplomatic arena in the Middle East," Admiral Turner said, "holding out as a carrot the glimmer of a stable political atmosphere if the Gulf states become more cooperative on oil and political matters."

He said, "Moscow is already making the point that Middle Eastern oil is not the exclusive preserve of the West."

Even without a war or crisis in the Middle East, Admiral Turner said, there will be a shortage of oil on the world market during the 1980s.

Members of the committee, who believe the United States should build a domestic oil reserve for emergencies, urged him to make a specific prediction on the odds of a cutoff.

"I do not want to forecast a high probability," Admiral Turner said, "but the possibility certainly does exist . . . it certainly can happen."

Admiral Turner said that Saudi Arabia, the major Middle Eastern producer, may reduce production.

23 April 1980

# Inside the news—briefly

## Turner sees oil pinch, use of force in USSR

Washington

The Soviet bloc will become an importer of oil by 1985 and a Kremlin decision to use military force to ease its energy problems in this decade cannot be ruled out, Stansfield Turner, director of US Central Intelligence, said Tuesday.

"The entrance of the Soviet Union into the free world's competition for oil not only further squeezes oil supplies available to the West but also entails major security risks," Admiral Turner told the Senate Energy Committee. "Given the advanced age of Soviet leaders, the oil crunch is likely to occur during a large-scale changeover in the Soviet Politburo."

He said the competition for declining world oil supplies would strain relations within both Soviet-bloc nations and industrialized Western powers.

"Politically, the cardinal issue is how vicious the struggle for energy supplies will become," he said. "This competition will create a severe test of the cohesiveness of both the Western and Eastern alliances."

# Turner predicts competition for world oil supply

By Mike Shanahan  
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — CIA Director Stansfield Turner said yesterday that potentially "vicious" competition over a diminishing worldwide supply of oil will develop in this decade.

In a rare public forecast of the international energy outlook, Turner said the Soviet Union would begin importing oil over the next few years, putting increased pressure on already tight Mideast reserves.

For the United States and other Western powers, Turner said, "The cardinal issue is how vicious the struggle for energy supplies will become."

Asked whether a major cutoff of Mideast oil to the United States was likely during the 1980s, the CIA chief said it "certainly can happen."

Turner testified before the Senate Energy Committee, which has been investigating strategic implications of a tightening supply of oil.

"We believe that world oil production is probably at or near its peak and will decline through the 1980s," he told committee members, who unsuccessfully encouraged him to speak openly about the likelihood of international energy crises over the next 10 years.

Turner did say that before the end of this year, Soviet oil production — 11.7 million barrels daily last year — would peak. (A barrel contains about 42 gallons.)

That country's search for new sources of oil, Turner said, will force Soviet leaders to make "extremely painful" economic, political and military choices to keep the economy from sharp decline. He said the Soviets may use diplomatic pressures or barter arrangements for weapons with Mideast producers.

But he added that tougher action, including "covert subversion," intimidation and military action, "cannot be ruled out."

Combined with diminishing production from Mideast producers, Turner said, the smaller Soviet oil supply will add "another potentially destabilizing ingredient to an area (the Persian Gulf) which already has experienced wrenching political events in the past year...."

"It also is likely that the Soviets will be increasingly active in the diplomatic arena in the Middle East," he said, "holding out as a carrot the glimmer of a stable political atmosphere if the gulf states become more cooperative on oil and political matters."

"Moscow is already making the point that Middle Eastern oil is not the exclusive preserve of the West."

Even without a war or other sort of crisis in the Mideast, Turner said, there will be a shortage of oil on the world market during the 1980s.

Members of the committee, who believe that the United States should build a domestic oil reserve for emergencies, urged him to make a specific prediction on the odds of a cutoff.

"I do not want to forecast a high probability," Turner said, "but the possibility certainly does exist ... it certainly can happen."

Turner said that Saudi Arabia, the major Mideast producer, may reduce production from 9.5 million barrels daily to 8.5 million barrels sometime this summer.

He said production in Iran is likely to decline because of deteriorating equipment and untrained oil field workers.

"There is increasing sabotage in the oil fields and discontent among oil workers with the present management," Turner said.

Iran is currently producing about 2.5 million barrels of oil daily, about 1.5 million for export, mainly to Japan. That country announced that it would decline to pay Iran's new price of \$35 a barrel, and Iran on Monday suspended oil shipments to Japan. (The Saudi Arabian price is about \$26 a barrel.)

Japanese leaders have been hinting that the United States should help make up any shortage, but Turner said that an existing temporary abundance of oil on the world market probably will make that unnecessary.

In the long run, however, only stringent conservation policies by the United States and other oil-consuming nations will avert major economic disruption, he said.

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
23 April 1980

# What's News—

*World-Wide*

Soviet military action to relieve an "oil crunch" this decade can't be ruled out, CIA Director Stansfield Turner said. He told the Senate Energy Committee that the U.S.S.R.'s petroleum output will start to drop in 1981, leaving Soviet leaders "extremely painful" choices.



# ASSOCIATED PRESS

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7PM-CIA-WORLD OIL; 8JT; 500

TURNER SAYS RUSSIANS WILL BE IN OIL MARKET

FOR RELEASE AT 9:30 A.M. EST - TIME SET BY SOURCE

FEES: HEARINGS START AT 9:30 A.M. EST. PRENOON TOP EXPECTED.

BY MIKE SHANAHAN

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - AMERICA'S TOP SPY TOLD CONGRESS TODAY THE SOVIET UNION FACES AN "EXTREMELY PAINFUL" DROP IN OIL SUPPLIES AND SOON WILL BE COMPETING WITH OTHER BUYERS ON THE WORLD MARKET FOR OIL THAT IS ALREADY IN SHORT SUPPLY.

IN FACT, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR STANFELD TURNER SAID, HE CAN'T RULE OUT A RUSSIAN ATTEMPT TO COME UP WITH MORE OIL THROUGH "FORCEFUL ACTION" SUCH AS "COVERT SUBVERSION" OR EVEN "MILITARY ACTION."

TURNER, IN RARE PUBLIC TESTIMONY, TOLD THE SENATE ENERGY COMMITTEE THE CRUNCH IN RUSSIAN OIL WOULD COME BECAUSE SOVIET OIL PRODUCTION WILL PEAK THIS YEAR AND THEN DROP.

AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, SAUDI ARABIA LIKELY WILL REDUCE PRODUCTION BY A MILLION BARRELS DAILY THIS SUMMER.

FOR RUSSIAN LEADERS, TURNER SAID, "THE POLICY OPTIONS ... TO ADJUST TO REDUCED OIL SUPPLIES ARE ALL EXTREMELY PAINFUL."

IN TESTIMONY PREPARED FOR DELIVERY, TURNER PREDICTED THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO TRADE FOR OIL AT REDUCED PRICES BY OFFERING TO SELL WEAPONS OR OTHER COMMODITIES TO OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS.

"MORE FORCEFUL ACTION, RANGING FROM COVERT SUBVERSION TO INTIMIDATION, OR, IN THE EXTREME, MILITARY ACTION CANNOT BE RULED OUT," TURNER SAID.

TURNER PAINTED AN EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC PICTURE OF WORLD ENERGY RESERVES IN THE NEXT DECADE.

"THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE MOST PROLIFIC OIL PRODUCING AREAS HAVE ALREADY BEEN LOCATED AND DRILLED," HE SAID. "EVEN WITH MODERN TECHNOLOGY, THE CHANCE OF FINDING NEW GIANT FIELDS IS DIMINISHING."

AMONG MIDDLE EASTERN PRODUCERS, TURNER SAID SAUDI ARABIA, AMERICA'S MOST DEPENDABLE SUPPLIER, COULD POTENTIALLY INCREASE ITS CAPACITY BY A MILLION BARRELS OVER CURRENT PRODUCTION OF 9.5 MILLION BARRELS DAILY.

BUT INSTEAD OF AN INCREASE, TURNER SAID, "WE EXPECT BY THIS SUMMER THAT THE SAUDIS MAY REDUCE ACTUAL OUTPUT TO 8.5 MILLION BARRELS A DAY OR LOWER."

# ASSOCIATED PRESS

-CIA-

ONLY IF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER CONSUMING NATIONS BEGIN STRINGENT CONSERVATION POLICIES WILL MAJOR ECONOMIC DISRUPTION BE AVERTED; HE SAID. "THE ENERGY OUTLOOK PRESENTS SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS."

THE SOVIET UNION IS THE WORLD'S BIGGEST OIL PRODUCER; PUMPING 11.7 MILLION BARRELS DAILY IN 1979; TURNER SAID. PRODUCTION WILL "PROBABLY PEAK THIS YEAR AT LESS THAN 12 MILLION BARRELS DAILY AND BEGIN FALLING NEXT YEAR."

THAT MEANS THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS DEPENDENT EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS WILL BEGIN COMPETING ON WORLD MARKETS FOR OIL; ALREADY IN SHORT SUPPLY.

COMBINED WITH DIMINISHING PRODUCTION FROM MIDDLE EASTERN PRODUCERS; TURNER SAID THE SMALLER SOVIET OIL SUPPLY WILL ADD "ANOTHER POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING INGREDIENT TO AN AREA (THE MIDDLE EAST) WHICH ALREADY HAS EXPERIENCED WRENCHING POLITICAL EVENTS IN THE PAST YEAR. ..."

"IT ALSO IS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA IN THE MIDDLE EAST;" TURNER SAID; "HOLDING OUT AS A CARROT THE GLIMMER OF A STABLE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IF THE GULF STATES BECOME MORE COOPERATIVE ON OIL AND POLITICAL MATTERS."

HE SAID; "MOSCOW IS ALREADY MAKING THE POINT THAT MIDDLE EASTERN OIL IS NOT THE EXCLUSIVE PRESERVE OF THE WEST."

FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER BIG POWERS; TURNER SAID; "THE CARDINAL ISSUE IS HOW VICIOUS THE STRUGGLE FOR ENERGY SUPPLIES WILL BECOME."

AP-NY-04-22 0238EST

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UPI

WASHINGTON (UPI) - THE SOVIET UNION IS INFILTRATING AGENTS INTO IRAN TO UNDERMINE THAT COUNTRY, CIA DIRECTOR STANSFELD TURNER SAID TODAY.

"THE SOVIET UNION IS VERY ACTIVE IN A COVERT PROGRAM IN IRAN, INFILTRATING AGENTS INTO THE COUNTRY TO UNDERMINE THE COUNTRY THEY ARE OSTENSIBLY TRYING TO COURT," TURNER TOLD THE SENATE ENERGY COMMITTEE.

"THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNS OF SABOTAGE IN THE OIL FIELDS, AND DISCONTENT BY THE WORKERS," HE SAID.

TURNER ALSO SAID A TOTAL CUTOFF OF IRANIAN OIL SUPPLIES WOULD HAVE VERY LITTLE IMPACT NOW BECAUSE OF A CURRENT, BUT TEMPORARY, OIL GLUT ON WORLD MARKETS.

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CIA and Journalists/Missionaries

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A19

THE WASHINGTON POST  
23 April 1980

*Michael Getler*

# Why Journalists Can't Be Spies

A CIA official in Europe, one whom I had known for a long time and who was fascinated by issues of press and patriotism, once asked me the following question:

"If you were on a reporting trip in East Germany, and you happened to see large numbers of Soviet tanks moving westward, what would you do? Whom would you call first?"

I told him I would call my newspaper and try to file a story over the phone.

The question was clever, a probe of allegiances and inclinations. But it was not surprising because American foreign correspondents, if they were so inclined, would make marvelous spies. They can travel to distant places, talk to lots of people in and out of government, sometimes even take pictures, without arousing too much suspicion. The reason they can do this, of course, is precisely that they are *not* spies.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner and President Carter, however, either don't seem to understand this or are being rather casual about the safety of American correspondents abroad and the principle that the press must be scrupulously independent of government to carry out its proper role in American democracy.

In Washington earlier this month, Turner told a convention of newspaper editors that he would not hesitate to recruit a journalist for an undercover operation abroad when it was vitally important to the nation. Later, President Carter endorsed this policy as proper under "extreme circumstances" involving U.S. security.

Apparently, such extreme circumstances happen rather frequently, since Turner has also said that on three occasions in the last three years he authorized recruitment of journalists for covert operations that, for unexplained reasons, he says, were never carried out.

For American correspondents overseas, there could hardly be worse news than the top officials of the U.S. government putting on the record the best piece of ammunition that the secret police of dictatorships and totalitarian governments have had in a long time.

There is scarcely a U.S. reporter trying to cover Eastern Europe, Asia or South America who, assuming he or she is doing the job, has not been hassled by those police. After it happens the first time, a reporter never again is totally

calm approaching a border or airport security check, pockets stuffed with notebooks filled with interviews of people whom foreign governments prefer the reporter hadn't met.

In these situations, which are growing more frequent and tense, the reporter's only defense is his or her wits and ability to defend his or her work as legitimate journalistic enterprise.

My education began in Prague in January 1977, when Czech gumshoes raced into an apartment building ahead of me, turned out the lights in the stairwell and then came storming down the stairs at me, apparently to frighten me away from the people I was trying to visit.

That is tame stuff compared with what many U.S. reporters experience elsewhere. Indeed, the president appears to have forgotten 1977, when his human rights campaign stirred up all of communist Eastern Europe.

In June of that year, the Moscow correspondent of The Los Angeles Times, Robert C. Toth, was seized by the Kremlin's KGB security police, hauled into custody for two days of questioning and eventually accused, among other things, of being a CIA agent. President Carter said then that the United States had expressed its "strongest objections about what has been done about Mr. Toth" and that the Soviets "know about our deep concern about their... actions."

Almost a year earlier, in May 1976, the Soviets had charged three other American correspondents in Moscow with secretly working for the CIA.

One of them was Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek, who now is the press spokesman for White House national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

"We deplore such irresponsible charges," the State Department said at the time. The three are "highly respected professional journalists, and in our view the charges slander their reputations and the organizations they represent."

The State Department got it right in 1976. But it is now going to be increasingly hard for journalists to fight the battles for their integrity—and for the integrity of what they report—after the president and Admiral Turner have needlessly allowed an official cloud of suspicion to settle over correspondents.

Ironically, it could also harm U.S. attempts to badger communist Eastern Europe into paying greater heed to the provisions of the 35-nation 1975 Helsinki agreement dealing with greater freedom of movement for journalists, a provision that was supposed to have been a victory for the West.

*The writer covers national security affairs for The Post and was formerly Central European correspondent.*

# 'Unshackling' the CIA won't give it intelligence

"Intelligence is not a science," Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, declared recently in an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington. "It is a craft — even, at times, an art. An element of trust is vital because without it, flexibility is lost. And an intelligence organization that lacks flexibility is just another bureaucracy."

Trust. As Mr. Dooley once said, "Thrust iverybody — but cut th' cards." Admiral Turner, bespeaking the Carter administration's case for "unshackling" the CIA in a new legislative charter, has a peculiarly one-sided notion of trust. It is that Congress, representing the American people, should trust him and the CIA, but that Congress should not be trusted.

Yet as the CIA director conceded elsewhere in his address, "In practice, in my three years of association with the committees of Congress, they have exercised extraordinarily good judgment and have not pressed us for a level of detail that was unnecessary." Nor does he cite a single instance in which the eight committees of Congress, whom the president is required to inform "in timely fashion" before any covert operations can be undertaken, have betrayed their trust.

The argument, though, is not about the number of committees which should be informed "in timely fashion." On that, there is a consensus that eight committees with 163 members, plus staffers, is probably too many. The argument is over what is "timely fashion," and what kind of operations should be reported, and how they should be controlled, and who should make the decisions.

The Carter administration's position is that, as the President said in his State of the Union address, "unwarranted restraints on our ability to collect intelligence" should be removed. One of those is the legal requirement, proposed in the major Senate bill, that the president give Congress prior notice of covert activities. Another is the requirement in the 1974 Hughes-Ryan

amendment governing clandestine operations that the president must personally approve all covert operations. The administration wants a proviso requiring the president to approve only covert operations involving "substantial" risks and, in effect, leaving it up to the CIA to determine what those operations are.

On that, the administration has changed its position since early 1977, when soon-to-be Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was declaring that covert activities should be undertaken only in "the most extraordinary circumstances" and that on all of them the president "should sign off in writing, saying that he believes this vital to the national security."

The administration was right then, wrong now. The U.S. should not go back to the days when the CIA had the "flexibility" and used it to plot murder of foreign leaders, to spy on American citizens, and to operate its own foreign policy or, with a wink from the White House, a foreign policy unknown to Congress and the American people.

Nor should the CIA be given such vague authority as to permit it to spy on the political activities of American citizens and in other ways abuse their rights and liberties — activities that were justified on the grounds of "inherent power." In bills before the Senate, they would be codified. The case against is simple. Government cannot be trusted. Admiral Turner's arguments to the contrary are disingenuous. The Founding Fathers knew what they were doing when they wrote certain prohibitions on governmental power into the Constitution.

Admiral Turner demonstrates their understanding, and his own lack of it, in declaring that he "wouldn't hesitate" to use journalists in secret intelligence operations if he thought such a practice justified. The function of journalists is to get news, independent of any government, including their own. It is not self-serving, it is, rather, serving the interests of the people for whom that news is vital, to point out that that function can not be exercised freely if journalists are suspected of being spies in the pay of their govern-

ment. The CIA director says he is not now employing journalists as spies; the charter should specifically forbid such employment.

The legislative charter also should not go too far in relieving the CIA from the reasonable requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. Under the current law, genuine secrets are protected from disclosure. Admiral Turner is also disingenuous in his argument that the CIA should in effect be immune even from judicial review of its secrecy stamps. Sources must be protected; but it is one thing to say that; another to demonstrate, which Admiral Turner does not, that any sources have been blown by reasonable access to nonsecrets.

Something is missing in much of the debate over "unshackling" the CIA. That is that the primary mission of the agency is not covert operations. It is to gather intelligence, to analyze it, to evaluate it, and to disseminate it to those who need it (and their responsibility is to act upon it). Keeping the CIA from repeating its past abuses has little if anything to do with that mission. Indeed, one can make a case that the CIA's diversion into cloak-and-dagger operations had much to do with its failures in its primary mission.

In August, 1978, a top-secret CIA report advised that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary situation." Five months later the shah left the country on his extended "vacation." In February last year, Admiral Turner acknowledged that the CIA had been caught by surprise by events in Iran.

The CIA's failure did not come about because of shackles placed upon it by the Congress. It came about because of its own political and intellectual inflexibility in pursuing the art and craft of intelligence. The way to avoid such failures in the future is not to give the CIA the authority it abused in the past but by structuring it to pursue its primary mission.

UPI

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(CIA AND THE MEDIA)

(BY DANIEL GILMORE)

WASHINGTON (UPI) - A SPOKESMAN FOR SIGMA DELTA CHI, THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, TODAY ASKED CONGRESS TO PROHIBIT RECRUITMENT OF JOURNALISTS AS SPIES, "PARTICULARLY DURING PEACETIME."

ROBERT LEWIS, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIETY'S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMITTEE, ALSO TOLD THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE THE CIA SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN BLANKET EXEMPTION FROM DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

LEWIS, A WASHINGTON REPORTER FOR NEWHOUSE NEWSPAPERS, STRESSED THE SOCIETY'S CONCERN ABOUT JOURNALISTS BEING USED FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK.

"I CANNOT OVERSTATE THE DEPTH OF CONCERN IN THE NEWS MEDIA OVER THE QUESTION OF RECRUITING JOURNALISTS AS SPIES," HE SAID.

BOTH THE HOUSE AND SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES ARE DISCUSSING PROPOSED CHARTERS FOR THE CIA, FBI AND INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

THE CIA, WITH ADMINISTRATION BACKING, IS PUSHING FOR FEWER RESTRICTIONS.

UPI 04-22 07:59 PES

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ON PAGE A18

THE WASHINGTON POST  
22 April 1980

# LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## *Journalists and the CIA*

The Associated Press report in The Post (April 11) of Admiral Stansfield Turner's speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors disappointed me.

The report was correct when it said that "CIA Director Stansfield Turner yesterday defended the Carter administration's policy of allowing the spy agency to use American foreign correspondents." What the story failed to say in its remaining nine paragraphs was this salient point, emphasized by Mr. Turner: that no foreign correspondent would be approached by the CIA without the personal approval of the director of the CIA.

Later, the story reports that "members of the ASNE strongly disagreed with Turner." That sentence seems to imply that the members who were present (all of them) disagreed with Mr. Turner.

Such was not the case. I was not

alone when I told Admiral Turner after his talk that I would not only agree to serve under the special circumstances which he outlined, but would be proud to do so.

The AP story dwelled only on one aspect of Mr. Turner's detailed speech. There was no reference to other points that at least some of us in the audience felt would be considered more important by the general public than the parochial issue that alone was dealt with in the story.

As an editor, I am confronted frequently with criticism that one of our news stories is biased. I've tended to discount these critics. This firsthand experience will make me more understanding of criticisms and more diligent in demands upon my reporters for fairness.

R. H. RAWLINGS,  
Editor,

Pueblo Star-Journal & Chieftain

Pueblo, Colo.



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ON PAGE 2B

WICHITA EAGLE (KS)  
20 APRIL 1980

## Journalists and the CIA

MEMO TO: Stansfield Turner, CIA Director  
SUBJECT: Use of journalists by CIA

You told the American Society of Newspaper Editors the other day that you not only had approved the use of journalists for intelligence operations on three occasions, but that you saw nothing wrong with that.

You expressed some surprise that editors and other news professionals should be upset, and said, "I don't understand why you think if you accept an assignment from me that you are no longer free."

Let us tell you why. One thing that sets the American press apart from many of its counterparts elsewhere is that it is free, not only from government control, as prescribed by the Constitution, but also from government influence.

The latter is even more sinister than the former, and it is because the press in so many nations does work closely with the government in power that American news people are so often suspect when they go abroad.

You correctly said it would be "naive" to think foreign governments regard U.S. journalists as being above reproach. But that hardly means you should confirm those governments' worst fears by revealing that the

CIA does indeed ask journalists to spy for it on occasion.

You seemed to think this was old news, but for many of us, it struck like a bolt of lightning. We don't doubt that you had indeed promulgated the rule that journalists abroad could be used, with your consent, back in 1977. But we missed it, somehow, or we would have been sending this memo earlier.

More is at stake, you see, than the "honor" of the journalism profession, or the proper relationship of a free press with the government. You spoke, earlier in your remarks, of people such as former CIA agent Philip Agee "putting American lives in jeopardy" by disclosing agency secrets.

We're afraid you have done the same thing, Sir, by telling every foreign government in the world that any American journalist in any country could be in the service of the CIA. All that was necessary to raise the question was for you to admit that it was possible.

Think about it, and whether those are the kinds of doubts you want to raise. We doubt that they are, in which case you should rescind this unwise rule, and let a free press function as it should, unencumbered by suspicions of being merely a front for secret missions.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 20CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
20 April 1980

## Realms of spies, realms of trust

The question of whether American scholars, clergymen, and journalists can be put in the undercover service of the Central Intelligence Agency is one that, once asked, must be answered categorically. And the answer, however tempting it may seem to hedge it around with subtle distinctions and emergency exemptions, must be a flat no.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner, speaking at the convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, gave the wrong answer. "We fully share the recognition that journalism, religion, and academia have a special importance in our country," he said. "At the same time we recognize that there may be unusual circumstances in which an individual who is also a member of one of those professions may be used as an agent."

This drew attention to the fact that Mr. Turner had revised the flat prohibition on using scholars, clergy, and journalists as clandestine agents that his predecessor at the CIA, George Bush, had imposed. Now the regulation permits the CIA director to make exceptions and Mr. Turner had done so at least three times already. Though in no case did the CIA actually go through with the operation, it is fair to ask how often the "unusual circumstances" of which Mr. Turner spoke have to occur before they are considered commonplace.

In this field, the exception itself destroys the rule. The ban on recruiting clergy, scholars, and journalists must be absolute or it is nothing. Its whole point is simply to mark out three institutions within our society which, for special reasons, we choose not to corrupt with the suspicions, fears, and betrayals that inevitably attend the business of espionage. And if this commitment is qualified or made ambiguous, mistrust will have a place to insinuate itself.

Foreign espionage and counterintelligence have always sat restlessly with the American spirit. George Washington employed spies during the Revolutionary War. In private, he allowed that he thought espionage was of critical importance. But his effectiveness as a spymaster was not something he bragged about openly. This century, Herbert Hoover's Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, tried to dismantle the country's code-breaking establishment, huffing that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." International turmoil soon got the better of the code of gentlemanliness, and the secret bureaucracy was revitalized.

Espionage is a troubling adjunct to the

American constitutional order because it creates a murky, deceptive world in which all the daylight virtues of truth and integrity and humaneness become warped into liabilities. Espionage trusts no one, and it cannot be trusted. It is antithetical to the usual processes of an open society, and yet it protects the very possibility of openness that it cannot tolerate in its own affairs.

It is foolish to claim that a free society in an amoral world, facing ruthless adversaries, must not engage in this paradoxical behavior that denies what it defends. But it does not necessarily follow that because our adversaries reject the values that cause us discomfort with the techniques of espionage, we must put aside all our qualms. A balance must be struck between our ideals and the imperatives of living in a world that does not share them.

Scholarship, journalism, and religion have traditionally had special protection against government interventions. Not only have they been seen as particularly vulnerable, but also as specially important. They are realms of inquiry after truth, realms of trust and faith.

Nothing could do more damage to the work of these three professions than the suspicion that they are entangled in the secret network of espionage. For them, distrust destroys.

This is why they must be marked off as immune. It is not that journalists, clergymen, and scholars have no duty of patriotism. It is that their unhindered work serves the nation in a way that overrides the temporary advantage that may be gained by using them as undercover intelligence agents.

Reestablishing the Bush prohibition does not mean that all the usual reporter-source contacts between journalists and CIA officials must be forbidden. Nor does it mean that the CIA should turn away information volunteered to it in extreme cases by individual scholars, clergymen, or journalists. It only means that continuing relationships in which the members of these professions become the CIA's agents and also the use of these professions for cover should be barred.

New legislation is not required in order that this be done. It need not be chiseled into constitutional jurisprudence. But now that the question has been raised, it is the duty of the intelligence community to answer it unequivocally, to exercise self-restraint, and to make it plain that American scholars, clergy, and journalists are to be recognized for what they are, and not regarded with suspicion as people who may be moonlighting for the CIA.

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ON PAGE 14-15

EDITOR & PUBLISHER  
19 APRIL 1980

## CIA chief employs reporters as spooks

By I. William Hill

At the American Society of Newspaper Editors convention in Washington last week, editors like A.M. Rosenthal, *New York Times*, and Gene Patterson, *St. Petersburg Times*, expressed both surprise and dismay when Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of CIA, disclosed that in three separate instances since 1977 he had personally approved the use of journalists for secret intelligence operations.

The editors said they had understood that CIA policy since December of 1977 had been never to use American journalists in intelligence operations.

Turner declared, however, that it had been openly revealed at the time that, with the approval of the CIA Director, journalists could be used in very exceptional situations.

"What if we have a terrorist situation and the only way to gain information is through use of a journalist. That is the kind of circumstance I mean, a situation wherein the real security of the United States is involved."

"Do you think it's worthwhile to cast into doubt the ethical and professional position of every foreign correspondent?" Rosenthal demanded. "This endangers not only the ethics of our work but the physical existence of our foreign correspondents."

Patterson agreed with Rosenthal and announced he would try to set Admiral Turner straight by editorials in the *St. Petersburg Times*.

Turner went on to say it would be "naive" to think that a foreign government would assume that journalists of any nationality are free of association with intelligence agencies.

"Furthermore," he said, "I would be ashamed to think I needed a law to protect my ethical reputation."

In his prepared speech, Turner told the editors that in none of the three cases where he had approved use of journalists had they actually been used, due to a change in the situation that made them no longer required.

In response to questions, Turner said no journalists are now actively employed or paid either here or abroad as CIA agents. He said he had no current plans to use or hire any, but that if a situation presented itself in which he felt such a practice was justified, he wouldn't hesitate to recruit one.

Turner expressed surprise at the negative reaction of ASNE members and suggested they were "naive."

"I can't understand," he said, "why you think if you accept an assignment from me to aid the United States you are no longer free."

Asked if, in the event he did hire a correspondent to work for the CIA, he would so inform the correspondent's employer, Turner said he regarded that as an obligation of the correspondent hired.

**EXCERPTED**

NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE  
18 APRIL 1980

# The CIA and the Press

At the American Society of Newspaper Editors convention last week, CIA Director Stansfield Turner, responding to a question from the floor, said he had modified previous CIA policy against using journalists, academics and clerics for intelligence assignments to permit exceptions personally authorized by himself. This produced a rush to the audience microphones by outraged editors, and today on our "Other Opinions" page we present Carl Rowan, liberal, against Adm. Turner and Pat Buchanan, conservative, for him. We must cast our lot with the latter.

Journalists stand in a special relationship to the public and to officialdom, and are rightly zealous to avoid compromise or the appearance of compromise of our accuracy and objectivity. For a foreign correspondent, the trust of the public that reads him, the sources who inform him and the officials who permit him to work in their countries is the heartbeat without which the profession could not live.

But we were at that session of the ASNE, and that is not what we took Adm. Turner to be talking about. He specified that if a CIA mission affected what a reporter reported, that was the reporter's responsibility. Clearly, slanting the news or knowingly reporting misinformation was not the kind of ad hoc mission he had in mind — unlike one of his predecessors, William Colby, whose 1977 boast of using journalists to write CIA-prepared copy first raised the issue — and not the kind of mission reputable journalists would accept.

We would guess he had in mind such things as passing on information, instructions or funds, arranging contacts, collecting messages in the course of the journalist's ordinary work in cases when no other means are available or possible. The nature of foreign correspondents'

routines — popular fiction notwithstanding — does not lend itself to cloaks and daggers.

Adm. Turner taxed the protesting editors with naivete, for it is not hard to assume that many foreigners take into consideration the possibility that correspondents may routinely report to the CIA, as we, with far more reason, assume TASS correspondents are KGB operatives or sources. A good reporter, given information by a source off the record or discovering some hidden fact or development, is more likely to use it to develop a story he will write for publication than to deep-six it in the analysis section of the CIA.

But there is information and information, and a reporter who discovers something of urgent or crucial impact on national security, but something that is better known by responsible authorities than either published to the world or left unknown, will hardly keep it as a priest does a confession. We are dealing here with individuals with judgment, not a group of clones, and Adm. Turner's appeal to a patriotism that does not compromise professional principle is valid.

All American citizens, whatever their work, have an obligation to their nation's interest, and should be free to determine what part they can or will play in protecting that interest. The correspondent who completes the recruitment of a high Soviet Defense Ministry officer as an agent has helped the nation without harming his profession. In the three exceptions Adm. Turner says he has authorized (but which were never put into operation because the situations changed and the work was no longer needed), all three journalists were willing to cooperate, and we have enough respect for our colleagues to assume that they were willing for all the right reasons.

# Spying no job for press

**WE HAVE TO** say one thing for CIA Director Stansfield Turner: The man has guts. No coward could have stood before a convention of newspaper editors and told them that the agency has every right to press journalists into service as CIA operatives.

Admiral Turner indicated to the editors that he could not really see any validity in their arguments against the Agency's policy. He even suggested that he would expect any reporter approached to go along with the proposal. "I think a lot of correspondents are patriotic enough to do this," the jingoistic admiral noted.

Turner seems to lack any respect or understanding of the role of the press

abroad. It is vitally important to Americans that foreign correspondents be able to gather news in as free and unrestricted an environment as possible. If reports begin to come out that newspeople are being used as Agency lackeys, it will severely impair the work of all journalists in other countries.

When Iran threw U.S. journalists out of the country, the action appeared to the world as unjustified and arbitrary. If Turner had his way, Iran would have had every right to expel the journalists: Any country that discovers spies in its midst can justify ridding itself of them. We can only hope that Turner does not succeed in his goal of calling all journalists' integrity into doubt.

## Cloak, dagger...and notebook

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Stansfield Turner, sees nothing wrong with using journalists as undercover agents. He reserves the right, he told an audience of newspaper editors last week, to enlist reporters for secret missions abroad. And he was rather surprised when the editors reacted with shock and dismay.

He should know better. Newspaper and television reporters, at home as well as overseas, must be perceived as operating completely independently of their government. How, for example, would Americans be able to get any news of what's happening in Iran if the reporters working there were suspected of being CIA agents? Admiral Turner's remarks could give the Iranians justification for arresting or evicting every American correspondent working in the country, and the same would be no less true in other parts of the world.

We are mindful that the American press, in recent years especially, may have worn out the public's patience in asserting its special privileges — the rather extraordinary protections which the First Amendment and a democratic society affords the working journalist. The vehement professional objection to the use of journalists as spies may strike some people as yet another example of the same tendency.

But what's at stake here is more than protection for the reporter. Anyone who relies on newspapers or television for a reasonably ac-

curate picture of the world ought to feel he has some guarantee that the go-betweens aren't paid operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency any more than they're shills of General Motors. Reporters can't be anything less than the seekers of facts that they present themselves to be, or their credibility vanishes.

If a foreign nation comes to look upon every reporter as a spook, which thanks to Admiral Turner it very well might, what happens to a journalist's ability to inquire? Does the admiral think a news source, say an official of the French government, would give frank answers? How can a reporter find out what's going on so he or she can accurately interpret and present the facts? And what happens to a reporter's very safety in a foreign country?

Admiral Turner evidently hasn't asked himself such questions. He doesn't seem to understand and maybe doesn't see the value to the American people (and for that matter to their government) of unfettered inquiry. He doesn't appreciate that credibility is one of the most important tools a journalist has. That's bad enough. What makes it worse is that the CIA, in trouble in recent years because of its disregard for American values and frequently its laws, doesn't seem to have learned very much. And what makes it even worse than that is Jimmy Carter's answer to a question about his Naval Academy classmate's position: Does he agree with it? Yes, he said, I do.

NEWSDAY (N.Y.)

11 APRIL 1980

# CIA Head Would Use Press Spies

By Thomas Collins

Newsday Media Writer

Washington—The gap between the CIA and the press widened yesterday when the CIA director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, told newspaper editors that he saw nothing wrong with the practice of using American journalists on covert operations if unusual national security reasons warranted it. A correspondent might be "uniquely placed to serve his country in important circumstances," he said.

Speaking in response to questions at the American Society of Newspaper Editors convention, Turner said that he was puzzled by editors who oppose the practice. "I don't understand it, I really don't," he said. "You're saying that if you serve your country, you're no longer free. If you slant the news, that's bad, but at least you're free to do so. But reporting information to us somehow profanes your work. I'm sorry, I don't understand the connection you make." Turner said that the agency would resort to using journalists only in exceptional circumstances. He said he had changed the policy of former CIA Director George Bush, now a Republican presidential candidate, which had been not to use journalists, the clergy or academics in agency assignments. But Turner said that any such use would have to be approved by him. He had approved only three cases, he said, but none of the covert operations was carried out.

"I think a lot of correspondents are patriotic enough to do this," he said. He added that it would be up to the individual journalist whether to inform his news organization that he was working for the CIA on the side.

Some editors felt strongly that the policy casts doubts on the journalistic independence of American correspondents abroad and could result in their being accused as spies. A. M. Rosenthal, executive editor of The New York Times, who questioned Turner closely on the subject, called the CIA policy "shocking."

"It endangers the reputations and even the lives of foreign correspondents," Rosenthal said.

Eugene Patterson, editor of the St. Petersburg Times, said he was going to write an editorial explaining to the CIA why many in the press opposed the practice. Not all of the editors at the convention agreed, however. Randall Terry, president of the High Point (N.C.) Enterprise, said he supported the CIA policy. His managing editor, Joe E. Brown, was against it. "We're going to have write two editorials," Terry said. Jerry Ausband of the Myrtle Beach (S.C.) Sun News, said he thought "you could come down on either side of the issue and not feel guilty. It's not a black and white situation."



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 494THE NATION  
26 April 1980

## C.I.A. Secret Missionaries

*Until 1975, the Central Intelligence Agency routinely used missionaries and clerics as informants and for covert activities. This was particularly true in Latin America, where most of the fourteen documented cases of collaboration with the C.I.A. occurred.*

*Now, under foreign intelligence charter legislation being considered by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the C.I.A. would again be empowered to use church groups to gather intelligence. White House spokesmen claim that the C.I.A. would enlist missionaries only if "it is terribly important." They also state that the Government will support a charter to "protect the integrity" of missionaries and clerics. On the basis of the C.I.A.'s past record, however, such assurances are dubious—as is shown by the following passage excerpted from Penny Lernoux's Cry of the People, to be published by Doubleday on May 2.*

—The Editors

### PENNY LERNOUX

**A**dolfo Centeno Alancastro was suitably sympathetic. It really was a shame, he told the Uruguayan Jesuit, how brutish Uruguayan police agents were, but what could you do with people who thought that Medellín\* was the name of a person and confused pictures of Christ with Che Guevara.

The police had just ransacked the priest's house in Montevideo, carrying off his entire library to burn, including a rare collection of theological treatises, and here was their boss commiserating with him over the loss of his life's work! According to Centeno, such incidents would never happen if Church officials would only cooperate with educated policemen like himself.

Whatever his claims, Centeno had bona fide credentials,

for, like his counterparts in Brazil and Chile, he could demonstrate an intimate knowledge of theology and Church politics, as well as an expertise in intelligence and "dirty tricks," courtesy of the C.I.A. After years of using and abusing local and foreign religious groups in Latin America, the C.I.A. now appears to be seeking a lower profile in this area, partly because of the ruckus caused by indignant Catholic and Protestant organizations in the United States following revelations in 1975 of C.I.A. penetration of missionary groups. More to the point, the Latin American security agencies can now do the job themselves. Centeno, for example, was trained in the Panama Canal Zone; his boss at the Uruguayan Interior Ministry, Luis Vargas Garmendia, was an old C.I.A. hand who had worked with former C.I.A. agent Philip Agee in the 1960s. The pair spent their time making life difficult for diplomats from the socialist countries accredited to Uruguay back in the days when Uruguay was still a democracy. Vargas Garmendia was generally thought to have planned the murders of two former Uruguayan Senators in Buenos Aires in 1976. He was later made secretary to President Aparicio Méndez, front man for Uruguay's repressive military regime.

Because of his background in Church affairs, acquired during a stint in Central America, Centeno was chosen to monitor and persecute Uruguay's critical Catholic Church. Also useful were his credentials as a militant in Catholic Action, a laymen's movement that was influential in Latin America during the 1960s. Centeno professed not to understand why Uruguayan priests were so "strangely" reluctant to answer questions, whereas his experience with Catholics in Central America had been "just the opposite." But in view of the regime's arrest and/or expulsion of fifteen religious between 1972 and 1976, the closure of five Church publications and a smear campaign against Montevideo's Archbishop Carlos Parteli, labeled a Communist because he defended human rights, such reticence was well-founded. Though an "educated" policeman, Centeno specialized in the "black propaganda" of half-truths or outright lies practiced by the C.I.A. in its work with Church groups in Ecuador, Brazil and Chile during the 1960s and early 1970s. When such important Montevideo bookstores as Ramos y Mosca refused to stock *The Church of Silence*, a slanderous attack on Chile's bishops by a right-wing Catholic group known as Tradition, Family, and Property (T.F.P.), Centeno threatened the owners.

Men like Centeno owe their skills in part to the Agency for International Development's police training programs, but they also adhere to a long tradition of Church spying that dates to the C.I.A.'s forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), formed during World War II. Later, during the cold war, U.S. missionaries routinely collaborated with the C.I.A. and, on their return to the United States, visited the State Department to be debriefed. In those days there was nothing conspiratorial about this relationship, nor any suggestion of moral conflict: most missionaries shared

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the concerns of their Government, particularly about the spread of Communism. A number of Foreign Service personnel came from missionary backgrounds, and it was not uncommon for missionaries to take sides in military/ideological confrontations.

During the 1960s, when the Alliance for Progress was in vogue, nobody questioned its relationship with the missionaries, since church groups and the U.S. Government were agreed on the twin priorities of economic development and anti-Communism. "Part of the problem stems from the fact that the great Latin crusade by the churches in the 1950s and 1960s merged, at times almost totally, with the thrust of the Alliance for Progress and its Truman-Eisenhower predecessors," said Thomas Quigley, assistant director of the Division for Latin America of the U.S. Catholic Conference.

The stated goals were to promote development and contain Communism and few then realized the ambiguities contained in that statement. Only later was it learned that development, as practiced, benefited the rich at the expense of the poor, and that containment of Communism was often simplistically equated with protecting an unjust and un-Christian status quo. Now we see those aspects. But at that time, the average missionary—perhaps especially the socially progressive ones—sensed a greater affinity with certain people from the local United States Embassy or consulate than with fellow missionaries from another country or even congregation. The prime targets for C.I.A. contact were precisely such pragmatic liberals sent in large numbers during the period to Latin America from the United States churches—the "concerned" missionaries from the mainline Protestant churches and from Catholic societies like Maryknoll and the Jesuits.


Typical of this sort of collaboration was the Protestant missionary in Bolivia who regularly met with a C.I.A. agent to pass on "all sorts of information about unions and farmers' cooperatives," according to a highly placed minister in the same denomination. "Now," said the minister, "if a missionary had a similar connection, I would call him in and fire him." U.S. missionaries today wonder how they could have been so easily deceived. Looking back, one priest who had worked in Bolivia at the time when U.S. Special Forces were combing the jungles for Che Guevara and his guerrillas, explained: "The maneuver was to butter one up as to one's knowledge of the terrain and the people, a kind of anthropological recognition of one's merits as a person who knew the area. At the time, most missionaries were very naïve and it usually worked. I don't know what good I was but I talked a lot over beers, feeling flattered by the attention. Later I realized who my drinking companions were."

Darryl Hunt, a Maryknoll missionary who headed the Lima-based Latinamerica Press news service, covering hemispheric Church affairs, recalled that C.I.A. visits to Maryknoll headquarters in New York were routine up to a decade ago, when the order's superiors were alerted to the Agency's intentions. "They tried to get information from the missionaries in the field by developing friendships with them and appearing to ask disinterested questions without identifying themselves as C.I.A.," he added. "U.S. Embassy officials in Lima asked me questions about progressive priests' movements in Peru that later seemed highly suspect."

Jim O'Brien, a former priest who worked in Guatemala in the late 1960s, described how C.I.A. agent Sean Holly used his background as a Maryknoll seminarian to develop contacts with U.S. missionaries. Officially listed as the labor attaché, Holly was later kidnapped by a Guatemalan guerrilla group and freed in exchange for four political prisoners held by the Guatemalan Government. Holly's job, said O'Brien, was to keep tabs on U.S. missionaries, particularly Maryknoll priests and nuns.

According to John Marks, a former State Department intelligence analyst and co-author of the controversial *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, 30 to 40 percent of the churchmen he interviewed, during an investigation of the subject, knew of a C.I.A.-church connection. Marks also reported a retired C.I.A. agent as stating: "Hell, I'd use anybody if it was to the furtherance of an objective. I've used Buddhist monks, Catholic priests, and even a Catholic bishop."

It is precisely this amoral—some would say immoral—attitude that altered the thinking of many missionaries: that and political conditions in the countries where they worked. In the days before Vietnam and Watergate, few missionaries questioned U.S. support of right-wing dictatorships, because those governments claimed to be anti-Communist. But as the United States expanded its role as world policeman, its police methods becoming ever more dubious, the missionary was forced to face the conflict posed by his dual role as American citizen and bearer of Christ's universal Good News. Indigenous Christians were suffering imprisonment, torture and death, as well as hunger and social discrimination, at the hands of repressive governments, and yet these governments were receiving U.S. economic and military aid, and in some instances had been brought to power



by the United States. For the missionaries working and living with these people, this was not a remote issue of foreign relations but a question of neighbors and friends. As one Protestant writer put it, "Most missionaries loved the countries and the people where they worked far too much to knowingly damage them." Thus, when these missionaries realized that they had been used as tools by their own Government to harm the interests of the people they had thought to serve, they were shocked and angry. The crux of the matter was the blatant violation of freedom of worship, one of the fundamental guarantees in the U.S. Constitution, by an agency funded by American taxpayers, and all on behalf of right-wing political interests. According to U.S. Senate investigations, the C.I.A. attempted to play God in Latin America, deciding who should be President, who should be eliminated, how the people should live and whom they should have as allies and enemies. Foreign missionaries and local religious groups were among the many means used to achieve these ends, but because of what they believed and taught, their manipulation must be viewed as an act of calculated cynicism.

C.I.A. Director William Colby's assertion that C.I.A. use of clergy and churches was "no reflection upon their integrity or mission" was absurd: there is conclusive proof that the C.I.A. used religious groups in Latin America for its own secret ends. At the same time it contributed to the persecution and division of Latin America's Catholic Church by supporting right-wing Catholic groups, and financed and trained police agencies responsible for the imprisonment, torture and murder of priests, nuns and bishops, some of them U.S. citizens. That is why missionary groups in the United States have changed from complacent collaborators to harsh critics of the C.I.A.—they have seen the results of the Agency's intervention with their own eyes.

After President Ford announced his approval of illegal U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries, sixteen officials of Catholic and Protestant mission agencies wrote him:

Contrary to what you would have us believe, C.I.A. covert actions in the Third World frequently support undemocratic governments that trample on the rights of their own people. We missionaries have felt first-hand the effects of such interventions, which are certainly not in "the best interests" of the majority of the citizens of those countries. Nor do such actions, which are prohibited by international law and by Article 6 of our own Constitution, serve "our best interests," as you stated. Gangster methods undermine world order and promote widespread hatred of the United States.

Warned *New World Outlook*, published by agencies of the United Methodist and United Presbyterian churches: one cannot "defend democracy by destroying it." As long as U.S. citizens shrug their shoulders, romanticize "spy thrillers" and pass the buck to politicians, it added, there will be blood on our hands, "for it is our money and our government that pay for the regimes that do the killing."

To avoid a repetition of the C.I.A. connection of the

1950s and 1960s, a number of church groups set up watchdog committees. The Church of the Brethren's general board, for example, instructed its missionary personnel to "avoid any relationship with the C.I.A.," and a Washington-based ecumenical organization representing Catholic and Protestant missionary groups went so far as to prepare a primer on "how to identify spooks."

Judging by the statements of C.I.A. officials, there were good reasons for such caution. In response to a letter from Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, who had expressed concern over the C.I.A.'s continued use of religious organizations, Director Colby said he believed "it would be neither necessary nor appropriate to bar any connection between the C.I.A. and the clergy and the churches." It "would be a mistake and impose a handicap on this agency that would reduce its future effectiveness to a degree not warranted by the real facts of the situation."

David A. Phillips, the C.I.A. former chief of Latin American operations and a self-appointed public relations spokesman for the Agency, said that "any information-gathering organization would be derelict if it did not take advantage of the in-depth experience of American clerics working in the area." He added that C.I.A. contacts with U.S. missionaries were "to mutual advantage," though he failed to specify what advantage a missionary might gain from collaborating with an agency involved in the arrest and abuse of priests. Phillips is himself a good example of the mentality that has alienated and shocked so many religious groups. His book, *The Night Watch*, a C.I.A. whitewash that does not even try to refute ex-C.I.A. agent Agee's *CIA Diary*, makes it evident that in the C.I.A. no means, however illegal or unpleasant, is ever questioned if it achieves the desired goal. While admitting reservations about the C.I.A.'s operations in Chile, for example, Phillips justified the Agency's intervention by arguing that orders were orders—after all, who was going to deny President Nixon if he wanted Salvador Allende's head? There is no room for moral distinctions in that line of reasoning, and collaboration with the C.I.A. is indeed a reflection on the integrity and mission of U.S. churchmen, whatever Colby may say. Phillips's assertion that C.I.A. contacts with missionary groups have declined in recent years is undoubtedly true, but that is more because missionaries have learned to be suspicious than because the C.I.A. has resolved to be scrupulous.

If Congress heeds current demands to "unleash" the C.I.A. and removes the checks on recruitment of U.S. church missions in Latin America and elsewhere by the Agency, the attempts to enlist churchmen in espionage activities will both provoke resistance from the religious groups and once again put all Americans resident abroad under the burden of proving to suspicious local populations that they are not spies. The good name of our missionaries in Latin America has only begun to recover from the severe damage caused by the corruption of a few in the past; a reversion now to the policy of "any means to achieve whatever ends" can only make the damage permanent. Congress should place the strongest possible ban on any covert use of our clergy in foreign lands. □

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
24 April 1980

Melvin Maddocks

## Literature and litigation

A sort of exchange of professions is going on in the worlds of literature and litigation. Judges are reading novels, like book reviewers. And critics are now reviewing legal decisions, like lawyers.

The most sensational of the cases that have the book reviewers on the edges of their chairs — just unable to put that brief down! — is *Bindrim v. Mitchell and Doubleday*. In 1971 Gwen Davis (now Mitchell) wrote a novel, "Touching," about an encounter group in California. Paul Bindrim was the leader of an encounter group in California that Gwen Davis joined for a marathon just before writing her novel. Bindrim claimed to see himself in Simon Herford, the guru of "Touching." He produced witnesses who agreed. Furthermore, he made the case that the vulgar language Gwen Davis put in Simon Herford's mouth constituted defamation of his profession (psychologist) as well as of himself.

A jury awarded \$75,000 in libel damages to Bindrim, and a California appellate court upheld the verdict. When the Supreme Court refused to review the case, Doubleday filed its own suit against Gwen Davis for \$138,000 — its share of the damages (\$50,000) plus interest and all court costs.

Eliot Fremont-Smith, book editor of the *Village Voice*, concluded, ironically, that "had Davis written a nonfiction work describing Bindrim factually, there would have been no libel."

There was conjecture that Scott Fitzgerald — for just one example — would have been vulnerable to libel for "The Great Gatsby" (not to mention "The Last Tycoon") according to the Bindrim precedent.

John Hersey advised his fellow novelists: "We have finally begun to pay the price for blurring the distinction between fact and fiction."

The argument broadens beyond the rights and responsibilities of novelists when the case of *United States v. Snapp* is considered. Frank W. Snapp III, a former CIA agent, wrote "Decent Interval" (1977), a well-documented essay critical of the conduct of the American government during the last days of the Vietnam war. Snapp was not accused of making public any classified information. He was sued simply for violating his employment contract, in which he pledged "not to publish . . . any information . . . relating to the Agency" without prior approval. The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, upheld the judgment of breach of contract, maintaining that Snapp had been "unjustly enriched" and compelling him to forfeit his earnings from "Decent Interval" — about \$120,000 so far.

The law-and-lit. reviewers point out that a small army of Watergate authors have been enriched by their best-selling retrospectives of far less blameless days as government employees without suffering Snapp's fate. The analysts have also raised a more fundamental question: Was Snapp's contract a violation of his rights under the First Amendment?

The First Amendment — this finally becomes the issue behind all the other issues. Ralph Nader, whose very function as consumer advocate rests upon freedom of speech, sued the columnist Ralph de Toledano for alleged abuse of that right. De Toledano accused Nader of falsification and distortion in his famous indictment ("Unsafe at Any Speed") of the Corvair. Writing in the *Village Voice* — which has become a regular commentary on the First Amendment — Nat Hentoff suggests that Ralph Nader is now playing General Motors (the powerful vested interest) to little-fish de Toledano. Hentoff does not defend de Toledano's argument; he does contend that Nader should have answered the argument in kind: "With words alone, Nader could have pulverized the conservative columnist. But he hired a lawyer instead. If there is ever an epitaph for free speech in America, the tombstone should read: 'They hired lawyers instead.'"

Is freedom of expression too important to be left to the courts? A lot of literary courtroom-watchers also feel this way about the suit being brought by Lillian Hellman against Mary McCarthy for remarks on the Dick Cavett Show. Like Ralph Nader, Lillian Hellman used to be on the other end of the free-speech question, back in the witch-hunt days of Senator McCarthy.

We have become a litigious people who seem to hold others more and more strictly accountable even as we feel less and less responsible ourselves. And so a man who claims his marriage was ruined by his drinking is suing a vodka company.

Once the courts tended to be protective where the First Amendment was concerned, even when those protected were pornography pedlars or native-fascist demagogues. Free speech was perceived to be a rare and delicate seed that ought to be allowed to grow according to the parable of the tares and the wheat.

Now the mood appears to have changed, and one is held as accountable for one's words as a manufacturer for defective brakes. Opportunistic writers will not be hampered — opportunists never are. The danger is that serious writers and serious publishers will become more cautious, more self-censoring — less ready to risk what Fremont-Smith eloquently calls "that loveliest and lowliest of abstractions — routine and everyday freedom."

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ON PAGE 22THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
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## James Angleton: Superspook or Tragic Figure?

By DAVID IGNATIUS

The literature on James Angleton, former chief of counterintelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, could fill a small bookshelf.

Mr. Angleton's first chronicler was none other than Harold "Klim" Philby, the So-

**The Bookshelf***"Wilderness of Mirrors"*

By David C. Martin. Harper &amp; Row. 236 pages. \$12.50.

viet "mole" who penetrated the top level of the British Intelligence Service. In his 1968 memoir, written from Moscow, Mr. Philby blew Mr. Angleton's cover and mischievously recalled the "genuine friendliness" between him and Mr. Angleton during the late 1940s.

When these embarrassing sections of the Philby book were summarized in The Washington Post in 1968, Mr. Angleton was irate. He promptly severed his friendship with Ben Bradlee, the Post's editor—ending a relationship that had seen the Bradleys and the Angletons learning to dance the "twist" together in happier days.

Much as he disliked that first mention by Mr. Philby, Mr. Angleton has seemed—to some of his former colleagues at the CIA—to be cultivating publicity in the years since his forced retirement in 1974. His detractors point to a recent wave of "Angletonia" as evidence that Mr. Angleton and some of his former associates have been using journalists in their battle for vindication and revenge.

A simpler explanation for the recent literary interest in Mr. Angleton is that he is—in the view of friends and foes alike—the most fascinating, and perhaps the most powerful, personality the CIA has yet produced. In "Orchids for Mother," a thinly disguised novel by Aaron Latham, intelligence buffs began to learn of Mr. Angleton's passion for cultivating rare flowers; his method of playing espionage agents slowly, like trout on a fishing line; and his habit of chain-smoking "Virginia Slims."

In a 1978 nonfiction account called "Legend," by Edward Jay Epstein, readers were briefed on Mr. Angleton's chilling theory that the Soviets have been sending defectors to the U.S. to seduce and paralyze the CIA. And in "The Fourth Deadly Sin," by Andrew Boyle, they thrilled at

his quiet role in unmasking Mr. Philby and other British traitors. In these books, Mr. Angleton seemed to personify the twilight world of espionage that had previously surfaced only in spy fiction.

David Martin, a reporter for Newsweek magazine, has turned the Angleton saga inside out in his new book, "Wilderness of Mirrors." In place of the prevailing view of Mr. Angleton as an eccentric superspook, Mr. Martin argues that he is a near-tragic figure, whose own career was finally destroyed by the climate of suspicion he had instituted at the CIA.

Mr. Martin researched his book in a way that Mr. Angleton, as an intelligence professional, must find annoyingly familiar: a classic double-cross.

The book opens with Mr. Martin confiding that Mr. Angleton was once his "source," with whom he held "perhaps more than a hundred" conversations in the years after 1974. Indeed, he notes, "Angleton encouraged my first thoughts of writing a book"—although that book supposedly was to be a study of the late William Harvey, another of the CIA's great characters. Some material on Mr. Harvey's covert career remains in the book Mr. Martin ultimately produced, but its pages are dominated by the enigmatic Mr. Angleton.

The reporter-source relationship ended suddenly, two years ago, when Mr. Martin began to explore one of the strangest riddles that haunts intelligence journalism: the allegation that Mr. Angleton, the CIA's chief mole hunter for 20 years, may himself have been a Soviet agent.

This allegation strikes most people who know Mr. Angleton as preposterous. But the fact that such a case was actually prepared by one of Mr. Angleton's associates on the CIA counterintelligence staff—and presented to top-level CIA officials in 1974—suggests the corrosive power of the analytical method that Mr. Angleton himself had championed.

This method started with the plausible assumption that there was a Soviet mole within the CIA, and then tried to deduce who the mole was on the basis of minute facts and discrepancies in a particular CIA officer's record. Eventually, Mr. Angleton's number came up.

The allegation, however dubious, is contained on 26 hours of tape recorded in 1974 by Mr. Angleton's accuser. The tape is said to be held in strict secrecy in the office of CIA Director Stansfield Turner.

It's ironic that the case was rejected by then CIA director William Colby, the same man who fired him later that year. Mr. Martin notes that Mr. Colby's reason for dismissing his counterintelligence chief—his dislike of what he viewed as Mr. Angleton's hypersuspicious methods—prevented him from taking seriously the similarly conspiratorial case made against Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Martin's underlying thesis is that during Mr. Angleton's 20 years as Chief of Counterintelligence, the CIA became lost in a "wilderness of mirrors." The phrase, it should be noted, was Mr. Angleton's own; he used it to describe what he believed was a massive Soviet KGB deception campaign against the West, in which nothing the CIA touched could be fully trusted.

Soviet defectors were likely to be false defectors; agents recruited by the CIA were likely to be Soviet double agents, feeding "disinformation" to their CIA case officers.

Within the CIA, this view of a nearly invincible KGB came to be known as the "ten-foot-tall syndrome," and many former CIA officers believe that it nearly paralyzed the CIA's own operations against the Soviets. They contend that Mr. Angleton's skepticism was so withering and pervasive that, during part of the 1960s, the agency nearly gave up trying to recruit spies behind the Iron Curtain.

The problem with this critique of the Angleton method is that much of the time, Mr. Angleton was right. Reliable evidence suggests that many of the CIA's supposed recruits during the 1960s were, in fact, Soviet double agents. And there is also some evidence that Soviet "disinformation" during this period contributed to erroneous CIA estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and political goals. CIA officers didn't like being told by Mr. Angleton that they were drawing water from a poisoned well, but in many instances, he was correct.

"Wilderness of Mirrors" should be read partly as a battle document in the war of leaks between former CIA officers. Mr. Martin's sources—hostile to Mr. Angleton—have argued their case with a remarkably detailed account of the internal disputes about the defectors and double agents that tied the CIA in knots during the 1960s. But already, the Angleton forces are challenging parts of the book, and rebuttals will surely follow.

Intelligence buffs will savor each new revelation. So, too, undoubtedly, will the KGB. But the discussion may be of limited interest to the general reader, who cannot be blamed if he decides to leave the tortuous logic of counterintelligence to the

Mr. Ignatius, who covers the Senate for the Journal's Washington bureau, writes



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WASHINGTON STAR  
20 APRIL 1980

# The hostages can be freed!

By Miles Copeland

Independent News Alliance

Retired "special operations" specialists of Washington's intelligence and military communities are reluctant to criticize our government's handling of the hostage situation in Iran. Having been on the spot ourselves, we know that what appears to be inactivity may conceal some strategy that works only in the dark, and that what appears to be bumbling may be calculated diversion.

We squirm, however, when we hear congressmen pressure the government to make moves which are justifiable only in terms of what one White House cynic has called "domestic foreign policy" which can have no possible relevance to "foreign foreign policy" and can only make the hostage situation worse.

For example, there is the statement of Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the effect that the situation calls for negotiating, not use of force.

I have discussed this statement with some of the nation's top negotiators — and in my day I've done a bit of negotiating myself — and I have not found one who will say that departure from Rule No. 1 is justified: One must never, never negotiate under duress when so doing will cause duress to become recognized as an effective negotiating tool, to be used over and over again in situations in the future.

After all, those hostages presently being held in Iran are of secondary importance. Primarily, our concern must be for the hostages of the future who surely will be taken should the "student" captors be allowed to succeed.

Early last December, a young chap from a certain government agency made the rounds of us old timers, "unofficially and off the record," to ask whether we thought an "Entebbe-type" or SWAT-type raid on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was feasible. His intention was to elicit a resounding "no" so as to justify President Carter's policy of "restraint" when pressure was building up to get the hostages home by Christmas.

We didn't give him the answer he wanted, however, since, after all, he questioned "Safford," "The Weasel," "Masterson," "The Whistler" and others who, in total, had carried out hundreds of such operations during World War II and afterwards, against opposition considerably more formidable than we would run into in Iran. In the 1950s, for example, the Whistler penetrated the infamous Lubyanka Prison in Moscow to rescue a Central Intelligence Agency operative.

Among such operators, it's the near unanimous view that the hostages could be "lifted," and with no more risk of loss of life than would be justified when compared to the risk of not lifting them.

Safford and most of the others are still more or less on call for one or more of the various contingency plans now being considered at the Pentagon; so they must remain anonymous. "The Whistler," however, long ago was revealed as Col. Stephen Meade (ret.), former "escape and evasion" expert for several governmental agencies and one of the models for Ian Fleming's James Bond.

Shortly after The Whistler was approached by the young chap from that certain agency, he (Meade) and I worked up a plan for rescuing the hostages which most of the other old timers believed to be completely workable.

Since we happen to know that, despite press indications to the contrary, the government does have other plans that are not motivated by "domestic foreign policy" considerations, we can only present here a model showing the kind of things that can be done, and of necessity we must obfuscate some of the techniques and gimmickry that would be used.

All the same, we can publish herein enough about our nation's intelligence and military potentials to refute those arguments of dovish politicians who persist in the notion that we must rely entirely on "peaceful means."

Before proceeding, it must be stated that President Carter has not confided his intentions to me, nor has this article been cleared by the CIA or anyone else. It has, however, been agreed to by my old colleagues, who wish to be associated with it.

First, some important guiding principles.

- Principle No. 1. Although "negotiating," as we in the civilized world understand the term, is out of the question, we must manage to communicate with the "students," if only unilaterally. The communicating must not be so much to gain an understanding of their point of view (we understand that already) as to make them understand ours — specifically, that we will entertain no thought of doing anything they want us to do so long as they hold onto those hostages. Whether the CIA aided SAVAK, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's secret police, whether the Shah "stole billions" from the Iranian people, and other such matters are simply not matters for discussion so long as the "students" and the officials who have associated themselves with them remain in an outlaw status.

This is more than ever important now that the president has switched to a posture which "does not rule out the possibility of military action."

- Principle No. 2. Once such a posture has been adopted, all our stances are no longer for the benefit of the opposition, but for the "opposition's opposition."

One of the greatest fallacies weakening the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy in recent years is the notion that "getting tough" only drives the would-be moderates into the camp of the extremists. On the contrary, all our experience shows that signs of softening only convince the extremists they have been right all along.

- Principle No. 3. Here, I offer what a member of a certain Middle Eastern royal family is fond of saying: "If you kick a king, make sure that you kill him." In other words, a mere kick only makes him a greater menace than he is already and, if you are not willing to go for broke, it is better to accept defeat at the outset and devote your energies to finding ways of living with it.

The first step in planning for military action in the region must be a drive, not so much to convince our allies and potential allies that the present leaders of Iran are morally reprehensible and the Soviets a menace, but to convince them that the United States intends to do everything the situation calls for, including totally backing their efforts.

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To put it another way, our allies and potential allies in the area must be the main attackers, and our role must be one of support. Fortunately, every chief-of-state in the area except one privately or openly has expressed to our government sentiments such as those I have described herein — and the exception is not Iraq, a country with whose practical-minded and decisive leaders our government enjoys much better relations than is generally known, and whose army, with the possible exception of the Israel Defense Forces, is the best equipped and most powerful in the Middle East.

Along with our attempts to line up support from governments in the area — or, rather, our attempts to get those governments to take action that we will support — must be a revival of our attempts to stimulate insurrection in the area, our earliest attempts having been called off at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because of President Carter's sudden realization that the Soviets, with their demonstrated willingness to go for broke, would leap into the vacuum while the CIA was still arguing with its seven congressional oversight committees.

To any off us special operations types who have seen duty in Iran, the job of stirring up major insurrectionary conditions looks much easier than it does to the academics who have been advising the State Department.

### Turning the Mob

In the first place, it is our experience that a mob such as the one we have seen on television shouting anti-U.S. slogans in front of our embassy in Tehran is almost never representative of the "people" as we understand the term, nor do the leaders who make such extravagant references to "the people" ever represent a population at large.

In August 1953, when Kim Roosevelt and his Iranian friends needed to reverse the growing anti-shah hysteria, they did so by arresting the Tudeh Party's agitprop figures and getting the mob which had been shouting "Death to the shah, long live Mossadegh" to substitute "Death to Mossadegh, long live the shah." It was that simple. When the shah appeared at the airport, those who led in his denunciation were the first to greet him.

The raid on the embassy which must be an integral part of any overall military action, perhaps preceding it by 24 hours as Col. Meade recommends, would consist of the following elements:

**Reconnaissance:** Already, we have detailed maps of the embassy compound, showing not only the location of the various rooms, but details of the electrical wiring, fuse boxes, light switches, plumbing, heating and ventilation, and some information on changes that have been made since the "students" took over.

We will need to know more, however, about where and how the prisoners are kept, where the boobytraps, if any, are planted, how the patrols work, what arms and munitions there are; how food and medical supplies are delivered, psychological details on the various hostages and, above all, more precise information than we already have on the identities, nationalities, mentalities and motivations of the individual "students" — for example, which are true religious zealots and which are using religion as a cover for the "new leftism," which are Iranian nationalists and which are of other nationalities, which are fanatics and which are cold-blooded, professional revolutionaries, and so on.

**Recruitment of agents among the "students":** Considering what we might offer — we could offer any one, or more, of the "students" a long and secure life as a millionaire living comfortably on a South Sea island — and considering that there are sometimes as many as 40 of them away from the compound out on the town or spending the night at their homes, this is an easier feat than it might appear.

It is axiomatic among CIA case officers that people who are "quietly and sensibly patriotic" are usually beyond inducement, but that fanatics and so-called revolutionaries are duck soup; "the bigger they come, the harder they fall," we used to say.

Contrary to popular opinion, when fanaticism has not developed past the point of outright lunacy, it is as shallow and unstructured as simple anger, and it makes those who possess it peculiarly susceptible to the kind of blandishments which CIA case officers, in appropriate disguise, are able to offer.

In any case, considering the number of prospective agents — and, to the CIA pro, every one of those "students" is a potential agent until proven otherwise — the law of averages is on our side.

Success in this recruitment effort will depend on (1) correct psychological assessment; (2) inducement; and (3) the success of the agent handlers in convincing the agents that it is we who will win in the end, and that he is on the side of losers.

**Cover:** The raid itself would not be of the "Entebbe type," in which the attackers wear proper uniforms and are readily identifiable as Americans. Instead, the operation would be under cover from beginning to end. There would be at least two layers of cover and innumerable "disinformation" ploys designed to point the fingers of blame — or credit — in all directions except the right one.

At first, even the raiders themselves may be led to believe they are working for some authority which has following in the area, e.g., the Iraqi or Libyan governments, or some respected Moslem organization; but once that cover has begun to leak, it might be revealed that, in reality, the backing comes from the Iranian government itself.

In any case, what is important by way of cover is how the operation appears to the outside world. To all who will actually witness the raid — the "students," the hostages and the spectators outside the compound — the raid will appear to be of entirely indigenous origin. "Team A," which will actually enter the premises, will look exactly like those Iranians we see on television jumping up and down in front of the U.S. Embassy and shouting anti-U.S. slogans. "Team B," the military support team, will masquerade as Iranian soldiers. In all probability, they actually will be Iranian soldiers. The three U.S. nationals in the operation, the Whistler himself and two highly trained technicians, will enter the compound as members of a television camera crew seemingly on a news assignment approved by the government. They will, of course, carry the necessary credentials.

**Personnel:** To carry the main thrust of the raid itself, Col. Meade favors the use of Qashqai tribesmen, those tough, dashing, resourceful mountaineers who all look like Anthony Quinn in his heyday and who believe that one government in Tehran is as objectionable as another.

It is essential, however, that, for both internal and external reasons, the rescue team must have a definite mercenary character and be a discreet combination of Qashqais, Kurds and, of course, Farsis. In any case, they must be true mercenaries and "unattached politically," as the CIA people say, meaning they are "detachable" politically.

There also is a role for those Iranian officers who have been undergoing training at Fort Bragg, Little Rock Air Base and other such camps, many of whom already have offered their services.

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unavoidably, there must be three U.S. participants — Col. Meade, the Whistler, wearing some disguise which "Lady Windermere," the CIA cosmetician, will design for him; and two others of the agency's special effects department who, as Italian-Americans, will look "ethnic" enough for the operation's purposes.

The first of these will be expert at certain technical gimmickry which CIA security regulations do not allow in the hands of foreigners; the second will be a psycho-pharmacist. Both will have been trained in such agency black arts as "baffling," "piffling" and "scrugging," and in the other techniques by which the victims of a rescue operation are separated from the beneficiaries, and the former are confused into fighting each other, stumbling over their own traps and otherwise messing up their own defenses, while the latter are sleeping peacefully through it all "until it's time to go home," as the Whistler says.

**Positioning:** There will be a "staging area" somewhere within helicopter range of Tehran at which brush-up training and final briefings will be given the two teams. This may or may not be the same as the "field headquarters" where some younger version of myself and a communications assistant will monitor the operation, keep Washington informed and sound a "wrap it up!" signal if things go sour anywhere along the line, or appropriate "go-go" messages as the operation proceeds successfully from one step to the next.

There also will be a point or points known as the "PP," the "penultimate position," from which the attack actually will be launched.

The choice of this latter is highly important. It — or they — must be near enough to the target to allow for a thrust lasting less than one minute and, at the same time, it must be part of the "peoplescape" in the immediate area. Remember, seconds before the attack the raiders will actually be a part of the anti-shah, anti-U.S. mob surrounding the compound.

In 1954, when Kim Roosevelt led the operation to topple Mohammed Mossadegh, the "PP" which hid Mossadegh's successor, Gen. Ardeshir Zahedi, was less than 100 yards from the target area of that operation.

**Anesthetization:** This step, which security considerations prevent me

from describing in any detail, consists of measures to incapacitate all resistance.

In its primitive form, it includes such measures as the insinuation of knock-out drops into food sent into the hostages and their captors, the use of stunning or nauseating, but otherwise harmless gases, and other items such as you would see in an ordinary James Bond film.

In modern psycho-pharmacy, however, there is more emphasis on behavior-altering agents, the use of which necessitates highly sophisticated techniques of psychological supervision of the sort one of our U.S. technicians is trained to provide.

In any case, the general public — and those "students" holding our citizens hostage — just as well should know this: The CIA possesses the capacity to render unconscious every living person and animal within a radius of 200 yards of the embassy compound, giving them all no more than slight headaches as after-effects, and delivering the knock-out agency from as much as a mile away.

**The attack itself:** The actual attack calls for great courage, stamina and resourcefulness on the part of both teams, but its planning and execution are much easier than would be supposed. Even a target which has been only half-way anesthetized may be so "piffled" in its defenses that the attackers are able to walk through their operation at a pace much slower than in rehearsal exercises.

The dangerous moments are the first and the last, when we can never be certain our preparations have not been spotted and countered.

By moves too precisely detailed to be described here, Col. Meade's plan calls for "Team A" to blend in with the chanting mob at various points near the main gate, at strategic points around the perimeter of the compound, and at a position at the edge of the crowd where some highly explosive diversionary move will be made. The diversionary move, serving as the kick-off signal, will direct the attackers to storm their various entry points and the agents inside to activate the "anesthetization" process inside the compound. The rest, as the Whistler says, is "in the lap of the gods."

**Escape:** Once the embassy has been entered and the defenses neutralized, "Team A" will have on its hands a lot of confused defenders and very sleepy hostages. By then, our three helicopters, bearing the markings of the Iranian Army and appearing to be entering the target for purposes of counter-attack, will land at designated points, and the attackers will begin loading the hostages and those "students" who still are alive — and who will themselves, at least for a limited period, become hostages.

Meanwhile, "Team B," operating as though it were a unit of the regular Iranian army, will have taken control of all communications into and out of the compound, as well as all communications throughout the city which might in any way concern the compound and its problems.

There will be tense moments when we are unsure of our neutralization efforts. Remember, we will have so confounded all communications in the area that we will not even be certain of our own, but Col. Meade never enters a target without a variety of alternative "success" and "cut and run" plans.

**Safehaven:** Already, thanks to emergency plans the CIA station in Iran had devised for contingencies which the reader will readily guess, there are several well-stocked, well-guarded areas near Tehran to which our helicopters may flee in a very short time with minimum danger of being followed, and with minimum chance of hostile reception by local inhabitants.

At the particular safehaven which Col. Meade actually has selected for this operation, we would expect active aid from the local inhabitants who, among other things, would provide guides for a cross-country escape should airborne evacuation turn out to be impracticable for any reason.

In any case, once the safehaven has been reached, there should be smooth sailing from then on. Intelligence we already have on the Iranian government and on the various political groups sponsoring the students indicates strongly that, once they see that success is on our side, their defenses will fold. In fact, an impressive percentage is likely to be knocking on our doors to join us, even though in the end we are revealed as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. This was the case in 1954, when those who had partici-

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pated most actively in the anti-shah underground became the first recruits of the upgraded SAVAK. There is no reason to believe it would not be the same in 1980.

**Final evacuation:** This, of course, is a matter for our State Department. For present purposes, it need only be said that our government has more friends in the Middle East than is commonly supposed.

**Counter-counter-attack:** A continuing step, which would begin before reconnaissance and continue through evacuation, is one which the Whistler no doubt would leave to "Major Lincoln," i.e. myself. It would be to orchestrate a complex set of actions designed to ensure that the Iranian government's police, security and military forces get the alarm too late to act on it properly, that they will move only unenthusiastically and haphazardly once they do get it and, perhaps, even lend a helping hand here and there either wittingly (those who've "seen the light," or have been bribed), or unwittingly (those who've been duped into believing they are aiding some worthy indigenous cause).

Also, it will include steps whereby we hope to bring about at least a modicum of "behavior alteration"

for the "peoplescape" as a whole, one which consists of attitudes bearing hostility towards the regime rather than ourselves, and which will diminish the chances of post-operational developments such as might pave the way for a Soviet invasion.

Unfortunately, this whole plan, whether executed separately or as part of an overall military assault, has a weakness, one which may explain why it is that Jimmy Carter keeps taking steps which may impress the people at home, but which have zero effect on the Iranians on whom he hopes to exercise pressure.

It is that our government can take no action which does not have the full support of the people and of Congress. Remember, it's all-out, no holds barred action that the situation in Iran — or its aftermath — will require.

If we cannot get support of the American people for it, we would just as well write off those hostages right now and await the consequences — and the even more damaging consequences of what our leaders, feeling the pressures of an election year, will feel they have to do to avoid appearing weak and unconcerned.

*Miles Copeland, known as "Major Lincoln" in his World War II days with the Office of Strategic Services, served under Allen Dulles as the first head of the Central Intelligence Agency's political action staff. He was special assistant to Kermit Roosevelt at the time of the CIA-assisted operation to save Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from a coup in 1953. Since then, Copeland has been a political adviser to a number of African and Middle Eastern heads of state. Early in 1979, Copeland says, he was among an international group of consultants who toured tribal areas of Iran to determine what he calls "insurrectionary possibilities."*

# Hostage Rescue Plan



By Miles Copeland Architect *Former CIA Director*

April 20, 1980



- 1 Reconnaissance on the compound, and on the identities, loyalties and psychology of the militants.
- 2 Turn some of the militants, knowingly or unknowingly, to serve our purposes.
- 3 Create a raiding party which seems indigenous — and indeed may be.
- 4 Snatch the hostages, leaving their captors fighting among themselves. Use CIA techniques such as "baffling," "puffing" and "serugging."
- 5 Create an undetected staging point only a minute away from the compound.
- 6 Anesthetize the compound.
- 7 Set off a diversion, and raid the compound.
- 8 Bring in three helicopters and lift the sleepy hostages.
- 9 Confuse the enemy for the escape to the staging area, and then to a neighboring country.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-13

WASHINGTON STAR  
19 APRIL 1980

Douglas S. Blaufarb

## The writer's debt to espionage

Readers of this page may have missed the news report of March 6th which represents one of the great literary betrayals, since Iago turned against his benefactor Othello and did him in. This was the letter from the Authors' League of America signed by its distinguished president, John Hersey, and addressed to Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, chairman of the subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

In his letter Hersey demanded on behalf of the 8,800 members of the league that the intelligence agencies be unequivocally prohibited "from using journalists and professional authors of books and magazine articles to gather information or perform other intelligence services."

The letter argued that the fact that some writers "may play a dual role as CIA retainers (*sic*) can discredit other writers, have a chilling effect on their potential sources of information and erode confidence in the United States press, both here and abroad."

Chilling effect, indeed. Shades of Christopher Marlow, Daniel Defoe, Benjamin Franklin, Somerset Maugham, Ernest Hemingway and a host of other writers of talent who saw no conflict at all between a spot of honest espionage now and again and their literary endeavors, and, indeed, thereby enriched the experience of life on which they drew for the work that earned them immortality. Moreover, it would be a dimmer world altogether without Maugham's *Ashenden*, Ian Fleming's James Bond, Le Carre's Smiley or, to cite an American example, Charles McCarry's Paul Christopher.

All those authors were

### Point of View

immersed for longer or shorter periods in secret operations and thereby gained the insights which lent authenticity to their fiction. Truly mind-boggling, however, is the ingratitude of Hersey's proposal.

The moral debt of America's writers — both of fiction and non-fiction — to the intelligence community for providing a seemingly endless supply of plots and characters, scandals and heroics which have been mined to create whole sub-categories of modern literature is truly immense. The Authors' League sees no obligation created by this dependence. No, indeed — all this weighs not at all compared with the famous "chilling effect."

Well, let us examine that proposition for a moment. First of all, the assumption is made without argument that the secrecy of a secret association is of no moment. What counts is the guilty knowledge (how obtained is not clear) that here or there such secret associations do — or perhaps simply may — exist. The mere possibility, it is implied, causes sources to avoid all American writers as if they were so many Typhoid Mary's.

Having conducted secret operations in four different countries around the world, this writer can assert on the basis of personal experience that in friendly or even neutral countries this proposition is simply untrue. The possibility that he is speaking with a secret agent of the U.S. government, far from chilling the interlocutor, stimulates him to greater frankness and earnestness and even, on occa-

sion, to annoying persistence.

He feels he has hold of a valuable pipeline to the decisive levels of our government. It hardly needs pointing out that such attitudes can be useful to a writer seeking information for his own use.

In hostile environments another reaction prevails. There it is simply assumed that all foreigners, and particularly Americans, are spies and that is an end to it. Legislation protecting one or another category from contamination — be they journalists or writers or orthodoxists — is simply dismissed as a clumsy imperialist subterfuge not to be taken seriously.

It is well-known in this country that U.S. government guidelines ban the use of journalists by the intelligence agencies, but if one asks our correspondents in Moscow, for example, whether this has lightened Soviet controls or surveillance of their activities, the answer, of course, is emphatically no. The answer is no different although the efficiency of the surveillance may vary in such militant leftist countries as Algeria, Angola or Libya.

Thus the proposed ban would not accomplish what it aims at: a certification of purity to facilitate the collection of information by American writers for their private use. Moreover the proposal has another side which makes it even more undesirable. By pushing for an outright legislative prohibition, it forecloses writers of all kinds from the freedom to choose whether or not to help their government in situations where such help could be most valuable, even critical to the national interest.

Underlying the proposal is the unspoken assumption that the government's busi-

ness is of no concern to unofficial Americans if that business involves secrecy and — dare I speak its name? — espionage. The inference to be drawn is that nothing the government may be doing involving espionage can be more important than preserving the purity of our writers' self-image even though, as we have seen, that image is a delusion regardless of immunity conferred by legislation.

Writers and other bearers of the torch of ethical purity in a naughty world (made so, it is implied, by our own government among others) would be prevented from dropping that torch even if they saw other values to be served which they might deem even more worthy. One wonders whether, if this were pointed out to the Authors' League, they would agree to having their freedom so circumscribed.

Hersey and the Authors' League base their position, somewhat remotely to be sure, on First Amendment considerations. But it is not farfetched to argue that behind it is the additional motive of putting a crimp in the work of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies.

If writers of all stripes are added to journalists, academics, missionaries, cultural exchange representatives and Peace Corps volunteers — all of whom have demanded or have been granted prohibitions on their use by the intelligence agencies — the intelligence activities of the United States will be even further circumscribed, confined and limited. This is a result to rejoice all those who, from whatever motives, want U.S. intelligence to wither and decline.

Mr. Blaufarb is a retired CIA operations officer of 20 years' experience in various countries.

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY  
18 April 1980

## Former CIA Agent Finds Woes In Seeking Clearance for Book

The post-Snepp crackdown by the Central Intelligence Agency on unauthorized books about the agency has claimed its second victim—this time at the instigation of the author himself.

"I've been completely aboveboard and have not tried to publish without their knowledge. If I were facing this situation again, I'd do the same thing," said Wilbur Eveland in a refreshingly candid interview with PW.

Nevertheless, his book, "Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East," to be published by Norton, will not make its May 19 publication date. Eveland fears it may not make the bookstores before August—and all because he notified the CIA he was publishing a book revealing tasks he performed for the agency.

"I have not one damn nickel," Eve-

land admitted, saying he needs money from the book soon. His telephone calls to the CIA are collect. At 61, he hasn't been employed for five years and lives, he says, "with some nice people" in Los Altos, Calif.

His problems began as his book was in type, page proofs for jacket blurbs were in the mail and Norton was ready to print. Then Eveland's editor, Starling Lawrence, called to discuss the just-released Supreme Court decision against Frank Snepp, author of "Decent Interval" (Random House). The court ruled Snepp should have submitted his book to the CIA for clearance because he had signed an agreement to do so as part of his CIA employment. Soon after, the government moved against John R. Stockwell and his book, "In Search of Enemies," also published by Norton. As in the Snepp case, the CIA wanted his royalties.

Eveland has been trying through the Freedom of Information Act since 1975 to get copies of any CIA documents he might have signed. "I didn't ever sign anything involving prepublication review or submission of writings. . . . They didn't even have a secrecy agreement such as Snepp signed in the days I was there," he said. Eveland was with the CIA from 1955 to 1960.

"I really am disturbed about the Snepp decision," Eveland said. "I think the publishing trade should be more disturbed than it appears to be. I've memorized that Supreme Court decision and it scares the hell out of me."

He said he feared that if he didn't notify the CIA of his book, liberally sprinkled with anecdotes about CIA activities in the Middle East, he might eventually suffer the fate of Snepp and Stockwell. On February 29, he sent a mailgram notifying the agency of his book. The mailgram said he'd be glad to see any documents the CIA had to support a claim the agency had a right to read his manuscript. "All I want is the date of a piece of paper and the operative clause and my signature on the bottom of it," he said.

Printing was halted. He gave the CIA 10 working days but received no response. Printing was restarted. On March 20, he received the CIA's letter insisting it had review rights. Printing was once more stopped. Eveland called the CIA and asked again for copies of any documents he had signed. A CIA lawyer, he said, admitted the agency had nothing signed by Eveland prior to September 1957 and said the agency was still in the process of declassifying pertinent papers dating from that date.

Eveland thought about the situation some more and, fearing that publication would be delayed until August if he waited, decided he would have Norton send the CIA only those portions of the book dealing with the post-1957 period in dispute, the final chapters, 24-30. On April 2, he called the CIA and told them what he was going to do. "They were pleased that I would tell Norton to do this," he said, but the next day he also sent a mailgram to the CIA stating: "Without conceding the CIA's right to prepublication review or censorship of the book I have written, I have today voluntarily instructed my publishers to send immediately to the CIA all portions of the narrative dealing with events from September 1957 onward. My decision in respect to making any modifications or deletions requested by the CIA will be taken following my receipt from the agency of copies of any documents purporting to

bind me to prepublication review, and advice of counsel concerning my obligations, if any exist."

A CIA spokesperson, Herbert Hetu, told PW: "We don't know what we're going to do yet, but if we review the book we'll try to do it within 30 days." He said the agency had sent Eveland the relevant parts of the documents it claims he had signed. Hetu said the CIA maintains its position that it has the right to review the entire book.

There is a lot in the book that would have been considered classified in 1955, Eveland said, but "virtually everything that's in there has been published either abroad or here, and my contention is that it's no longer classified." In fact, he added, he and his exploits were mentioned throughout a 1960 book published by Simon & Schuster, "The Game of Nations" by Miles Copeland.

The problem Eveland faces is that the CIA doesn't consider anything declassified until it does the declassifying, regardless of whether the facts have been published.

What will he do if the CIA demands changes?

"I can't tell you because I don't know what they're going to talk about. If they get plain silly about it, I should think I would argue," he said. But his objective is to get the book out, so "I would probably swallow some things that I might not otherwise." He's "flat-ass broke," he said, and doesn't want to get into any protracted haggling. "I have absolutely no desire to become a landmark Supreme Court case," he added.

HOWARD FIELDS

*In its April 4 review of "Ropes of Sand," printed before notification that publication was held up, PW observed: "The main body of the book, dealing with Eveland's career until 1975, will be of interest primarily to experts on the Middle East. The last chapter, however, pointing out how little we have learned from our mistakes, should be read and pondered by anyone seriously concerned about the CIA, OPEC, the Arabs, Israel, the Palestinian problem, and U.S. foreign and petroleum policy. Hard hitting and opinionated, the book will prove controversial."*



AIR FORCE TIMES  
April 1980

## Russia and Iran: Cold War and Warm Water Why Iran is Next on Russia's Hit List

by Jack Maury

*Jack Maury, a 28 year veteran of CIA, was Chief of the Agency's Soviet operations for eight years. More recently he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense.*

TO WINSTON CHURCHILL, RUSSIA was "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." To the late Chip Bohlen, probably the most clearheaded Kremlinologist of our time, Russia was "a land of many secrets but few mysteries." For my money, Bohlen was nearer the mark. If there is anything surprising about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it is that sensible people seem surprised. Certainly few nations have been more candid than the Soviet Union in proclaiming their foreign aims or more consistent in pursuing them. Nowhere has this been so true as in what the Kremlin has loosely referred to as "the direction of the Persian Gulf"—Iran and Afghanistan—where considerations of ideology, history, and geography combine to create a special Soviet interest.

From the earliest days of the revolution Soviet leaders perceived such undeveloped and "colonial" areas, whose resources were an easy prey for foreign exploitation, as "the weakest link in the imperialist chain." At the XII Party Congress in 1923 the comrades were called upon to "inflame the . . . semi-colonial countries . . . and thus hasten the fall of imperialism." In later years the pursuit of this policy has met with mixed success. But where the taste of the Soviet carrot may have soured, the increasing clout of the Soviet stick, whether wielded by Soviet or surrogate hands, has usually done the trick. Thus, the Kremlin appears firmly committed to a policy of subverting or seducing third world nations with one hand while holding NATO at bay with the other.

The application of such a policy "in the direction of the Persian Gulf" has deep historical roots. In the mid-17th century the Czar Alexis launched a short-lived invasion of Persian territory. In 1722 his son, Peter the Great, under pretext of aiding Persia in her war against the Afghans (whose invading forces had driven all the way to Isfahan) dispatched an army into northwestern Persia and occupied the three provinces bordering the Caspian. Although Peter's interest in Persia was no doubt dominated by his life-long dream of warm water ports on the Gulf, his successors found the Persian provinces difficult to defend and adminis-

ter and in 1732 they reverted to Persia.

The next military confrontation between Russia and Persia resulted from two unsuccessful attempts—in 1812 and again in 1825—by the Persians to reconquer Georgia, which in 1801 had been annexed by Russia, to whom she had turned for protection against Persian predacity.

Another crisis in Russo-Persian relations arose as an outgrowth of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 under which northern and central Persia fell within the Russian sphere of commercial interest. Under pretext of protecting Russian nationals in accord with the spirit of this agreement, the Russians, following the 1909 Persian revolution, dispatched some 6,000 troops to the Qazvin area (100 miles northwest of Tehran) and threatened Tehran itself.

Russian troops remained in northern Persia throughout World War I. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution the new Soviet government sought to win Persian friendship by withdrawing troops from Persian soil and renouncing Russian concessions in, and debt claims against, Persia. In 1920 during the Russian Civil War, however, Red forces pursuing the Caspian flotilla of the White General Deniken invaded and occupied a sector of the Persian Caspian coast where they attempted to establish a puppet Soviet government. This effort was abandoned in 1921 following the signing of a Soviet-Persian non-intervention treaty. At about the same time, however, the Soviets inspired and supported the formation in Persia of an underground Marxist student group, the forerunner of the present Tudeh ("Masses") party.

Continued Russian interest in Persian real estate was further demonstrated in 1939 when Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov explained to his German counterpart, von Ribbentrop, that a Nazi-Soviet pact would be possible only if the area "in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

Iran (the official name adopted in 1935) viewed the approach of World War II with deep concern and divided sympathies. Fear of Russia led the Shah and some of the military to lean toward the Axis. Anxious to take no chances and in order to insure Russian access to supply lines safe from Axis interdiction, Russia occupied

the northern half of the country and England the south. This arrangement was formalized in a 1942 treaty whereby the occupying powers guaranteed Iranian territorial integrity and promised to withdraw their forces within six months after the war's end.

It was Moscow's violation of this agreement by installing a puppet communist regime in Iranian Azerbaijan and refusing to withdraw its troops that created the first post-war confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West. The Soviets eventually withdrew their troops in the face of united opposition in the UN Security Council, but left behind the puppet regime in the hands of the Moscow-controlled Tudeh party. This regime collapsed when troops were sent into Azerbaijan by the Tehran government in December 1946. But the real reason for the Azerbaijan regime's collapse, as American Ambassador George Allen reported at the time, was that all concerned knew the US was not bluffing in its support of the Tehran government.

The Tudeh party, which went underground after the Azerbaijan venture, may have had a part in the assassination of Iranian Premier Razmara in 1951. In any event it surfaced during the regime of Razmara's successor, the volatile and colorful Mossadegh. The Tudeh found Mossadegh useful in making trouble for western oil interests and Mossadegh welcomed Tudeh political support. After Mossadegh's ouster in 1953 the Tudeh again went underground, to resurface last year. Its Secretary General, Nurreddin Kianuri, gave interviews in late November to two European journalists applauding Khomeini.

And indeed if the Tudeh and its Muscovite mentors liked Mossadegh why shouldn't they love Khomeini? Rarely have Kremlin strategists been offered a more

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tempting array of the classical ingredients of a revolutionary situation: anarchy in the target area; impotence among the "imperialists" who might be tempted to intervene; easy and safe access for Soviet military intrusion when called for. Rarely have the aims of Russian nationalism and the theories of communist doctrine been in closer harmony. And, lest there be any misunderstanding about the Kremlin's readiness to take appropriate action when confronted with such opportunities, hear the words of Comrade Brezhnev addressing the XXV Party Congress: "Detente does not in the slightest... change the laws of the class struggle. . . . In the developing countries... we are on the side of the forces of progress." Or, as the late Defense Minister Grechko put it: "At the present stage, the historic purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces is not limited merely to their function in defending our motherland and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively and purposefully . . . supports the national liberation struggle . . . in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear."

Should we have been surprised by what has happened in Afghanistan? Should we be surprised when it happens in Iran? And in the next "weak link in the imperialist chain" after that—Pakistan perhaps, where there are now some 5,500 Soviet technicians (no doubt including hundreds of KGB operatives)? Or maybe Saudi Arabia? For unless we stand firm, happen it will—maybe not today or tomorrow, perhaps only after the current surge of American concern and vigilance has subsided. But with her unrelenting quest for warm waters, her impending need for oil imports and the growing geopolitical significance of the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean littoral we can be sure that the days ahead will bring no diminution in Russia's age-old aspirations "in the direction of the Persian Gulf."

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FOIA

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26 April 1980

## EDITORIALS.

### C.I.A./F.O.I.A.

**T**he effort to exempt the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies from the Freedom of Information Act (see editorial, "Future Secrets," February 23) has stirred up a storm of controversy. A letter opposing the provisions in the C.I.A. charter (S. 2284) and the Moynihan bill (S. 2216) that would exempt the Agency from the Freedom of Information Act was recently sent to Congress by a group of more than 150 individuals and organizations, including the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Association of American Publishers, and Common Cause. Even the Justice Department cannot swallow the C.I.A. proposal. As Associate Attorney General John Shenefield put it in a recent speech, the F.O.I.A. provisions are "vastly overbroad and . . . in stark contrast to the spirit and philosophy" of the act. As a result, Justice has come up

with a new proposal, reluctantly accepted by the C.I.A., which it regards as a "much narrower" exemption.

Unfortunately, this new improved proposal is as bad as the original. It does abandon the attempt to secure an across-the-board exemption from the F.O.I.A. for the intelligence agencies, but it would achieve much the same result by allowing the Director of Central Intelligence to certify "information" as exempt from disclosure if it falls into one of three catchall categories: (1) information that is provided by anyone not employed by the U.S. Government, (2) information that would "tend to identify" a source or method and (3) information from or about technical or scientific intelligence systems.

The Justice Department regards this proposal as "narrow" and unlikely to be used very often—mainly because the exemptions in the F.O.I.A. itself are already so broad. The act now allows the withholding of information that is properly classified or that would identify a source or method. The Justice Department's proposal, however, would sanction the withholding of information that is not even classified or that would merely "tend" to identify a source or method. Much more important, under the current law an agency's refusal to release information under one of the exemptions in the F.O.I.A. is reviewable in court—a judge can decide, for example, if a file, document or part of a document was properly classified. Under the new proposal there can be no judicial review of the Director's certification. Given the C.I.A.'s often-stated fear that some "irresponsible" judge might, in the future, divulge national security secrets (so far, it acknowledges, none has), why should it support exemptions that could be overturned in court instead of one that is judge-proof?

If the Justice Department is seriously concerned about "the spirit and philosophy" of the F.O.I.A., then it should reconsider its backing of this new proposal. Meanwhile, we shall oppose it as vigorously as the old one.



# New CIA Pressure For Secrecy

By Richard Dudman

Post-Dispatch Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told newspaper editors last week that the Soviet ambassador, under an American law, can ask for information from CIA files and get a response within 10 days.

What Turner did not say was that the CIA does not have to give the Soviet ambassador, or anyone else, any information that has been properly given a secrecy classification or any information that would disclose sources and methods of intelligence collection. Nor did he say that, in practice, virtually no one has received information from the CIA in 10 days.

Turner's remark, possibly intended to shock the visiting editors, was part of a campaign by the CIA and some members of Congress to exempt most of the agency's files from provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

Other efforts are under way to grant blanket exemptions for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Trade Commission.

The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966 and strengthened in 1974, at the height of the Watergate scandal. It was intended to establish a framework for giving citizens access to government files. It never has been popular with government agencies, although they generally have responded to requests in good faith, while making full use of the broad exemption provisions.

Among the public disclosures that have resulted from requests under the act are the CIA's spying on the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, the agency's wiretapping and mail-opening programs, aspects of its Bay of Pigs fiasco, the agency's infiltration of lawful political groups in the United States, its secret behavior-control and drug-testing programs, and its attempts to keep the Glomar Explorer incident out of the press.

Now the pendulum has swung away from reform toward a new emphasis on national security. The drive to dismember the act has gained strength from the humiliation of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and other more recent foreign policy setbacks.

Turner, in his appearance before the editors, said the agency was seeking only "limited relief" from the Freedom of Information Act. His main point was that foreign intelligence agencies and prospective U.S. undercover agents abroad see the act as a security threat.

"How do you persuade someone to risk his life for our country if he fears that I may be required by law to reveal his name in public?" Turner asked.

He did not dispute the fact that the working of the act never has forced the CIA to make public any information that was classified or that would disclose intelligence sources or methods.

Last year, a federal court did order the CIA to make public three or four lines of a classified document, but that case remains under appeal. Another adverse decision, which the CIA says would force the release of information about intelligence sources and methods, also is under appeal.

Turner, rather than asserting an actual threat, says the problem is the perception of a threat, in the minds of foreign agents whose cooperation is needed.

Surprisingly, Turner acknowledged that the agency had on unspecified occasions divulged national security secrets. But he added that this was "only because of administrative error on our part."

"There is a perception on the part of foreign sources that we may not be able to hold the line under the Freedom of Information Act," he said. "So far, we have not lost a case. But if you are going to put your neck on the line, do you want to bank on courts with unpredictable judges and court procedures? Of course not."

A strong supporter of the Freedom of Information Act, the privately financed Center for National Security Studies, sees no reason to doubt the CIA contention that some friendly intelligence services and sources are leery about cooperating with the CIA because so much information has been made public about the agency in the last few years — in some cases without the CIA's consent.

But, says the center in a report last week, the act is not the leading cause of the problem. Other sources of public information about the CIA, the report says, include leaks by intelligence and other officials, damage actions against the CIA or individual officials, memoirs written by former CIA officials, and possible disclosures of information provided to the Senate and House Oversight Committees, although neither house has yet taken such action.

The report said the CIA had hurt its reputation for protecting its agents by several recent instances in which it has pulled out of relationships and left agents exposed.

For example, in the U.S. exodus from Vietnam in 1975, the CIA not only failed to take along the Vietnamese who had cooperated with the agency under a promise of protection, but it also left behind records identifying them to Hanoi as CIA collaborators, according to the report. It quoted former CIA agent Frank Snepp's book, "Decent Interval," as a source.

The center's report told how the Freedom of

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Information Act works, to explain that even though no final court decision has ordered the CIA to release information, the act has led to the disclosure of much information from the CIA that would not otherwise have been made public.

When a request for information is made under the act, someone at the agency first determines whether it has the data in its files. If so, he examines the material to see whether there is information that either must or should be made public. If the material does not come under one of the exemptions, it must be provided. Perhaps it should be made public as a matter of policy.

This may have been the first time in many years that anyone has looked at the particular file. Some material often is made public.

The person requesting the material, if not satisfied with what has been released, can appeal for more. A review group, including lawyers familiar with the requirements of the act, often releases substantial additional information.

If the person making the request still is not satisfied, he or she may file a suit, which requires a further review by officials, including lawyers in the Department of Justice and the office of the U.S. attorney. This may lead to still further releases.

As the case goes through the courts, additional material may be found to be suitable for release, either by the agency or by order of the courts.

The CIA's campaign for sweeping exemptions from the act found only part support at the Justice Department. As Associate Attorney General John H. Shenefield put it in a recent speech: "We are not persuaded by arguments for sweeping file exemptions that would have virtually exempted intelligence agencies from the act. Such an approach would produce an amendment that would be vastly overbroad and would stand in stark contrast to the spirit and philosophy of the act."

Although Shenefield gave no details, The Washington Post later disclosed that the Justice Department had come up with a plan that would empower both the CIA and the FBI to block court review of any documents included in a certification procedure.

Although some critics considered such an arrangement unprecedented and unduly protective of the agencies, Morton H. Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, saw it as a compromise that was better than the proposed blanket exemption.

Halperin told the Post-Dispatch that it had the advantage of retaining the requirements that the agencies search and index their files, whereas under the blanket exemption they simply could reject any requests.

The legislation, moreover, would go to the congressional committees that have been handling the Freedom of Information Act, instead of to the Intelligence Committees, where the members and staffs are less familiar with the history of the act.

But Mark Lynch, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer who specializes in Freedom of Information matters, said that the prospect of eventual court review is a powerful influence preventing the CIA and the FBI from overclassifying information. He said exemption from court review would be a disaster.

A new bill incorporating the Justice Department's views is expected to be introduced in the House this week.

As the debate proceeds, those who would cut back the act can be expected to revive the charges that it opens the way for the Soviet ambassador and Soviet intelligence to legally rifle the CIA's files.

The slim basis for such concern is the fact that the Polish Embassy here once made a request for some information under the act. That was the only case a CIA spokesman could cite when asked for examples of use of the act by the Communist powers.

And the exemptions specified in the act applied to the Polish request just as they applied to a request from anyone else.

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OPINIONS OF CIA - PRO AND CON

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 16THE BOSTON GLOBE  
21 April 1980

# Charting the intelligence course

Intelligence agency legislation has followed a rather twisted path in Congress since the need for it was first identified in the mid-1970s. Initial attention focused on agency abuses, wholesale infringements on individual privacy and lawful political activities. Yet, little of a permanent and sweeping nature happened. Executive orders, subject to change at any time, were promulgated. But that is about it.

As time passed, the demand for an intelligence agency charter ebbed. In fact, the emphasis recently has been on removing "restraints" on the agencies. Yet, ironically, that focus has produced an opportunity now to deal with the issues that drew attention to the intelligence community.

The problem that has drawn the most attention in Congress is the proper degree of congressional oversight. The intelligence agencies, joined by the President, have complained that reporting requirements pose a danger of leaks. Yet, as Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) has noted, there is no evidence that any covert operations have been made public by members of Congress.

Prior notification to Congress of all covert operations should remain a requirement. Now, however, as many as eight congressional committees are in line to receive prior notice. A limitation to perhaps two committees — the House and Senate committees on intelligence — might calm agencies' fears and still ensure that a reasonable cross-section of opinion is sought before any covert activity is undertaken.

The intelligence agencies, in carrying out their institutional responsibilities, simply cannot be allowed to undermine other institutions. CIA Director Stansfield Turner's recent defense of his agency's use of journalists — as well as clergymen and academics — suggests that the nation's freedoms can somehow legitimately be compromised in the effort to secure the

nation's freedoms. It's a perverse view, and Congress should bar the CIA's use of the press, the clergy and the academic community.

Further, the intelligence community ought to be subject to the same kind of public review as any other agency. Proposals to exempt the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act are ill-conceived. No one doubts that the agency needs to keep secret the names of agents and ongoing operations. But when events have passed, an intelligence agency ought to be accountable.

In defining the actual work of the intelligence agencies, congressional direction must be precise. They should be prohibited from conducting investigations that involve covert techniques, unless there is evidence that the subject of the investigation may be involved in a crime.

That standard should be applied to intrusive surveillance of Americans both at home and abroad. Under one proposal, infiltration of groups and the securing of "third party" records could go forward without court order; political organizations merely suspected of having connections with foreign governments could be subjected to covert investigative techniques; abroad, wholly innocent US citizens could be subject to court-approved intrusive investigations — mail openings for instance — simply because they might have information of "essential" value to the United States. Tighter controls are essential.

It was Vice President Mondale himself who, when still a senator, reminded the nation that "the fact is that if you get the right of government to investigate Americans for things that are not crimes, there are ways of destroying persons without ever appearing in a courtroom ..."

THE MIAMI HERALD  
19 April 1980

## *Criticism of the CIA Is Undeserved*

To The Editor:

On several occasions, you have written disparagingly about what the Central Intelligence Agency has and is trying to accomplish.

It is utterly amazing how your editorial staff has the solutions on how foreign intelligence should be gathered, how the agency should function, and what restrictions should be placed in its new charter in order for it not to get out of hand.

While I fully appreciate your right to your opinion, the inclusion of unsupported "facts" to bolster your editorial opinion is bad journalism.


The Central Intelligence Agency was created in order to protect the security of the United States. It exists and works for us. It is staffed by very capable Americans. The CIA does not formulate policy. It is not an entity in itself, but an integral and vital part of our Government. Its activities are those directed and approved by the President and the National Security Council.

After 10 years of intensive review by numerous investigative committees in Washington, they have all publicly acknowledged that the great bulk of the agency's activities have been conducted within its charter and carried out in a creditable and professional manner. And that the charges levied against it were much ado over not very much.

However, you still see fit to be involved in how the agency should function. In your April 15 editorial "Spying and Journalism Don't Mix" you create the false impression that any U.S. foreign correspondent who becomes contaminated with the CIA immediately loses his objectivity, becomes biased in his reporting, and performs a disservice to his readers and the editors who sent him abroad. This is absolute naivete and unadulterated rubbish.

The U.S. foreign correspondent chosen by the agency may not have to perform a reporting chore at all, and if he did have to write, the likelihood would be that he will be exposed to information he was not aware of. In either case, on a one-shot or short-term deal, I fail to see how one episode in the service of one's country is going to adversely affect a capable U.S. foreign correspondent.

The fact that Admiral Turner openly disclosed that he will not hesitate to use U.S. re-



porters when "the national interest" justifies it, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), indicates to me that the Central Intelligence Agency feels the following about using U.S. foreign correspondents:

- Many hold unique positions overseas that allow them to be in certain areas, observe what is going on, meet with indigenous peoples, and undoubtedly have freedom of movement denied to other Americans.

- That the allegiance of every U.S. foreign correspondent is first to the United States, and then to his editors and readers.

- That since some of these correspondents are in a unique position to perform a service to their country without jeopardizing the credibility of their reporting, they can be asked to do so but never compelled to do so. The choice is their own.

Rebuilding the CIA, which will take considerable time after the damage wrought by its enemies and its reformers, appears now to be agreed upon. The President, the Congress, the media, and the American people should get on with the job. Only the Soviet KGB has reason to laugh at the delay.

STANLEY W. SPECKER  
CIA Intelligence Officer,  
Retired  
North Palm Beach

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY  
18 April 1980

### Groups Protest Aspects of Proposed CIA Bills

Voicing the strongest objections to any legislation that would remove the CIA and other intelligence agencies from public and scholarly scrutiny, Kirkpatrick Sale, vice-president of P.E.N., testified March 25 before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Also expressing fears over proposed intelligence legislation were representatives from the American Civil Liberties Union, the Organization of American Historians and several church organizations.

In an earlier action, John Hersey, president of the Authors League, had asked for legislation that would "unequivocally prohibit the CIA (and other agencies) from using journalists and professional authors of books and magazine articles to gather information or perform other intelligence services." The Authors League position was outlined in a letter to Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D., Ky.), who introduced the proposed National Intelligence Act of 1980.

The Senate committee is expected to begin line-by-line consideration in the middle of this month of the Huddleston bill as well as of a similar one proposed by Senators Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.) and Malcolm Wallop (R., Wyo.).

In still another action protesting aspects of the proposed bills, 150 organizations and individuals circulated a letter to senators and representatives on the relevant committees, expressing opposition to provisions that would substantially exempt intelligence agencies from the Freedom of Information Act. Among the national organizations sponsoring the letter are the Association of American Publishers and P.E.N.'s Freedom to Write Committee.

The provisions to which the group objects "represent a radical change in government policy and would severely limit the disclosure of information to the public. They would damage serious historical and journalistic research and . . . informed public debate."

Noting that the FOIA "in its present form provides ample protection for information that is properly classified or which reveals intelligence sources or methods," the group concludes: "It is imperative that the Freedom of Information Act not be sacrificed as part of a hasty or ill-considered reaction to current international tensions."

Representing P.E.N.'s 1700 writers and editors at the Senate hearing, Sale declared: "The works that have been produced as a result of FOIA access have been absolutely essential, we believe, in giving the American people a better idea of the true nature of its government and enabling them to assess its foreign and domestic policies."

THE MICHIGAN DAILY  
16 APRIL 1980

## CIA secrecy gone too far

**I**N FEBRUARY, the Supreme Court, in an extremely unusual move, ordered former CIA agent Frank Snepp to turn over the profits from a book he had written about the Agency. The decision was handed down by the justices without benefit of hearing either side of the case.

Now the Court, as expected, has denied a petition for "rehearing" Snepp's case, even though it was never really heard in the first place.

The controversy over Snepp's book arose over a clause in his standard contract that he would submit anything he wrote about the CIA for clearance before bringing it to a publisher.

That Snepp violated the letter of the contract is not at issue; he acknowledges that he did. But there are certain kinds of promises, which, under the law, are not binding. One example: If the signer of a document can prove that he or she signed with anything less than full consent, the

validity of the agreement can be called into question (and overruled) in a court of law.

It is clearly not in the nation's interest for the CIA contract to be unexceptionally binding. The Agency, after all, has a long tradition of being oversensitive about its operations. Just recently, some formerly classified material was released which revealed that President Nixon had once privately discussed the U.S. role in western Asia. The material was quite innocuous by anyone's standards—except those of the CIA.

Perhaps a panel of judges and/or congresspersons could be established as a screening committee for CIA-related material, to ensure that genuine secrets are not made public. But for the CIA to be able to decide unilaterally to stifle embarrassing information is clearly an intolerable state of affairs. The Agency's secrecy to date has frequently hurt U.S. interests, and has only occasionally advanced them.



NEWSDAY  
14 APRIL 1980

By Jim Klurfeld  
Newsday Washington Bureau


Washington  
**I**T IS not exactly what the reformers had in mind when they set out to tame the Central Intelligence Agency.

Three years ago, when the Senate Intelligence Committee began to write a charter for the U.S. intelligence community, the goal was to rein in the spooks and prevent the abuses of power revealed by congressional investigations—the assassination attempts, the domestic spying, the illegal opening of mail, the drug testing on unsuspecting citizens, the conduct of small- or even medium-scale but never declared wars. For the first time, a charter would be written that specified what secret spy organizations could and could not do and how they would be held responsible in a democratic society.

Now, after three years, three drafts, three dozen hearings, a revolution in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan, the reformers find themselves fighting to prevent the CIA and the other intelligence-related agencies from being unleashed again—before a charter has even been adopted.

"The question we are dealing with is very basic and very important," said Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) of the House Intelligence Committee, who favors a strong charter. "The intelligence agencies did some plain crazy things in the past—you know about the attempts to assassinate Castro with an exploding cigar and all the others—and we feel there must be strong congressional oversight to help prevent those types of actions in the future. To have that oversight, we need a strong charter. . . . But we are no longer headed in that direction. Instead, with the recent international crisis, there has been an attempt to give the intelligence community greater flexibility without any of the charter restrictions."

There is a reform bill before the Congress, S2284, a 172-page document that for the first time since the creation of the CIA and its sister institutions would establish a detailed legal basis for their operation. It would ban assassinations, require prior notification to Congress of all covert operations, and guarantee to Congress full and complete access to all intelligence information.



# CIA Reform Ensnared In An Undertow

But most lawmakers concede that there is very little hope of getting such a comprehensive and complicated bill through Congress this year. And S2284 is only a modified—some would say watered-down—version of a more detailed bill first introduced in 1978.

The real question before Congress is whether to grant the intelligence community the new flexibility requested by President Carter in his State of the Union message without any charter reform at all.

That is the thrust of a bill introduced by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.). That bill, instead of telling the CIA what it cannot do and defining the agency's legal obligations to Congress, would allow it greater flexibility in planning and executing covert operations, reduce the number of committees the CIA must report to from eight to two, grant an exemption from provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and establish criminal penalties for current or former officials who reveal the identities of CIA officers, informants or sources.

The Moynihan bill contains none of the strictures that reformers want in a charter. It does not provide for prior notification of covert operations to Congress, guarantee Congress full access to information or ban assassinations.

"This is a classic case of a reform attempt being abandoned in the process of negotiation," said Jerry J. Berman, the legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union. "It is a case of liberal failure."

The debate is over basic constitutional questions as well as the future of the intelligence agencies, and at times it has become quite bitter. Behind it all is a fundamental question: Is it possible to impose public accountability on a secret intelligence operation?

Those who have watched the charter debate since 1975 believe the CIA has achieved exactly what it set out to do—delay action long enough so that public outrage at the agency fades and events once again prove the need for CIA flexibility. As events have changed and the public mood has altered, the CIA has become more obstinate in its positions and less cooperative about congressional requests.

These are the key issues that have emerged in the debate:

- Whether the executive branch must give Congress "prior notice" of all covert operations or just "timely" notice.

- Whether Congress should have access to all information it deems necessary to carry out its oversight functions.

- To what extent the intelligence community can investigate American citizens not specifically suspected of criminal acts.

- Whether the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community should be exempted from provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

- Whether journalists, academ-

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ics and members of the clergy can be used as spies (Editorial, Page 40).

• Whether criminal penalties should be imposed on those who disclose information that would reveal the identities of CIA officers, informants or sources.

What is not in question any longer is the most basic issue—whether the United States should have an agency, as part of the intelligence service, that performs covert tasks. After the Senate revelations of CIA horror stories, a group in Washington argued that covert operations were so incompatible with the workings of a democratic society that the entire capability should be denied to the government. The CIA would do little more than collect and analyze intelligence. That position now has few, if any, backers in Congress. It is certainly not reflected in the charter.

But most congressional insiders say it is highly unlikely that S2284 will be acted on this year. They believe it will be Moynihan's bill or nothing. The matter is just too complicated and sensitive in an election year, they say.

Indeed, it has become an issue in the presidential campaign. Former CIA Director George Bush, a Republican candidate, has made strengthening the CIA a major part of his plan to improve U.S. foreign policy. Ronald Reagan, too, accuses the Carter administration of not doing enough for the CIA. Four years ago, controlling the CIA was the popular stand on the campaign circuit.

An irony of the debate is that not only have the conservatives gained the upper hand, but some liberal stalwarts of the past have shifted. Chief among them is Vice President Walter Mondale, who served on the Senate committee that revealed many of the CIA abuses. At first Mondale tried to use his position to draft a strong charter. At one point, when he felt the Carter administration was not offering a comprehensive enough charter because of pressure from conservatives, he told his staff to stiffen the provisions, reminding them who had won the election, according to one report.

But the views of Mondale and other members of the Carter administration have changed. Being inside the executive branch, they have tended to be more sympathetic to the basic intelligence community position—that stringent rules and regulations will hamper the effectiveness of intelligence operations.

"We still think that it is important to have a charter," said David Aaron, the deputy national security adviser to the President and formerly Mondale's staff representative on the intelligence committee. "But it is important so the agency can operate again without the great uncertainty and caution that have characterized its actions since the investigations. It is an agency designed to take risks, and it has not been able to do that. It is time to close the books on the past episodes."

Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.), head of the Senate intelligence subcommittee drafting the charter legislation, said he believes a new charter can be brought before Congress this year, but one that is shorter and less complicated than the current version. And he says he believes he can block an attempt to pass only the Moynihan bill. He and others fear that if the Moynihan bill passes, there will be no incentive to pass a more comprehensive charter. But most believe that Huddleston is too optimistic.

Moynihan defends his approach, saying that if the CIA is to function effectively at a time of great international peril, those measures must be taken immediately and not be delayed by the long, drawn-out process of adopting a comprehensive charter.

Aaron argues that even without a charter, in the last three years the intelligence community and Congress have been able to establish an effective oversight relationship that has ended the sort of abuses that had come to light in committee hearings, particularly those headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho). "Now," Aaron said, "we have practical experience to show that it can work without settling every detail into law."

A major point against the reforms that is acknowledged by

Huddleston, Mondale and others is that the U.S. reform movement has had a chilling effect on friendly foreign intelligence agencies that work with the United States. CIA Director Stansfield Turner, in his frequent appearances before Congress, says a great deal of first-hand intelligence in certain parts of the world—Eastern Europe is known to be one such area—is gathered by friendly nations and shared with the United States. Foreign agencies' fears that their cooperation with the United States will be exposed has caused a cutback in such cooperation, Turner and other intelligence officials say—usually without citing specific cases.

Carter, too, has told Congress that some of the regulations and laws established following the congressional investigations have already hindered the CIA's ability to act. The administration has cited the Hughes-Ryan Act, which was adopted in 1975 after revelations of the CIA's covert undermining of the Allende regime in Chile and the failure of former CIA Director Richard Helms to tell Congress the truth about it.

That act says no funds may be spent by the CIA on covert operations abroad unless the president finds the operation is "important" to national security and reports "in a timely fashion" to the "appropriate" committees of Congress. The resolution forming the Senate Intelligence Committee, which came into being as a result of the congressional investigations after the Hughes-Ryan law—requires the CIA to keep the committee "fully and currently informed" of its activities, including "significant anticipated activities."

With the formation of intelligence committees, first in the Senate and then in the House, the CIA had to report to eight congressional committees. The agency objects to that, saying it means that more than 200 members of Congress are being told of covert activity, a number that greatly increases the possibility of a leak. In practice, only a small percentage of the members of those eight committees are told of a covert operation, because the committees said either that they don't want the information or that only the chairman and ranking minority member need be informed. Nevertheless, one of the administration's main points has been the need to limit intelligence reporting to the two intelligence committees. That is an uncontroversial provision in both Huddleston's comprehensive bill and Moynihan's "CIA relief bill."

But the question of when the CIA must report an action is controversial. Congress is insisting that the requirement of prior notification be written into law. Turner says there are instances when prior notification will be impossible or will endanger lives if there was a leak. Turner says that under Hughes-Ryan, the CIA has given the intelligence committees prior notification in all cases but one. The one exception is reported to have been the Canadian embassy's housing and then transporting of U.S. officials out of Tehran.

"We believe the so-called prior notice requirement is a distinct departure from the timely reporting called for under Hughes-Ryan," Turner told the House intelligence panel at a recent hearing. "The administration favors alternative provi-

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sions which would confirm current oversight arrangements by requiring that the intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed . . . Prior notice would be unwise because, it would hamper the president's ability to deal with situations involving grave danger to personal safety or which necessitated the utmost speed and secrecy. It would also have a chilling effect upon the willingness of individuals and organizations to cooperate with the United States in these endeavors."

Turner argues that such a statutory requirement would also be an excessive intrusion by Congress into the president's domain under the Constitution.

Aspin, a former Pentagon official, reacted angrily. He accused Turner and Carter of wanting to have things both ways—eliminating six committees from the reporting requirement and then not having to tell the other two committees in advance about an action. "We need real information to judge, and I would submit to you that information delayed is information denied," Aspin said. He emphasized that Congress would not be able to veto a proposed covert operation, but that because the process would require briefings of outsiders, it might prevent the CIA from such ridiculous operations as the exploding cigar.

Other members of Congress, familiar with the history of the CIA, note that a delay in notification could mean the spending of millions of dollars on a major operation that might run counter to the wishes of Congress and even counter to the administration's foreign-policy goals. It is pointed out that by the time the Senate found out about the covert operation in Angola in 1975—after the Hughes-Ryan amendment was in effect—the CIA had helped organize a small army and prepared it for a role in the civil war.

Because the prior notification issue is being formulated as a constitutional question, it might prove the most difficult on which to compromise, according to officials on both sides. Feelings are so high on the issue that after a recent meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, a private organization, Aspin and Aaron, formerly allies, got into a shouting match as they were leaving.

Turner and the administration also object strongly to a charter provision that any information requested by the intelligence committees be presented. The director claims that could compromise his duty to protect CIA "sources and methods," the heart of any intelligence operation. But Congress fears that by not making the requirement specific, it would create a loophole that might make effective oversight impossible.

CIA objections to the Freedom of Information Act, Huddleston and other charter proponents say, are not justified because there has not been a single instance in which either classified information or information damaging to national security has been released and because the law does not require the release of classified material. Scholars and journalists argue that the information act has been a valuable tool in helping expose CIA abuses, such as illegal drug testing. But Turner says the possibility has frightened off foreign intelligence agencies.

Even more controversial has been the matter of using journalists, clergymen and academics as spies. The original Senate reform bill banned the peacetime use by the CIA of full-time clergymen or missionaries and prohibited the use of journalists or executives of news organizations. The latest version is much vaguer, saying the CIA will protect the integrity and independence of U.S. institutions. The bill does prohibit the CIA from using those groups to establish cover. That is one area in which Huddleston and Mondale have changed their position and now support the intelligence community.

The criminal penalties for exposing CIA officers are being attacked by civil libertarians as an infringement on First Amendment freedom of speech. Moynihan has amended his original bill—which would have subjected the press to criminal penalties for publishing officers' names—because of constitutional questions. But in light of the activities of former CIA agent Philip Agee, who has published officers' names, there is pressure to impose criminal penalties on current or former officials who disclose classified information that reveals the identities of CIA officers.

Berman of the ACLU argues that the bill would allow government surveillance of American citizens at home or abroad simply because they may have information the government deems important. It could, for instance, allow targeting of a member of the American Jewish Congress who traveled to Israel and came back to the United States to lobby Congress on the Mideast. The government could claim that the citizen was acting on instructions from a foreign government and ask that his phone be tapped.

Aaron argues that the provision still represents progress, because under the charter and an executive order issued by Carter in 1978, the government would have to obtain a warrant and go through a process of judicial review. Before, the government was not subject to such a procedure.

Huddleston says he will block Moynihan's bill in committee and try to bring an amended version of his own bill to the Senate floor by May. But it is far less certain that the House will be ready to act this year. And if it appears that a comprehensive bill cannot be passed, there will be increased pressure to go with the Moynihan approach. "But that," Huddleston said, "will be giving the intelligence community all the carrots and none of the sticks."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE SFST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT  
12-13 APRIL 1980

# CIA—a tighter or looser rein?

By JOHN GILLINGHAM

**T**he CIA is back in the news, but, if it has its way, not for long. For it is directing an intense campaign to prevent, whenever possible, public disclosure of its activities. If successful, there will be no further congressional investigations, no additional books by researchers operating under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, and, above all, no more "kiss-and-tell" memoirs by former employees.

In early February the CIA went to court to block publication of *Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa* (Lyle Stuart, Secaucus, N.J.; \$20) only to learn that it was actually on sale in Washington, D.C., bookstores.

A month ago it secured a Supreme Court ruling, since vehemently challenged, denying to former agent Frank Snepp royalties earned from the sale of *Decent Interval*, published in 1977, which is sharply critical of the agency's handling of the evacuation from Saigon. The divulgence of classified information was not an issue in the case but rather mere failure to submit the manuscript of the book to prior CIA censorship. In the opinion of numerous editorialists, the ruling points the way to legal recognition of the government's power to exercise rights of proprietorship over information concerning its activities.

The CIA has also recently gone to court, in a case still pending, to gain broad exemption from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act of 1976, by which governmental agencies must disclose upon request records pertaining to individual Americans. Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., has, in addition, introduced an agency-supported bill which, if passed, would exempt it entirely from the provisions of the act.

Finally, the CIA has been lobbying for months in an effort to secure a rider to the proposed National Intelligence Act of 1980. If attached, it would eliminate, specifically, the provisions of the law now in effect (the Hughes-Ryan Act), which requires the agency to report to no fewer than eight congressional committees. President Carter has strongly endorsed the CIA's position. Another bill, proposed by Sen. Pat Moynahan, D-N.Y., would impose criminal penalties for the publication of either classified material or the names of agents still on duty.

Philip Agee is the cause of the agency's present agonies. The first "insider" to defect to the public, his *CIA Diary*, published in 1974, recounts the daily activities of his 12-year career, spent mostly in Latin America, as a "covert action officer." In exhaustive detail, the book supplies the names of agents and informants, describes operations and the strategies behind them, and analyzes their effects. The book destroyed the myth that the CIA's main business is "intelligence gathering" and established beyond a doubt that it is indeed "dirty tricks," counterrevolution and subversion.

**A**gee, now a virtual fugitive, has continued his exposures of CIA operations and, in so doing, organized international networks of journalist collaborators, inside informants, and sympathizers. *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe* (Lyle Stuart; \$24.95) and *Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa* are anthologies that present the results of their more important investigations.

Recently, other former "insiders" have taken Agee's cue. Snepp's *Decent Interval* has already been mentioned. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (W.W. Norton & Co., N.Y.; \$4.95 paperback), by John Stockwell, former chief of the Angola Task Force, provides a history of our involvement there. Finally, John Marks, a former Foreign Service officer, tells the story of agency brainwashing projects in *The Search for the 'Manchurian Candidate': The CIA and Mind Control* (McGraw-Hill, N.Y.; \$4.95 paperback).

"*Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe* has the bulk and appearance of a metropolitan telephone directory. It presents some 30 articles together with a "reference section" of 350 yellow pages. The latter consists of a "Who's Who?" listing biographical data — often including the present address and telephone number! — of every known CIA agent in Europe. For the additional convenience of the user, a "Who's Where?" is also included, listing agents by station. These

lists, compiled with the aid of official State Department publications, present persuasive evidence indeed of the massiveness of CIA operations in Western Europe.

The articles themselves, all of which contain valuable information, differ greatly in scope and quality. Most of them are by Agee and his close associates; the others (on the whole the more interesting) are reprints from European news magazines. It probably goes without saying that they are all highly critical of the agency and its works.

The book is, at the very least, extremely informative. For starters: It provides estimates of CIA expenditures in Europe, bares its organizational structures, exposes its *modus operandi* in several specific cases, describes its techniques of press manipulation and self-financing, and examines the impact of certain past operations on the political development of individual nations.

**I**f the book has a shortcoming, it is in the failure of the editors to provide summations of CIA priorities, the extent to which it has been in a position to achieve them, and the actual degree of its success. One is in fact left wondering: Do CIA activities in Europe amount to a giant, fully fraudulently foisted on the U.S. taxpayer as being essential to the national security? Or are they a fundamental threat to its freedom — and ours?

*Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa*, with a format similar to its predecessor, contains articles dealing with the roles of U.S., European and "settler state" intelligence services, CIA methods, and its operations in various regions. Although of immense informational value, the volume lacks editorial focus. The significance of the material it presents is thus somewhat blurred.

It soon, however, becomes clear from the text that today "covert action" is of far greater importance in the emerging nations of the Third World than in Europe. Intelligence services do in fact have it in their power to set up or topple African governments and, as the evidence presented in the book amply demonstrates, they are actively engaged in the business of doing so. The CIA's complicity in the assassination of the Congolese "revolutionary" Patrice Lumumba has long been a matter of public knowledge. *Dirty Work II* discusses it at length, as it does the larger issue of the agency's continued involvement in the internal affairs of the Congo (now Zaire).

The book performs a particularly valuable service in revealing CIA plans and plots in less familiar regions of Africa: in the Enclave of Cabinda, Rwanda-Burundi, Guinea, Ghana, Angola, and Uganda. The CIA is everywhere — or at least would like to be.

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Nonetheless, the volume unintentionally leaves the reader with a distinct impression that in Africa we are at best novices. The former colonial powers and the "settler states," whose involvement in African affairs is long and deep, have at their disposal much more substantial security forces than ours.

In South Africa, the CIA's role is basically limited to maintaining liaison with the dreaded and efficient secret police organization BOSS. Until 1974, a similar relationship existed in Mozambique and Angola with Salazar's brutal PIDE.

The French are well-ensconced in most of their former colonies, indeed to the extent that the term "covert" hardly applies to their operations. Foreign Legion brigades, stationed locally, prop up the rule of more than one African dictator. SDECE, the French security service, maintains cadres to recruit and supply mercenary armies at short notice. It has also proved itself demonstrably efficient in arranging for the removal of undesirable politicians, to wit the recent fate of Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa. The conclusion is inescapable that, in Africa, the CIA operates, on the whole, at the sufferance of the European and "settler state" security forces: They, in short, call most of the shots.

Apparently to avoid excessive dependence on them, the CIA has, as related in several articles, engaged in a major effort of its own to build bridges to promising future African political leaders. Most of this activity is "soft-core," relatively inoffensive in and of itself. It includes sponsorship of training institutes for union organizers; the provision of research support of various kinds, payments for trips abroad, and the award of scholarships. The agency has also endeavored, apparently with indifferent success, to recruit both prominent black Americans and "academic liberals" for use as fronts and contact men with African politicians. Such efforts have the unfortunate effect of casting doubt on the general credibility of U.S. scholars. Let it be added, however, that the same reproach can be made with regard to one of the articles in the volume. It stigmatizes several U.S. Africanists with CIA associations without producing a shred of evidence to support such charges and merely because, to the author, the topics of their investigations appeared to be suspect.

What, then, is the CIA actually up to in Africa? If John Stockwell is to be believed, even the agency itself does not know the answer.

His book, a history of our ill-fated Angolan intervention, presents the first "case study" of a CIA operation. It explains thoroughly and in gripping detail why it was launched, how it was handled, and what became of it.

The CIA got involved, he tells us,

because Henry Kissinger decided in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle that the United States would not hand the Soviets any more easy victories. Thus, in Angola, due for independence in October 1975, we were to oppose the formation of a government by the MPLA, which had received military assistance from various Soviet bloc nations. The purpose of the operation was to build up the political and military power of two competing factions, each replete with "revolutionary" leadership and a rag-tag army. Our aid was to be given in quantities sufficient for them to stave off the MPLA rather than defeat it. The Kissinger policy had, in short, a "no-win" rationale; it was conceived as a holding action. Neither Stockwell nor his CIA associates expected the Angola operation to be anything but a failure.

The actual results were even worse. By pumping vast quantities of money and munitions into Angola, the CIA transformed a tribal dispute into a great-power confrontation involving surrogate warfare and costing tens of thousands of African lives. As for the "Marxism" of the MPLA, it has not, as Stockwell points out (and as reported in "Fortune" magazine two weeks ago!) prevented it from cultivating good working relationships with U.S. corporations, Gulf Oil above all. The royalties of the latter to the MPLA, now the recognized government of Angola, exceed by five times the amounts the CIA paid out to its opponents! The intervention, it seems, was completely unnecessary. It can be said to have benefited only the likes of the French/SDECE mercenary Bob Denard, who collected payment of \$500,000 for the recruitment of a phantom army.

In *The Search for the 'Manchurian Candidate': The CIA and Mind Control*, John Marks, writing from material made available under the Freedom of Information Act, exposes another episode in its history which the CIA would just as soon have us forget: the experimentation of the 1950s and early 1960s with techniques of behavior modification. The effort included both work in the lab (on-site as well as at various universities) and in the field. It ran the gamut from the psychological (hypnosis and electro-shock therapy), through the pharmacological (peyote, LSD, etc.) to the sexual. CIA researchers, according to Marks, hoped, first, to develop some kind of "truth

serum" and, ultimately, the power to command agents to act like robots.

Some of the experiments were simply ludicrous. To test the uses of sex as a "truth serum," a "crash-pad" was set up in San Francisco's "Beatnik-land." Prostitutes were recruited to lure to it unwary derelicts, flakes, and conventioners. Once there, they would be plied with booze and dope, then enticed into bed, while CIA operatives, note pads in hand, observed "the action" through strategically placed peepholes and one-way mirrors. On the basis of these observations, the CIA rejected the idea that a man could be forced to tell the truth by an agonizing prolongation of the approach to the moment of sexual climax — here, apparently, finding corroboration for the intelligence adage that a man undergoing torture will say almost anything. It concluded instead that because "rapport" had to be achieved between prostitute-recruit and "target," the best time to begin questioning was over the post-coital cigarette.

Other operations had far more chilling consequences. The agency's lavish funding of LSD research spread knowledge of the drug from the laboratory to the academic community, from which it soon reached the teen-age public. As Marks puts it (p. 120), "No one could enter the world of psychedelics without first passing, unaware, through doors opened by the agency. It would be the supreme irony that the CIA's enormous search for weapons among drugs — fueled by the hopes that spies could, like Dr. Frankenstein, control life with genius and machines — would wind up helping to create the wandering, uncontrollable minds of the counterculture."

The CIA now dismisses its mind-control experimentation as the unfortunate work of "rotten apples" — a few dirty-minded Boy Scouts and the occasional Strangelove on the staff — offering assurances that nothing similar is still underfoot. But how does one know for sure? And what dangers lurk if all access to information concerning its operations is restricted?

Those who argue that the national security requires giving free rein to the CIA tell us that the agency is demoralized. The accusing finger is pointed directly at Agee, and others, for providing "Yellow Page" listings of operatives. But CIA stations have long existed in a gray, semi-secret *demimonde*.

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


No, the source of demoralization is the CIA's own incompetence. At least three recent chiefs of the agency — Adm. Stansfield Turner, George Bush, and James Schlesinger — have attempted to deal with it through large-scale dismissals in the "covert action" branch. The public has got wind of the problem through the CIA's repeated failures — by this time endemic — to provide the president with timely warnings of the major political and military events of the past 30 years.

What the books by Snepp, Agee and his group, Stockwell, and Marks reveal is that the CIA has, and is, intervening in the social and political processes of a world it fundamentally does not understand, on the basis of a rationale which has long outlived its usefulness, often with consequences it cannot foresee, and with a refusal to make amends.

The national security may well indeed require not loosening the public reins on the CIA but tightening them.

*John Gillingham teaches history at UMSL and is a Fellow at the Center for International Studies there.*



Workers man consoles in the operations center of the CIA's headquarters. This is the central gathering point for information transmitted to the CIA daily from agents around the world.

## More CIA Censorship

The CIA seems to be taking full advantage of its new court-affirmed power to censor.

CIA officials have stalled the printing of a book, called "Ropes of Sand — America's Failure in the Middle East," in order to review those passages that deal with the agency.

Interestingly, the book was written by a man who may never have been a CIA employee and who may not have signed the CIA employment contract requiring pre-publication review.

Wilbur Eveland, the author, says he never formally joined the agency. He was detached from the staff of the National Security Council at the White House to serve as the late CIA director Allen Dulles' principal representative in the Middle East in the late 1950s.

Mr. Eveland says he doesn't even remember signing a promise to submit his writings for approval before publication. Of course, it should be easy for the CIA to prove he did sign the contract just by producing a copy of it, something Mr. Eveland has asked the agency to do. But, alas, the CIA says its secrecy agreement is itself too secret to reveal — at least for now.

The Eveland case confirms our worst fears about the implications of February's U.S. Supreme Court decision in a case involving former CIA officer Frank W. Snepp.

The court ruled against Mr. Snepp for failing to get CIA clearance before publishing his book, "Decent Interval," as he had agreed to do by contract. The book contained no classified information.

That decision gave the government too much power to restrict the release of any information by employees and former employees.

Further, the decision was written so broadly it could presumably be used to censor anyone who had access to classified sources and materials of any government agency. Its language suggested that the contract wasn't even necessary for the CIA to try to stop publication of Mr. Snepp's book.

As Mr. Eveland has discovered, the CIA now thinks it has the right to override an author's freedom of speech and to exercise prior restraint under the most dubious of circumstances.

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CIA and Universities

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


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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
23 APRIL 1980

## *Today's News In the Region*

### **William and Mary Covert Operations**



*The student newspaper at the College of William and Mary obtained documents showing the CIA monitored activities on campus during the late '60s and early '70s.*

Documents obtained by the student newspaper at the College of William and Mary show the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a covert information-gathering operation on the college campus during the turbulent late 1960s and early 1970s.

CIA files obtained by the newspaper, the Flat Hat, under the Freedom of Information Act show that an unidentified informant regularly reported to the CIA on "dissident" activities and incidents on campus.

The Flat Hat quoted an unidentified CIA employee as saying the agency's activities at William and Mary were part of "Project Resistance" and the companion "Merrimac" operation — nationwide efforts to monitor extremist activity.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 7NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
22 April 1980

# Rip cloak off CIA's Columbia U research

By JAMES SCHACHTER  
and SHERYL MCCARTHY

The Central Intelligence Agency apparently conducted research projects at Columbia University in the 1950s and 1960s, employing the services of university faculty and students and sometimes using supposedly independent organizations as fronts for CIA funding. In most cases, the faculty and students were unaware that they were working for the intelligence agency, and that a CIA employee served as director of one of the projects.

These disclosures were culled from thousands of pages of CIA documents that were recently obtained by Columbia students under the Freedom of Information Act. They appear in a current series of articles in the Columbia Daily Spectator, the student newspaper, and paint a fuller picture of the extent of CIA covert and overt activities at the university than had previously been disclosed.

A Columbia spokesman described the recent disclosures as "interesting," and noted that in 1978 the University Senate adopted guidelines designed to prevent such clandestine use of university resources by outside groups. He would not comment on the specific allegations.

Issuance of the guidelines followed the CIA disclosure in 1977 that Columbia was one of 86 institutions where secret research in mind control techniques was conducted between 1953 and 1964. The guidelines require

that all organizations who wish to fund programs, recruit students, engage in consulting activities at the university or use the university's name must do so openly and must identify the source of their funds.

## 'We've taken action'

"What I'm saying is that we've taken action to deal with this kind of thing," the spokesman said yesterday.

The documents reportedly reveal:

That from 1956 to 1969 Thad Alton, a CIA employee, directed the National Incomes Project on Eastern Europe in Columbia's School of International Affairs. Financed by a \$535,000 grant from the CIA, the project involved doctoral and post-doctoral students in a study of the economic development of Eastern European countries after World War II.

In 1967, university officials publicly revealed the CIA's sponsorship of the project, but even then university officials may not have known that the project was "under agency control and headed by an agency employee," as one recently acquired CIA document indicates.

In 1957 and 1958, the CIA financed research into trends in modern scientific breakthroughs at Teachers College, an affiliate of Columbia. The agency gave \$4,000 fellowships to each of five doctoral students, who were told that the grants were from the Office of Naval Research. But the documents show that the Teachers College professor who solicited the grants knew they were from the CIA.

A sixth student involved in the project, Robert

Scidmore, was identified in the documents as a CIA employee. The project was part of a larger CIA investigation into Soviet scientific developments.

The documents show further that in 1952 the CIA used the National Science Foundation, a major research and educational organization, as a cover to channel a \$40,000 research grant to Columbia. The money was used to fund the development of a Russian-English scientific dictionary. The documents show that the dictionary was needed by the CIA to help the agency interpret Soviet scientific developments.

The CIA also paid \$3,000 to Columbia's Neuropsychiatric Institute at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital to finance a study on Hungarian refugees. The exact nature of the study was not revealed, but the money was channeled to the university through the Human Ecology Fund, an organization that has been revealed by a U.S. Senate committee as being the cover agency through which the CIA financed mind control studies in the 1950s and '60s.

The Columbia studies resulted in published books, articles and reports, none of them classified materials, although Scidmore's report on the Teachers College project became classified. But the material was helpful to the CIA in its own activities.

The articles also reveal that in 1977 a Columbia graduate, then a CIA employee, visited the campus to secretly recruit promising students to become foreign language specialists for the agency. The CIA employee talked with two department heads and received the names of three students from one of them.

THE FLAT HAT  
College of William & Mary  
18 April 1980

# THE CIA ON CAMPUS: 1969-1971

## File Reveals 'Project Resistance' Operation at W&M

by Jennifer McBride

Flat Hat Asst. News Editor

The Central Intelligence Agency conducted a covert information-gathering operation on the William and Mary campus in the late 1960s and early 1970s, according to an agency file recently obtained by The Flat Hat. The file which the newspaper had sought for two years under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) shows that an unidentified informant made regular reports to the CIA on "dissident" activities and what he perceived as threatening radicalism at the College.

The CIA's activities here were part of PROJECT RESISTANCE (and a companion program, MERRIMAC), a national effort "to monitor extremist activity against the agency," explained an employee of the agency's Information and Privacy Division who asked to remain anonymous. The CIA feared that "someone was trying to overthrow the government" and that dissident student groups might be supported by Communists, he claimed. The employee conceded that in retrospect, most student activism "did not pose a threat" to national security.

More specifically, PROJECT RESISTANCE aimed at "predicting violence or harassment that might affect agency recruiters on campus," said Cathy Pherson, an employee in CIA's public relations. This came in the aftermath of a 1968 bombing of the agency's recruiting office at the University of Michigan. Pherson said that the CIA acted under pressure from the White House and "if we're guilty of anything it's of following orders." She also noted that vague wording in the CIA Charter left some doubt as to what the agency could or could not legally do.

Such an explanation of the CIA presence is "far-fetched," responded J. Wilford Lambert, vice president of student affairs during the activist period. Lambert said that if he had known that a CIA informant operated on campus he would simply have told the agency "We are not aware of a need for your services."

The existence of the file vindicates several faculty members and student leaders who were scoffed at for believing that they were being watched.

"This is proof that even paranoids have enemies," commented Professor of History Edward Crapol as he examined a copy of the file. While almost no one contacted by The Flat Hat expressed disbelief at the CIA's

actions, Nancy Terrill, president of the SA in 1969-70 said that "the lack of surprise doesn't lessen the anger."

Substantial portions of the file (including one five-page general assessment of William and Mary) have been blacked out by the CIA. The agency claimed exemptions under the FOIA which permit the withholding of information related to national security and the protection of the CIA's sources and methods. In addition, names of suspect professors were withheld because their release would constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

CIA officials were reluctant to discuss the details of PROJECT RESISTANCE with The Flat Hat. The anonymous employee pointed out that the FOIA merely requires the agency to furnish documents, not to provide interpretations or draw inferences from the material.

The report estimated the 1970 radical population at William and Mary to include ten professors, and less than 200 students out of a student body of 3,800. The activities of the campus "dissident" group SAM, Student Action Movement (which according to the informant had the active support of three or four "weirdo professors" along with tacit backing of others), are outlined for late 1969 and early 1970. "Attachments" to the CIA file include a warning about draft board strangulation, a list of demands made by students at

the College in a "peace action strike" which followed Kent State, and a letter from a Student Association president addressed to Dean Lambert.

Noteworthy events at the College in April 1970 were several fires (one set to a state-owned vehicle), "almost daily" telephone fire and bomb threats made to the College switchboard, verbal threats of use of bombings and Molotov cocktails received by the president, student pickets, and two sit-ins. Lambert seriously questioned the accuracy of the report, saying that he cannot recall several of the fires and that he "would have known about it if the switchboard had received daily threats."

Carson Barnes, former dean of students, and according to the file, "the center of resistance to the radical left," does remember that "several fires of a highly suspicious nature were set" and that the State Fire Marshal was called to investigate. However, he does not know whether two students apprehended in the case were known sympathizers of the dissidents.

The informant concluded his April 1970 analysis by predicting that "the College of William and Mary will undergo severe ferment and disorder in the coming year regardless of the national scene because the radical elements control most student functions." The Student Government Association and The Flat Hat were cited as major culprits.

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Nancy Terrill, described the forecast as "amazing and ironic." Instead of a severe ferment, "a general malaise" took over the campus in the fall of 1970, she said. Students sensed that "nobody was listening, that we were going nowhere."

Winn Legerton, SA president 1970-1971, objected to the CIA's portrayal of student protests as part of a cohesive force when she saw them more as "individual actions in different groupings."

David Jones, professor of philosophy and by his own admission, probably one of the CIA's "weirdo professors," said that the "severe ferment" statement and the general threat mentality pervasive in the report indicate that the "informant was trying to justify his salary." The typical William and Mary protest was respectful and low-key (such as a silent peace vigil), in keeping with the conservative background of the students. In addition, Jones noted that student activism here was directed more at loosening women's curfews and dress codes than at protesting the Vietnam War.

An exception to this occurred in November 1969 when several students collected signatures on anti-war petitions at the Williamsburg Shopping Center. They were confronted by two barbers from Zuzma's barbershop who questioned their patriotism, then proceeded to hit them and tear up their petitions. At one time during the dissident era, Jones, a member of the American Civil Liberties Union, suspected that his phone was tapped and that his mail was being opened. A friend on the police force advised him that "the spooks were after him."

Jones and other dissenters were almost certain that an intelligence agency was spying on campus, although at the time, most believed that it was the FBI or Army intelligence. They presumed that the CIA limited its activities to foreign countries, as is called for in its charter. Crapol says that "it was a standard joke at meetings — to try to figure out who the FBI man was."

Sometimes this was not difficult. Jones recalled one draft counseling session where a

man dressed in a grey suit — with a pair of handcuffs partially hanging out of his pocket — sat in the back row. When asked to identify himself, the man neither spoke nor moved.

Jones started draft counseling on campus not as an attempt to force students to make a certain moral judgment on the war, but rather to "inform them of their rights and options under the Selective Service Act." Most people who came in sought some "gimmick in our bag of tricks" to defer them, Jones said. For example, some people would ask if their hemorrhoids would get them exempted.

Although Jones was already a tenured member of the faculty in the spring of 1969, his contract — along with one other faculty member's — was withheld because President Paschall felt that he may have unduly influenced a sophomore cadet to resign from ROTC. The contracts were issued after the faculty showed a decisive negative reaction to Paschall's tactic.

Other information contained in the file indicates that the CIA informant was a person closely connected with the College administration. Specifically, a copy of a May 1970 letter that SA President Legerton wrote to Lambert appeared with the CIA documents. The letter advised Lambert that several groups — including the Committee for a New Congress, the Draft Counseling Committee, and the Committee on Peace Action Coordination — would have access to the Student Association Office in the Campus Center over the summer.

Lambert strongly denied that he passed Legerton's letter to the CIA and noted that it could have been leaked by any of seven other administrators who also received copies. Barnes, one of the seven, believes that the letter was provided to the CIA by someone outside the administration who obtained a copy from Legerton.

Very few persons contacted by The Flat Hat could even remember the New Congress or Peace Action Committees mentioned in Legerton's letter. By contrast, the events of a "dorm-in" sponsored in November 1970 by SAM are vividly recalled. Female students visited in male dorms in defiance of College policy, and Barnes was given responsibility for dealing with the protest. Lambert said that the President had not consulted him regarding appropriate response to the "dorm-in" and that he had heard about it over the campus radio.

One sentence from the CIA report on the event commands special attention:

The informant said that females are prohibited by regulation from entering male dormitories and that during this visit in the various deans of the College had made inspections of the dormitories, identified persons involved and "cleared them out as we went along."

One possible reading of the sentence is that the "we" refers to the deans, that the informant was present during the dorm-in, and that he counted himself among the "we" of the sentence. The unidentified CIA official said that "a reasonable inference could be drawn that the informant was a dean or assistant dean at the College."

Crapol said that in view of Barnes's strong opposition to the liberalizing movement and his attacks on faculty and students one could make "a reasonable inference that it was Barnes himself." Other sources speculate that the informer may have been an assistant to Barnes.

Barnes denied that he had any contact with the CIA. He pointed out that the wording of the quotation does not represent typical language for a dean and more importantly that the information is inaccurate. Students were not actually cleared out, he said, but were read a statement informing them that they were violating college regulations and that they had ten minutes to comply, under pain of suspension.

The event stirred considerable community attention and Barnes incorporated it into an unusual analogy in a speech before the Williamsburg Kiwanis Club a few weeks later.

Last week you had head football coach Lous Holtz for your speaker. He had a losing record of 3-7 this season. Most of you know I suspended ten students about a month ago and all ten are still on campus. Therefore, I should remind you that my record is 0-10 so far and the season is not yet over.

Barnes went on to comment that the "inaccurate, unethical, and misleading" Flat Hat could get no worse "although it seeks to disprove this week by week."

The speech further alienated Barnes from the College community. Barnes said that in the end he "was given another job," as Director of the Office of Special Programs and that this "was probably a good thing." He maintained that he had been "thrust in the middle" between overly restrictive regulations and students who clamored for quick changes. He said that he "daily" felt as if he was doing someone else's dirty work in the often "arbitrary, capricious activity" of enforcing curfew rules.

Crapol however perceived Barnes not to be reluctantly enforcing severe social regulations but to be pursuing his job "with a good deal of vigor and enthusiasm."

Crapol said that it is "constructive" for The Flat Hat to "rake over the coals" and inform the college community of CIA activities such as PROJECT RESISTANCE. He declared that "spying or prying is an anathema" and pointed to "the paradox that an agency supposedly protecting our liberty is actually subverting it." Crapol is particularly disturbed at the file's presumption that "there is an orthodoxy, an accepted standard to which every American should adhere."

He suggested that a good slogan for the "American Empire" would be that "the sun never sets on the activities of the CIA." Although the agency claims that PROJECT RESISTANCE was terminated in 1974, Crapol believes that the CIA "is still at the same games." He is worried about moves in Congress which he believes will restore greater

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


power to the CIA and limit the number of Congressional committees with oversight responsibilities for the agency. Douglas Rendleman, professor of law at Marshall-Wythe School of Law also sees problems with S.2284, the Senate National Intelligence Act of 1980. Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, he pointed out that the bill as currently written does not guarantee the integrity and independence of higher education and does not prohibit certain activities (such as covert information-gathering and covert recruitment) which clearly violate the moral standards of a university.

Crapol said that the idea of a CIA presence at William and Mary "grows more horrendous" the longer that one thinks about it, but he said that the informant himself is "a sad or rather pathetic figure."

Terrill simply said, "it sounds like Nixon."



Former Dean of Men Carson H. Barnes is shown above with other deans patrolling a men's dorm on the day of the 1970 dorm in. Barnes was described as "intelligent, capable, perceptive and most importantly accurate" in the CIA summary of an anonymous informant's reports. Barnes denied knowledge of the CIA's activities.



Jacobson photo


Ed Crapol, Professor of History.



Jacobson photo

David Jones, Professor of Philosophy.

Professors Crapol and Jones were probably among the 10 professors identified as supporters of the radical left by the CIA file.



One of the biggest threats perceived by the CIA was the Student Action Movement (SAM) shown above at an infor

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CIA STUDIES/ESTIMATES

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-7

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 APRIL 1980

## Soviet Officials Get Entangled In Their Tape

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 21 — The difference between the Soviet Union today and the Soviet Union under Stalin, a Russian poet remarked recently, is confusion: What Stalin wanted happened. Today the vast Soviet bureaucracy often pursues contradictory aims.

Hakan Nilsson, the correspondent here for Swedish Television and Radio, discovered the meaning of this observation recently when he was suddenly in deep trouble with one bureau for visiting a "forbidden zone" to which another bureau had taken him.

Seeking an account of the situation of Soviet women, Mr. Nilsson, who arrived in Moscow only a few months ago, wanted to film an ordinary Soviet woman at work, at home and at the daily ordeal of shopping.

Even such innocuous projects can be undertaken only through official channels, so Mr. Nilsson asked the State Radio and Television Committee to pick an "ordinary" woman for him and arrange permission for the filming.

Weeks went by. Finally a letter came granting permission. The authorities designated a hairdresser who had won several competitions for work in her field at her typical Soviet salon, a shabby place in central Moscow.

### Approval From the Top

Mr. Nilsson was told that the letter had been signed by the head of the State Radio and Television Committee himself. It authorized Mr. Nilsson to begin work with the help of an employee of the committee, a Comrade Vamba Kapp, who showed up when Mr. Nilsson and his Soviet cameraman were ready to begin shooting certain segments.

The hairdresser, meanwhile, was surprised but delighted by this sign of official confidence in her work. She and her husband readied their eighth-floor apartment in a high-rise building at Khimki, just outside the Moscow limits on the way to Sheremetyevo Airport, for that part of the visit. She and Mr. Nilsson met at the salon.

The hairdresser looked radiant. Mr. Nilsson said, "We finished filming in the shop and then decided to put off filming on the shopping expedition for the next day, "and go to her apartment for some footage there. The Soviet cameraman and Mr. Kapp came with me, and we spent awhile talking with her husband, with their daughter and admiring their apartment.

### 'There Was a Knock on the Door'

"Then," he went on, "there was a knock on the door. It appeared to be the police and they asked the woman to come out in the corridor to speak with them. I asked what was wrong but they didn't give me any answer."

"An hour or so went by and a plain-clothesman told the hairdresser to ask me for my accreditation card. I wanted to speak to him myself, so he and I exchanged our identification papers, and I asked what was wrong — was my car parked improperly? He gave no answer."

"He asked me to please just stay put for another half hour," Mr. Nilsson added. "I said I wouldn't unless he told me why, and I started to go out to my car — I had to go back to my office. Suddenly the elevators, which had been running perfectly, were said to be out of order. I walked down the stairs, but policemen tried to stop me at the car and said I had to wait and sign a protocol."

"Why?" Mr. Nilsson asked. "You are on forbidden territory," was the answer. In the end, he waited, signed and left.

The policeman, meanwhile, was pointing to a factory behind a red brick wall just behind the apartment building, saying: "Khimki is closed to foreigners — and look, he can film that plant right out the window."

### Neighbors Whisper of 'Spies'

Neighbors started whispering about spies. Mr. Nilsson's escort from the State Radio and Television Committee grew paler.

None of the maintenance staff of the apartment building knew that they lived in a closed area and no one knew what the factory did. Mr. Nilsson, now completely confused, got back to Moscow and asked an American what had happened.

"The Soviet Foreign Ministry told me I could drive anywhere within 25 miles of Moscow," he said. "And they didn't tell me there were any forbidden zones."

In past instances the Foreign Ministry has referred Western correspondents for information about these matters to a map of the Moscow area published by the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington.



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE D-3

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 APRIL 1980

## Big Drop Cited In Iranian Oil

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 21 — Iran's production of crude oil, hampered by maintenance problems and sabotage, has fallen from a level of six million barrels a day before the revolution to less than 2.5 million barrels a day, according to the latest American intelligence reports.

Continued failure by the Iranians to maintain oil pumping and processing equipment, and new incidents of sabotage, could reduce the flow still further, eventually depriving Iran of export income considered critical to its economy, American officials said.

Iran's income from oil exports, according to analysts, has already fallen to \$48 million a day. The recent refusal by Japan to purchase Iranian oil at \$35 a barrel, an increase of \$2.50, threatens to cut that income by half because Japan had been buying nearly half of Iran's daily export of 1.5 million barrels, officials said.

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ON PAGE 12

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
22 April 1980

# WHY SOVIET BREADBASKET IS NEVER FULL

*Richard Critchfield has spent more than a decade tracking village and farm developments throughout the third world. Here is his personal view of the sluggish Soviet food machine.*

**By Richard Critchfield**  
Special to  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Why can't the Soviet Union feed itself?

Just over 300 million acres planted in grain isn't enough for 260 million Russians.

Yet 110 million Japanese grow enough rice on 7.5 million acres; 660 million Indians manage on 350 million acres; the Chinese, pushing a billion, haven't increased food imports proportionately in 10 years; and Americans, with about 390 million acres, feed themselves and a good many of the third world's cities, too.

More than \$500 billion has been pumped into Russian agriculture over the past 15 years. It remains an unpredictable mess.

Last year's disappointing 179 million-ton grain harvest is far below the 222 million tons the Russians produced way back in 1973-74. Russia hoped to import 34 million tons this year, much more than any country has ever imported. (India, in the bad monsoon years of 1966 and '67, before its own green revolution, imported only 10 million tons each year.)

The Carter administration, hoping to take advantage of this dependency, cut off US grain shipments to the Soviets after they invaded Afghanistan. But the punitive measures will likely have little effect.

The Soviets are finding other countries, notably Argentina, willing to fill their breadbasket to pre-embargo levels.

Still the question lingers: What is wrong with Russian agriculture? First, nature has not been particularly helpful. Large areas of the Soviet Union are subject to five-year cycles of frost and drought. There's low rainfall and a short growing season.

These won't change even if, miraculously, Russian farming becomes more efficient. But most experts feel Russia's shortage of well-watered, warm, and fertile land could be overcome with up-to-date farm science.

So second, there is technology. In a recent paper entitled "Marx Was a City Boy," Lester Brown of Washington's Worldwatch Institute says that until the mid-1930s Russia and Eastern Europe exported 5 million tons of grain a year, the same as North America did. From about 1935 on, thanks to new seeds, irrigation, mechanization, and the massive use of fertilizer, American agricultural production took off.

The Soviets do have some of the latest farm technology, such as tractors, combines, and mineral fertilizers. But a cumbersome and inflexible management system hampers their efforts to get it to the right place on time. Experts say that little of the irrigation-based tropical farm technology that has benefited India and China since the 1960s fits the rain-fed, colder Russian environment.

Third, as Mr. Brown and others are starting to suggest, the Russians can blame Marxism-Leninism for their farming failure. Karl Marx, a German who worked out of a London library, had a strange hatred of peasant villagers. He described them as "a class that represents the barbarism within civilization."

He went on to describe the peasant as "clumsily cunning, knavishly naive, doltishly sublime, a calculated superstition, a pathetic burlesque, a cleverly stupid anachronism."

Lenin was shrewder. He took Marx's theory of internal proletarian revolution and transformed it into global class warfare between the West and East. But 70 to 80 percent of the East's people were and still are peasant farmers.

Lenin's technique — familiar from Vietnam — was to win over peasants by promising them land and playing on resentments of foreign domination. First, you promised "land to the tillers." Second, you actually carried out land reform. Third, you formed agricultural cooperatives on an ever-bigger scale. Fourth, you took the land away and made it the property of the state. Last, you forced the peasants to work harder for less return so you had the savings to industrialize rapidly.

Lenin, who gave farmers plenty of machines before

CONTINUED

gradually bringing them into socialism and communism, was able to carry out only the first three steps before he passed on.

In Russia this ended up with today's *sovkhozes*, huge mechanized farms worked by squads of men and women who have no other tie to the land. There are also *kolkhozes*, collective grain farms.

State and collective farm members (as well as many urban workers) now work some 32 million private plots. They produce about one-third of the Soviet Union's meat, milk, eggs, and potatoes.

\* \* \* \* \*

For those sitting in the Kremlin just now, watching the green revolution of modern farm science defeat the old red Marxist-Leninist kind of revolution in country after country in Asia, and seeing Russian industry in serious trouble and oil running out (the CIA estimates the Soviet Union will be forced to import 700,000 barrels a day by 1985), the problems just ahead must seem staggering.

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Iran

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE UA-19THE WASHINGTON POST  
24 April 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

# CIA: Boycott Could Bring Down Iran

The Central Intelligence Agency has determined that Iran can be brought to its knees "within a matter of weeks" if U.S. allies will agree to boycott the country. It is possible such a move would secure release of the hostages in Tehran.

Iran's supposed oil stranglehold on Western Europe and Japan is actually no more than a minor inconvenience, the CIA has reported. Japan's and Europe's need for Iranian oil is far less than Iran's need for foodstuffs bought on credit.

Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council insist that Iran is self-sufficient, but this is hogwash. Iran must still import vast quantities of food, and many of the countries that supply the food are not particularly friendly to the Iranian government. They are likely to cut off credit any day, according to intelligence sources.

What makes matters worse, from the Iranians' point of view, is that the country's food imports depend on its oil exports — and many big oil customers don't need Iranian oil just now.

Iran's biggest oil customer had been Japan, which imported 520,000 barrels a day. But what the ayatollah apparently didn't realize is that Japan has been buying oil from other producers to the point it could last more than 110 days if it didn't get another drop of petroleum from any source.

Another big Iranian customer, West Germany, has stockpiled enough oil to last three months, according to CIA sources. In fact, Germany, Japan, France and Italy are now getting a total of 1.4 million barrels of oil a day

above their normal consumption.

As a measure of Iran's sticky situation on oil prices, an apparently unconcerned Japan rejected Iran's recent price hike of \$2.50 a barrel — and was cut off.

The important point is that Iran's economy depends on oil exports. Iran must sell 1.6 million barrels a day just to stay alive — and most sales are to U.S. allies, according to intelligence analysts.

"There's no way they could buy adequate amounts of food if credit isn't extended," a CIA analyst told my associate Dale Van Atta. In fact, he said, a boycott of Iranian oil would "bring Iran to its knees in less than two months unless they get charity from Arab countries."

What puts Khomeini in such a vulnerable position — undeniable even by the Arab oil moguls — is that there is now a worldwide glut of oil. The surplus hasn't brought any price reductions, but it does give Iran far less clout in its dealings with the nations that buy Iranian oil. It's not a buyer's market as far as price is concerned, but the oil-consuming industrial nations don't have to fear ruination from a cutoff of Iranian oil supplies.

Even the oil producing countries' chief spokesman, Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Arabian oil minister, recently admitted as much in a little-publicized speech in London.

"Many of the energy problems from which the world is suffering today did not result from a shortage of supplies," he said. "Energy supplies, particularly petroleum, have always been more than adequate. This was true

through 1979. An observer has only to look a little carefully at the oil stocks hoarded in extraordinarily large quantities in the consuming countries to see this for himself."

Yamani added: "The free world's oil supplies in 1979 increased 4 percent over 1978 despite the fact that one of the major Middle Eastern oil-producing countries [Iran] reduced its production that year."

In other words, as expert sources have concluded, the circumstances couldn't be better for a squeeze on Iran.

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ON PAGE 53-54

THE BOSTON GLOBE  
23 April 1980

## Princess Ashraf Pahlevi

# 'If I fight now, who will hear me?'

By Marian Christy  
Globe Staff

NEW YORK — Princess Ashraf Pahlevi, the twin sister of the deposed Shah of Iran, is twirling a long cigarette in the slender fingers of her right hand — a cigarette she never lights, a cigarette that is a kind of sophisticated worry bead that brings no comfort.

The princess is, by her own word, "miserable." The dramatic mood expressed in an interview at her residence here is made melodramatic by the high-backed, throne-like seat on which the princess sits. It is a white upholstered chair covered with giant black roses. Unwittingly, it is unhappy symbolism. When the shah ruled Iran, red roses were the country's state flower and signature. Now the roses on which the princess rests are black. So is the princess' mood.

\* \* \*

Princess Ashraf believes that Khomeini is not so much in charge of Iran as he claims to be. She says that Khomeini has built a framework for a Communist regime. She also says that in 1963 Khomeini was the man behind a wave of "riots and fires" in Tehran and that he was condemned to death by the shah. Ironically, a highly placed member of the Islamic clergy made a direct appeal to the shah who gave Khomeini the title "ayatollah" (bishop), which prevented the death sentence. Ayatollahs cannot be put to death in Iran and, as the

princess tells it, "Khomeini was promoted to save his head." Khomeini was then exiled to Paris where he plotted the overthrow of the shah. "If my brother, the shah, was the animal he is painted to be in the press," the princess says, "Khomeini would be dead." She also says that SAVAK, the Iranian secret police, was a "cooperative effort" with the American government and that SAVAK's bosses were trained by the CIA. Why? "To hold the line against Communist infiltration."

Princess Ashraf does not mask her bitterness. It shows on her face and comes in loud and clear in this interview. She abhors the fact that American politicians, particularly President Carter, have disassociated themselves from the shah, the man they had supported for decades. There are clashing views on how much loyalty the United States owes a former ally, Iran. It's obvious that Princess Ashraf thinks the friendship extended is minimal compared to the needs.

Is Henry Kissinger a friend of the shah?

"Friend?" she says, icicles in her voice. "How has Henry Kissinger been helpful to my brother? Oh yes, he spoke of the long-term friendship between the United States and Iran in speeches but he never went to see my brother in the hospital. Nancy Kissinger came once."

Is David Rockefeller a friend of the shah?

"He has helped find schools for the children. And he helped in our traveling plans. But that is it."

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 5THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
21 April 1980

# Public favors action on Iran; US seeks Mideast bases

## Majority in polls back blockade or rescue attempt

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Although polls now show a slight majority of Americans favor military action against Iran, voices in the nation's civilian and military leaderships are warning of the possible consequences.

More than half of the Americans asked by the Washington Post and the Harris-ABC News survey recently said they supported unspecified military action against Iran if the American hostages were not freed. President Carter has indicated military options may be used if trade and other economic sanctions fail, and if US allies do not join these sanctions.

Fifty-five percent of 1,873 people asked by the Post said "yes" to the proposition that the United States should set a deadline for return of the hostages and take military action if it is not met. Thirty percent, however, favored no military action, no matter how long the hostages are held.

An earlier Harris-ABC News poll, conducted just before the President's nonmilitary sanctions were announced, disclosed rising criticism of the President's handling of the crisis. A 51-to-39 percent majority agreed with the view that "the US should take military action against Iran, if Iran puts some of the hostages on trial as spies, even if that might endanger the lives of the hostages."

Strongest among the voices of caution has been Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D) of West Virginia, the Senate majority leader. He expressed sympathy with Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Timm, parents of a US Marine hostage, who flew to Tehran to try to see their son.

Senator Byrd warned that "it's extremely difficult to envision any direct military action to free those hostages unharmed." Speculation about it was harmful, he said. Military action might only destroy Iranian moderates who want the hostages freed and invite Soviet action. "Let's stop, look, and listen," Senator Byrd urged.

Alfred E. Kahn, the Carter administration's anti-inflation chief, warned that a naval blockade — one of the main military options the Pentagon is studying — might bring gasoline rationing "quite soon" to the US.

Mr. Kahn said this was because Japan at present imports 13 percent of its oil from Iran, meaning it could not tolerate a blockade unless the US could curb its own consumption. Cutoff of Iranian oil to Japan, he told Texas newsmen in Fort Worth, would put Japan in competition with the US and other Western industrial states for foreign oil.

Military choices for the US, according to uniformed service commanders and civilian analysts with whom this reporter has spoken, include:

- A full blockade of Iran or a naval and air "quarantine" to inspect shipping to and from Iran, before it enters the Persian Gulf or (if this is determined) tankers carrying Iranian oil away from the Gulf.

- Mining of Iran's Persian Gulf ports by air drop from US Air Force bombers, or Navy patrol planes, or Navy planes based on the two US aircraft carriers near Iran in the Arabian Sea. Some Navy professionals favor this.

- A surprise rescue of the hostages using open or, more likely, covert infiltration by US special forces troops. The Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy all have such forces.

Gen. Dan Shomron, the Israeli general who commanded the rescue of hijacked Israeli hostages from Uganda, urged April 20 in the Israeli newspaper Davar that this is feasible and possible. The proliferation of armed students, guerrillas, and other gunmen in and around the embassy compound would make it easier, General Shomron argued.

Miles Copeland, author of books on covert action in the Middle East and a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, urged in a US television panel and an interview in the Washington Star April 20 that covert forces, using if possible "Iranian helicopters" flown by Iranian pilots trained in the US (some of whom stayed behind when about 200 Iranian military trainees were expelled from the US early this month) should paralyze the embassy compound with sleep-inducing gas, then rescue the hostages.

"We have the capability," Mr. Copeland said. "It's at Ft. Bragg."

At Ft. Bragg, N.C., two US Special Forces groups, the Fifth and the Seventh, and the US Army Institute for Military Assistance, which includes a school for the "green berets" of the special forces, do train paratroop-qualified soldiers and officers for guerrilla missions.

Another Ft. Bragg organization, the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, trains men and exchanges information with visiting allied, Israeli, and other "friendly" specialists, on what a JFK Center officer describes as "unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, and civil affairs."

Though the CIA has largely lost its well-publicized covert action capabilities, the Army at Ft. Bragg (another special forces group is stationed at Ft. Devens, Mass.) has cultivated its own much less-publicized capabilities since World War II.

Mining of Iran's main Persian Gulf ports of Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, and the oil terminal installations at Kharg Island, Bandar Shahpour, and Bender Mahshahr, some seapower buffs say they believe, could be done "selectively."



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ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 APRIL 1980

# Study Finds U.S. Weak Reacting to Shah's Fall

## Lack of Policy Cited During Iran Turmoil

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

A detailed new study of the fall of the shah and the takeover of Iran by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, based on interviews with a number of key U.S. and Iranian officials, concludes that "the Carter administration had not ever really formulated a policy, established objectives, or designed tactics to deal with the Iranian crisis."

State Department policymakers who felt Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had to go "never got a single serious initiative off the ground" to guide the situation toward a desirable result, while the National Security Council "could not offer any practical alternative" to keep him or some moderate successor in power, the study says.

It was published today in *The Washington Quarterly*, which is issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. The study was written by the quarterly's editor, Michael A. Ledeen, and William H. Lewis, a professor in the George Washington University's Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies.

According to other sources, the authors interviewed Americans who played critical roles in Iranian affairs both in Washington and Tehran during the period from September 1978 until February 1979, when Khomeini returned home in triumph from exile near Paris. The authors also interviewed several Iranians involved at a high level.

But to protect their informants, the authors do not name them, nor do they give specific sources for new information or for evaluations.

The study's conclusions amount to a scathing critique of President Carter's handling of what the authors call his first crisis. They say that his administration had introduced "a more informal style of government (that) did not serve him well."

"But with the stakes so high, and the crisis so clear by the late autumn (of 1978), one would have expected some clear definition of American interest, some leadership for the foreign policy community, some instruction to his top advisers," Ledeen and Lewis write.

"This never took place," they conclude.

Their critique is expected by political observers here who are familiar with it to contribute to a gathering controversy over "Who lost Iran?" The hostage situation in Tehran has muted any political dispute so far, but it is gradually developing.

Ledeen and Lewis say that the shah was under medication for cancer during 1978 and, as a result, was "unexpectedly passive, introspective and withdrawn." Fearing potential rivals, he had eliminated anyone with authority who could make hard assessments and carry out difficult assignments.

As a result, the growing political turmoil in Iran found the shah "not likely to take strong and independent action during the crisis."

He was also deterred from action by Carter's human rights policy, the study says. State Department human rights reports implicitly condemned his regime, and the department blocked shipments of tear gas canisters that the shah wanted to deal with growing street demonstrations.

The study pictures a sharp split between the State Department and the National Security Council under Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The NSC "and Brzezinski in particular believed that the nature of the shah's regime was a distinctly secondary question" to keeping in friendly hands a country vital for U.S. interests. But the State Department, especially Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and his Iran desk officer, Henry Precht, "was eager to establish that the old Kissingerian geopolitical view of the world had been abandoned in favor of a more moralistic approach," the study says.

Other potentially important players did little, it says. Defense

Secretary Harold Brown never took a strong position, and CIA Director Stansfield Turner took cautious positions while never calling the situation desperate.

At the same time, both officials in Washington and senior diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Tehran held two important beliefs, Ledeen and Lewis say. One was that Khomeini was a moderate, "a somewhat eccentric but basically admirable dissident." The other was that moderate, Westernized members of the old National Front in the Iranian opposition would dominate any post-shah situation — not the Moslem clerics.

While Brzezinski was telephoning the shah in the autumn of 1978 with assurances of strong U.S. backing, including support for a tough military government to quell unrest, the State Department experts had concluded that the shah had outlived his usefulness, the study says.

The experts felt the shah's "continued presence was inflammatory and the only acceptable solution to the conflict in Iran was the creation of a more 'progressive' government" by National Front-type leaders.

The shah was perplexed. When he asked for cabled confirmations of Brzezinski's line, the State Department cut them off, Ledeen and Lewis write.

With Precht and the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, William H. Sullivan, taking a pessimistic line, "while Brzezinski was seeking ways to bolster the shah's resolve and demonstrate American reliability," Brzezinski cut the State Department out of most consultations, the study says. Although Vance attended White House meetings, the department was left with little more than administrative problems like evacuating American civilians from Iran.

Brzezinski wanted a high-level mission sent to Tehran to make it clear to Iranian military leaders that the United States was prepared to see force used. But this idea turned into the visit by Air Force Gen. Robert E. Huyser, which the study says had the opposite effect of obscuring any decisive steps.

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Ledeen and Lewis say it may be argued that the possible U.S. lines of action were speeding up the shah's departure so a reformist government could entrench itself against a revolution or using the iron fist. "The Carter administration did neither," they write. "It hoped for the best, and got the worst."

But in the critical last months before he left Tehran, the shah thought that the United States must have had some clever master plan. Iran had always been too important to it — as a source of oil and as the militarily most powerful ally in the region — for Washington not to know what it was doing now, the study says the shah felt.

With events largely out of his hands, and thinking "the Americans would take action to guarantee that their interests were protected," the shah opted out of the tough measures that Brzezinski was advocating, Ledeen and Lewis write.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-7NEW YORK TIMES  
20 APRIL 1980

# Washington Said to Have Weighed Backing Iranian Military in a Coup

The following article is based on reporting by Philip Taubman and Richard Burt, and was written by Mr. Taubman.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 13 — The Carter Administration attempted to lay the groundwork for a military coup in Iran in the event that the pro-Western Government appointed by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi early last year was swept aside by forces loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, according to senior Administration officials.

The rapid disintegration of Iran's military forces made the plans unworkable before they could be carried out, according to the sources, who include current and former military and foreign policy officials closely associated with the mission.

On Jan. 3, 1979, at a time when the Administration was desperately trying to rally support for the new Government, an Air Force general, Robert E. Huyser, was sent to Teheran.

In the period when planning for a coup was in progress, the situation in Iran was chaotic. The deposed Shah departed for Egypt on Jan. 11 and the Government of his handpicked Prime Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, was near collapse. With the major cities in turmoil, Ayatollah Khomeini was preparing to make a triumphant return to Teheran after years in exile.

In Washington there was confusion and deep division about how to respond to the rapidly unfolding events, according to the officials. Some Carter Administration advisers wanted the United States to help the Bakhtiar Government crush the revolution; others, including the United States Ambassador in Teheran, wanted the Administration to open communication with the Khomeini opposition. Publicly, the Administration urged the Iranian military forces to back the new civilian Government and accept the Shah's departure.

General Huyser's initial orders, the officials said, called for him to keep the military forces intact and loyal to the Government of Mr. Bakhtiar and to prevent the officers from seizing power.

At the same time, however, the White House ordered General Huyser to develop contingency plans for a coup in the event that revolutionary forces appeared to be toppling the Bakhtiar Government. In conversations with President Carter and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, General Huyser reportedly said that such a coup could be staged on short notice, the sources said.

The purpose, officials said, was to install a military government that would keep Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters from dominating Iranian politics. The future of a military regime, or of any succeeding civilian government, was not considered in detail.

By the time the Bakhtiar Government was collapsing in early February 1979, senior American officials, including General Huyser, recognized that the disintegration of the armed forces precluded any military effort to block Ayatollah Khomeini.

The mission of General Huyser has been a subject of growing interest and controversy. An article scheduled for publication this week in *The Washington Quarterly*, a periodical published by the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, concludes that he was "not well suited" to his mission and that his reports to Washington "were almost completely misleading."

Senator John G. Tower of Texas, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, called in late January for an investigation and possible hearings into the Huyser mission.

## A Lightning Rod for Criticism

The Huyser mission has served as a lightning rod for diverse criticism of Carter Administration policies in Iran during the months leading up to the assumption of power by the Islamic revolutionary forces.

One group of critics has asserted that General Huyser was sent to prevent the Iranian military from keeping the Shah in power. They maintain that when the United States should have been taking forceful action to maintain order and crush the revolution, it was using its influence, through General Huyser, to block the military from taking firm action.

Others view the Huyser mission as a symbol of a policy that kept the United States loyal to the Shah and to Prime Minister Bakhtiar long after it was clear that they no longer enjoyed popular support. If the United States had reached out to establish relations with Ayatollah Khomeini, these critics insist, later convulsions, including the taking of American hostages, might have been avoided.

Last December the Shah, in an article in a British magazine excerpted from his memoirs, said that in his view the "clear purpose" of General Huyser's visit to Teheran was to neutralize the Iranian Army so that it would not stage a coup against the Bakhtiar Government and touch off a civil war. The Shah said he did not share the American fear of action by the army.

## 'Bound by Their Oath'

"My officers were bound by their oath of allegiance to the crown and the Constitution," the Shah said in the magazine. "As long as the Constitution was respected they would not falter. But the intelligence services of NATO and the C.I.A. may have had good reason for thinking that the Constitution would be abused. It was therefore necessary to neutralize the Iranian Army. That was clearly the purpose which brought General Huyser to Teheran."

The *Washington Quarterly* article, written by Michael A. Ledeen, the periodical's editor, and William H. Lewis, a professor of political science at George Washington University, suggests that the Huyser mission reflected confusion in the Administration about how to respond to events in Iran.

The authors report that General Huyser talked with selected Iranian generals about "the long-term possibility that it might be necessary to create a military 'safety net' to prevent the country from falling into total chaos." But the article concludes that, "in reality, there was no such safety net."

## Extensive Iranian Desertions

However, in interviews, several officials close to the Huyser mission said detailed plans for a coup were developed by General Huyser and senior Iranian military leaders. The possibility of putting these plans into effect was still being explored by the State Department in the final chaotic hours of the Bakhtiar Government. At the time Iranian troops were deserting by the thousands, according to American officials who were in Teheran.

The extensive desertions, coupled with policy disagreements in Washington, turned the plans for a coup into "a pipe dream," according to the officials, and as a result the White House never gave the order for starting a coup.

A reconstruction of the Huyser mission, based on extensive interviews with key policymakers on Iranian affairs, indicates that it grew out of a proposal made in November 1978 by James R. Schlesinger, who was then Secretary of Energy. He suggested that the White House send a high-ranking official to Teheran to underscore continuing American support for the Shah.

Mr. Schlesinger, according to the official sources, wanted to propose former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for the mission, but, anticipating that President Carter would reject the idea, he suggested Mr. Brzezinski instead. Conversely, it is said, Mr. Brzezinski proposed that Mr. Schlesinger be sent.

## Deep Division in Official Ranks

At the time there was deep division in the Administration about how best to respond to events in Iran, the officials said. Mr. Brzezinski, Mr. Schlesinger and others wanted the United States to demonstrate its support for the Shah while urging him to clamp down on the insurgents. Others, primarily in the State Department, contended that the Government should open lines of communication to the opposition, including such people opposed to the Shah as Mehdi Barzargan, a future Prime Minister in the revolutionary regime, to prepare for dealing with a post-Shah Iran.

Mr. Carter, according to the officials, opted for a position in the middle, hoping that a constitutional government would take root in Iran, possibly through the administration of Mr. Bakhtiar. The Shah appointed Mr. Bakhtiar, a member of the moderate National Front opposition, to head a civilian government on Dec. 21, 1978.

At the urging of officials in the Defense Department, Mr. Carter selected General Huyser to make the special visit to Iran. The general, who had acted as an advisor to the Iranian military, was stationed in Stuttgart, West Germany, serving as deputy to Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., then Supreme Commander of North Atlantic forces.

General Haig, reportedly incensed that a military officer was being sent on what appeared to be a political mission, strongly opposed the selection of General Huyser but was overruled by Washington, the officials here said. General Haig resigned a few days later, partly to protest the Huyser mission.

On Jan. 4, 1979, the day after General Huyser arrived in Teheran, the State Department announced that he had been sent to urge calm among the military leaders and would depart for Saudi Arabia in three days. Actually the mission lasted until Feb. 2, when General Huyser left Iran for the final time.

#### Maintainance of Order

Initially, General Huyser's main job was to preserve order in the military. Concluding that the military could remain a viable force, he passed that optimistic assessment along to Washington in daily telephone conversations with the Pentagon.

General Huyser's view was not shared by the American Ambassador, William H. Sullivan. According to the official sources, Mr. Sullivan was advising Washington to open communication with Ayatollah Khomeini, then still in exile in France.

General Huyser and Ambassador Sullivan, in a kind of a two-man microcosm of the policy divisions in Washington, sometimes simultaneously, communicated their divergent assessments by telephone from the same room in the embassy, the sources said.

General Huyser was also apparently experiencing problems with Mr. Bakhtiar. Although General Huyser was in Iran at least ostensibly to keep the military loyal to the Prime Minister, the officials said Mr. Bakhtiar apparently feared that some kind of double-cross was being engineered behind the scenes. The two men met only once during the month that General Huyser was in Iran, it is said.

As the opposition to the Bakhtiar Government increased in January, General Huyser was ordered to develop plans for the coup. As part of the planning, the officials said, the United States ordered a Navy tanker to stand off the coast, presumably to supply fuel to the military in case their regular sources were cut off.

Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran on Feb. 1, 1979, and received a tumultuous welcome. General Huyser departed the next day.

On Feb. 10 the final assault by the revolutionary forces began. As the general uprising spread across Iran, Iranian troops and officers abandoned their arms and pledged loyalty to the revolution, according to officials in Iran at the time.

Any hopes for a military coup dissolved during the night as the disintegration of the forces became complete, the sources said.

One official working in the embassy that night said that Mr. Sullivan received a call from the situation room in the White House in which a State Department official asked if it was still possible to launch a coup. Mr. Sullivan is quoted as replying that it was not, followed by several expletives.

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ON PAGE 1

BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE  
20 APRIL 1980

# Firm that flew shah to Egypt had CIA links

By Ben Bradlee  
Globe Staff

Acting at the request of White House counsel Lloyd Cutler, a Providence business executive last month arranged for the deposed shah of Iran to fly from Panama to Cairo aboard an Oregon-based charter airline that has had recent ties to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Bruce G. Sundlan, president of the Outlet Co., a group broadcaster with diversified retail interests, said he arranged the shah's March 23 flight to Egypt after receiving a call from a State Department official in Washington. The official, whose name Sundlan could not remember, said he was acting on instructions from Cutler, who was in Panama at the time with White House chief of staff Hamilton Jordan.

Cutler, in a telephone interview, acknowledged initiating the charter arrangements. He said he did so on the request of the shah after a plane scheduled to be sent to Panama by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was delayed.

Cutler said he contacted the State Department operations center in Washington and left instructions to call Sundlan, an old friend who is also chairman of the board of Executive Jet Aviation Inc., a charter airline in Columbus, Ohio.

Sundlan, whose fleet of Lear jets was not capable of hauling the shah and his entourage more than 6000 miles from Panama to Egypt, instead contacted Evergreen International Airlines, a Newberg, Ore., charter company, which has had at least two links to the CIA in recent years:

- In 1975, Evergreen acquired most of the assets and many employees of Intermountain Aviation Inc., an Arizona airline officially acknowledged to have been owned and financed by the CIA.

- In addition, George Doole Jr., the man who for nearly 20 years controlled the CIA's worldwide network of secret airlines, is a paid consultant for Evergreen.

Both the CIA and Evergreen deny that the agency has any involvement with the company today.

The United States had hoped to persuade the shah to stay in Panama, fearing that his move might further complicate the hostage crisis in Iran, as well as cause difficulties for Sadat. But Cutler said he saw no conflict between that policy and helping to arrange the shah's flight from Panama.

"It was his decision that he should go to Cairo, rather than stay in Panama," Cutler said. "We urged him to stay, but once he made the decision, and asked for assistance, we complied with the request by putting him in touch with a private charter. We had no way to stop him from going. We weren't going to keep him in jail down there."

Cutler called Evergreen's ties with the CIA "very remote and past" and said he didn't learn of the connections until after the shah arrived in Egypt.

Cutler did express surprise at Evergreen's link with Doole, but cautioned against any speculation that the government wanted to choose an airline with CIA ties to fly the shah. "All of that is the purest kind of coincidence," he said.

But past or present connections between Evergreen and the CIA could serve to strengthen the hand of the Iranian militants holding Americans hostage in Tehran. The militants have sought to exploit every possible connection between the shah and the CIA, and have tried to portray the shah as a White House puppet.

Though little has been known about the US government's role in the shah's flight from Panama, officials in Washington have been concerned that Iran would view the move as an American plot designed to thwart Tehran's attempt to extradite the ex-monarch. And the shah's Evergreen charter left Panama just 24 hours before Iran's Revolutionary Council was to present Panamanian authorities with a formal extradition request.

Cutler said the United States played no role in extradition negotiations and that talks between the White House and Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr on resolution of the hostage crisis had "nothing whatsoever to do" with the shah's extradition. But in Iran, there are strong feelings that the reason the United States encouraged the shah to go to Panama in the first place, after his recuperation from surgery in the United States, was to protect him from any extradition proceedings.

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Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, Panama's strongman, is regarded in Iran as an American puppet, and his sheltering of the shah a quid pro quo for the return of the Panama Canal.

But whatever the White House role, the case of Evergreen and the shah provides a good example of the way things get done in a hurry, the way in which old networks of friends with past military and CIA connections can cooperate, unofficially, to carry out sensitive missions.

Sundlan says that after placing several phone calls to various charter airlines around the country, he got Evergreen to agree to take on the job immediately. Evergreen dispatched a 186-seat DC8 it had available in Detroit to pick up the shah in Panama.

Sundlan said it is "routine" for him to arrange flights anywhere in the world, but conceded it was unusual to be able to book a DC8 on anything less than 90 days notice. Sundlan said it was "sheer good fortune" that the Evergreen plane was available.

Sundlan, a wartime pilot in Korea who later attained the rank of colonel in the Air Force reserves, said he agreed to arrange the Evergreen flight as a personal favor to Cutler.

"I got a request from a personal friend that I've known for 25 years," Sundlan said. "The shah's name was never mentioned, though it wasn't hard to put two and two together. It was made very clear to me that this was a private charter and that the government was in no way involved."

Though Cutler's initiative blurred those two distinctions, Sundlan dismissed any questions about the propriety of the lawyer's request, given the situation in Tehran. "I'm flying airplanes, not making political decisions," he said. "I've known Lloyd Cutler long enough and well enough that if he asks me to do something, I'll do it. I have the greatest respect for him."

Sundlan would not comment on the cost of the charter, other than to say it was "more than \$200,000." He said he paid Evergreen and will be reimbursed by an agent for the shah.

Sundlan also denied knowing of any ties between Evergreen and the CIA: "When I got hold of Evergreen, I was getting a hold of a charter company. I didn't know anything about any CIA connections."

Intermountain Aviation Inc., most of whose assets Evergreen International Airlines acquired in 1975, was a private, Arizona airline located near the Mexican border. It is officially acknowledged to have been a "proprietary corporation" financed and controlled by the CIA as a cover for paramilitary and clandestine missions the agency undertook in Central and South America.

A General Accounting Office report on Evergreen's acquisition of Intermountain has been classified as secret.

The CIA was forced to dispense with Intermountain in the wake of several published reports in the mid-1970s that blew its cover. The company was dissolved, but 50 of its 120 employees signed on with Evergreen.

The CIA's air proprietary corporations evolved from the mandate given the agency's clandestine services section, which undertakes covert missions. To facilitate these missions, the CIA developed over the years a stable of wholly owned proprietary corporations which appeared to, and often did, do business as private companies. The largest and most significant were airlines.

Evergreen president Ward Eason conceded in a telephone interview it was "probable" that the CIA had been a customer of his airline in the past, though he said he could not recall any specific instances.

Evergreen has a fleet of 19 jet transport planes, along with a reputation in the aviation industry for being able to take unusual jobs quickly. Two months ago, for example, Eason said Evergreen flew the body of an Arabian princess who had died in a Texas hospital to her home in Dubai. On another occasion recently, a Saudi prince chartered an Evergreen DC8 for a week to fly his mother and friends around the United States.

Evergreen International Airlines is owned by a newly created holding company called Evergreen Air Inc. The firm has a number of subsidiaries

which together make it "the most diversified air company in the world," in the opinion of Donna Nelson, a spokeswoman for the firm.

She said Evergreen Air companies are involved in passenger and cargo charters, health and hospital ambulatory work, heavy construction, forestry application (seeding, spraying, fertilizing, logging, firefighting) and the servicing of offshore oil wells.

Much of this work is done by the 132 helicopters belonging to Evergreen Helicopters Inc., which has its own subsidiaries in Alaska, California, Arizona, Montana, Virginia and Singapore, according to Nelson.

Overall, Nelson said, Evergreen Air employs 1200 people, and did \$100 million in business during the last fiscal year. The company has operations in Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Mexico and the Seychelles. It is wholly owned by Delford M. Smith, a 50-year-old Washington state native and former Air Force paratrooper.

Smith built the Evergreen interests from a meager two-helicopter spraying business in Sweet Home, Ore., 20 years ago. He has expanded the scope of his own company and aggressively snapped up the assets of other firms, including Intermountain.

According to Christopher Robbins, author of "Air America," a book about the CIA's secret airlines published last year, Evergreen paid Intermountain \$2.8 million for 12 aircraft. These included one Electra, four Twin Otter STOL (short takeoff and landing) planes and four Bell Jet Ranger helicopters.

For an undisclosed sum, Evergreen also acquired Intermountain's long-term lease on the Marana Air Park, owned by Pinal County, Ariz. That base is now called the Evergreen Air Center, and, according to Nelson, is one of the country's four "unlimited repair stations." It is a comprehensive service and maintenance facility for all types of aircraft, with the ability to reconfigure fuselages along with passenger, cargo and fuel capacity.

**CONTINUED**



Intermountain was founded in the fall of 1961, six months after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and its Mariana lease began at about that time. According to sources close to the CIA, the agency wanted an all-purpose air and training facility that could help correct the failures evident in its aborted attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro.

What Intermountain did, for public consumption, was train firefighters for the Forest Service and provide associated services for the Department of Interior.

Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that when Intermountain wasn't fighting fires, it started some of its own: The airline once flew anti-Communist Tibetan agents to their homeland and delivered unmarked B26 bombers to Africa, among other missions flown in the name of national security.

Another organization that flew forestry and fire-fighting missions alongside Intermountain for at least 10 years was Evergreen. But Evergreen Airlines president Eason said he was unaware of Intermountain's CIA connections until negotiations to buy the company's assets began.

There have been non-Intermountain employees who have done work for Evergreen after stints with the CIA. Ernest Brace, who was captured in Laos in 1965 by North Vietnamese regulars while flying a mission for the CIA, was held eight years in captivity, and joined Evergreen on his release. In an interview, he said he worked for the company five years, rising to vice president of operations, before leaving to join Sikorsky Aircraft in 1978.

Another figure associated with Evergreen is George Doole Jr., the driving force behind the CIA's air proprietary corporation network for nearly 20 years. According to Victor Marchetti, a 14-year veteran of the agency, and coauthor of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," Doole, a former Pan American pilot, was a near legendary figure in the spy business.

He was originally a contract agent who presided over the CIA's sprawling Air America and Air Asia proprietary corporations in Indochina, which, dur-

ing the 1960s, employed nearly 20,000 people, more than the entire workforce of the parent agency at the time. Doole, now 70, and living in Washington, D.C., later became a CIA career officer.

In 1978, Doole wrote a letter to an aviation magazine, Rotor and Wing, in which he was identified as being a director of Evergreen. But Doole, in a telephone interview, denied being a director and said "that was somebody else's confusion." He said he has been a consultant for Evergreen for "about two years."

Evergreen's Eason confirmed that Doole is a paid consultant for the company specializing in procuring federal contracts. "There was some talk about making him a director," Eason admitted, "but we felt that would have aroused too much talk, so we decided to keep George on a consulting basis."

Today, the CIA says it is out of the airline business, but it has acknowledged in testimony the importance of private companies as a cover for undertaking covert missions, and has said it will continue to use them, though on a reduced scale.

In 1976, the chief of the CIA's cover and commercial staff testified before the Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities: "We need a variety of cooperating personnel and organizations in the private sector. Proprietaries ... are part of the arsenal of tools that the agency must have in order to fulfill its job."

Concluded the Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities in its final report: "Most of the (proprietary corporations) of which the agency has divested itself were either sold or given to witting individuals (former officers, employees, managers and contractors, etc.). A handful were sold or given to witting individuals who had no formal relationship with the proprietary. In several cases, transfer of the entity was conditioned as an agreement that the proprietary would continue to provide goods or services to the CIA."

That report was issued at a time when there was a general outcry against CIA tactics. But now, observers of the agency feel that as public sentiment for a more active CIA continues to mount, and as congressional restrictions diminish, the agency could step up its proprietary corporation activity again.

And though companies like Intermountain may dissolve, old friendships like the one with George Doole will not. At the least, sources close to the CIA freely admit, the agency is likely to be able to tap an old-boy network of friendly air companies for favors.

BEN BRADLEE



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# Who 'Lost' Iran? The Postmortem Begins

*There were two possible lines of action for the American Government [in 1978]. The first was to speed up the Shah's departure and attempt to get a reformist government in power ... to block the revolution. The second was to encourage the use of the iron fist ... The Carter Administration did neither; it hoped for the best and got the worst.*

**W**ho lost Iran? The battle over that controversial question is just beginning, and the first big salvo will be fired this week in a 38-page article in the respected Washington Quarterly. It places much of the blame on Jimmy Carter and his top advisers. Authors Michael A. Ledeen, executive editor of the Georgetown University publication, and William H. Lewis, a political scientist at George Washington University, charge that the Carter Administration never "really formulated a policy, established objectives or designed tactics to deal with the Iranian crisis." As Iran plunged toward chaos, they maintain, Presidential advisers tugged in opposite directions—some trying to drive the Shah out, others hoping to prop him up. The President never chose between them. "One would have expected ... some leadership," say Ledeen and Lewis. "This never took place."

**'Worst of Both Worlds':** While the Americans vacillated, the Shah dithered, according to the authors. He was weakened by cancer and the drugs he took to combat it, and in late 1978, visitors "found him unexpectedly passive." He was unable to choose between conciliation and what he called "the iron fist." Ledeen and Lewis argue that "the Shah subjected himself to the worst of both worlds." By imposing martial law, he antagonized his domestic foes and many Americans, but his army did not act firmly enough to restore order. When he left Teheran in January 1979, the Shah was convinced that the U.S. had some "grand strategy" to replace him with a more stable pro-Western regime. "He did not believe for a moment that the American Government had no such plan," says the study. Weeks later, it began to dawn on him that there was no grand design—and the Shah felt betrayed.

The article is spotty in places. Carter himself is notable by his absence; his attitudes and words are rarely recorded. But from the evidence available to them, Ledeen and Lewis conclude that the President and his men badly underestimated Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and overestimated the moderate revolutionaries. Such misjudgments, they say, contributed to the triumph of a rabidly anti-American

faction in Iran. A year later, they contend, "the long agony of more than 50 American hostages ... is only the most celebrated and durable reminder of the growing strength of a radical Islamic movement that considers the U.S. its enemy."

Ledeen and Lewis admit that the seeds of the Iran debacle were planted long before Jimmy Carter entered the White House. The stability of the Shah had been an American article of faith, and the Carter Administration was slow to realize that trouble was brewing. The two authors quote an August 1978 CIA study that said

"Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation"; a month later, the Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that the Shah would "remain actively in power over the next ten years." But not everyone was in the dark, according to Ledeen and Lewis. In September, U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan sent cables that "accurately described the gravity of the situation. But there was no action from Washington."

Both the Shah and his American allies made bad mistakes early on. "The greatest error of judgment," suggests the article, "was that of the Shah himself, who told the French Government it was all right to permit the Ayatollah Khomeini to take up residence in the Paris suburbs. This gave Khomeini a platform." The Americans also underrated the threat from Khomeini, even though the CIA rented a house near the ayatollah's residence in order to keep tabs on him. Until it was too late, the U.S. regarded Khomeini as "a somewhat eccentric but basically admirable dissident."

At this critical juncture, a fundamental split developed in Washington. According to the authors, national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski "believed that the nature of the Shah's regime was a distinctly secondary question, and that Iran was of such pre-eminent importance to American Middle East policy that the Shah should be encouraged to do whatever was necessary to preserve control of the country." This view was opposed by human-rights enthusiasts in the State Department, including Iran desk chief Henry Precht who, the authors say, "had disliked the Shah's re-

gime for years." Ledeen and Lewis say that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance gave his "full backing" to Precht and others who argued that the U.S. could not support "repression in Iran."

A seesaw battle ensued. Brzezinski called the Shah and said the U.S. would "back him to the hilt." The State Department drafted a cable calling for a more "progressive" government in Iran. Brzezinski got the cable canceled. With Brzezinski's backing, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger proposed that the aircraft carrier Constellation and other U.S. warships



*The Shah leaves Teheran: No 'iron fist'*

be sent into the Indian Ocean, just in case. "The President agreed," says The Washington Quarterly. "The order was given but then, inexplicably, the President reversed himself and ordered the [Constellation] to return to port."

The bureaucratic infighting continued. "Precht, based on increasingly pessimistic reporting by Sullivan, and on his own conviction that Iran should be free of the Shah, insisted that the Shah had to go, while Brzezinski was seeking ways to bol-

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ster the Shah's resolve," according to the account. Rosalynn Carter wrote "several warm letters" to the Shah's wife assuring her of American support. Mrs. Carter's husband was much less emphatic. "There was no clear line of command," continues the article, "in part because the President never took an active role in the proceedings, never gave any clear indication of the



AP



UPI

*Huyser and Precht: The general's reports were 'misleading'; the diplomat 'disliked' the Shah*



Olivier Rebbot

*Sullivan taken prisoner: Accurate warnings*

kind of solution he favored, and never . . . aided the policymakers at lower levels in formulating options."

Amid all these "conflicting signals" from Washington, the Shah drew his own conclusions. He decided that Washington did not want him to use the "iron fist." He suspected that the U.S. "had undertaken an alliance with radical Islam to launch a frontal attack against Communism," report the authors. "If that were true, then the President had already made an ar-

rangement with Khomeini, and the Shah would only cause greater suffering for the country if he tried to stem the tide."

By the early autumn of 1978, Ambassador Sullivan had "concluded that the Shah was doomed." In cables to Washington, he argued that the U.S. "had to attempt to build a secure barricade against the ayatollah." Sullivan proposed that the U.S. try to rally the Iranian military behind a National Front government headed by moderates like Shahpur Bakhtiar, the Shah's last Prime Minister, and Mehdi Bazargan, Khomeini's first Prime Minister. Brzezinski opposed Sullivan with a notion of his own. He and Schlesinger argued that Carter should send a personal emissary to Teheran to assure the Shah that the U.S. would back him up, whatever course of action he chose. "Schlesinger believed," the authors say, "that the Shah . . . would use the iron fist."

Brzezinski wanted Schlesinger to be Carter's envoy. But the President rejected the iron fist, and he chose a different man for a different mission. Air Force Gen. Robert Huyser was dispatched to Teheran; his assignment was to persuade the Iranian generals to support the Shah's last legacy: the Bakhtiar government. Huyser's superior, Gen. Alexander Haig, the NATO commander, opposed sending Huyser on "an operation that could not succeed." Haig argued, unsuccessfully, that "Huyser was the wrong man for the job, since a man of considerable political skill was required."

**Military Plans:** In Teheran, Huyser closeted himself with Iran's military leaders. Ledeen and Lewis report that "on at least two occasions Huyser warned the generals that any attempted coup would result in the United States' 'cutting them off at the knees'." On both occasions, Huyser had been told about—or asked to support—plans for military action. Working in "a near vacuum" at the U.S. Embassy and Iranian military headquarters, Huyser reported to Washington that the generals were behind Bakhtiar and that "Bakhtiar might well succeed," according to Ledeen and Lewis.

"Huyser's reports were almost completely misleading," they write, "and the real picture was that painted by Ambassa-

dor Sullivan." The ambassador said that the mullahs were gaining strength, that the army was cracking and that Bakhtiar had scant support. "But this," the authors add, "was a message that the policymakers did not want to hear; nor were they inclined to believe it, since they believed they had the ultimate 'insider' among the generals."

On Jan. 16, the Shah left Iran. Khomeini returned from Paris in triumph, and Bakhtiar's regime soon collapsed. Militants invaded the U.S. Embassy on Feb. 14, taking Sullivan prisoner. They let him go quickly enough and withdrew. But they returned on Nov. 4, and have held 50 Americans hostage ever since.

This account of the fumbles and indecision by the Carter Administration is a damning indictment, and one that appears to be grounded in energetic research. Although Ledeen and Lewis conducted dozens of interviews, their article does not identify any of their sources. But judging from the text itself, the authors must have talked extensively to Sullivan and Huyser. And Ledeen says that the Shah's side of the story came from three Iranian sources and was confirmed by the deposed monarch himself through an intermediary.

**President's Views:** Clearly, Carter was not consulted, and his side of the story remains to be told. Disputing the picture of Carter as an indecisive waffler, one top-ranking policymaker of the period insists that the President had very definite views—namely, "to let the dust settle and avoid circumstances in which it could accurately be said that the U.S. was dictating to the Shah." Perhaps Carter can be faulted for the incompatibility between what he wanted to do—adopt a noninterventionist approach—and what he hoped would come of it: the preservation of Iran as a U.S. ally. But through it all, his defenders say, the President stuck to his principles. "His basic inclination," says one source, "was not to use force, not to get the U.S. involved, not to interfere with the Iranian people." In hindsight, it now seems ironic that Carter is threatening Iran with a naval blockade.

Like the argument over "who lost China," debate about the Iranian revolution will shed both heat and light. Ledeen and Lewis have started the process; accounts more sympathetic to Carter and to both wings of his badly divided Administration will undoubtedly follow. It remains to be seen whether a fuller airing of U.S. actions during the Iran crisis will bolster the President's reputation. In this election year, however, The Washington Quarterly has given Carter's Presidential rivals a stick to beat him with—and they can be expected to wield it with vigor.

RUSSELL WATSON with DAVID C. MARTIN  
in Washington

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Afghanistan

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ON PAGE 2

WASHINGTON WEEKLY  
22 APRIL 1980

**"Why Didn't  
They Tell Us?  
Important News  
Big Media  
Suppressed**



**Cliff Kincaid**

Ronald Reagan has said that as president he would supply weapons to the Afghan freedom fighters. Speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 8, Reagan said: "We in the past have found ways to do this before we got so frightened that we decided that the CIA should become a kind of Virginia Gentlemen's Club and not do things to preserve our security." He added: "I have no quarrel with delivering weapons to someone who is trying to fight for his freedom." *Reagan's remarks on the Afghans, ignored by the Washington Star and the New York Times, were partly reported by the Washington Post.*

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
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## Proving Ground

# Russian Army Has Been Good but Not Perfect In Combating the Insurgents in Afghanistan

By KENNETH H. BACON

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Every day, U.S. intelligence satellites spin over Afghanistan snapping pictures for an eager audience in Washington.

These pictures, along with intelligence gathered from eavesdropping on Soviet communications and from refugees fleeing Afghanistan, are providing an intelligence bonanza for U.S. military analysts. They're getting a look at something they haven't seen since World War II—Russian troops in large-scale combat.

The information pouring in shows a Soviet invasion force that is highly trained, firmly disciplined and well-armed. "We're seeing a high level of operational confidence," one analyst says.

But the Red army's record in Afghanistan isn't perfect. "They've demonstrated that they can make their share of mistakes, that they're not 10 feet tall," a senior U.S. general observes. He reports that the Soviet army often suffers from faulty battlefield intelligence and that Moscow's generals are finding it difficult to adjust a rigid Europe-oriented strategy to the task of fighting Afghanistan's scrappy insurgents.

### The Invisible Enemy

"The Russians have unquestionably gained control of the cities and the main roads, but 10 feet away it's Indian territory," one military man remarks. "They're trying to use traditional mechanized tactics against an enemy they can't find" in rugged mountainous terrain where Soviet tanks and mobile artillery can't operate effectively.

"This is the first time the Soviets have been in combat for 35 years," a U.S. analyst notes. "They don't have many combat-hardened officers, so it isn't surprising that they're making mistakes."

U.S. officials see signs, however, that the Soviet high command now is revising its tactics in Afghanistan. Moscow is evidently looking for ways to improve the speed and accuracy of attacks against the elusive resistance fighters who are killing or wounding an average of 500 Soviet soldiers a week. Russia is "using this war as a proving ground," just as the U.S. tested tactics and weapons in Vietnam, a military man says.

And any lessons learned from Afghanistan could heavily influence Moscow's willingness to send its forces into such places as the Persian Gulf or Africa—moves that might be sanctioned by present Kremlin doctrine and encouraged by Russia's expanding military power.

The 1.9-million-man Soviet army is nearly twice the size of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps combined. It has more—and, in some respects, better—tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers and chemical-warfare equipment than U.S. forces have. Kremlin leaders long asserted that their military power was designed simply to defend the Communist state from attack. But "beginning in the early 1970s they began to define the mission of their forces differently," a Pentagon official says. "They defined it as the defense of the homeland and protection of Soviet interests around the world."

### Equipment to Match

With the offensive cast came new equipment—ships and planes to ferry troops and arms over long distances—and changes in training to prepare Soviet officers to fight on foreign soil. Required-reading lists for Soviet officers—90% of whom are Communist Party members—began to include more books about revolutionary and other conditions in Third World countries.

U.S. officials are studying the Afghan invasion to see how well Soviet military abilities match the Kremlin doctrine. Mobilization for the invasion was smooth. Last summer Moscow, worried about the instability of the new Communist regime on its border, sent Gen. Ivan Pavlovsky, the commander of its ground forces, to Kabul, apparently to plan the invasion. In the fall the Kremlin began to mobilize skeleton divisions—normally kept at 25% strength—along the Afghan border by calling up local reserves and bringing in officers and weapons experts from crack units in Eastern Europe.

Washington analysts have since detected signs that Soviet commanders were displeased with the length of time it took to mobilize. "They've become aware of some of their own deficiencies and appear to be taking action to correct them," a White House official says. Shortly after moving into Afghanistan, for instance, the Soviets strengthened some low-readiness units along the border with Iran. Such improvements could cut mobilization time—and, hence, warning time for the U.S.—in the future, officials fear.

### Classic Doctrine Followed

The invasion itself followed classic Soviet doctrine, which calls for deception, surprise, speed and heavy force. Just before Christmas the Soviets landed two airborne divisions—about 15,000 men—in Kabul, taking the airport, securing key roads and seizing the capital. Then armored divisions poured across the border, capturing roads and military posts. The invasion brought 80,000 troops.

To eliminate the threat of Afghan opposition to the initial airborne landing, Soviet agents had closed Kabul's radio station and recalled the Afghan army's Soviet-built tanks to repair depots for correction of a supposed defect. Thus the tanks weren't available to attack Russian planes as they landed.

"The whole thing was planned in a very precise way," a Pentagon official says. "The thing that's so distinctive about them is their attempt to make warfare into an engineering science. It's almost as if they have a checklist—a cookbook type of procedure."

The rigidity of the Soviet approach led to a sort of overkill. Because divisions moved in with packaged units of equipment, "they brought everything that wasn't nailed down," including a lot of heavy equipment that is useless against the evasive, lightly armed insurgent opposition they face, a U.S. official says. The Russian forces brought hundreds of mobile launchers for anti-aircraft rockets, although they face no fighter or bomber threat. They also brought large mobile launchers for surface-to-surface missiles that could be used against a mass tank attack, but that is another threat the Soviets don't face in Afghanistan.

### Tanks Working Well

Maintaining and moving this heavy equipment in Afghanistan is putting some strain on Soviet supply lines. Nevertheless, the tanks and other heavy equipment seem to be working well, without the breakdowns that embarrassed the Soviet army during its unopposed 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

What isn't working well, according to U.S. officials, is the Soviets' much-rehearsed blitzkrieg tactics, designed primarily for a sweep through Europe. This approach has often failed against the elusive insurgents, a loosely organized force of some 50,000 to 100,000 Moslem freedom fighters.

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"The Soviets tend to be very cautious," a U.S. analyst says. "They collect intelligence, prepare their forces and then move in with great power. The rebels won't stand and fight. They prefer to move and snipe." Frequently, the Soviets end up bombarding positions and villages the insurgents have vacated, a tactic that only increases local opposition. "The Soviets don't have enough men to hold the countryside," an official notes. "As soon as they move on, the insurgents float back in."

But "we're beginning to see the Soviets adjust to what is a classic insurgency strategy," one top military man says. "It's too early to say whether they can."

#### Hover and Spray

The new tactics stress the use of smaller, more-mobile troop units and highly effective helicopter gunships. "They just hover and spray an area with machine-gun fire," an official says. While the insurgents have downed some of the choppers with rifle fire, they lack the missiles necessary for an effective defense.

But U.S. officials still don't know how well the helicopters coordinate with Soviet ground forces, and they see some signs that Soviet intelligence isn't good or fast enough to use helicopters to the maximum advantage.

All in all, Kremlin leaders haven't been pleased by the results in Afghanistan. They've shuffled military leaders in the invasion force and are reorganizing some units. U.S. officials are waiting to see how well the highly structured, politically controlled Red Army finally adapts to the largely guerrilla war.

"The poor leadership of the field commanders is something that has plagued the Soviet army throughout history," a U.S. offi-

cial notes. "It's a political army and decisions come from above. Lieutenants and captains are reluctant to take the initiative. This works very well in peacetime and in training but not as well in combat. They tend to miss targets of opportunity."

#### The Enlisted Man

Training for Soviet enlisted men—who are drafted for two years at age 18—leaves no room for initiative. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, low-ranking Soviet soldiers aren't trained to make battlefield decisions, and they have no access to radios, maps and other sources of combat information. They are taught to follow orders from the top—a fact that would make destruction of communications networks a central U.S. goal in any combat with the Russians.

Still, the Soviet soldier is formidable. His training stresses political education, unwavering allegiance to the homeland and highly realistic and rigorous field exercises designed to prepare soldiers to continue battle by rote even if debilitated by nuclear fallout or chemical warfare. Several years ago a Soviet defector reported that an entire motorized regiment was sent into a radioactive nuclear test site; hundreds of men needed prolonged hospitalization.

In Russian society, military training begins well before actual induction into the armed forces. Preschool children are read a book called "We Pick Up New Rifles," which shows children receiving weapons and repulsing an enemy attack on the homeland. Schoolchildren perform military drills and play extensive military games at summer camp.

"The formation of a soldier isn't easy," a Soviet army publication states. "It shouldn't begin at the moment the new recruit is enlisted in the ranks, but rather much earlier, at the time of the first signs of maturity, during the time of adolescent dreams."



ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 17AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY  
21 April 1980

# Afghan Problems Stall Soviets

Logistical and tactical difficulties in pursuing guerrillas,  
lack of flexibility in command structure keep effort static

By David R. Griffiths

Washington—Soviet forces in Afghanistan have run into two obstacles that so far seem to have kept them static while awaiting more troops or a decision to change the tenor of the conflict either upward or downward—Vietnam-like logistical and tactical headaches in pursuing guerrillas and a command structure unsuited to independent, small-unit action.

That is the opinion of military and congressional analysts here, who point out that the Soviet Union has learned patience as part of a tradition of subduing Central Asian republics that goes back to the czars.

The Afghan fighting has been characterized by tribesman resistance, which has been all the more difficult to contend with because of the unpredictable nature of guerrillas. In addition, the mountainous terrain has inhibited both close air support and Russian jet aircraft and helicopter gunship and troop transport operations.

Those difficulties have been compounded by a logistical shortfall, which, in Soviet military doctrine, is acceptable in order to achieve surprise but obviously not for sustained fighting. The buildup following last December's invasion has been delayed, analysts said, because of the lack of secondary roads, the need to furnish Afghanistan army logistics, and unanticipated levels of urban violence and weather, including snowfalls that closed many eastern arteries.

In the opinion of some observers, such a slowdown probably will not affect long-range Soviet plans. "Many analysts expected more action before this," a congressional researcher said. "But now it looks as if there's a breakdown of the administrative structure of the central government. Russian civilians are taking over the ministries and the Afghan army has lost its credibility. They're a long way from developing an indigenous government. The Soviets are committing themselves to a military solution."

If the next step is a major Soviet offensive, a military analyst said, the 85,000 Soviet personnel there now may not be enough. In the elements of three rifle divisions, two airborne divisions and at least two other independent units, there are about 60,000 troops. About one third are expected to be capable of closing with an enemy.

If offensive operations are ordered, many combat troops will have to be diverted from other missions, including securing cities, garrisoning choke points, convoy escort and base camp security.

Making additions to the combat force is not expected to be a problem. Supporting them once they are in place in the precipitous terrain marked by steep, narrow valleys is another matter. Military analysts have not been overly impressed with Soviet airlift into Afghanistan because of the short distance to Russia. The difficulty comes in supplying operational units from air bases in cities such as Kabul and Shindand.

"It was easy for us in Vietnam to set up an airlift network, with C-123s, then CH-47s hopping into the front," an analyst said.

"The Soviets don't have that type of infrastructure of supply through the airfields. In Vietnam, every plantation had a strip. In Afghanistan, there are smaller strips, but they're hampered by weather."

Another limiting factor is that there does not seem to be a Soviet army counterpart to such positions as the U.S. S-4, or supply officer, at lower unit levels. Much of the decision-making in logistics as well as combat leadership automatically goes up to the Soviet division level or higher, analysts said.

One noted, "The Russian army's basic training and motivation is for an attack against NATO. There's not much small-unit thinking required, just attack in massed formations."

The lack of initiative from junior Soviet officers reported by Western intelligence sources could be a continuing detriment to coping with small, isolated guerrilla bands. So far, although casualty statistics are unreliable, those tribesmen seem to at least be holding their own. The Russian forces, meanwhile, are finding themselves

in much the same situation as World War 2 German occupiers of Yugoslavia or the French in Indochina in the early 1950s. They hold the roads and the cities, but little else.

When Soviet troops have ventured out after the rebels, military analysts said, they meet the sort of enemy that does not appear to be vulnerable to air operations. There are no indications yet that the tribesmen are armed with anything more than relatively small-caliber and antitank weapons, but there have been reports that that has been enough against helicopter assaults.

"Air-to-ground has not been that effective," a congressional researcher said. "Whether they've been stymied by guerrillas or the Afghan terrain is hard to say."

Beyond the problem of finding and firing upon small, village-based groups, Soviet helicopter pilots face a quandary unfamiliar to their American counterparts in Vietnam. In many instances, tribesmen holding the high ground have shot down at helicopters flying up valleys to insert troops or attack guerrilla concentrations and villages.

"What they should do," one intelligence source said, "is have the helicopter infantry get the high ground, with the armored troops coming up the valley roads and coming out the other end. But there is a problem, of course, that in those high altitudes, the helicopters have less load-carrying capability."

In another comparison with Vietnam, some analysts said casualties being inflicted on the tribesmen could have a more serious long-term effect in Afghanistan because the manpower pool may not be as large as that in the Viet Cong recruiting areas and in North Vietnam.

So far, non-helicopter ground-attack aircraft, such as the Sukhoi Su-17, are not playing as important a role as rotary-wing aircraft. "It's tough to take a fast mover down a valley and hit a machine-gun nest," an analyst said. "There are few reconnaissance aircraft, and Russian-based aircraft can support the northern half of Afghanistan. Also, there has been some napalm dropped on villages to support terrorist tactics."

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John M. Collins, senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress, has been to Afghanistan. "Air power is not that effective against guerrilla troops there," he said. "With air power, the best technique is use of area weapons, such as gas. It's tough, otherwise, to pinpoint targets in the nooks and crannies."

"There's been some talk about nerve gas in Afghanistan, but if it's non-persistent, the wind could force it in the wrong direction or disperse it. A more persistent gas, such as mustard gas, might be more effective."

Whatever weapons the Soviets are using, the one factor that may keep them fighting indefinitely in Afghanistan if they choose to stay with the military solution is the support received by rebels from Pakistan, with which Afghanistan shares a 1,000-mi. border. The ties between Pakistan and the tribesmen have not been overt, but analysts said the supply of small arms from Pakistan can be tapped for a long time, perhaps indefinitely.

Getting the arms across the border by way of thousands of trails apparently has caught the Soviets' attention to such an extent that they recently concentrated Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters close to Jalalabad, east of the capital, Kabul, and near the border. That puts them close to the Kunar Valley, a rebel stronghold. Going the next step beyond airborne surveillance and interdiction to seal off the border would require 5-10 divisions, analysts said.

What the Soviets will do in the near future, other than securing the limited areas under their control, could include the establishment of Vietnam-type fire bases or large supply depots like Long Binh, near Saigon. Those, however, may prove to be too vulnerable. If they choose to mount further, more concentrated ground-based operations, the army's structure may have to undergo some change. "If they want to build a tasking organization, they may need a two-star general just to lead a regiment-sized unit," an intelligence source said.

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**World**

Rebels escort defecting Afghan soldiers; a *mujahidin* elder; below, bodies of Afghan workers executed by rebels as Soviet collaborators

## AFGHANISTAN

**Fierce Fight***Resisting the Soviet onslaught*

**B**acked by armor and helicopter gunships, Soviet troops last week launched a fresh assault against Muslim rebels in eastern Afghanistan. The attacks included search-and-destroy missions against Afghan villages, the machine-gunning of unarmed civilians and even the dropping of incapacitating gas by Soviet gunships. Meanwhile, Western intelligence experts estimated, the Soviets have suffered at least 8,000 dead and wounded since last December's invasion. According to reports from Eastern Europe, some Soviet soldiers wounded in Afghanistan are now being flown directly to military hospitals in East Germany—presumably because the Kremlin does not want its own people to know the number of casualties in "Moscow's Viet Nam."

In the capital city of Kabul, there were rumors that insurgents had caused a landslide, killing 600 Afghan soldiers in a mountain encampment and destroying 40 tanks. A band of rebels reportedly crossed the border between Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. and managed to kill 200 Soviet troops. The rebels also claimed to have exploded a newly completed copper mine in the Logar Valley and coal mines in Badakhshan. They have been putting pressure on farmers to cut back on spring planting. Partly for that reason, this year's grain crop will be only 75% of normal. When two grape growers pruned their vines, in violation of the rebels' orders, insurgents cut off the growers' ears.

The Soviets appear to be firmly in control of Kabul. Moscow-appointed advisers are in charge of most government offices, leaving Afghan employees, as one observer put it, with nothing to do but "sit around and drink tea." Outside the capital, the



country is still in chaos. The exodus of refugees continues; there are an estimated 700,000 Afghans in Pakistan and 100,000 more in Iran. The demoralized Afghan army, which used to have 80,000 men, is down to 20,000 or 30,000 and suffers from the constant defection of soldiers to the rebel side.

The *mujahidin* (holy warriors) are limited by a lack of supplies, ammunition and even food, but they fight on with remarkable tenacity. On assignment for TIME, Photographer Steve McCurry accompanied a band of rebels on a raid near Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar prov-

ince. About a mile from the University of Nangarhar, the rebels attacked a convoy of Afghan army trucks and captured three members of a military road-repair crew. Two tanks joined the skirmish on the army side, but the rebels fought on all afternoon, even after one of their number had been killed. That night, the rebels slipped away and marched for six hours to the village of their slain comrade. Next morning, before the burial ceremony for the dead rebel, they staged a "trial" and summarily executed their three prisoners. The charge: collaborating with the Soviet enemy.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS  
18 April 1980

## CIA director calls leaks worst threat to America

By Sally Ann Stewart

Staff Writer

Warning that the CIA must be protected from public scrutiny, Director Stansfield Turner said leaks of secret information undermine the effectiveness of the agency.

"Leaks are the most serious threat to American survival today," he said.

Turner, speaking yesterday at the last Palm Beach Round Table discussion at the Paramount Theatre, was joined by FBI director William Webster, and Marvin Stone, editor of U.S. News and World Report.

Turner, who has headed the CIA since March 1977, continued his drive for legislation to free the agency from the Freedom of Information Act. He also is pressing for legislation to allow prosecution of those who disclose foreign agents' names or identities.

Turner said he has asked Congress to cut the number of formal oversight committees from eight to two.

The two-hour round table, attended by about 1,000 persons, focused on relationship of press to the two intelligence agencies, the CIA and FBI.

Stone asked Turner if he had changed his mind about using newspaper foreign correspondents as CIA spies. At a convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors last week, Turner said he did not find the practice harmful.

The remark last week drew sharp criticism from newspaper editorial writers. The *New York Times* called Turner's remarks a "threat to (reporters') safety," and argued that reporters need to be independent seekers of truth.

Turner responded to Stone's question yesterday by saying the editorials had not swayed his opinion, although he said the CIA had not worked with reporters for at least four years.

Noting that there has "always been an exchange" of information between the media and the two agencies, Stone said, "All my colleagues feel it would have been better left unsaid."

Webster said that three people in the "media profession" currently are supplying information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because "we believe we are entitled to that information."

Webster said the three informants had volunteered their information and the plan was approved by the U.S. Attorney General.

THE MIAMI HERALD  
18 April 1980

## FBI Chief: 3 in Media Supply Data

By FREDERICK BURGER  
Herald Staff Writer

The FBI is using three members of the "media" to supply information about continuing criminal investigations in the United States, FBI Director William Webster said Thursday in Palm Beach.

"There are three people in the media who supply us with information," said Webster, who added that all of them had volunteered to do so.

"There are only a few of them," Webster said. "And they serve only a limited function."

He declined to identify the people as "reporters," but said they work in "journalism, radio and television." He said those persons are "in a position to supply ongoing information" to the FBI and, Webster continued, he doubts the superiors of these "volunteers" know of the activities.

The FBI chief offered no additional explanations.

Webster made the remarks during a joint appearance before the Palm Beach Roundtable with CIA Director Stansfield Turner. The CIA director told Congress recently that the CIA had, on three prior occasions, made exceptions to its ban on using journalists to gather intelligence. In those cases, he said, the exceptions had been granted, but the agency never actually used the journalists.

Nevertheless, Turner said Thursday: "We reserve the right to have a relationship with the American media under extraordinary circumstances."

CIA officials have said in the past that these circumstances could include using reporters to make approaches to government officials who could not be approached by U.S. businessmen or embassy employees — the only CIA "cover" jobs not covered by regulations.

Turner said the CIA is "very sensitive" to objections that it uses reporters to gather intelligence information.

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# Reagan Names 67 Foreign, Defense Policy Advisers

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, who has been accused of lacking a set of well-defined foreign and defense policies, has named 67 advisers to provide "guidance" on these issues.

Most are known as conservatives on foreign policy issues. Only a few are considered members of the foreign affairs "establishment" which has dominated governmental thinking on diplomatic and defense matters for several decades.

There was no indication which of the advisers is among the most influential or active in formulating policies for Reagan. Richard V. Allen, coordinator of foreign policy issues in the Reagan campaign, said those on the list had not necessarily endorsed Reagan for president.

According to Allen, a "work program" for the foreign policy advisory group is being drawn up, and meetings are to begin within two weeks. Allen said the advisers will provide

day-to-day counsel, develop policy and position papers for the general election campaign and inventory resources available for a future Reagan administration.

The list of advisers released by Reagan:

## Foreign Policy

Dr. Kenneth L. Adelman, senior policy analyst, SRI International; former assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Dr. Adda B. Bozeman, professor emeritus of international relations, Sarah Lawrence College; Dr. W. Glenn Campbell, director, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University; Dr. Lev Dobriansky, professor of economics, Georgetown University.

Dr. Peter Duignan, senior fellow and director of African and Middle East studies, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University; Dr. Charles H. Fairbanks, assistant professor of political science, Yale University; fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Roger W. Fournier, director of Latin American studies, center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University; Jeffrey B. Gayer, director of foreign policy studies, The Heritage Foundation.

Dr. Nathan Glazer, professor, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University; Dr. Mose L. Hervey, director, Advanced International Studies Institute, University of Miami; Dr. Rita E. Hauser, attorney; former U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; Dr. Fred C. Ikle, consultant; former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Dr. David C. Jordan, professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia; Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University; resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Ernest W. Lefever, professor and lecturer, Department of Government, Georgetown University; Dor. Carnes Lord, assistant professor of government and foreign affairs, University of Virginia.

Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, research professor, Georgetown University; senior fellow, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University.

Prof. Charles Burton Marshall, consultant on foreign policy; former member State Department Policy Planning Staff; Dr. Constantine Christopher Menges, consultant to The Hudson Institute; Dr. Henry R. Nau, associate professor of political science; faculty member, graduate program in science, technology and public policy, George Washington University.

Amb. Robert G. Neumann, senior research fellow, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University; former ambassador to Afghanistan and Jordan; Dr. Robert Osgood, professor, School of Advanced International Studies; director of security studies program, The Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Robert L. Pfaltz, Jr., professor of international politics, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Walter J. Pforzheimer, first legislative counsel to the Central Intelligence Agency; Dr. Richard E. Pipes, professor, department of history, Harvard University; Dr. Uri Ra'Anan, chairman, International securities studies program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; Dr. Edward Rozek, professor of comparative government, University of Colorado.

Pedro A. Sanjuan, director, hemispheric center, American Enterprise Institute; Frank Shakespeare, president, RKO General Inc.; former director, United States Information Agency; Amb. Laurence Silberman, executive vice president, Crocker National Bank; former ambassador to Yugoslavia and acting attorney general; Dr. Richard F. Staar, director, international studies program, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.

Dr. William L. Stearnman, professor, Georgetown University; director, Russian area studies program, Georgetown University; Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupe, former ambassador to NATO, Sweden and Belgium; Dr. Raymond Tanter, professor of political science, University of Michigan; fellow, The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution; Amb. James D. Theberge, international business consultant; former ambassador to Nicaragua; Dr. Robert W. Tucker, professor of political science, The Johns Hopkins University.

Dr. Charles E. Walker, chairman, Charles E. Walker Associates; former deputy secretary of the treasury; Dr. Richard L. Walker, director, institute of international studies, University of South Carolina; Richard J. Whalen, chairman, WIRES Ltd., Washington, D.C.; author and business consultant.

Dr. Aaron Wildavsky, professor of political science, University of California; Dr. Curtin Winsor Jr., associate director, Alliance For Free Enterprise, Washington, D.C.

## Defense Policy

Frank R. Barnett, president, National Strategy Information Center; Gen. David A. Burchinal, USAF (Ret.), former deputy commander in chief, U.S. Forces in Europe; Dr. Joseph Churba, president, Institute for International Security; Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, consultant, strategic analyst, Boston; Lt. Gen. John Davis, USA (Ret.), former assistant director of the National Security Agency; Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, USAF (Ret.), former commander in chief, Strategic Air Command; Dr. Leon Goure, associate director, advance international studies institute, University of Miami; Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, cochairman, Coalition for Peace Through Strength; former director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Walter F. Rahn, defense analyst, Washington, D.C.; Martin R. Hoffman, attorney, former secretary of the Army; Dr. Peter G. Hughes, defense analyst, Seattle; Dr. William R. Kinner, professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania; former ambassador to Thailand.

Charles M. Kupperman, defense analyst, Washington, D.C.; Dr. John L. Lehman, Jr., president, Abington Corp.; former deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; J. William Middendorf II, president, Financial General Bankshares; former secretary of the Navy; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.), former chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Patrick J. Parker, chairman, department of national security affairs, Naval Postgraduate School; Dr. Jeffrey Record, consultant; strategic analyst, Washington, D.C.

Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, USA (Ret.); former joint chiefs of staff representative to SALT negotiations; Dr. William R. Schneider, consultant to the Hudson Institute; Harriet Fast Scott, consultant and writer on Soviet military affairs; Dr. William F. Scott, consultant and writer on Soviet military affairs; Dr. William R. Van Cleave, director, institute for international studies, University of Southern California; former member of SALT I "B" Team.

Gen. John W. Vogt Jr., USAF (Ret.); former commander in chief, U.S. Air Forces Europe; Gen. Lewis Walt, (USMC-Ret.), former commandant, Marine Corps; Seymour Weiss, vice president, Abington Corp.; former ambassador to the Bahamas.

THE MIAMI HERALD  
19 April 1980

## CIA May Have Ended Nassau Bank Probe

The CIA may have forced federal investigators in Miami to abandon an investigation of a Nassau bank that operated as a tax shelter for prominent Americans, sources said Friday.

The investigation of accounts at Castle Bank & Trust Ltd. ended quietly, several years ago, without filing as many as 300 pending tax cases.

Organized crime figures, entertainers and several prominent magazine publishers reportedly had hundreds of thousands of dollars in the bank.

New details about the aborted investigation, nicknamed Project Haven, were revealed Friday in the wake of Wall Street Journal story about the CIA's involvement.

"I've had suspicions for a long time that the CIA was involved," a former IRS investigator said.

A once-prominent Miami lawyer, who represented a former Castle

Bank official, said he thought the CIA pressured the Department of Justice to end the investigation.

The reported reason for CIA interest in the bank was national security.

The Castle Bank may have laundered CIA funds for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, sources said. The bank also may have been used to move CIA money for other Latin American operations.

A key link to the theory of CIA involvement in the bank is former Miami lawyer Paul L.E. Helliwell, who died in 1976. Helliwell represented the Castle bank. He was a former OSS officer in World War II and reportedly was connected with the CIA.

When IRS agents obtained a secret list of the Castle Bank's clients in 1973, Helliwell may have used his CIA contacts to force an abrupt end to the investigation, sources said.



ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH  
13 April 1980

## *SEC Tainted By CIA*

Having already tainted such private institutions as labor unions, corporations, the church and the media by infiltrating them, the Central Intelligence Agency now seems to be in the process of corrupting governmental institutions.

At the behest of the CIA, the Justice Department some time ago dropped the prosecution of two executives of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. who were accused of lying about their role in illegal CIA-ITT interference in a Chilean election. Now the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the first time at the request of the CIA, is reported to be negotiating a settlement of foreign bribery allegations against Page Airways, Inc. that would involve dismissing charges against Page and six executives for channeling \$7.5 million in illegal payments to officials in African countries, Middle East countries and Malaysia. The implication — although no public proof has been provided — is that

Page is a CIA proprietary engaged in the dirty business of corrupting other governments for CIA's own purposes, unknown to the U.S. public.

The excuse for SEC dismissal of the charges is that pursuing them would expose national security secrets. We suspect that the real issue is not the disclosure of national secrets but whether the United States, through the CIA, should be secretly trying to influence other governments by corrupt means rather than openly trying to influence them by proper means. The CIA seems to have become the modern instrument for doing by stealth and perversion what the Marines used to do openly. The military method was at least honest, even if imperialistic.

The CIA method, like the military, causes the U.S. to be hated and suspected in other countries but, unlike the military method, it also corrupts every domestic institution that it touches.

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## Harrison Salisbury sues security agency

Contending that the National Security Agency illegally intercepted and kept records on his private communications while he was a foreign correspondent, former associate editor Harrison E. Salisbury of the *New York Times* last week (April 10) filed a damage suit against the agency in District Court in Washington.

Salisbury said he discovered the interceptions after he made a Freedom of Information Act request for all CIA files and documents under his name.

After the CIA located records on Salisbury that had been initiated by the NSA, it referred Salisbury's information request to the security agency.

According to court documents, the NSA subsequently denied Salisbury's requests for the records, which they said were classified.

The American Civil Liberties Union's Center for National Security Studies filed the suit for Salisbury.


ACLU lawyer Mark Lynch said Salisbury's name may have been on an NSA "watch list" compiled in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Congressional investigations have disclosed that "watch list" targets included members of the anti-war movement, and that communications from journalists in southeast Asia were intercepted.

Salisbury was in China and North Vietnam in 1966 and 1967, and in North Korea in 1972.

In letters filed with the court, the NSA said that any records on Salisbury were developed during its lawful acquisition of foreign intelligence and did not result from an investigation of Salisbury or the *New York Times*.

The agency maintained that the information requested by Salisbury is classified and would reveal intelligence sources and methods.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH  
13 April 1980



**'This Shortcut Will Make It Easy To Bring Down The Enemy'**

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE B14THE WASHINGTON POST  
21 April 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

## Possible Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba

The latest intelligence information gathered by U.S. surveillance satellites and other sources has confronted the Carter administration with the alarming possibility that the Soviet Union is once more preparing nuclear missile sites in Cuba.

The introduction of nuclear missiles into the Russian-dominated island 90 miles from Florida took the world to the brink of war in 1962. That time, the Kremlin backed down in the face of a determined stand by President Kennedy.

But the Soviet leaders have obviously decided that Jimmy Carter is a president who can be pushed around. His sorry performance last October—when he marched up the hill and back down again over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba—coupled with his ineffectual handling of the Tehran hostage situation, may have convinced the Russians they can flout the Monroe Doctrine with impunity.

This changed attitude of the normally cautious old men in the Kremlin lends urgency to U.S. intelligence analysts' attempt to figure out the intended use of several large holes the Russians are digging near the Cuban city of Matanzas. Are they an innocent feature of a suburban housing development, or underground silos for nuclear missiles aimed at the United States?

CIA sources have told my associate Dale Van Atta that the holes are "strikingly similar" in size, shape and construction to those that house nuclear missiles in the Soviet Union. Other agency analysts are not so sure, theorizing that the holes could be part of housing construction or similarly peaceful projects.

The experts who lean toward the view that the holes are missile sites are the same ones who argued—correctly—that the Soviet brigade identified last year was a combat unit.

In support of their interpretation, these analysts point out that the construction near Matanzas, and particularly the Russians' involvement in it, are being protected by unusually strict security. The secrecy extends to the point of barricading the road that leads east from Havana to the construction area.

The mystery of the Matanzas holes is just one more ominous development in the Soviets' increasingly bold military presence in Cuba. In recent months I've reported a number of disturbing intelligence discoveries from Cuba:

- There are already two airfields on the island that can accommodate the Russians' Backfire bomber, and runways at a third field are being lengthened to the required 9,000 feet. A Defense Intelligence Agency report last year warned that the Soviets may send a detachment of the nuclear bombers to Cuba in 1980.

- Our spy satellites over Cuba have sent back pictures of a suspicious-looking building at Punta Movida, near Cienfuegos. It closely resembles the Soviets' nuclear missile storage and maintenance sheds in Eastern Europe. Some intelligence analysts caution, however, that the Cienfuegos construction, which includes a railroad line to the naval base at Punta Movida, may be simply part of a nuclear power plant the Russians are building there.

- The Soviets have been upgrading their communications equipment in Cuba, and can now conduct virtually simultaneous two-way exchanges be-

tween Havana and the Soviets' intelligence headquarters in Moscow. Havana has become the KGB's relay center for its intelligence and subversion operations in Latin America.

- Russian pilots have been flying regular reconnaissance missions from secret Cuban bases, monitoring U.S. naval movements in the Atlantic. The Russians even have an independent fighter unit flying MiG21 jets out of an airfield near Havana.

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ON PAGE 8A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
19 APRIL 1980

## U.S. reports no evidence of A-blast

By Fred S. Hoffman  
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — A government investigation has ended with experts still baffled over whether there was a clandestine nuclear test explosion over the South Atlantic last September, a senior defense official said yesterday.

The official told reporters that the White House-directed investigation of the suspected Sept. 22 nuclear explosion has "ended inconclusively."

Although experts studied between 20 and 30 different kinds of sensors, he said, they never came up with any evidence beyond an "optical flash" registered by a Vela nuclear-test detection satellite.

No "atomic residue," or fallout, was found, he said.

"We really didn't find any other indicators," said the official, who asked not to be named.

U.S. intelligence sources who reported the Vela detection last fall said at the time that they believed that South Africa might have exploded

a nuclear device in the atmosphere over a remote part of the South Atlantic.

South Africa denied it had conducted any nuclear test. The intelligence report also fueled speculation that Israel might have set off a test explosion in attempted secrecy.

The defense official indicated he has a lingering suspicion that a nuclear explosion of some sort occurred.

"I am not willing to conclude there was a nuclear burst," he said, but he added he holds a "high belief" that there was such an event.

This official, with an extensive scientific background, said the only two possibilities are that it was "an anomaly," not a nuclear explosion, or that there was a test but that "whoever conducted it did so in a clever way" to foil conclusive scientific detection.

The Vela satellite system first went into orbit in 1963. It is aimed mostly at the Northern Hemisphere because that is where the Soviet Union and China conduct tests.

The official said the United States will have a new satellite system aloft in the late 1980s that is expected to give high confidence that all atmospheric nuclear tests will be detected. That system will ride on Navstar navigation satellites, with four space vehicles aloft at all times looking at all parts of the world, he said.

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ON PAGE A2

WASHINGTON STAR  
20 APRIL 1980

## Today's People

### ■ Nixon's Back in Form

Former President Richard M. Nixon, who directed the CIA to perform some questionable deeds during his days in the White House, now says the agency has been "castrated." In an interview with the French magazine *Le Point*, Nixon said a strengthened CIA would help the nation prevent future terrorist acts such as the seizure of the American hostages in Iran. "The CIA has been castrated," he complained. "It's necessary to give operational methods back to our intelligence service... (so) it doesn't have its hands tied each time action is necessary." Nixon also took a verbal swipe at President Carter, saying that Carter was "a little naive" about the Soviet Union and that his sudden reawakening to the Soviet military threat may have been caused by election-year politics.



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THE WASHINGTON POST  
19 April 1980

## Senators Agree to Soften Stand On 'Prior Notice' of CIA Activity

In an effort to break an impasse with the Carter administration, leading members of the Senate Intelligence Committee have agreed to drop their demands for prior notice of all CIA covert operations.

The change was made in an effort to move an abbreviated legislative charter for the U.S. intelligence community to the Senate floor early next month. Congressional strategists fear that further delay would make enactment this year impossible.

Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), the chief Senate sponsor of the charter legislation, denied that the agreement on the prior-notice issue represented a "surrender" to the administration. He called it "a clarification" of "what we intended all along."

The bill will require the president to notify the House and Senate Intelligence committees "in a timely fashion" whenever "extraordinary circumstances" do not allow prior notice of covert operations.

In effect, Huddleston said, "we're trying to finesse the issue."

Huddleston and other senators had maintained that prior notice of all covert actions to at least some members of the Senate and House Intelligence committees was essential for adequate congressional oversight.

Huddleston said yesterday that neither he nor the other members of the Senate committee had ever wanted "to preclude the president's authority to act in extraordinary situations. This [new language] will make it explicit that he's got that prerogative."

NEW YORK POST  
15 APRIL 1980

# CIA saga: sad facts

By ARCHER WINSTEN

THE SAD FACT that *On Company Business* is opening for two weeks at that remote Public Theater on Lafayette St. is a disservice to the American general public and our democracy.

This is three hours of surveying international skulduggery of the notorious CIA during the past 30-odd years.

Producers Howard Dratch and Allan Francovich have assembled some stern and knowledgeable critics of the Central Intelligence Agency, such former employees as Philp Agee, Victor Marchetti and John Stockwell.

Giving the other side of the picture are CIA loyalists like Richard Helms, William Colby and David Atlee Phillips.

We are given a chance to consider the question of a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro with the aid of Mafia gangsters. Poison pills were an alternate, or a needle. At about that time President Kennedy was actually killed.

The hidden revelations continue all over the world: Chile and Allende are a target; the Brazilian shift of power is assisted; the CIA hand is busy in Angola, and we see how the Shah of Iran was shored up and Mossadegh plowed under, with the current complications now in full view to all of us. Dan Mitrione's death in Uruguay is documented, reminding one of the movie — *State of Siege* by Costa-Gavras.

The vital questions of the function of an intelligence agency, its control by Congress, and the overriding consideration of what a democracy can and should do in cut-throat international competition are all brought forth in the material here spread on the film record for some kind of decision.

It is not the province of this reviewer to argue one side or the other. There is enough ammunition to arm either side with powerful weapons. But it is certain that these are matters too germane to national survival to be decided by a few insiders, even if one of them is President of the United States and the other Secretary of State.

*On Company Business* is a documentary that should be required seeing for every responsible, thinking citizen of this country. It raises tremendous questions about our taking sides, so often on the wrong, dictator's side, so often on the side of our international corporations.

What's more, this picture's shockers are given not in a total atmosphere of anti-CIA propaganda. There is a small degree of balance, enough to allow some pause for reflection.